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Preface
“I observed that men rush to arms for slight causes, or no cause at all, and that when arms 
have once been taken up there is no longer any respect for law, divine or human. It is as if, 
in accordance with a general decree, frenzy had openly been let loose for the committing of 
all crimes”. Hugo Grotius, On The Law of War and Peace, 1625
In 1998 the State Parties to the Rome Statute established a treaty-based orga-
nization of universal character dealing with humanitarian crimes of inter-
national concern committed against civilians in conflict and post-conflict 
situations. The Rome Statute institutions are complementary to the United 
Nations system but independent from such an established international 
regime, whose aims are to facilitate the cooperation in the field of interna-
tional security, international law and human rights. The emerging regime 
of international criminal justice constitutes arguably the most significant 
reform of international law, but there is still a long way ahead for systemic 
changes in the governance of humanitarian affairs centralizing individual 
rights in intra-state conflict and post-conflict situations. It remains to be seen 
how the concept of human security would have an impact a) on the tran-
sition of international law and international security; b) on the measures 
applied on the ground by complementary international mandates; c) on the 
role of the Security Council, State sovereignty and the international gover-
nance of humanitarian escalations; and d) on the creation of new norms and 
the place of non-state actors in international law. Moreover, it is also impor-
tant to assess the evolution of universal jurisdiction, including the policy for-
mulations of global threats and further definitions of serious crimes of com-
mon concern such as the crime of aggression, including their controversial 
governance and the application of double standards in the selection of inter-
state conflict situations resulting from acts of aggression. Another aspect 
requiring attention is to avoid the use of the emerging regime of interna-
tional criminal justice as an instrument of coercive diplomacy in the context 
of peace and security maintenance by those permanent members of the UN 
Security Council (China, Russia and the US), which so far rejected the Rome 
Statute partnership, but still use it occasionally when this favors their own 
political interests. In other words, we will look at the ingredients required 
and the recipe wished, if any, while advocating for democratic governance 
systems based on the principles of global justice and the role of public inter-
national law and its institutions consolidating human security. In this study 
the intersection between politics, law and institutions complementary in 
their nature, receives an accurate analysis proposing integrated governance 
models of peace, justice and security to be applied globally.
XVIII Preface
The multidisciplinary approach of important fields such as law and global-
ization, the politics of justice and international law, including the develop-
ments in the field of human security, are absolutely required when exploring 
the construction of a global society. Much more important then is to preserve 
what remains of the concept of the nation-state, its sovereignty and gover-
nance, in the turmoil of regimes and sub-regimes led by criminal groups and 
conflicting political factions. The undemocratic and violent political transi-
tions and the complete absence of law and order characterize the disintegra-
tion of many domestic systems unwilling or unable to carry out genuinely 
their duties towards their citizens. The shorter distance between the concept 
of the nation-state, its domestic governance systems, and the international 
community monitoring internal affairs during civil wars, becomes for many 
stakeholders problematic, but it still represents an important opportunity 
to preserve fundamental individual rights. The efforts to safeguard uni-
versal values on the side with individuals and communities devastated by 
war and crime through governance structures fostering international peace, 
justice and security are absolutely worth it. The advocacy of human secu-
rity measures, including monitoring, reporting and fact finding activities 
to reveal severe violations of international humanitarian law, represents 
a paradigm shift challenging international relations. Such an advocacy is 
contrary to state-centric security policy including governance models keep-
ing the impunity regime of international crimes unchanged in several situ-
ations.
In general terms human security measures prioritize the needs of individu-
als and communities as important guarantors of sustainable peace, develop-
ment and stability. Unfortunately, in multiple and inter-linked situations, the 
failure of preventive strategies of mass atrocity crimes severely compromised 
the safety of civilians, including their fundamental individual rights. In sev-
eral countries, such as in Libya, Syria, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Uganda, Kenya, Central African Republic, Ivory Coast and Mali, civilians 
have severely paid the consequences of such failure. The costs of human lives 
after the humanitarian disaster in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Cam-
bodia are well known and indicate serious problems dealing with the causes 
and effects of war and crime. Besides, the sometimes claimed right of humani-
tarian intervention of the international community is challenged now and 
qualified by the responsibility to protect civilians in situations of mass atrocity 
crimes. Such an international norm represents an unfinished business in glob-
al politics and is considered by many far from capable of preserving the rule 
of international law. The current practice of governing the international order 
deserves analysis between the liberal vision of normative frameworks in the 
view of pluralism and its theories, and a supranational capacity from the per-
spective of constitutionalism. The preservation of the rule of law as a principle 
of governance in a world of multilevel jurisdictions requires discussions, as 
well as the advocacy of global values in international relations, such as mul-
tilateralism, collective responsibility, global solidarity and mutual account-
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ability.1 As clearly described by Delmas-Marty, “complementarity does not 
separate national from international criminal jurisdiction, nor does it put 
them in conflict with each other…”.2 The grey-zones of the complementarity 
principle, however, clearly arise in the governance of justice functioning out-
side the arrays of peace and security maintenance in conflict and post-conflict 
situations. This study deals with the impact, challenges and possible solutions 
in such governance. It proposes other options rather then the use of military 
means or military coalitions when intervening in situations of war and crime.
This study offers an overview of the challenges occurring in the emerging 
regime of international criminal justice as a tool of sustainable peace. It illus-
trates the impact of such regime in international relations focusing on the 
obstacles and concerns of its governance in the context of the maintenance 
and restoration of international peace and security. It advocates for an appro-
priate interaction strategy between the United Nations and the Rome Statute 
institutions as a matter of international mutual concern and for the sake of 
human security. The responsibility to protect cannot be considered as the 
evolution of human security. Further progress is required in the frameworks 
of governance dealing with it. In accordance with this study the political 
compromise reached in Rome contains the same controversial issues not yet 
resolved in the international legal and political order. The review conference 
of the Rome Statute in Kampala (Uganda) confirmed the challenges for such 
emerging regime to find a place in the arrays of peace and security. The polit-
ical selectivity of the Security Council responding to mass atrocity crimes, 
the political criteria to reach the resolutions of international criminal justice, 
and the application of double standards when dealing with them, are the 
main factors undermining the credibility of the so-called “narrowed” inter-
national responses during intra-state conflicts. Some would even consider 
the use of international legal processes to replace or complement acts of war 
mandated by the Security Council. With the Rome Statute, such limitations 
confronting the pursuit of peace and justice are not completely alleviated. In 
accordance with a broad and idealistic interpretation of the Rome Statute, 
however, the governance of international criminal justice could be defined as 
the response to safeguard individuals and communities in extreme conflict 
situations through the rule of law, multilateralism, collective responsibility, 
global solidarity and accountability, fighting against the regime of impunity 
of serious crimes at local, regional and international levels.
1 For an overview of the debate and the extensive literature on the issue of legal plural-
ism and globalization see R. Michaels, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’, Duke Law School Faculty 
Scholarship Series, Paper 185, 2009, accessible at: http://lsr.nellco.org/duke_fs/185 See 
also A. S. Sweet, ‘Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes’, Yale 
Law School Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 1295, 2009, accessible at: http://digitalcom-
mons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1295
2 See M. Delmas-Marty, “Interactions between National and International Criminal Law 
in the Preliminary Phase of Trial at the ICC”, Oxford Journal of International Criminal Jus-
tice, Volume 4, Issue 1, March 2006, at 2-11.
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Since 1945 the discourse around the international legal order has been 
dominated by the political role of the United Nations and its institutions. It 
needs to be noted that while the UN has been the object of significant criti-
cism, it has nevertheless played a remarkable role both in the progressive 
development and codification of international law. The Preamble of the UN 
Charter reads in part: “We the peoples of the United Nations determined to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war [...] and to establish 
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from 
treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to 
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom […]”. 
Although the Preamble is an integral part of the UN Charter, it does not set 
out any of the rights or obligations for its member States. Rather, its purpose 
is to serve as an interpretative guide for the provisions of the UN Charter 
through the highlighting of some of the core motives of the founders enforc-
ing the organization.3 In 2005 the member States of the UN General Assem-
bly embraced the responsibility to protect civilians in paragraphs 138-139 
of the Outcome Document of the so-called World Summit. In the historic 
gathering of world leaders in New York for the High-level Plenary Meeting 
of the General Assembly, the heads of States and governments reached con-
sensus on the formulation of the responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. When 
States are ‘manifestly failing’ to protect their population from mass atroc-
ity crimes and peaceful means are inadequate, the international communi-
ty would take collective action in a ‘timely and decisive manner’ through 
the Security Council and in accordance with the UN Charter and with the 
cooperation of regional organizations as appropriate.4 The emerging regime 
of international justice and leadership accountabilities, the preservation of 
human rights and international inquiries and the rehabilitation of victimized 
civilians are important tools to establish the truth and create the premises to 
protect, react and rebuild in situations of war and crime. The good governance 
of such tools contributes to sustainable peace. Obviously, such an impor-
tant shift in the international politics of mass atrocies deserves attention at 
the present and in the years to come. The governance of global regimes of 
complementary character and the dilemma of human security are concepts 
requiring analysis and debate.
3 For an illuminating overview of such an approach see the  Report of the Rapporteur of 
Commission I/1 UNICO VI, 1945, at 446-7, Doc. 944 I/1/34(1). See also L. Gross, ‘The 
Charter of the United Nations and the Lodge Reservations’, 41 AJIL 3, 1947, at 531.
4 UN General Assembly, Sixtieth Session, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/RES/
60/1, 2005, para. 138 and 139.
Thesis Outlook
This thesis explores the governance of global regimes fostering peace, justice 
and security in extreme situations of war and crime. It examines the quest 
of complementarity between international frameworks of governance and the 
dilemma of human security measures applied in the practice on the ground 
in conflict and post-conflict situations. It debates the challenges, obstacles 
and concerns in the governance of peace operations, law enforcement and 
civilian protection duties. It argues about the meaning of international 
humanitarian escalations of last resort under the flag of civilian protection 
duties. It debates the requirement of a political road map centralizing civil-
ian protection duties in collapsed societies. It examines the governance of 
international mandates in the field operations not being appropriately inte-
grated between them, and which obviously lose part of their effectiveness. 
The analysis of the humanitarian escalations of last resort between comple-
mentary global regimes and their impact in the field operations is central for 
new policy orientations. The presence of both the United Nations and the 
International Criminal Court; the configuration of international mandates 
on the ground; the deployment of peace enforcement operations; the investi-
gations and prosecutions of mass atrocity crimes are interdendent resources. 
They deserve accurate risk assessments for the sake of civilians in multiple 
situations. These global tools have the potential to improve human secu-
rity expectations in situations of war and crime. There is, however, a long 
way ahead. After a decade of the Court’s existence and activity the practice 
demonstrates the needs for integration, harmonization and consolidation 
between the two global regimes of complementary character.
The preliminary part of this study addresses serious concerns in the institu-
tional and normative decentralization characterizing the emerging regime 
of justice falling under the Rome Statute. It also emphasizes the theories of 
‘statehood’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘governance’ and the urgent requirement of 
political convergence on sensitive issues. The introduction argues that due 
to the absence of a supranational organization for the implementation of the 
emerging regime of justice at domestic, regional and international levels the 
harmonization between so defined multilateral, global, universal, comple-
mentary international governance institutions involved in conflict and 
post-conflict situations is fundamental. The global interactions based on the 
rule of law, multilateralism, collective responsibility, global solidarity and 
mutual accountability wait to be translated in governance mechanisms at 
disposition of the international community, finding remedies for a consistent 
evolution of international relations in the post-cold war. In order to reach 
democratic standards in such interactions the independence and authority 
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of justice is a basic requirement for human security. It should be time for 
the nation-states to choose between maintaining the Charter of the United 
Nations as drafted after WWII, or to consider radical changes regulating 
human security issues. The main challenge is whether consensus can be 
found on a road map fostering peace, justice and security dealing with the 
criminal accountability of States and individuals during armed conflicts. 
The aspects of protective, retributive and restitutive justice require further 
application at domestic, regional and international levels. In order to verify 
the current evolution or devolution of these aspects, the first part of this the-
sis debates the quest of complementarity and the dilemma of human security 
in conflict and post-conflict situations. The second part elucidates some of 
the challenges, obstacles and concerns in the governance of complementa-
ry global regimes and the necessity of political convergence. The third part 
deals with the humanitarian escalations of last resort and their governance 
in the field operations and offers the concluding assessment deriving from 
the case studies selected.
The introduction of this thesis clarifies the statement of the problem, the 
research questions, the purpose of the research and the methodology used. 
It debates on the nature of the current architecture of governance and the 
limits of complementary global regimes dealing with international threats 
and crimes. It is of fundamental importance to question the impact of inter-
national humanitarian escalations and the role of the United Nations and 
the International Criminal Court responding to mass atrocities and crime 
prevention, firstly verifying theories, principles, current practice, and sec-
ondly, finalizing recommendations useful to maximize the results with 
defined mechanisms upholding the human security doctrine. The principles 
and theories upholding the expectations of human security characterize the 
journey of this thesis. However, this work does not solve the grey-zones still 
prevailing in the conceptualization of human security. This concept requires 
policy implementations and governance models between global regimes 
of complementary character. The theoretical uncertainties in the concept 
of human security could be solved by concrete actions in the governance 
of complementary global regimes. For such governance it is important to 
remind the background information of the causes of war and crime which 
have devastating consequences on nation-states, regional and international 
organizations, communities and individuals. The complementary char-
acter of the UN and the Rome Statute institutions should be based on the 
human security doctrine. In order to clarify the meaning of this concept the 
thesis examines the Rome Statute institutional framework and the interac-
tion background between the United Nations and the International Criminal 
Court, answering questions related to the interdependence of peace, justice 
and security in the field operations, and the necessity to improve measures 
of human security such as protection, relocation, reparation and rehabilita-
tion of civilians victimized by serious crimes of common concern. This study 
demonstrates that further efforts are required by decision-makers for the 
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conceptualization of human security and its expectations. Political conver-
gence is further required about jurisdictional extensions and complementar-
ity for the governance of international threats and crimes destabilizing peace 
and security.
There is a significant amount of evidence to suggest that both internal insta-
bility and State fragility significantly increase the commission of atrocity 
crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, includ-
ing the flight of refugees spreading from single to multiple States, causing 
regional and large scale instability. However, the policy approach about 
international humanitarian interventions in fragile States are fragmented, 
decentralized and the priorities not harmonized with early warning and 
early action. Obviously, the current international legal frameworks reflect 
such discrepancies and need to be challenged with political convergence. 
Besides, the global governance of war and crime requires reliable models, 
systems and institutions updated to the challenges of the time. The judicial 
outcomes pointing out crimes and perpetrators are not used for the config-
uration of international mandates of law enforcement on the ground. The 
accountability system of international crimes does not receive sufficient sup-
port in order to strengthen its deterrent effect in conflict and post-conflict 
situations. In situations of conflict breaking out since the end of the bipolar 
world order, which left unresolved the main causes in the majority of such 
conflicts, civilians have been the greatest victims of warfare. In particular 
women and children, who are often the targets in times of violence and have 
been severely used as a weapon of war. In such context, law enforcement 
and civilian protection duties wait to receive a place in the fight against the 
impunity of international crimes and within the arrays of peace and security 
maintenance keeping alive the links of reconstruction and development.
The country-situations in Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and East Asia are 
impressive examples where ethno-political conflicts show dramatic statis-
tics. In the African Great Lakes Region for instance, the political crisis and 
the continuing violence between different factions involved in political tran-
sitions, the establishment of a war economy and militarized regimes and the 
impunity of serious crimes of common concern are the only realities identi-
fied through reliable empirical data. The analysis of such data demonstrates 
that global regimes are not yet entirely able to cure the causes of warfare. 
However, they can have an impact at least on the effects in the short and 
middle terms, while developing the capacity to act on the causes in the long 
term. In order to accomplish such a model of governance an expansion of 
complementarity between established and emerging global regimes is abso-
lutely required for the sake of the human security doctrine. The UN deploy-
ment of robust peacekeeping in the field operations for instance, should per-
form civilian protection duties hosting and complementing the investigative 
activities of the International Criminal Court in both referrals and non-refer-
rals activities of the Security Council. The States non-parties to the Rome 
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Statute should be bound and be engaged through their UN membership. In 
the current reality of humanitarian escalations the regime of international 
criminal justice falling under the Rome Statute functions without any power 
of police and law enforcement on its own, but depends from the cooperation 
from its States Parties and relevant stakeholders, such as the United Nations. 
Therefore, global strategies are absolutely required to prevent, react and 
rebuild situations of war and crime in accordance with the rule of law, mul-
tilateralism, collective responsibility, global solidarity and mutual account-
ability. This thesis approaches the politics of international law and the views 
of future law, or de lege ferenda, as opposed to de lege lata, or the law as it cur-
rently exists. It examines the controversial debate between the consolidation 
of global values in the constitution of the world community against plural-
istic legal frameworks based on decentralized laws and institutions far from 
offering sustainable peace in situations of war and crime.
This study focuses on the longstanding debate to manage, maintain and 
restore peace and justice centralizing the protection of civilians in situations 
of war and crime. It advocates for solutions in the shortcomings of inter-
action between complementary global regimes fighting against the impu-
nity of crimes of international concern, while offering sustainable peace 
in extremely violent conflict zones, before, during and after civil wars. It 
emphasizes the priority of implementing measures of human security in 
conflict and post-conflict situations with an integrated approach of gover-
nance of peace and justice. It clarifies the concept of global justice and its 
retributive, protective and restitutive aspects which are undermined by the 
shortcomings of political engagements, international responsibilities and 
constitutional adjustments reflecting international, regional and nation-
al realities. This study explores the nexus between law and politics in the 
emerging regime of justice debating models of governance to secure the rule 
of law in a system of multilevel jurisdictions. It emphasizes the international 
political convergence required, and still missed, and the role of international 
law promoting the consolidation between complementary global regimes 
based on cooperation. It proposes an insight of international criminal justice 
and the role of public international law to promote it. It debates feasible solu-
tions on structural, normative and operational issues implementing the gov-
ernance of justice in conflict and post-conflict societies in accordance with 
the human security doctrine. The more general purpose of this study is to 
verify the progress of public international law and its multilateral premises 
dealing with war and crime according to the challenges of the time. It offers 
an extensive analysis of the paradigms in the making of complementary 
international governance institutions fostering human security in multiple 
situations, providing some direction on the way to formulate de lege ferenda.
The rise of the Rome Statute system represented a shift from State-centric 
political positions to the claims coming from civil society organizations. 
However, it still struggles to find its place in the system for the maintenance 
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or restoration of international peace and security. The establishment of a 
permanent International Criminal Court was pressured by civil society to 
decision-makers in order to centralize the role of the victims during judicial 
proceedings fighting against the impunity of serious crimes. The political 
compromise that has been reached so far in regard to the Court’s position 
in peace and security mandates still characterizes its limits. The governance 
of international criminal justice requires risk assessments which cannot be 
limited only to the Court’s activities. Such governance requires global con-
siderations on the ways international regimes would become complemen-
tary. The main considerations are listed and examined in this work. From 
a broader perspective this study clarifies the main challenges and opportu-
nities of regulatory frameworks fostering human security. The interaction 
between complementary global regimes is seen as an important tool in order 
to build up the basic premises of global justice for the advancement of sus-
tainable peace, human development and for the protection of human rights. 
It is fundamental to define preventive measures between global regimes 
of complementary character before mass atrocity crimes would occur. It is 
important to reflect on reliable response mechanisms applicable during the 
humanitarian escalations of last resort characterized by extreme violence and 
violations falling under international law, including measures applicable in 
the context of rehabilitation, reparation and humanitarian assistance to the 
victims of war and crime.
The human security doctrine which has developed in the last couple of 
decades deserves further application of its concept even with the difficulties 
incurred in our globalized world. The rule of international law would profit 
from such an approach evolving in the centralization of individuals. It is 
important to measure the standards of complementary interactions between 
the relevant actors centralizing individuals in global matters. The member 
States of multilateral treaties have still the protective responsibility towards 
civilians in their own territories and jurisdictions, while the international 
community is in charge of preventing, reacting, and rebuilding situations of 
war and crime. Models of capacity-building are required in the absence of 
the nation-state and its disintegration, including the nation-state formation 
moved by political oppositions based on violence and controversial domes-
tic governance such as corruption, autocracy and armed conflicts and the 
constant risk that the perpetrators of serious crimes would offend the digni-
ty of human lives. Besides, that the basic rights of civilians would be violat-
ed, or they would be taken as the hostage during violent political transitions, 
and with the range of crimes committed by the perpetrators simply remain-
ing unpunished. The governance of peace, justice and security is examined 
in the three parts of this study providing an assessment of law enforcement, 
civilian protection and other urgent issues waiting for solutions. This study 
attempts to define the meaning of complementary global regimes in accor-
dance with the UN Charter and the Rome Statute. The progress of interna-
tional law and its institutions centralizing fundamental individual rights 
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requires with no doubts further political convergence and advocacy. The 
many and real challenges to reach sustainable peace in situations of war and 
crime demonstrate the necessity of a political road map to define, design and 
manage global regimes of complementary character. In this study the search 
and formulation of political convergence on these issues is considered a very 




This study debates the ways complementary global regimes are currently 
empowered and governed in the field operations, and emphasizes the con-
stant risk of reducing the effect of their respective peace and justice efforts, 
if appropriate interactions are not settled and political convergence is not 
finally found. This study argues that the emerging regime of internation-
al criminal justice is still missing the support of regional and international 
organizations, which are important at the same extent of nation-states for 
the sake of human security. The good governance of such sensitive issues 
might shorten the links in the preservation of individual rights. The civilian 
protection measures entail additional competence, which requires further 
institutional design, including resources and know-how about the victims 
of war. Besides, the priority should be given to sensitive issues waiting for 
solution, offering a well-defined place of the Rome Statute regime in global 
governance systems dealing with individual rights in conflict and post-con-
flict situations. Both the States and the complementary tools at disposition 
of the international community need substantial reforms in order to respect, 
protect and fulfil the right of the victims of human rights violations to an 
effective civilian protection remedy. In the end, the establishment of an inde-
pendent international judiciary is only a halfway step to prevent, react and 
rebuild conflict and post-conflict situations, including the range of crimes 
deriving from them.
This study is very cautious about the claim that nation-states would have a 
legal ‘right’ to intervene with military operations under the ‘flag’ of civilian 
protection duties. After all, the use of force is essentially prohibited under 
international law and this is not the only tool to stop mass atrocity crimes. 
But how does the emerging regime of international criminal justice falling 
under the Rome Statute, currently receive a place in the arrays of peace and 
security maintenance? How are violent internal political transitions gov-
erned at global scale? Is the international society more human, more secure, 
and more peaceful with the complementary tools currently at disposition? 
And which is its current ability to take care of serious breaches of human 
rights? This work approaches the distinction between the concepts of legal-
ity and power in the absence of checks and balances systems monitoring the 
‘right’ of humanitarian intervention, and the paradigm shift of civilian pro-
tection duties. It offers reflections on the important role of complementary 
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International Threats and Crimes
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global regimes to mitigate such fields when intervening with their activi-
ties in the domestic jurisdictions of ‘failed’ States. The advocacy expressed in 
this study is that statehood, sovereignty and governance deserve to remain 
central in the current debates dealing with the fight against international 
threats and crimes and the developments of human security.
In the context of intra-state and inter-state conflicts, or also referred as armed 
conflicts of international and non-international character, the question is how 
the international community develops the capacity-building to deal with 
both these conflict categories. In situations of war and crime the causes and 
the disastrous effects on civilians require reliable deterrent tools. In the past 
two decades most wars have taken the form of intra-state conflicts. Some of 
their causes derived from the competition to patronize resources and lands, 
have been triggered by political and economic transitions, by ineffective gov-
ernance and by corruption and undemocratic inequalities. In broad terms, 
the main cause of the disintegration of the nation-states and their struggle 
to retain a place in the global society are not self-sufficient elements to pre-
vent the commission of mass atrocity crimes. The majority of intra-state con-
flicts are still holding the causes and effects of the post-colonial formation 
of nation-states at the expenses of civilians.1 The cruelty and brutality with 
which intra-state conflicts are fought and the difficulties to have deterrent 
systems in place against them are partly due to the use of child soldiers and 
gender crimes, the privatization of warfare, and the presence of non-state 
actors such as the use of paramilitary forces. The frameworks of governance 
in place dealing with them are characterized by a myriad of gaps. The causes 
rooted in societies devastated by war and crimes have as the negative effects: 
the regime of impunity, the unstable and unrepresentative political institu-
tions, the poor infrastructure in domestic governance systems and the abun-
dance of cheap weapons and porous borders.
The view expressed in this study is that violent intra-state transitions require 
models of capacity-building rather than support with military operations, 
which should remain neutral and focus on civilian protection duties. The 
military intervention in Libya represents a bad example of the practice of 
civilian protection measures applied collectively. Bad decisions and bad gov-
ernance destabilise the tools at disposition by the international community 
and deserve to be challenged. The problem is not only what makes account-
ability more or less feasible and what strategies are deployed by comple-
mentary global regimes to achieve visible results on the ground. Another 
requirement is the recognition of the responsibility to constantly review 
and reform, enhancing the role of regional institutions in the formulation 
of peace and security policies, which still focus on State security, rather than 
human security. Another requisite refers to the constitutional adjustments in 
1 On the legal and political distinction between tribes and races, see, M. Mamdani, When 
Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and Genocide in Rwanda, 2001.
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order to maximize the results of humanitarian interventions on the ground 
in conflicts and post-conflict situations, while also preserving the interna-
tional legal and political order centralizing fundamental individual rights 
in global affairs and civilian protection measures. The UN Charter needs 
amendments including a democratization process of its institutions. This is 
a fragmentary process that still requires solutions. It has been advocated for 
too long and deserves at least to remain at such, particularly in the context of 
conflict prevention, use of force and large scale escalations of serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law.
1.2 The determinations required by institutions, policy and law
In this study, the following issues are extensively discussed from several legal 
and political perspectives: the design, definition and the governance of global 
regimes in the post-cold war era; the international governance institutions 
deriving from such global regimes; the transition of international security, the 
preservation of human security globally, and the responses to global threats 
based on collective efforts; the governance of international threats, and the 
challenges for international criminal justice in the arrays of peace and secu-
rity, namely about the measures for its maintenance and restoration. This 
analytical work measures the standards of effectiveness of the tools already 
at disposition of the international community, assessing the governance gaps 
and the priority to maximize their impact at domestic, regional and interna-
tional levels. The approach in this study is that complementary global regimes 
fostering human security have to be prepared to respond to a) the abuses of 
fundamental individual rights and freedoms compromised by the coercions 
of political leaders and warlords; b) the exploitations of children and women 
in times of violence and war; c) the trafficking of weapons and drug trade; 
including d) all other dysfunctions of domestic governance such as abuse 
of power and corruption. These international threats, and the crimes deriv-
ing from them, characterize the reality in several countries in the complete 
absence of domestic governance systems able to respond to severe violations 
of international humanitarian principles and laws. With regard to the formu-
lation of international security policies for instance, there are serious doubts 
about the approach of the US, as permanent members of the Security Council, 
and Israel, that failed States are the source of the most serious international 
threats and crimes. Such an approach by the decision-making in peace and 
security maintenance is contested in this study. After all, it is evident that 
fragile, or so-called ‘failed’ States are mainly a real threat for their own citi-
zens, and that State ‘failure’ and international security, are not necessarily the 
two faces of the same coin.2 In order to offer some background useful for the 
reader, and further clarify the analysis performed in the several parts of this 
2 See P. M. Stewart, Weak Links. Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, Oxford 
University Press, May 2011.
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study, both preliminary remarks and section outlines will appear in every 
chapter and sections. The purpose is to shed some light on the conceptual 
orientations expressed in the topics and the theoretical tools used in the argu-
mentations.
In the international political circles the approach of the responsibility to pro-
tect norm diverges between the search of mechanisms of prevention and ear-
ly warnings and military response, and the use of force in case of mass atroc-
ity crimes. A wider reflection is that the Security Council would remain in 
charge of nearly all mechanisms of enforcement available, while from a theo-
retical perspective multilateral forces should be used for emerging regimes 
attempting to stabilize law and order in situations of mass atrocity crimes 
such as the Rome Statute. As far as premature it could be considered, this 
study debates whether there would be harmonization of such issues in the 
UN Charter as the constitution of the world community, and if, there would 
be ever a role of international criminal justice in humanitarian interventions, 
and if yes, how such role would be. It is important to examine the progress 
of complementary global regimes and the intersection between world politics 
and international law, including possible measures of human security to be 
found in the interaction strategies of international governance institutions. 
This study recalls the necessity of an appropriate strategy, combining the 
responsibility to protect civilians in conflict and post-conflict societies with 
the determination to put an end to the impunity of mass atrocity crimes. Sev-
eral documents have been analysed to verify the status quo of such a strat-
egy at governmental, regional and global levels especially with regard to the 
armed conflicts occurring in the African Great Lakes Region and the concerns 
of the African Union during the instability of peace and security spreading 
in the African continent, including the political unrest and the violence on 
civilians spreading in the Middle East and Asia, and further political sup-
port required by the EU and the Latin America group of States to the emerg-
ing regime of international criminal justice falling under the Rome Statute.
The empowerment and public authority of international governance institu-
tions dealing with global threats and crimes persist to be problematic for the 
reasons examined in this study. Therefore, the ways global actors interact 
with each other deserve to be questioned. If we only consider the minimal 
resources allocated to them, the expectations to respond to the current break-
downs in domestic jurisdictions affected by war and crime are very high. 
First, the international governance institutions have to rely on the support 
and cooperation of governments. Second, in order to maximize the results 
in conflict and post-conflict situations the interaction between them is cen-
tral for democratic governance, but not less problematic. A political road map 
represents an important opportunity finding suitable solutions fostering 
peace and justice in the context of human security. The interaction between 
the accountability mechanisms and the responsibilities to protect individ-
uals require further international efforts from the relevant political actors. 
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When the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) defined the responsibility to protect, identified a responsibility to 
‘prevent’; a responsibility to ‘react’; and a responsibility to ‘rebuild’. Thus, spe-
cific responsibilities before, during, and after the humanitarian escalations 
would occur.3 Unfortunately, the interaction between complementary global 
regimes does not reflect sustainable model of prevention, international assis-
tance and capacity-building applicable during intra-state conflict. The politi-
cal forces engaged in the implementation of the regime of international jus-
tice are still delaying to prioritize the law enforcement of judicial decisions 
and the civilian protection duties in the field. The ability to ‘prevent’, ‘react’ 
and ‘rebuild’ situations affected by war and crime requires comprehensive 
programs of reconstruction, support of electoral systems, rule of law and 
justice sector reforms (army, police and judiciary). Therefore, all possible 
donors have to be mobilized as well as academics and civil society.
The occurrence of the emerging regime of justice in the context of peace and 
security and the potential, whether still latent, to stimulate the moderniza-
tion of the tools (and mechanisms) at disposition by the world communi-
ty, such as the UN system, will need further investigation. It is too soon to 
speculate on these sensitive governance issues of the international society 
and their transition. At this moment in time, however, the initiation of the 
public administration of international criminal justice simply struggles to 
find its place in the arrays of peace and security. The outcome deriving from 
such initial struggle should not be delayed any longer and receive visibility 
through primary (UN Charter, Rome Statute) and secondary law (UN-ASP 
legislation) including arrangements and agreements in the field missions. 
This study indicates that the current political discussions are characterized 
by some degree of theoretical shortcomings, constraints and speculations at 
national level, including ultra vires interpretation of the treaty-law, which 
received extensive legal research since the establishment of the Rome Stat-
ute. The global governance issues which are at the core of these arguments 
do not receive any progress if we also consider the weak shift and decentral-
ization of the treaty-based bodies preserving human rights under the UN 
umbrella and their liaison with the Rome Statute regime. It is agreed that the 
UN Charter represents the crystallization of an era that does not apply well 
to the contemporary international society. Its institutions reflect such disso-
luteness instead of evaluating the needs of the time and responding to them. 
3 In 2005 the political imperatives of the UN World Summit Outcome declared that “each 
individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the pre-
vention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international 
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsi-
bility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability”. See 
the Report of the UN Secretary-General, Implementing the responsibility to protect, UN doc. 
A/63/677, (2009).
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In any case, the UN democratization should be considered as a process that 
would in the first place enhance its capacities, tasks, duties and responsibili-
ties.4 The purpose of such process should avoid any possibility for some of 
its members to profit or acting far away, or shaping at their own advantage 
universal premises fostering peace, justice and human security. In this way, 
the interaction between complementary global actors would bring innova-
tion in their competence, duty and knowledge sharing.
1.3 Conflict governance, humanitarianism and global justice
The responsibility of the international community to intervene in domestic 
jurisdictions of failed States, unable or unwilling to fight against the impunity 
of serious crimes, has been established by the Rome Statute in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations. Such important accomplishment 
is absolutely not an end to itself. Much more needs to be done. Of primary 
importance is the search of a complementary place such regime would receive 
within the international legal and political order. The legal and political chal-
lenges of global humanitarianism need the attention by the decision-making 
enforcing complementary global regimes and their international governance 
institutions.5 The main assumption is that the relationship between comple-
mentary global regimes should have been settled by primary law (UN Char-
ter and Rome Statute) and not by separate ‘relationship’ agreements which 
limit the necessary implementation of governance at global level of sensi-
tive humanitarian issues. The evolution of the human security doctrine will 
need to solve such limitations in the years to come. The effectiveness of the 
Court remains to be determined and may well be hampered by having just 
slightly more than half of the members of the United Nations as signatories. 
The fact that such a tribunal was established is in itself a major accomplish-
ment. Hopefully, its presence will bring the States and the world commu-
nity closer to prosecuting international crimes and closer to the preservation 
of victim rights. There are valid reasons to explore the meaning of global 
regimes intended to be the governance tools of the international society and 
the evolution of international law for the sake of individuals. In other words, 
the progress achieved and achievable by concrete human security measures 
and human rights law. For the first time in the history of an international 
tribunal the Rome Statute centralizes the roles of victims and witnesses in 
the judicial proceedings. The security concerns of investigation and prosecu-
4 See J. Muravchik, The Future of the United Nations: Understanding the Past to Chart 
a Way Forward, 2005. See also N.J. Schrijver, “The Future of the Charter of the United 
Nations”, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 2006, 10: 1-34.
5 For the debate see the book review by T. M. Shaw of Fragile Peace: State Failure, Violence 
and Development in Crisis Regions, T. Debiel, A. Klein (eds.), 2002. The book review is to 
be found in T. M. Shaw, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 2005, Volume 12, 
Issue 3, at 128-135, accessible at: http://www.politicalreviewnet.com/polrev/reviews/
JCCM/R_0966_0879_077_1004614.asp
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tion still remain and especially in the field operations. The fight against inter-
national threats and crime deserve the support by the UN presence on the 
ground and by the political circles sponsoring it. The deployment of peace 
operations should complement the investigative activity on the ground and 
engage in civilian protection duties. But this is not the case.
This study requires multidisciplinary assessments and preliminary analysis 
before formulating pragmatic recommendations. It highlights the necessity 
to clarify the meaning of complementary duties particularly in the configu-
rations of mandates and multidimensional operations in the field in extreme 
conflict situations, and in case of serious violations of international humani-
tarian law. It focuses on the verification of global strategies of relationships 
and partnerships in order to raise a democratic architecture fostering human 
security, using the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ established global tools such as the 
United Nations and the Rome Statute institutions. This chapter clarifies fur-
ther the main theoretical approach characterizing this work, before the study 
embarks on the respective analytical assessments dealing with the intersec-
tion between international law and global politics. It clarifies the unresolved 
issues in the construction of a global architecture of governance dealing 
with intra- and inter-state conflicts and with serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law. Moreover, it contains the statement of the problem, 
the research questions, the purpose of the research, the topics to be debated 
and the methodology used, including a summary of the multidisciplinary 
approach performed in this study. It also offers further clarification of the 
meaning of complementary global regimes fostering peace and justice and the 
possible progress in their governance. It discusses the investigation required 
in order to formulate conclusions and recommendations to be addressed to 
the political organs enforcing complementary global regimes dealing with 
intra- and inter-state armed conflicts.
The fundamental rights of individuals in situations of war and crime 
deserve to be central. The emerging regime of international criminal justice 
is in need of a consolidated strategy of engagements at political, institution-
al and normative levels, not only vis-à-vis the States but also with regional 
and international stakeholders. There are no doubts that the efforts under-
taken by the States must build up an acceptable law enforcement strategy 
that would improve the regime of justice and human rights protection in 
their own domestic reality. Besides, international governance institutions of 
universal character need to be modernized according to the challenges of 
the time. Another argument is whether individual rights, specifically victim 
rights, are at the centre of such sensitive systemic issues, or the interests of 
the States are exclusively central. In other words, the attempt of this study 
is to verify whether the rule of law functions as a principle of governance 
in modern societies in both constitutional and pluralistic approaches. This 
study also underscores the political convergence required fostering peace 
and justice in the current transition of the world order.
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1.4 Integrated or disconnected global architecture of governance?
With the end of the cold war intra-state conflicts, regional instability and seri-
ous breaches of human rights have received significant international atten-
tion. This has strengthened the promotion of complementary global regimes 
as preventive tools of war and crime. The inter-state conflicts are concerned 
with regional competition and distribution of natural resources, among oth-
er reasons of nation-state formation, while the intra-state conflicts are the 
result of civil wars rooted in ethnic, religious, and violent political transi-
tions, including bad governance, autocracy and corruption. Every conflict 
situation has a particularly history and background. However, they share 
some of the same causes generating war and crime. The constant risk is that 
the devastating effects in such situations would spread at larger scale, if not 
properly dealt with. In Sub-Saharan Africa the quest for nation-building 
occurred during the independence explosion of the 1960s aimed at devel-
oping nation-states, was followed by the neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s 
and 1990s, which left behind significant capacity gaps at the domestic level, 
where civic engagement in public governance had been inexistent and civil 
wars were spreading all over the continent.6 During the past two decades, 
governance has become a key concept in the international development 
debate and policy discourse over these countries. In Africa, there has been an 
historical record of bad governance and improving it must place the African 
continent on a path of sustainable development encompassing good gover-
nance and prosperity with a consolidation of peace, security, and stability.7
In both cases of inter- and intra-state conflicts the lasting process of militari-
zation has been the cause of armed conflicts in the majority of such domes-
tic regimes. The militarization in underdeveloped countries became the 
substitute of possible progress of domestic governance institutions other 
than army.8 So said, which are the opportunities to recur to the rule of law in 
such life-threatening situations for civilians during armed conflicts? Which 
are the models of governance proposed in this particular moment of short-
6 See M. Mamdani, ‘Political Violence and State Formation in Post-Colonial Africa’, Inter-
national Development Centre Working Paper Series, Paper No.1, October 2007 acces-
sible at: http://idc.open.ac.uk/fi les/Resource/20090911_031601_2192.pdf
7 For an overview of the UN projects and research fi ndings see K. R. Hope, The UNECA 
and Good Governance in Africa, Harvard International Development Conference: Gover-
nance and Development in a Dynamic Global Environment, 2003, Boston, accessible at: 
http://www.uneca.org/dpmd/Hope_Harvard.doc For an overview of participation in 
public governance, civic engagement, and decentralization of government in the process 
of policy development, service delivery, and public accountability of institutions in Sub-
Saharan Africa see E. Armstrong, “Integrity, Transparency and Accountability in Pub-
lic Administration:”, in Ethics, Transparency and Accountability, United Nations source: 
DESA, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2005, accessible at: http://
unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan020955.pdf
8 See R. Luckham, ‘The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: A Survey 
of Literature and Issues’, in African Studies Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Sep., 1994), at 13-75.
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comings and failure of monitoring systems of war and crime at domestic, 
regional and international levels? Are the actual ‘paradigms in the mak-
ing’ of complementary governance combined with the ‘work in progress’ of 
global values (such as the rule of law, multilateralism, collective responsi-
bility, global solidarity and mutual accountability), contributing further to 
the development of the international society dealing with global threats and 
crimes? Besides, how should a universal jurisdiction be enforced, in order 
to have an impact simultaneously on the causes and effects of mass atrocity 
crimes in domestic and regional realities? And last but not least, how are the 
current humanitarian escalations dealt with by international governance 
institutions of universal character? Obviously, finding the responses to such 
sensitive questions requires looking at the transition of the institutional con-
tours of international law, including the political convergence required by 
the formulation of a road map of governance fostering peace diplomacy, jus-
tice and human rights. This study performs such a task, among other tasks.9
The political agenda to fight against international threats and crimes reflects 
a couple of important aspects which may influence the current interna-
tional legal and political order according to the challenges of the time. Such 
an agenda would primarily depend on the determination of the political 
organs enforcing complementary global regimes fostering peace, justice and 
security, and secondly depend on the implementation of norms universal-
ly recognized in domestic jurisdictions and national constitutions, includ-
ing the important role of regional political entities and civil society. The 
fight against threats and crimes needs further implementation in domestic, 
regional and international frameworks, which require assistance by interna-
tional governance institutions in accordance with the politics of transition 
in conflict and post-conflict societies. The problem is that the governance 
of global threats, such as the intra-state warfare, the spreading of regional 
conflicts and mass atrocity crimes, the military exploitation of humans and 
resources, the bad governance and corruption, the drug trafficking, the ter-
rorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction, suffers from systemic 
breakdowns at social, economic and political levels, including the short-
comings of nation-states to comply with international law and multilateral 
approaches. Besides, some of these global threats do not receive any crime 
definition and are still in the way of being digested by global politics. It is 
required to look at the ways international regimes have been enforced and 
are currently governed, focusing on the meaning of their complementary 
role and their possible evolutions in the fight against international threats 
and crimes. Now that serious violations of international humanitarian law 
9 For relevant studies providing some conceptual defi nition of governance see M. Bevir, 
Key Concepts in Governance, 2009. See T. Weiss, “Governance, good governance and 
global governance: Conceptual and actual challenges”, Third World Quaterly, Volume 21, 
Issue 5, 2000, at 795. See also R. Falk, On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Poli-
tics: The World Order Models Project Report of the Global Civilization Initiative, 1995.
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are categorized as disturbing international peace and security, they require 
further responsibilities at domestic, regional and international levels. Fur-
ther legal research is also required on common and shared responsibilities 
of intergovernmental entities, their competence and know-how, including 
the transition of the responsibilities of international organizations and the 
implementation of new fields of law such as international administrative law.
In theory, the governance of international regimes fighting against war and 
crime is based on the principles of the rule of law, multilateralism, collec-
tive responsibility, global solidarity and mutual accountability. There are no 
doubts that these principles of governance promote social progress, human 
rights, and the achievement of world peace. Within the current international 
legal and political order urgent solutions are required in the short, middle 
and long term balancing the ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention and its 
transition to the ‘responsibility’ to protect civilians with every means. Legal 
frameworks are required preserving fundamental individual rights, while 
extending the criminal accountabilities equally when dealing with the inter-
national crimes characterizing conflict and post-conflict situations. The 
preservation of the rule of law has the potential to impact order and sta-
bility in transition societies, while also retaining universal values shared by 
the world community. However, the ways international humanitarian law 
and human rights law may provide a relevant legal framework applicable 
in situations not qualifying as an armed conflict is still not clear, including 
the accountability mechanisms, law enforcement, and civilian protection 
measures in conflict and post-conflict situations. The historical, political 
and legal factors of such lacuna are extensively examined in the struggle 
to achieve a democratic architecture based on human security. In order to 
measure the aspects of democratic governance, further research would still 
be required per situation, keeping in mind that a perfect analytical formula 
does not exist, while the theory offers valuable principles for the policy for-
mulation to prevent, react and rebuild in conflict and post-conflict situations.10
10 According to the Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon and the report released by the Interna-
tional Commission of on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), these are the three 
pillars of the R2P. The responsibility to protect (R2P or RtoP) is a UN initiative established 
in 2005. It consists of an emerging norm, or set of principles, based on the idea that sov-
ereignty is not a right, but a responsibility. R2P focuses on preventing and halting four 
crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, which it 
places under the generic umbrella term of, Mass Atrocity Crimes. The Responsibility to Pro-
tect has three pillars. 1. A State has a responsibility to protect its population from mass 
atrocities; 2.The international community has a responsibility to assist the State to fulfi l 
its primary responsibility; 3. If the State fails to protect its citizens from mass atrocities 
and peaceful measures have failed, the international community has the responsibility to 
intervene through coercive measures such as economic sanctions. Military intervention 
would be considered as the last resort option. See the Report of the ICISS and State Sov-
ereignty, 2001, accessible at: http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf For 
relevant positions in this debate see also T. Weiss, ‘The Sunset of Humanitarian Interven-
tion: The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era’, Security Dialogue, 2004, Vol. 35, issue 2.
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1.5 Statement of the problem
The establishment of an international judicial institution responsible to ver-
ify on a case by-case basis when serious international humanitarian crimes 
committed by individuals would fall within the competence of domestic 
judicial authorities, and when an international judiciary would be required, 
is a visible accomplishment advocated for ages. The important paradigm 
shift refers to governing the transitional challenges characterizing massive 
humanitarian escalations in conflict and post-conflict situations, between the 
responsibility to protect civilians and the fight against the impunity of inter-
national crimes. In the current legislation of the United Nations, the civilian 
protection duties are associated to the maintenance of peace and security 
and to the right of intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign States for 
humanitarian reasons, extending further the reach of a criminal jurisdiction 
to punish the perpetrators of serious crimes of common concern. The shift 
throughout the humanitarian intervention doctrine, including the ex-post 
capacity of international judicial institutions and ad hoc tribunals established 
by the Security Council, and the transition to the notion of the responsibility 
to protect and human security doctrine, including the ex-ante capacity of the 
International Criminal Court using its proprio motu powers, requires reliable 
models of governance. Empirical verifications indicate that the humanitar-
ian intervention by States or military coalitions, if not occasionally illegal, 
was often attributable to political or economic interests, rather than human 
rights, or based on global solidarity. The political responsibilities and the 
legal accountabilities of such actors wait to be further fulfilled. This explicit-
ly means that the architecture of governance of complementary global regimes 
simply depends on the political convergence of several important issues 
which are discussed in this study. The most important of which is the exten-
sion of accountabilities when fundamental individual rights are violated, 
including the implementation of civilian protection duties.
The legal frameworks based on cooperation are characterized by several 
shortcomings of compliance and require responsibilities in the political con-
figurations of mandates deployed in the field operations including their 
legal accountabilities. The complementarity principle intended to delimit 
domestic and international responsibilities is not applied in the delimita-
tion of competence between international public authorities involved in 
the humanitarian escalations of so-called ‘last resort’. The international 
responsibilities and the forms of accountabilities of non-state actors are not 
yet defined when intervention in mass atrocities occurs and since interna-
tional crimes are committed. In many situations, the political configuration 
of mandates on the ground takes in consideration, on the one hand, only 
the compromised position of the local government without even verifying 
whether the peace negotiations are taking place with the individuals most 
responsible of the crimes. On the other hand, the judicial activity in the field 
should not be paralyzed by peace processes and negotiations. In the major-
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ity of these situations the right timing and the unity of intents of such global 
actors involved in mass atrocities are seriously compromised. Moreover, vic-
tim rights and civilian protection duties are still waiting for reliable models 
applicable on the ground. Another issue, which is not considered a marginal 
one, refers to the internal regime of accountabilities in the UN when peace 
forces deployed would also commit unlawful acts. Thus, international politi-
cal responsibilities and legal accountabilities are in transition and require 
both legal and political debate based on accurate findings provided by 
research projects in the field of international law, international relations and 
peace and security studies.
From an empirical perspective, it is still not verified whether international 
criminal justice would have an impact on the maintenance and restoration 
of international peace and security, while its complementary role with politi-
cal global regimes is in transition and deserves attention. It is important to 
provide assessments of the peacekeeping operations and the configuration 
of security mandates on the ground, considering the presence of comple-
mentary global actors which are responsible at the same extent to preserve 
acceptable standards of human security, such as the United Nations and the 
Rome Statute institutions. Another aspect relates to the challenges of peace 
enforcement, collective security and humanitarian interventions, including 
their accountabilities in democratic governance systems. In order to govern 
such issues substantive reforms are required, if not, such governance would 
only be based on legal controversy and political impasse. This study looks at 
the political dilemma deriving from the past, which shaped the formulation 
of the legal frameworks visible in the present. Policy formulation and legal 
issues characterize the governance of complementary global regimes which 
still function without international governance institutions updated to the 
challenges of the time, while acting in a decentralized system of governance. 
Many analysts, throughout the verification of empirical data, proved that 
“democracy is the form of government least likely to kill its citizens, and that 
democracies do not wage war against each other”.11 Thus, in which ways are 
complementary global regimes able to contribute to the theory of democrati-
zation of societies, at domestic, regional, and international levels?
In the last decade, the inquiries of legality of the ‘right’ of humanitarian 
intervention in international law received valuable and extensive scholar-
ly analysis. The risk of ‘unilateral’ humanitarian intervention for instance, 
derived from the failure of the collective security system established after 
the WWII and was characterized by the delegating role of the UN Security 
Council to military ad hoc coalitions as the only alternative to the inaction 
in case of mass atrocity crimes. In the post-cold war era and with the adop-
tion of the Rome Statute, the shift of civilian protection duties deserves dis-
11 R. J. Rummel, Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence, 1997, at 11.
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cussion in order to centralize individuals in conflict and post-conflict situa-
tions, extending the accountabilities of the criminal leaderships and major 
perpetrators, while monitoring the impunity regime of domestic jurisdic-
tions in the conflict and post-conflict phases. The paradigm shift between 
the concept of international security and human security is in transition and 
deserves attention, including the serious shortcomings of law enforcement 
after the judicial outcomes based on supranational rules. The practice of the 
responsibility to protect civilians on the ground deserves assessments, not 
only for the military responses authorized and for the forces deployed in 
the field such as peacekeepers, but also for other complementary actors of the 
United Nations such as the International Criminal Court, which also strug-
gles with protection measures of witnesses and victims of serious humani-
tarian breaches of international law. For the International Criminal Court, 
and in accordance with its ex-ante character, the ideal would be receiving 
support before, during, and after the human security concerns would arise 
in violent conflict and post-conflict situations. But this is an idea not realised, 
and probably it will never do. If we look at the political distance taken by 
some relevant States and regional entities from the Rome Statute, it would 
be accurate to refer to an impasse in the design of a governance structure 
of complementary character. This study analyzes the strengths and weak-
nesses of complementary international regimes and proposes reforms in order 
to respond to the spreading of intra-state conflicts, and the commission of 
serious crimes deriving from them, including the international responses in 
inter-state armed conflicts which governance is still in a state of uncertainty 
(e.g. aggression).
There are no doubts that national jurisdictions have the first responsibility 
fighting against the impunity of mass atrocity crimes. If we only consider 
the first decade of existence of the Rome Statute and the outcomes of its first 
review, the concern is not only related to finding remedies of cooperation 
by implementing national legislations, but also on the way the Rome Stat-
ute institutions and the UN interact and work together. In order to clarify 
the obstacles in the interaction between the United Nations and the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, this study also reports a) on the institutional and nor-
mative decentralization and fragmentation of the international legal order; 
b) on the current status of the governance of international criminal justice 
complementing the maintenance of peace and security at global level; and 
c) on the multidimensional character of international mandates, including 
the operational gaps on the ground, where both organizations are involved. 
In theory, when intervening in the domestic affairs of ‘failed’ States the col-
lective effort to implement the effectiveness of complementary global regimes 
refers to the nexus between politics and law in the field of human security 
and humanitarian protection. The concept of complementary global regimes, 
one based on the evolution of world politics and the other exclusively legal 
based on its judicial character, deserves analysis and discussion. The legal 
and political analysis of their interaction offers valid considerations for the 
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governance of peace and justice and threats and crimes. In other words, the 
opportunities for further progress of international law, finding applicable 
measures of human security and law enforcement cooperation in case of 
serious violations of international humanitarian law during armed conflicts 
all of them require debate. With the advent of the Rome Statute it is acknowl-
edgeable that there is the opportunity for States without armed forces to rely 
on the rule of law contributing to the transition of security in their domestic 
governance, which undeniably requires a deeper humanitarian perspective. 
The regime of justice falling under the Rome Statute is a vital component 
of this transition. However, considering the political standpoints of relevant 
States opting out from such multilateral regime, there seems to be hardly 
any determination to design a system of governance based on the account-
abilities of the States and individuals at the same extent. At structural level 
and for the purpose of capacity-building, it would be important to establish 
a ministerial network of support for the Court either linked at domestic or at 
regional and international levels with specific institutional liaisons. The net-
works already in place should receive appropriate implementation. Anoth-
er aspect is that in the current reality of its governance a capacity-building 
model for the emerging regime falling under the Rome Statute is still under 
construction.
While especially less powerful States enlarged the emerging regime of jus-
tice, giving the impression of the success of the Rome Statute campaign, its 
place within the regional and international realities is characterized by short-
comings of political convergence, and by a serious political impasse under-
mining its credibility. If the political support by the EU and Latin America 
to the Rome Statute system requires further political determinations, oth-
er regional entities such as the AU, Asian groups of nation-states and the 
League of Arab States take political distance from important interactions in 
the governance of political instability, violence against civilians and the com-
mission of mass atrocity crimes. The non-parties to the Rome Statute system 
such as the US, China and Russia do not show the political willingness to 
finally becoming part of it. The fact that the Court obtains requests from the 
Security Council, for instance, does not mean receiving appropriate opera-
tional support during its operations on the ground. Furthermore, the out-
comes of the inquires of serious breaches of human rights by the UN Human 
Rights Council should also engage the Security Council to refer dangerous 
situations for civilians to the Court, providing support on the ground with 
the configuration of its mandates. The Rome Statute regime simply struggles 
to find its complementary role within established international governance 
systems. The question is whether its existence and activities would stimulate 
the political convergence required for the democratization process of inter-
national governance institutions fostering peace, justice and security.
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1.6 Research Questions
This study examines the emerging architecture fostering peace, justice and 
security looking at complementary global regimes, including the decision-
making of intergovernmental organizations and the political forces respon-
sible of their empowerment. It recalls the unresolved issues in the sequence 
of peace and justice between international governance institutions. This is the 
case of the interaction between the UN Security Council and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) as an outsider from, but not stronger then to the UN 
system. Such interaction represents the opportunity for further implemen-
tation of international law and for the progress in the politics of justice. In 
several situations the so-called ‘interests of peace’ and ‘interests of justice’ do 
not coincide, even if they represent in theory the two faces of the same coin. 
The cooperation of the Security Council with the Court is not compulsory. It 
is exclusively based on political engagements not able to guarantee sustain-
able peace on the ground in situations of war and crime. The Security Council 
should consider law enforcement measures to support further the concept of 
accountability, thus strengthening the role of the International Criminal Court 
in the current international legal and political order. The Rome Statute institu-
tions should be part of the peace-building process, especially with regard to 
the victims and witnesses undertaking their protection, relocation and reha-
bilitation. In order to promote the domestic autonomy of judicial proceedings 
in situ, the emerging regime of international criminal justice should receive 
resources to rehabilitate domestic judicial systems in the post-conflict phase, 
with the UN supporting the reform of security sectors and rule of law of 
domestic institutions (police, army and judiciary). From a wider perspective, 
democratic interaction strategies are required to contribute to the transition 
of international law dealing with different legal systems and traditions. The 
analysis performed in this study concentrates on political, legal and institu-
tional frameworks respectively dealing with international threats and crimes 
in conflict and post-conflict situations, and the way those frameworks inter-
act with each other. This study attempts to verify their complementary roles 
dealing with the political responsibility of the States and the legal account-
ability of the individuals committing international humanitarian crimes, 
and the efforts to maximize the results to prevent and reduce them while 
making sure they are not left unpunished. This study explores the advent 
of global humanitarianism and the international interventions under the 
flag of the responsibility to protect civilians and the possible links with the 
emerging regime of international criminal justice fighting against the impu-
nity of genocide, crimes of war, crimes against humanity, and possibly at a 
later stage, of the crime of aggression, under the treaty-based ‘opt-out’ claus-
es based on the nation-state consent. This study advocates for interactions 
developing the role of complementary global regimes in the establishment 
of an ‘open’ society where the domestic, regional and international realities 
would contribute in the governance of international threats and crimes.
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In the scholarly debates the principles and visions of ‘internationalism’ 
favoring the policy of cooperation among nation-states have been argued 
between several approaches in the context of balance of power, democratic 
governance, and institutional reforms of universal premises. Current areas 
of discussion include national and ethnic conflict regulation in intra-state 
warfare, the fight against the impunity of serious breaches of human rights, 
and civilian protection measures during large scale humanitarian escala-
tions. The common element in the current debates is the relevance of inter-
national regimes and their complementary roles. From a legalistic perspective 
the cooperation between them is still devoid of any compulsory character. 
The paradigm shift dealt with in this study is about the ways these regimes 
are complementary to each other, particularly considering the necessity of a 
global architecture fostering peace, justice and security and its governance. 
The question is: at which extent such architecture is feasible and desired in 
the current break downs of governance systems at domestic, regional and 
international levels? Are complementary global regimes developing legal 
frameworks based on further international political responsibilities and legal 
accountabilities? Is there a chance to centralize human security concerns and 
the fundamental rights of individuals affected by war and crime? Moreover, 
is the political convergence required possible, without the consent of rele-
vant stakeholders such as some of the permanent members of the Security 
Council? And last but not least, does the pessimistic view that underscores 
the risks of conflicting international regimes, including conflicting laws, con-
flicting mandates and multilevel jurisdictions represent a real threat for the 
preservation of the rule of international law and the progress of an ‘open’ 
global society able to monitor human security measures internationally? 
The sensitive challenges in the international legal order are characterized by 
competing conceptual approaches dealing with them. There is disagreement 
between the views to control power politics towards a legal order of supra-
national character and the alternatives of dealing with normative conflicts 
between multiple legal frameworks based on pluralism. The several issues 
dealt by constitutionalism and pluralism represent the current politics of 
international law dealing with the disintegrations of the nation-states and 
their failure towards their own citizens. The concern behind relates to the 
political will of a constitution of the world community retaining such sensi-
tive issues or just relying on multiple legal frameworks dealing with several 
approaches of governance.12
In our globalized world the question is whether international governance 
institutions, or so defined ‘sister’ organizations, are able to interact accord-
ing to the principle of interdependence between peace, justice and security, 
or the idea of such ‘relationships’ and ‘partnerships’ are left in doubt by 
several overlaps at structural, normative and functional levels. After all, the 
12 See the suggestions of M. Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism. A Conceptual Framework for 
Understanding the Transnational Legal World, 2009.
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threats to peace and security and the commission of international crimes in 
conflicts and post-conflict societies are strictly interrelated, if we look at the 
current legislation of the Security Council. But how is such principle of inter-
dependence translated in the practice? How are the international responses 
to threats and crimes taking shape in multilateral political engagements? Are 
such responses governed in accordance with the rule of law as a tool of gov-
ernance and in accordance with the challenges of the post-cold war era, or 
political realism simply prevails? For some observers it seems that the Court 
would constantly be jeopardized in extreme conflict situations in the con-
text of peace v. justice including several human security issues. In any case, 
granted amnesties neutralizing the accountability of serious humanitarian 
breaches need to be out-of-the-way from peace talks and negotiations, while 
coercive diplomacy needs to find back the preventive approach of interna-
tional threats and crimes. As eminent commentators would suggest on such 
controversial issues, amnesties for mass atrocity crimes, whether explicit or 
de facto, have no legal validity at international level. Now that there is an 
independent international judiciary it should be allowed to the application 
of the law impartially, targeting alleged crimes by warlords, as well as any 
potential unlawful act committed by military alliances or other non-state 
actors. In other words, all global players involved have to feel responsible 
for their actions.13 But is this really the case?
In order to find responses this study assesses the current interaction between 
complementary global regimes including the requirement of an accountability 
system that would retain political responsibilities and legal accountabilities 
at the same extent for all parties involved in conflict and post-conflict situa-
tions. Emphasis is given to finding measures to maximize the results in the 
preservation of law and order at global level and in the field operations. The 
issues are addressed through the following questions:
Do we witness the emergence of an international architecture of governance foster-
ing peace and justice, including measures of human security applicable in conflict 
and post-conflict situations?
What kind of challenges, obstacles and concerns characterize the governance of com-
plementary global regimes?
How do the referrals to the International Criminal Court and their governance in 
the field operations currently work?
13 See C. Bassiouni, “Advancing the Responsibility to Protect through International Crimi-
nal Justice”, in H. Cooper and J. Voïnov Kohler (eds), Responsibility To Protect. The Global 
Moral Compact for the 21st Century, 2009 at 31.
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A global architecture fostering peace, justice and security embodies the 
idea that the rule of international law as a principle of governance and its 
institutions, would focus on the accountabilities of individuals, nation-
states and non-state actors in case of severe violations of common concern. 
In the current ‘testing’ environment visible in the responses to peace and 
security threats the application of this idea of the rule of law present sev-
eral issues which nearly neutralize the enthusiasm about the enforcement 
of a global architecture of governance dealing with international threats and 
crimes. The political configuration of complementary global mandates foster-
ing peace, justice and security on the ground present serious shortcomings 
in the civilian protection duties, including the engagement of law enforce-
ment against criminal perpetrators, once the judicial outcomes have been 
released by the Court (see the case of Uganda and Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Kenya, Sudan, Libya and Mali).14 The concern would be whether the 
persuasion of the permanent members of the Security Council in support 
of the referrals to the Court represents only the means of political pressure 
marginalizing respectively the criminal regime in the Sudan, or neutralizing 
the totalitarian Libyan regime, or even protecting the aggressive regime in 
Syria, rather than a real political determination to raise human security and 
civilian protection duties on the ground. As several observers emphasize, 
the contradiction in such positions undermines the pursuit of internation-
al criminal justice falling under the Rome Statute and the UN Charter. The 
main concern is the expression of militarization ignoring the basic principle 
of neutrality when intervening in the hostilities, including a weak system of 
accountability vis-à-vis non-state actors. Another concern refers to the dou-
ble standard characterizing the international humanitarian escalations with 
the last situation left ignored being Syria.
These are only some of the aspects characterizing the international politi-
cal divisions to intervene in transition societies and domestic security sys-
tems during massive humanitarian crisis deriving from intra-state conflicts. 
Complementary global regimes should prioritize a strategy of interaction in 
the field operations and also at global level, in order to marginalize the non-
cooperation of a criminal regime such as the government of the Sudan. The 
analysis of the ‘situation’ in the Sudan, as referred by the Security Council 
to the Court, and the judicial ‘case’ as initiated by the Court after the referral 
by the Security Council S/RES/1593 (2005), require attention on the break-
downs of the peace enforcement configurations by the Security Council,
14 In 2013, the Offi ce of the Prosecutor opened an investigation into alleged crimes com-
mitted on the territory of Mali since January 2012 after the referral coming from the 
Government. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
Mali (MINUSMA) takes over the authority from the African-led International Support 
Mission in Mali (AFISMA). The robust peacekeeping mandate in Mali is not confi gured 
to support the quest of justice in the country. French forces deployed in Mali have been 
authorized to intervene in support of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious 
threat upon request of the Secretary-General, see UN doc. S/RES/2100 (2013).
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including the involvement in mass atrocities by other actors in Africa, such 
as the African Union and civil society organizations. In other words, the 
negative political repercussions received by the emerging regime of inter-
national criminal justice established under the Rome Statute. The same view 
is valid in the case of the tribal structure and the complete absence of the 
State in Libya, and the sensitive governance issues for the Libyan transi-
tional council, which is dealing with the challenges of the vacuum of power 
after the regime of its tyrant, including the reconstruction of domestic secu-
rity sectors still in transition, and which deserve to be further monitored by 
international governance institutions. In regard to Syria, the absence of any 
international response and civilian protection measures so far is a matter of 
serious concern considering the outcome of the UN commission of inquiry 
on the serious breaches of human rights committed in the country. The dou-
ble standards in the selection of situations by the Security Council are once 
more confirmed. The regime of international criminal justice falling under 
the Rome Statute does not have any jurisdiction in Syria. The political pres-
sure of the Arab League on the Syrian authorities should be result-oriented. 
The presence of its observers on the ground is still a weak action considering 
the extreme violence on civilians protesting against the totalitarian regime. 
Thus, how is the doctrine of civilian protection duties currently working in 
such extreme situations?
A principal question addressed in this study is whether the Court is mar-
ginalized in its tasks to fight against the impunity of serious crimes, or if 
there is the political will to implement relations with the United Nations 
mandates in the field operations. The main concern is whether there is 
sufficient cooperation to monitor domestic channels while respecting the 
complementarity principle and State sovereignty. It also needs to be verified 
whether the current legal status of international cooperation is sufficient to 
destabilize criminal regimes compromising sustainable peace. The Rome 
Statute institutions need to be prepared to influence the rule of law with 
the jurisprudence of its Court. There are no doubts about the importance 
of such role. The problem is still the resistance of the Court’s decisions by 
powerful States, domestic jurisdictions, and the lack of multilateral coop-
eration in respect to the ‘interests of justice’. These obstacles, combined with 
the UN negotiations and political involvements in peace-talks with crimi-
nal regimes, characterize at the present the humanitarian crisis escalated 
to the Court as the last resort option (see the case of the Sudan and Libya). 
The main assumption expressed in this study is that multilateral institu-
tions, and the complementary regimes deriving from them, should not miss 
the opportunity to centralize individuals in international affairs. Models 
of governance of international threats and crimes are required at domes-
tic, regional and international levels. The Rome Statute explicitly declares 
the need to bring its institutions into relationship with the United Nations. 
In this phase of its existence the Court needs to build up a strong identity 
becoming a result oriented judicial institution, responding positively to 
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the critics, rejections and huge expectations, delivering best standards of 
public administration of international criminal justice. The Court however, 
cannot do this alone. The presence of the UN in the field where the Court 
is involved needs collective efforts in the conflict and post-conflict phases. 
The Court’s role is to bring justice into the ex-colonial reality of remote com-
munities with possible proceedings on the ground, to restore the regime of 
terror and the suffering of victims of severe human rights offences contrib-
uting to sustainable peace and stability. In the first phase of its existence the 
Court focused on the mass atrocity crimes as a priority to bring justice in 
some regimes of terror prosecuting the perpetrators. This is common to the 
DRC, CAR, Uganda, Kenya, and Ivory Coast, Libya and Darfur investiga-
tions and prosecutions, where some of its judicial outcomes are still waiting 
to be enforced. The next important duty of the Court’s judiciary is to repair 
the pain of the victims by providing justice. The overview of the lesson 
learned by the UN ad hoc tribunals, including the evolutionary path of inter-
national criminal law, is complemented by the substantial and very exten-
sive literature of scholars and practitioners noted in this study. The findings 
of this study verify that the implementation of human security measures 
between complementary global regimes would allow the universality of 
supranational rules, enhancing their credibility as international governance 
institutions fostering peace, justice and security at domestic, regional and 
international levels.
1.7 Purpose of the research
In this study the complementary role of the Rome Statute institutions to the 
United Nations system is explored not exclusively with regard to the impor-
tant interaction between the judicial organ, the International Criminal Court 
and the UN bodies, but between all actors involved in building networks 
in the emerging treaty-based architecture: the Assembly of the States Par-
ties to the ICC and the UN political organs, as well as the UN specialized 
agencies, regional intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. 
This includes the important role of academics and civil society offering their 
recommendations, guidelines and fact-findings of human rights violations 
addressed to such international governance institutions of universal char-
acter. The determination of this work is to examine the debate around the 
governance of complementary global regimes and the dilemma of human 
security. This study questions the place of the emerging regime of interna-
tional criminal justice in the arrays of peace and security maintenance and 
restoration. It attempts to define their complementary roles and the idea of 
a global architecture dealing with peace and justice in the context of human 
security centralizing and serving the rights of individuals in times of war 
and crime. Unfortunately, this study cannot be considered exhaustive. The 
topics and the issues examined will need further multidisciplinary research.
Chapter 1  The Global Regimes dealing with International Threats and Crimes 23
Against the backdrop of the peace and justice debates, many have ques-
tioned the impact of the Rome Statute in real terms against an international 
judicial institution not ready for a performance appraisal, instead, prepared 
for more jurisdiction, authority and resources. The aim of this study wants 
to fill the gap in existing literature on the creation of a global architecture 
towards the interaction of universal organizations mandated of fostering 
peace, justice and security through complementary judicial and political 
mechanisms, involving the domestic, regional and international realities. It 
focuses on the interaction between the United Nations system and the Rome 
Statute institutions responsible of democratic governance in their comple-
mentary field of expertise arguing on the current status of their cooperation. 
The subjects of such interaction also include the promotion of the univer-
sality of the Rome Statute, the status of implementing national legislations, 
and various aspects of law enforcement, cooperation and operational assis-
tance to the Court. The legislative history of the Rome Statute institutions 
since their establishment, and the UN longstanding presence in enduring 
conflicts, have been extensively analysed in order to detect global strategies 
and concrete objectives fostering peace, justice and security towards their 
interaction. This study considers the reasons of the delay and the obstacles 
in finding remedies implementing a system of international criminal justice, 
which can be found a) in the conflicting ideas of peace and justice in con-
flict and post-conflict situations; b) in the impasse of the reforms of the UN 
peace operations incorporating justice in the peace-building phase; c) in the 
international responses of law enforcement following judicial decisions in 
on-going conflicts; and d) in the search of civilians protection duties. In order 
to empower the system of international criminal justice, national implemen-
tation and judicial reforms at domestic level are important in the same way 
as for global actor reforms such as the UN and the Rome Statute institutions.
As underlined by Köchler “only a multipolar international system with a 
fair distribution of power and resources can credibly serve the causes of 
world peace, justice and human rights as proclaimed in the UN Charter. It 
is for this reason that a democratic reform of the United Nations, and in par-
ticular of the Security Council, has come to be urgently required in this tran-
sitory phase of a post-cold war order, where the paradigm of power politics 
still prevails”.15 The main theoretical assumption motivating this study is 
that democratic governance of international threats and crimes must also 
include less or non-democratic States. Such integrative approach will act 
as a strong stimulus to their ongoing or future democratization process of 
domestic governance, and also preserve their basic right of self-determina-
15 For the debate see H. Köchler, ‘Summary: A “New World Order” of Transnational 
Democracy versus the “Old World Order” of Superpower Rule’, in The United Nations 
and International Democracy: The Quest for UN Reform, IPO Research Papers, 1996, acces-
sible at: http://www.hanskoechler.com/unid.htm See also H. Köchler, Global Justice or 
Global Revenge? International Criminal Justice at the Crossroad, 2003.
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tion and autonomy. After all, the policy approach generating political frac-
ture between categories and sub-categories of States needs to be neutralized 
with all means as it may cause conflict.
This study offers an assessment of the impact of the Rome Statute institu-
tions in the global order, emphasising the importance of an interaction strat-
egy between relevant complementary actors. It analyses the evolution of 
the rule of law, multilateralism, collective responsibility, global solidarity 
and mutual accountability as principles of global governance in the inter-
national society, and their impact on the ground in conflict and post-con-
flict situations.16 This study debates the current transition of complementary 
global regimes and their interaction for the sake of peace diplomacy and 
negotiations offering sustainable stability, combined with the fight against 
the impunity of crimes of common concern, upholding human rights stan-
dards, including the search of measures of human security applicable on the 
ground in the field operations. In other words, it offers an assessment of the 
necessary measures applicable in situations of war and crime in accordance 
with universal values. It promotes the link between international criminal 
justice and the concept of sustainable peace in conflict and post-conflict sit-
uations towards the configuration of mandates on the ground. This study 
recalls the legal aspects regulating peace enforcement operations, the UN 
institutional reforms expected and not yet performed, including the legal 
and political determinations enforcing treaty-based organizations and their 
public links necessary for an international architecture dealing with global 
threats and crimes. This study measures the level of public authority of the 
Court as new international institution considering its jurisdictional reach in 
domestic realities, and the need of support from relevant actors involved on 
the ground in enduring conflicts. Attention is given to the judicial institution 
dealing with supranational criminal proceedings for the most responsible 
individuals of mass atrocity crimes centralizing human security measures. 
This study, which cannot be considered as exhaustive, also examines the 
interaction between the Rome Statute institutions (Assembly of States Par-
ties, Trust Fund for Victims and the Court) and the United Nations system 
on sensitive governance issues. It considers the importance of their indepen-
dence and delimitation of competence on one side, and the necessary coop-
eration, resource and knowledge sharing, on the other.
16 The intent is also to contribute to the theoretical debate on global governance issues 
between global politics, international law and international relations, see L. S. Finkel-
stein, ‘What is Global Governance?, in Global Governance 1 (1995), at 367. See also F. Nus-
cheler, ‘Global Governance, Development, and Peace: On the interdependence of Global 
Regulative Structures’, in P. Kennedy, D. Messner, F. Nuscheler (eds.), Global Trends and 
Global Governance, 2002, accessible at: http://www.sef-bonn.org/download/publika-
tionen/sonderbaende/sb-12-Feb-2000_zusammenfassung_en.pdf
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The purpose of this study is to fill a gap in the existing literature about the 
interaction of universal organizations mandated of fostering human secu-
rity through political and judicial mechanisms, namely the United Nations 
system and the Rome Statute institutions. The interaction of such comple-
mentary global regimes in conflict and post-conflict situations, including 
the implementation of strategies supporting their partnership and relation-
ship is the main object of this study. Moreover, the motivation is to offer an 
analysis of the emerging regime of international criminal justice towards the 
implementation of multilateral institutions and their consolidation. After 
all, the interaction between the United Nations and the Rome Statute insti-
tutions takes place at several levels, but most importantly it represents the 
nexus of global politics and the rule of law, interacting with several branches 
of international law, respectively humanitarian, criminal and the emerging 
law of human rights. The idea to promote the rule of law as a principle of 
global governance in the international society, receives assessment on the 
ways it currently works and eventually evolves. This study debates the cur-
rent humanitarian escalations of last resort between complementary global 
regimes and their impact in the field operations. It measures the status quo of 
human security between theory and practice. By way of case studies it exam-
ines the multidimensional operations fostering peace and justice, the issue of 
cooperation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the humanitar-
ian escalation of severe violations in the Sudan referred by the UN Security 
Council to the International Criminal Court. In other words, this study dis-
cusses the meaning of complementary roles of international regimes dealing 
with human security in conflict and post-conflict societies and the opportu-
nity of an integrated approach of governance.
The evolving concept of universal jurisdiction and international criminal 
law; the modern doctrine of humanitarian intervention and protection duties 
of civilians; the challenges faced by the legal theory in addressing issues 
on the sovereignty of nation-states and the responsibilities of global actors 
including the governance of complementary global regimes in the interna-
tional society require further research. These contested concepts represent 
the central dilemmas facing governments, international organizations, civil 
society and civilians. The meaning of complementary global regimes foster-
ing human security such as the United Nations system and the Rome Statute 
institutions needs clarification. It is fundamental to build up consensus on 
further international efforts to manage international humanitarian escala-
tions of last resort. The delimitation between sovereignty and international 
governance, the concept of nation-state and its self-determination, and the 
international responsibilities centralizing fundamental individual rights 
deserve constant attention by legal and political theorists. The search of gov-
ernance systems centralizing human security and its challenges, obstacles 
and concerns are the main parameters used to explore the current humani-
tarian escalations between global institutions of complementary character.
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1.8 The topics selected/proposed
The analysis of global matters challenging the international legal and politi-
cal order includes often the risk of being merely abstract, if it does not offer 
pragmatic recommendations on specific problems. This study wants to avoid 
such a risk. It explores the asymmetry of international legal and political rela-
tions manifested in the governance of complementary global regimes foster-
ing peace, justice and security at global scale. The purpose of this work is 
to find solutions using appropriately the knowledge acquired in the field of 
study proposed, setting the priorities in the governance of threats and crimes 
between complementary global regimes. The first priority is finding appli-
cable measures of human security in situations of serious violations of inter-
national humanitarian law. The findings of this study provide recommenda-
tions to policy makers on global governance issues, enhancing the ability of 
the international society to respond to large scale humanitarian crisis during 
internal civil wars, and eventually in armed conflicts of international char-
acter. The purpose is to preserve the rule of law in a globalized world and 
multilevel jurisdictions. This is only possible through substantial progress 
of political convergence, institutional reforms, and systemic changes in the 
governance of international threats and crimes. After all, only through such 
actions there would be the contribution of complementary global regimes to 
the principles of open society and further definition of global justice.
This study offers a clarification of the limited statutory provisions regulating 
the ICC and the UN interaction; it considers the complementary duty of the 
Rome Statute with the UN Charter; the Court’s independence from the UN 
framework; the controversial relationship with the Security Council and the 
political agenda of the conference review of the Rome Statute still far from 
solving the several issues of cooperation between States Parties and interna-
tional organizations of complementary character. With regard to the Rome 
Statute the political impasse between the signature and the ratification of 
key players is well known and needs solutions for the substantive support 
the Court needs from States Parties and non-States Parties and with regard 
to the cooperation with the Security Council. This study also approaches the 
debate on the amendment proposals of the Rome Statute and the impasse of 
further jurisdictional progress of the judicial institution. It also analyses the 
cooperation between the United Nations and the Assembly of States Par-
ties to the Rome Statute in the formulation of legal and political frameworks 
of governance. It attempts to verify the potential of the rule of law among 
other values and principles of governance, sustaining the human security 
doctrine among international governance institutions dealing with war and 
crime. The emphasis is given to developments programs, social equality, and 
capacity-building activities at domestic, regional and international levels. 
After all, in order to retain models of governance for devastated domestic 
realities by war, crime and famine, the feasible interactions between global 
actors require political convergence of expectations, which are emphasised 
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in this study. The Rome Statute system is based on important aspects of 
human security, such as the interests of victims and witnesses. Their protec-
tion, relocation and rehabilitation require deeper responsibilities upholding 
such human security measures. The interaction between the United Nations 
and the Rome Statute institutions is extremely important. It gives rise to the 
protective, reparative and retributive meanings of global justice throughout 
measures for peace, justice and security to restore individual rights, and the 
dignity of human lives offended in situations of war and crime.
This study offers an analysis of the nexus between humanitarian protection 
and justice with an integrated and comprehensive approach towards conflict 
prevention, stabilization and reconstruction. Complementary global regimes 
have the function to balance the distribution of powers in international rela-
tions throughout compliance of international law. For the sake of the princi-
ples of accountability and compliance, the International Criminal Court and 
the United Nations have a central role to play. The purpose of their inter-
action is to end the impunity regime of severe violations of human rights, 
towards global deterrent mandates, getting closer to the real concerns of civil-
ians in fragile and disintegrated States not able or unwilling to bring sustain-
able peace and justice on their own ground. In the field of human rights and 
for their preservation once treaty-based organizations, including the bodies 
deriving from the UN Charter, would prove a lack of compliance by their 
States parties, the Security Council and other political organs should imme-
diately open inquiries and also referrals about individual criminal account-
abilities. In these situations, the cooperation with the Rome Statute system 
should be mandatory. The case studies selected and proposed offer an over-
view of the practice applied in the field operations where complementary 
international mandates are involved. The findings of this study demonstrate 
that a normative harmonization is necessary if the vision of constitutional-
ism would be materialized. The functional implementation of relationship 
agreements advocated by the theoretical approach of pluralism is only a 
timid instrument of cooperation. Further evolution of international law 
would mean to focus on governance at multilateral scale, finding appropri-
ate adjustments in the normative and institutional tools of the international 
community as a whole, or the so defined community obligations. The rules of 
cooperation between complementary global mandates are having an impact 
on the lives of individuals, while public power will need further implementa-
tion of legal techniques in new fields of public international law, regulating 
global governance and administration, according to the principles of trans-
parency and accountability. The international community needs a model 
replacing progressively old methods of peace and security maintenance at 
global scale. The interaction between human security and transnational jus-
tice at national, regional and global levels needs the attention by the decision-
making either from the perspective of constitutionalism or pluralism. Human 
security and the preservation of human rights should be the priorities in both 
these approaches involved in the design of global governance frameworks.
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1.8 Methodology
The research methods applied in this study refer in summary respectively 
to: a) the multidisciplinary approach of the theories of international regimes 
based on human security and complementing with each other, and b) the 
legal and political solutions required to fill the gaps of governance foster-
ing peace and justice. These research methods emphasise the institutional, 
normative and functional analysis of complementary global regimes and the 
legal and political sources to verify their status quo. From a theoretical per-
spective the approach in this study tries to bring some light on the difficul-
ties to reinforce the doctrine of human security which has been lost in the 
academic discourse. The interaction between complementary global regimes 
fostering peace, justice and security would preserve the idea of human secu-
rity in international society.
a) Multidisciplinary approach
This study brings together an assessment made from the perspective of 
international law, international relations, political science and legal philoso-
phy. It attempts to verify the governance of justice and the transition of inter-
national peace and security in conflict and post-conflict situations character-
ized by mass atrocity crimes. It provides an extensive analysis of the new 
trends in modern international relations between mutual responsibilities 
of States combined with the individual accountabilities of criminal perpe-
trators. It offers an analytical tool about legal and political ramifications of 
the Rome Statute and its role in the emerging regime of justice vis-à-vis the 
States, the United Nations and the international community as a whole. It 
contains explanatory, qualitative and constructive research methods applied 
for an implementation of the basic principles of international relations and 
international law. These principles represent interdependent targets to gov-
ern peace, justice and security and symbolize the tools for setting the global 
priorities of democratic international regimes dealing with:
1) Rule of law
2) Multilateralism
3) Collective responsibility
4)  Global solidarity
5) Mutual accountability
This study will extensively approach the first three, the international rule of 
law, multilateralism, and collective responsibility, but it will still refer to all 
basic principles of international relations regulated by the UN and recently 
by the Rome Statute system. Sharing knowledge to develop global values 
in the international society is the function of public international organiza-
tions and this is common either to the United Nations and the Rome Statute 
institutions as multilateral tools of governance. The scope is the protection 
of human rights, the promotion of human security, combining political con-
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sensus to an appropriate lawmaking process for the implementation of more 
democratic international regimes of complementary character. An exten-
sive literature review has been performed considering both policy and legal 
aspects in the field of international criminal justice, and the ways new crimes 
would be considered for future reviews of the Rome Statute. In order to pro-
pose a consolidation model between the United Nations and the Court’s 
regimes, the UN missions from peacekeeping to peace building, especially in 
the African Great Lakes Region where the Court is involved since the begin-
ning of its investigative and prosecutorial activities, have been extensively 
examined. The intent is to promote democratic standards of interactions 
only achievable throughout concrete institutional reforms, which would also 
allow the extension of a universal jurisdiction to other serious crimes of com-
mon concern and wider design of an architecture governing international 
threats and crimes.
b) The theories of emerging international regimes based on human security
This study navigates the main international regime theories focusing on a 
variety of theoretical and methodological approaches used to explain and 
analyse the content, formation and effectiveness of international law and its 
institutions and to suggest improvements. The most common definition of 
international regimes found in the literature comes from eminent scholars as 
“institutions possessing norms, decisions, rules and procedures facilitating 
a convergence of expectations”.17 The liberal view of regime theory argues 
that international regimes are instances of international cooperation and that 
international governance institutions are regimes which affect the behaviour 
of States. On the one hand, for liberal scholars cooperation is indeed possible 
despite anarchy. The realists on the other hand, do not mean that coopera-
tion never happens, but that it is not the norm in the global order. The realist 
view of regime theory assumes that cooperation makes a difference of degree 
between anarchy and conflict in international relations. The question of the 
idealists is whether international cooperation can be better matched by a cor-
responding system of international responsibility, shared responsibility, and 
compliance, as the main issues characterizing the emerging regime of inter-
national criminal justice. The main argument is whether the current interac-
tion between the United Nations and the Rome Statute institutions creates 
the prerequisite of a global democratic ‘system’, or a global ‘architecture’ fos-
tering international criminal justice in the context of human security in con-
flict and post-conflict situations.
17 See S. D. Krasner, International Regimes, Cornell University Press, 1983. S. Haggard, 
“Theories of International Regimes”, 41 International Organizations, 1987, at 491. See also 
A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer, V. Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, 1997, at 2.
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From a theoretical perspective this study considered the several approach-
es in the global governance of international humanitarian escalations. The 
realists complain that States pursuing utopian moral visions through inter-
vention and humanitarian aid do their subjects harm and destabilize the 
international system. The majority of such interventions have been based 
on economic or political interests and not in the domain of human rights. 
The particularists object the destruction of traditional cultures by cultural 
colonialism under the guise of economic liberalism or defense of human 
rights. The nationalists deplore the fact that so many people are stateless or 
live under inefficient and tyrannical regimes that monitoring them at inter-
national level represent only utopia. The advocacy of the society of States, 
or cosmopolitans is concerned about the disintegration of nation-states and 
about the imperial ambitions of the powerful. The cosmopolitans believe that 
the contemporary world badly fails to guarantee equal social, economic, and 
political standards. Such equal standards would require considerable chang-
es in the actions of wealthy individuals and States. They might, for instance, 
require the transfer of capacity-building with every means in fragile States. 
They might require building international institutions able to limit, or even 
replace, the self-interested action of powerful States and corporations. They 
might require global governance systems based on collective responsibility, 
global solidarity and mutual accountability.18
The meaning of complementary international regimes is explored focusing on 
the effectiveness of the policy trend of ‘institutionalism’ emerging in the cur-
rent world order, including the intersection of the three schools of thought 
within the study of international regimes, such as: the realists, focusing on 
power relationships; the neoliberals, analysing the constellation of interests; 
and the cognitivists, emphasizing knowledge dynamics, communications, 
and interactions.19 The emerging regime of international criminal justice rep-
resents the determination to harmonize legal systems around the preserva-
tion of human rights and universal principles and norms, fighting against 
the impunity and inaction of serious crimes of common concern. The meth-
ods applied in this study verify whether such regime finds its place in global 
governance issues of peace and security, while focusing on the intersec-
18 See M. Griffi ths, Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations, 1999. See also I. B. Neumann, 
O. Waever (eds), The Future of international Relations: Masters in the Making, 1997. J. Kruzel, 
J. N. Rosenau (eds), Journeys Through World Politics: Autobiographical Refl ections of Thirty-
four Academic Travellers, 1989. M. Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger, 1986. D. 
Thürer, The “failed State” and international law, Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge/
International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 81, Issue 836 / December 1999, at 731-761. 
See T. M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, 1995. N.J. Schrijver et als, 
The United Nations of the Future. Globalisation with a Humane Face, 2006. See also O. Spijk-
ers, The United Nations, the Evolution of Global Values and International Law, 2011.
19 For inspiring theoretical approaches on the creation of global values in the international 
legal and political order see M. Griffi ths, N.J. Schrijver, O. Spijkers, supra.
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tion between international humanitarian law, human rights law and inter-
national criminal law. The methods applied also focus on the verification 
of governance and capacity-building of such complementary global man-
dates in conflict and post-conflict situations. Furthermore, these methods 
(normative, structural and functional) verify whether complementary roles 
of international governance institutions offer political and legal inputs for 
the definition of crimes internationally recognized, contributing to further 
progress of an ex-ante jurisdiction dealing with serious recognized interna-
tional crimes. The methodology applied also clarifies to a certain extent the 
implementation required in the immediate, middle and long terms in order 
to enhance the relationship and partnership between complementary glob-
al governance institutions. The legislative history of these organizations is 
extensively analysed, including the inputs of all relevant stakeholders. The 
poor arrangements and agreements in the field operations where comple-
mentary mandates are currently deployed receive analysis and critics. The 
suggestion is to overcome the lacuna in protection, relocation and rehabilita-
tion of victims and witnesses with an institution cooperating with the Court 
and other relevant stakeholders.
c) Legal and policy sources
The main primary sources used for this research are the treaties and the leg-
islative history, respectively of the United Nations and the Assembly of the 
States Parties of the International Criminal Court. The Rome Statute and the 
declarations of interpretation by its States Parties, the UN Charter, the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties; the relationship agreement between the 
UN and the ICC and the cooperation agreements with regional organiza-
tions, most notably the EU, the AU, the League of Arab States and with the 
specialized agencies of the UN family, in particular the agreements with the 
UN peace operations in situations where the Court is involved, all of them 
receive appropriate analysis. The institutional ‘contours’ of international law 
are debated between ‘old’ and ‘new’ tools of governance fostering peace, jus-
tice and security. It needs to be noted that since this study deals mainly with 
relatively new concepts in international law, customary international law is 
hardly relevant to it.
In order to offer an overview of the legal environment of the International 
Criminal Court, the general principles of international law, the principles of 
fairness and justice, which are applied universally in legal systems around 
the world (e.g. good faith, res judicata, impartiality of judges), have been 
found in decisions of international tribunals and national courts and in refer-
ences in writings and teachings of eminent scholars. These conceptual sourc-
es frequently involve procedural matters and the international tribunals 
rely on these principles when they cannot find authority in other sources 
of international law. Another category of sources are related to the policy 
formulations at national and regional levels and the intersection between 
peace, justice and security applied globally. Apart from the treaties the judi-
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cial decisions of the ICJ on immunities20 and its extensive jurisprudence 
have been consulted, such as its judgment on the Application of the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which 
provided authoritative guidance on the concept of genocide and the duty of 
States Parties to prevent genocide.21 Other primary materials include: the 
Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, such as the Security 
Council referrals; the referrals from the States parties (DRC, Uganda, CAR 
and Ivory Coast) and non-parties to the Rome Statute (e.g. Occupied Pales-
tinian Territories); the autonomous judicial activity of the Court in Kenya; 
and the official reports of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur.22 The 
dynamics of peace enforcement and the international duty to protect civil-
ians have been examined in situations where both the UN and the ICC 
are involved (DRC and Sudan). Of particular importance for this research 
are also the ASP resolutions concerning the Special Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression (SWGCA) including also the outcomes of the working 
group on cooperation which settles the main channels of cooperation and 
the main problems thereof between the Rome Statute institutions and the 
States, and between the Rome Statute institutions and the United Nations.23 
The controversial issue of the definition of aggression will be approached 
using primary sources as the results of the meetings of the Special Working 
Group on the crime of aggression.24 Furthermore, important sources are: the 
work of the Preparatory Commission for the ICC,25 the institutional docu-
ments and outcomes of reports and studies of working groups of the ASP 
20 For the debate over the immunity see S. Wirth, “Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ’s 
Judgment in the Congo v. Belgium Case”, 4 European Journal of International Law 13, 2002,
at 877.
21 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ at 18 October 
2007 (‘Application of the Convention on Genocide’) http://www.icj-cij.org For the back-
ground of the case, genocide and State responsibility and the ICJ jurisprudence see D. 
Turns, “The Court’s Judgment on the Merits: The Jurisdictional Question” in “Applica-
tion of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Serbia and Montenegro”, (2007) in 398 Melbourne Journal of
International Law 8(2), accessible at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbJIL/
2007/22.html
22 Available at: http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf
23 Available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-4-SWGCA-1-_FINAL_Eng-
lish.pdf
24 The complete overviews of the ASP sessions and the latest Report of the SWGCA are 
accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/aspaggression.html
25 As with the Rome Conference, all States were invited to participate in the Preparatory 
Commission. Among its achievements, the Preparatory Commission reached consensus 
on the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Elements of Crimes. These two texts 
were subsequently adopted by the Assembly of States Parties. Together with the Rome 
Statute and the Regulations of the Court adopted by the judges, the two documents com-
prise the Court’s basic legal texts, setting out its structure, jurisdiction and functions.
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and the UN.26 The negotiated relationship agreement27 and the ICC-UN 
interaction28 have been extensively analyzed, taking in consideration the 
latest developments. The so called Dutch Proposal pursuant to “Resolution 
E”, adopted at the Rome Conference in 1998, seeking to codify a definition 
of the crime of terrorism in the Rome Statute has been reported, including 
the proposals of States according to Article 124 of the Rome Statute and the 
amendments and debates approached during the review conference of the 
Rome Statute in Kampala.
26 For an overview of the Complete Report of the Preparatory Commission to the Assem-
bly of States Parties and the resolutions of the General Assembly see list of document 
available at: http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/prepfra.htm
27 The Relationship Agreement, concluded on 4 October 2004 by the President of the Court 
and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on behalf of their respective institu-
tions, affi rms the independence of the Court while establishing a framework for coop-
eration. See the Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the UN and the ICC, accessible 
at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-3-Res1_English.pdf
28 See the CICC Team on the UN-ICC Relationship Agreement and ICC liaison offi ce at the 
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This part explores the quest of complementarity trying to fix the margins 
between statehood, sovereignty and international governance of mass atroc-
ity crimes and the pursuit of human security. It offers an overview of the 
tools at disposition by the international community in societies in transition 
from conflict to reconstruction offering reliable models of governance and 
based on the advocacy of human security. In this chapter the following top-
ics have been comprehensively debated: the legal and political frameworks 
of governance fostering human security, the discussions around the rule of 
international law, the function of multilateralism versus unilateral interests, 
and the risk of opportunistic policy formulations. The last section concludes 
the assessment provided in the whole chapter about the transition of the 
concept of security and the paradigms in the making between the concep-
tualization, the applicability, and the critics of the human security doctrine. 
In other words, it highlights the formulation of human security systems of 
complementary character fighting against war and crime and the require-
ments thereof. The contribution in this debate underscores the needs of dem-
ocratic governance of humanitarian affairs throughout institutional reforms, 
strengthening the partnerships and relationships of governance institutions 
of complementary character with measures of human security.
This chapter clarifies where the emerging regime of international criminal 
justice comes from, and where it should go within the arrays of the gover-
nance of international peace and security and its role in the maintenance and 
restoration of sustainable peace. The main assumption articulated in this 
chapter is that the architecture of global governance systems reflecting the 
world as it existed in 1945, has not kept pace with the fundamental changes 
taking place in the world community. We face an incredible amount of short-
comings in the governance systems fostering human security at national, 
regional and international levels. The paradigm shifts include the spread of 
global threats, the commission of serious crimes of common concern during 
violent political transitions, and the devastating consequences of intra-state 
armed conflicts. The military interventions for humanitarian reasons and the 
protection duties of civilians are inconsistent, while the interaction strategies 
to prevent mass atrocity crimes with timely intervention are not sufficient. 
The influence of non-state actors involved in armed conflicts has repercus-
sions in the transition of human security and humanitarian intervention in 
2 The Legal and Political Frameworks 
Fostering Human Security
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conflict and post-conflict situations, including the problem of their account-
abilities. Therefore, it is required to identify the policy and the normative 
requirements for an effective governance system centralizing human secu-
rity, when dealing with intra-state and inter-state warfare and with the viola-
tions of international humanitarian law and human rights law.
This chapter argues that there are some opportunities to progress with 
human security measures between the emerging regime of international 
criminal justice and the established regime fostering sustainable peace in 
conflict and post-conflict situations of the United Nations. It debates the tran-
sition of global regulatory frameworks fostering human security, consider-
ing the intersection between international politics and laws, including the 
paradigm shift of global complementarity between established global regimes 
and emerging sub-regimes, the purpose of which is to solve the political 
impasse crucial for the progress of global justice and its architecture of gover-
nance. The approach in this chapter is complementary to the broad concept 
of human security originally articulated by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) in its Human Development Report delivered two decades 
ago,1 and its annual analytical reports which followed next, including the 
theoretical and empirical findings of NGOs and relevant think tanks, in 
accordance with the current changes occurring in the international society.2
From the valuable assessments performed in the past by legal and political 
theorists we learn that human security focuses on the protection of individu-
als, rather than defending the physical and political integrity of States from 
external military threats, which represents the traditional goal of national 
security. Ideally, national security and human security should be mutually 
reinforcing, but in the last hundred years far more people have died as a 
direct or indirect consequence of the actions of their own governments or 
rebel forces in internal civil wars, more than have been killed by invading 
foreign armies during inter-state conflicts. Acting in the name of national 
security we have seen that the governments themselves can pose profound 
1 See UNDP Human Development Report 1994, New Dimensions of Human Security, acces-
sible at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/fi les/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_
nostats.pdf
2 Important references are the empirical fi ndings of think-tanks and their programming 
activities such as The Hague Global Justice Institute (IGJ) dealing with the ‘judiciary and 
global justice’; ‘international affairs, peace diplomacy and global justice’; ‘environment, 
development and global justice’. Such programming activity is dedicated to the promo-
tion of knowledge of law and justice as the basis of, and in relation, to peace, security 
and social and economic development, using a comprehensive approach. The analysis 
of theory and practice and a network organization facilitates cross-fertilization towards 
global challenges such as failing States and governance systems, resource confl icts, cli-
mate change and its multiple consequences, the changing international architecture, the 
effectiveness of international judicial institutions and the increasing importance of non-
state actors. See the mission of The Hague Global Justice Institute (IGJ) accessible at: 
http://thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/index.php?page=Mission&pid=121
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threats to human security. This was the case in Syria, Libya, Iran, Tunisia, 
Egypt including any other aggressive and criminal regime where the army 
easily turned against its own populations. In such countries the reforms of 
the security sectors such as the army, police and the judiciary depend on the 
outcomes of political transitions and democratic reforms. The same require-
ment is valid for the States committing the crime of aggression character-
izing inter-state conflicts. The crime of aggression had been included in the 
Rome Statute in 1998 while its definition and implementation were deferred 
to a review conference. The amendments adopted in 2010 define the crime of 
aggression and provide for the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction over 
this crime. The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
once thirty States have ratified the amendments, and subject to a decision to 
be taken after 1 January 2017 by the States Parties.3
The States have the primary responsibility to protect civilians and the ways 
the international community deals with civilian protection measures, is 
definitely questionable. The human security policy focuses its attention on 
the threats stemming from violence to individuals and to collapsed soci-
eties where the absence of the rule of law could lead to political, military, 
social or economic instability and inequality. The emerging regime of inter-
national criminal justice falling under the Rome Statute is interpreted as a 
tool of human security and as such deserves global support. This chapter 
discusses the limits of such emerging international regime and its transition 
centralizing human security. It supports the idea of an integrated approach 
of governance able to offer capacity-building on the ground for the sake of 
humanitarian protection and human development through reparation mea-
sures, rehabilitation programs and social re-integration of the victims of war. 
Therefore, the interaction between complementary global regimes advocat-
ed in this study is based on the concept of global justice, respectively its retrib-
utive, protective and restitutive aspects. The human security doctrine deserves 
further consideration by the political actors enforcing complementary global 
regimes, and this of course, for the several reasons outlined in this chapter.
In order to have a complete overview, this chapter recalls what has been 
accomplished in the past in the context of multilevel criminal jurisdictions 
dealing with the serious violations of international law, which received a 
pluralist approach by primary and secondary laws in the global legal order. 
The attention also goes to the interaction between pluralist regulatory frame-
works respectively dealing with the accountability of the States and of the 
individuals as in the case of the crime of aggression which is not yet politi-
3 See Handbook Crimes of Aggression and War Crimes published by the Liechtenstein Insti-
tute on Self-Determination. Part I of the handbook is based on a workshop on the rati-
fi cation and implementation of the Kampala amendments on the Crime of Aggression 
that took place at New York University on 25 June 2012. The handbook is accessible at: 
http://crimeofaggression.info/documents/1/handbook.pdf
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cally agreed. This chapter clarifies the lacuna of human security measures 
between complementary global regimes, including the political impasse of 
multilateralism between the theories of constitutionalism and pluralism of 
international legal systems. It contributes to the views of the international 
legal world moving from the relative and the universal “to build order with-
out imposing it, to accept pluralism without giving up on a common law”.4 
The struggle remains: how far is it really possible to measure such transitions?
2.1 International Criminal Justice: The Evolution of 
Human Security?
Section Outline
The historical overview of the definition of multilevel jurisdictions, includ-
ing the establishment of judicial institutions enforced by political organs 
after the scourge of world wars, is important to measure the progress 
already achieved at global level fighting against the impunity of interna-
tional crimes. The Court today is a major international institution securing 
justice for victims when it cannot be delivered at the national level. Investi-
gations in nine country situations concern shocking allegations such as mass 
murder, rape, torture and the use of child soldiers. The prosecutor is cur-
rently conducting preliminary examination in ten situations including Pal-
estine, Afghanistan, Georgia, Guinea, Colombia, Honduras, Korea, Nigeria 
and Ukraine.5 The Court however, does not have jurisdiction on individu-
als responsible in case of aggression during inter-state conflicts. Such juris-
dictional pillar received postponement during the first review conference 
of the Rome Statute in Uganda (Kampala) and waits for further consensus 
and resources in 2017. In order to verify the reasons of such an impasse it 
is required to look in the past. The main theory promoted in this section is 
that on the one hand, for an understanding of the effects deriving from the 
political determinations enforcing international governance institutions, it 
is required to look at the causes placed in the past by the decision-making. 
On the other hand, if we want to understand the effects that might appear 
in the future, it is required to focus on the causes currently laid down by 
the decision-making. The question is whether the international governance 
institutions deriving from such political process would be able to simultane-
ously have an impact on the causes and effects of war and crime. The main 
concern is if there would be human security measures during humanitarian 
escalations of last resort between the complementary global regimes foster-
ing peace and justice. So said, in which direction evolve the policies of global 
4 M. Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism. A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the 
Transnational Legal World, 2009. M. Delmas-Marty, Les forces imaginantes du droit: Tome 1, 
Le relatif et l’universel, 2004.
5 See ICC website » Structure of the Court » Offi ce of the Prosecutor » Policies and Strate-
gies » ICC – Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013.
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‘humanitarianism’, global ‘solidarity’, collective ‘responsibility’ and mutu-
al ‘accountability’? This section briefly recalls the historical background of 
multilevel criminal jurisdictions, the UN judicial activity, and the progress of 
international criminal justice surely requiring further research.
2.1.1 The historical background of multilevel criminal jurisdictions
With regard to the inter-state conflicts (intended as international conflicts, 
or conflicts between States) the world community has sought to prevent 
war and eliminate aggression for ages. After World War I the efforts to 
limit international warfare resulted in the establishment of the League of 
Nations. The Treaty of Versailles of 1919 called for the prosecution of Kai-
ser Wilhelm II for waging unjust war but efforts to carry out this provision 
were fruitless since he found refuge in The Netherlands. The Kellogg-Bri-
and Pact of 1928 provided for the formal renunciation of war as an instru-
ment of any national policy.6 This renunciation became the basis of the 
London Charter of 8 August 1945, which established in Nuremberg the 
International Military Tribunal for the prosecution of the major Nazi war 
criminals, and of the 1946 Charter for the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East (IMFTE) establishing a similar war crimes trial in Tokyo.7 
These charters, the indictments and judgments of the tribunals, and the 
1947 United Nations resolutions embodying the ‘Nuremberg Principles’, are 
among the legal sources for considering aggression a ‘crime against peace’.8
In 1945, the United Nations Charter in Article 2 (4) and Article 39 prohib-
ited aggression but no definition of the crime was established.9 No real con-
sensus on the meaning of aggression was reached until the United Nations’ 
definition of aggression was agreed upon on 14 December 1974.10 The defini-
tion states in rather general terms that “aggression is the use of armed force 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of 
another State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations”. The definition also enumerates, not exhaustively, other specific 
examples of aggression and sets forth their legal and political consequences. 
6 The Kellogg-Briand Pact served as the legal basis for the creation of the notion of crime 
against peace. It was for committing this crime that the Nuremberg Tribunal and Tokyo 
Tribunal sentenced a number of people responsible for starting World War II.
7 For an historical overview of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMT-
FE), commonly called the Tokyo trial see Y. Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial. The Pursuit 
of Justice in the Wake of World War II, Harvard University Press, 2008. See also N. Boister, 
R. Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal. Charter, Indictment and 
Judgements, Oxford University Press, 2008.
8 UN doc. General Assembly Resolution 177 (1947)
9 For an overview see “International Criminal Law. Defi ning International Crimes”, in Law 
Library, American Law and Legal Information, Free Encyclopedia, accessible at: http://law.
jrank.org/pages/1392/International-Criminal-Law-Defi ning-international-crimes.html
10 UN doc. General Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974)
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The definition does not cover acts by non-state actors. The two key military 
alliances at the time of the definition’s adoption, the NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact, were non-State parties and thus were outside the scope of such legal 
considerations. Moreover, such definition did not deal with the responsibili-
ties of individuals for acts of aggression but only with the State responsibil-
ity. Aggression was widely perceived as an insufficient basis on which to 
ground individual criminal prosecutions.11 Those jurisdictional issues have 
been discussed in multilateral negotiations for decades, with the last event 
being the review conference of the Rome Statute in Kampala in 2010 which 
is approached in the next paragraphs. But before looking into the latest out-
comes, it is required to recall the UN political role in the advent of interna-
tional criminal justice.
2.1.2 The UN judicial activity and international criminal justice
Throughout history, the United Nations has adopted, or at least considered 
the adoption, of a number of variations on the definition of international 
crimes. In 1948, only a few years after the Nazi Holocaust ended, the General 
Assembly adopted the text of the Genocide Convention.12 Among these there 
are also the resolutions endorsing the standards of the Nuremberg Charter, 
the International Law Commission’s Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind, and the Statutes of the two ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals established by the Security Council. In the past however, 
the relations between threats and crimes, intra-state and inter-state conflicts 
and individual accountabilities have been resolved in the absence of an estab-
lished regime of international criminal justice which were only based on ad 
hoc Security Council resolutions. The international criminal tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR) were established by the 
Security Council to punish violations of international law during the Yugo-
slavia conflict and the Rwanda genocide. The United Nations also adminis-
tered the domestic criminal justice system of Kosovo. Likewise, Sierra Leone 
and the United Nations concluded an agreement to establish a Special Court 
to prosecute both international and domestic crimes committed during the 
conflict in the country. A similar tribunal for prosecution of Khmer Rouge has 
been established in Cambodia. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was 
established by an agreement between the United Nations and the Lebanese 
Republic.13 The United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations, endorsed the agreement on 30 May 2007.14 
The STL marks the first time that the UN-based international criminal court 
tries a ‘terrorist’ crime committed against a specific person. According to the 
11 L. F. Damrosch, “Enforcing International Law through Non-forcible Measures”, Recueil 
De Cours/Collected Courses, Académie de Droit International de La Haye, 1998, at 202.
12 UN doc. General Assembly Resolution 260 (1948)
13 UN doc. Security Council Resolution 1664 (2006)
14 UN doc. Security Council Resolution 1757 (2007)
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United Nations it is a “tribunal of an international character based on the 
highest international standards of criminal justice”.15
Thus, as discussed above and taking in consideration the analytical contri-
butions of eminent experts in the field of international law such as Arsan-
jani and Reisman, if we look at the evolution of international criminal justice 
in the course of history, two types of international criminal tribunals have 
emerged.16 The first category exemplified by the tribunals at Nuremberg 
and Tokyo, may be called ex post tribunals. They were established after the 
acute and violent situations in which the alleged crimes occurred, and had 
been resolved by military victory and new political settlement after WWII. 
As a result, the tribunals’ judicial activity did not affect international security 
concerns. Even if some conditions of instability were still present, these were 
not likely to be dealt with, as the victorious parties patronized the political 
momentum. The second generations of ad hoc tribunals established by the 
Security Council also has an ex post nature and were based on international 
security considerations settled by the political and executive organ of the 
United Nations.
Another category of international tribunals may be called ex ante tribunals. 
They are established before an international security problem had been 
resolved or even manifested itself, or established in the middle of the con-
flict in which the alleged crimes were taking place. In these circumstances 
authoritative political entities such as the Security Council and its operations 
in the field, if any, would have only been initiating the re-establishment of 
order in these situations, triggering the negotiations with the governments 
responsible of conflict resolution, or just addressing the threats of peace and 
security, or better say the severe humanitarian violations, to the appropri-
ate judicial channels, which also require the involvement of human rights 
treaty-based bodies within the UN system (UNHCHR).17 In such context the 
ex-ante judicial decisions may in theory influence the political configuration 
of peace enforcement by the Security Council depending on the willingness 
of further international engagements, while the Security Council may still 
suspend prosecutions for the benefit of peace negotiations. It is clear that 
the interests of justice and the discretion settled in article 53 of the Rome 
15 For an overview of the current proliferation and insight of international criminal tribu-
nals see R. Zacklin, ‘The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals’, in Journal of Interna-
tional Criminal Justice (2004) 2 (2), at 541.
16 See H. Arsanjani, W. M. Reisman, “The International Criminal Court and the Congo: 
From Theory to Reality”, in L. N. Sadat, M. P. Scharf (eds.) The Theory and Practice of Inter-
national Criminal Law. Essays in Honor of M. Cherif Bassiouni, 2008, at 325.
17 See S/RES/1970 (2011) which provides jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court 
over the situation in Libya since 15 February 2011. See A/HCR/16/20 (2010), “Combat-
ing Impunity and Strengthening Accountability, the Rule of Law and Democratic Soci-
ety”, in the 2010 Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, at 62.
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Statute (initiation of an investigation) is part of such ex-ante activity of the 
International Criminal Court which ratio is also valid in the referral activ-
ity of the Security Council. In the practice, however, the Court is not an ex-
ante judicial institution. It is a tool of last resort and witnesses serious crimes 
allegedly committed in conflict and post-conflict situations in accordance 
with the principle of complementarity. Article 53 provides that the Prosecu-
tor may desist from acting either in relation to opening an investigation or 
in continuing with an investigation that has been opened, if it appears that 
the decision to desist would be in the interests of justice. The decision of 
the Prosecutor not to investigate or not to prosecute based on these grounds 
may be reviewed by the Pre-Trial Chamber on its own initiative, or at the 
request of the referring State or the Security Council, and, in such a case, the 
decision of the Prosecutor will only be effective upon confirmation by the 
Chamber. The text of Article 53 reflects another aspect of the compromise 
reached during the first conference in Rome.18
The Court could be rather seen as an ex ante tribunal without police and law 
enforcement capabilities.19 In the longstanding peace v. justice debate some 
observers would even see the Court as an ex ante tribunal which “may create 
conflicting pressures on both the domestic tribunals and the actors respon-
sible for resolving the security problem in the country in question. A unique 
challenge falls on the judiciary and other domestic security sectors such as 
conventional army and police. Such actors determine whether and how to 
set priorities among their curial responsibilities and the inevitable politi-
cal consequences of their actions”. Such pragmatic approach of the “law 
in action” would only be feasible under important conditions.20 First of all, 
in respect of the judicial impartiality and independence from the political 
compromise with criminal domestic regimes; second, with a judicial institu-
tion able to monitor multinational law enforcement interventions, holding 
humanitarian interventions accountable when necessary; and third, through 
balancing public powers between international executive and judicial 
authorities towards configurations of mandates on the ground, institutional 
liaisons and resource sharing. Such idealistic assumptions however, depend 
on the willingness of the international community to give more credibility 
to the Court and to its public authority vis-à-vis international political bodies 
such as the Security Council. One example of such reasoning would sim-
18 See C. Gallavin, ‘Article 53 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: In 
the Interests of Justice’, 14 KCLJ, 2003, at 179-198. See also C. Gallavin, ‘The Security 
Council & the ICC: Delineating the Scope of Security Council Referrals and Deferrals’, 5 
New Zealand Armed Forces Law Review, 2005, at 19-38.
19 See H. Arsanjani, W. M. Reisman, supra.
20 See H. Arsanjani, W. M. Reisman, “The Law in Action of the International Criminal 
Court”, 99 The American Journal of International Law 2, 2005, at 385. See also R. Gerber, 
“Mass Atrocities and the International Community: The Multilateral Framework for Pre-
vention and Response”, The Stanley Foundation Articles, April 2011, accessible at: http://
www.stanleyfoundation.org/articles.cfm?ID=678
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ply be that human security waits for reliable mechanisms requiring political 
configurations of mandates assisting investigations and prosecutions on the 
ground with protection, relocation and rehabilitation of victims and witness-
es. What we currently see, instead, are political organs compromising with 
warlords the end of violence in the countries in question at the expenses of 
international criminal justice. These and other issues are extensively dealt 
with in this study.
2.1.3 A universal or a customized jurisdiction?
A frail accomplishment after post-cold war is the fact that the supremacy 
of the Security Council monitoring international threats and crimes such as 
rebuilding societies after conflict; setting ad hoc tools of international crimi-
nal justice with politicised judicial mandates; rehabilitating the access of 
justice in post-conflict realities; initiating legal reforms, including domestic 
institutional empowerment and rule of law sectors, among other things, are 
currently challenged by the independence of a permanent judicial institu-
tion dealing with the most serious breaches of international humanitar-
ian law and human rights. The Rome Statute, however, did not challenge 
such ‘supremacy’. The UN peacekeeping operations should serve with law 
enforcement operations following the judicial decisions of the Court. More-
over, a key question is to what extent non-state actors would be accountable 
for acts attempting human rights. The major concern in the current practice 
is to fill the accountability and responsibility gaps at all levels. If such lacuna 
is not solved serious risks would attempt the universal project of interna-
tional criminal justice and its global institutions.
We all agree that the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be defined as universal 
as yet.21 As a young institution the Court ought to expand the highest inter-
national standards of international criminal justice, representing an example 
to be followed by any tribunal of international character, while complement-
ing domestic jurisdictions on criminal proceedings. The ideal would be to 
achieve universality of such international judicial institution dealing with 
the accountability of individuals in domestic judicial systems. Its presence 
requires strengthening relations between and within courts and tribunals 
of States involved in the preservation of international humanitarian law. 
21 For an extensive legal analysis of some provisions of the Rome Statute see C. Stahn, M. 
El Zeidy, H. Olasolo, “The International Criminal Court’s Ad Hoc Jurisdiction Revis-
ited”, 99 American Journal of International Law, 2005, at 421. For an historical overview 
after the invitation given to the International Law Commission by the United Nations 
General Assembly to study the ‘desirability’ and ‘possibility’ of establishing a judicial 
organ as “a Criminal Chamber of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)” see Vespasian 
V. Pella, “Towards and International Criminal Court”, 44 American Journal of International 
Law, 1950, at 37. See also UN doc. A/760 (1948); UN doc. A/AC.48/4 (1951).
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The presence of the Court represents an historical opportunity. It offers a 
new direction to the evolution of international relations, international law 
and international criminal justice. Its impact in devastated domestic reali-
ties however, still needs to be verified by social scientists. The Court can-
not operate alone. Reconciliation and human security need a re-engagement 
of higher political priority. The responsibility relies on the actors involved 
and primarily on the nation-states, including the UN system, international 
and regional organizations, civil society and other stakeholders. This section 
promotes further research on the legal responsibilities of global actors and 
constitutional strategies of universal character according to the UN Charter 
and the Rome Statute.
2.2 The transition of global regulatory frameworks
Section Outline
In this section the attention goes further to the evolution of the rule of law 
and the human security expectations in global regulatory frameworks of gov-
ernance dealing with intra- and eventually inter-states conflicts. In theory, 
these frameworks are interdependent and complementary in their nature 
and reflect the global politics of international responses in mass atrocities. 
Looking further into the past, and for an understanding of the present, while 
avoiding speculations in regard to the future, it can be said that the establish-
ment of the International Criminal Court is the result of longstanding nego-
tiations and a legal discourse which took place in the United Nations as a 
forum for its 193 Member States to express their views, through the General 
Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and other 
bodies and committees involved in the preservation and evolution of inter-
national law. The International Law Commission presented a draft statute 
in 1993 which was examined by a committee appointed by the UN General 
Assembly in 1995. The Rome Statute was adopted on July 17, 1998. The Stat-
ute became a binding treaty, and came into force after it received its 60th rati-
fication, which was deposited at a ceremony at United Nations Headquarters 
on 11 April 2002. As a result of many years of negotiations aimed at establish-
ing a permanent international tribunal to punish individuals who commit 
genocide and other serious international crimes, the UN General Assembly 
convened a conference in Rome on the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court.22 This section provides an overview of the transition of glob-
al regulatory frameworks dealing with inter- and intra-state conflicts, and the 
triggering mechanism of jurisdiction deriving from them.
22 UN doc. A/CONF.183/10, 17 July 1998, Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Con-
ference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
accessible at: http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm
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2.2.1 The path of universality and integrity: from Rome to Kampala
After a longstanding diplomatic compromise, the Rome Statute was rapidly 
adopted by a vote of 120 to 7, with 21 countries abstaining. The seven coun-
tries that voted against the treaty were Iraq, Israel, Libya, China, Qatar, the 
United States, and Yemen. With the rejection of the United States and China, 
and with Russia abstaining, three permanent members of the UN Security 
Council are still not parties, while as of today 123 States ratified the Rome 
Statute.23 The important elements of such revolutionary international trea-
ty are without any doubt of historical character for modern international 
legal and political relations, first of all, as a response to the shortcomings of 
domestic jurisdictions in the fight against the impunity of serious crimes, 
and second, for the independence of such permanent judicial institution 
from the political and executive organ of the United Nations. The estab-
lishment of the Rome Statute represents the substantive alternative to the 
practice of the Security Council establishing ad hoc tribunals whose judicial 
mandates are currently under completion. Distant from reaching the trias 
politica or separation of powers in international relations, the Rome Statute 
represents the evolution of supranational criminal law, humanitarian and 
human rights law, pacing effectively the arena of international criminal jus-
tice mandates. Nevertheless, a new horizon arises for the emerging ‘con-
tours’ of international criminal justice in the field of international institution-
al law, international administrative and constitutional law, including the law 
of international organizations. These pluralist contours require legal tools to 
counterbalance conflicting laws and the gaps in the preservation of the legal 
order in the absence of a constitutional strategy.24
23 For an overview of the ratifi cation chart by region of the Rome Statute see CICC, A Uni-
versal Court with Global Support, accessible at: http://iccnow.org/?mod=romeratifi cation 
See also the ICC States Parties chronological list updated in 2013 and accessible at: 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/states%20parties%20
_%20chronological%20list.aspx
24 For an interesting overview of new fi elds of public international law and the theories 
of the potential and problems of global administrative law enhancing the accountabil-
ity of global governance, see N. Krisch and B. Kingsbury, ‘Introduction: Global Gover-
nance and Administrative Law in the International Legal Order’, in European Journal of 
International Law, (2006), Vol. 17 No. 1, 1–13, accessible at: http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/
17/1/64.pdf
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The first review conference of the Rome Statute in Uganda (Kampala) in 2010 
gathered over 2000 delegates of States Parties and non-State Parties such as 
the US from all corners of the globe. At provisional level, the States Parties 
discussed the following amendment proposals: the revision of Article 124 of 
the Rome Statute; the crime of aggression; the inclusion of the use of ‘certain’ 
weapons as war crimes in the context of an armed conflict not of an inter-
national character, such as the amendments of Article 8. In accordance with 
the treaty provisions, any future amendment to the Rome Statute requires 
the support of a two-thirds majority of the States Parties, and an amend-
ment will not enter into force until it has been ratified by seven-eighths of 
the States Parties. Any amendment to the list of crimes within the jurisdic-
tion of the Court will only apply to those States Parties that have ratified it, 
with the possibility of an opt- out clause by the States not endorsing such 
amendments.
The international legal order is still characterized by the absence of a supra-
national organization monitoring compliance of universal norms. However, 
some gaps should be filled according to the high expectations of a world 
constitution of the international community. With regard to the issue of pub-
lic authority it would be extremely important also to define the parameters 
between multilateral approaches of governance and the bilateral engage-
ments as for non-members, or only observers within the emerging multilat-
eral regimes of complementary character. This is the case of some permanent 
members of the Security Council such as the US, China and Russia as well as 
other States (India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran and Syria). In addition to such pol-
icy issues the institutional and constitutional matters of the United Nations 
and the Rome Statute institutions will be part of the discussions. The Secu-
rity Council for instance should refrain from the use of the veto in situations 
of mass atrocity crimes, namely genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity as proposed in the policy formulation of the ‘Small five’ (Costa 
Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland). Their proposal and 
policy formulations will need to be discussed in the General Assembly. If 
such proposal would pass, the civilians in Syria would at least have a better 
chance to be served by international justice and accountability.
2.2.2 Legalizing aggression from threat to crime
The Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) adopted in Rome in 
1998, lists aggression as a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. Nego-
tiations leading to the adoption of the Rome Statute produced consensus 
on a very narrowly defined core concept of crimes to be applied under the 
treaty, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and crimes of war. In the 
first instance, political consensus was not reached on aggression under the 
Rome Statute negotiations. Although a definition of the crime of aggression 
has finally been agreed, the jurisdiction of the Court will need more than 
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that.25 Resource sharing is fundamental, including appropriate triggering 
mechanisms between the governance institutions of universal character. It 
needs also to be noted that during the review conference of the Rome Stat-
ute in Kampala the States Parties agreed that no sooner than 2017, the Secu-
rity Council may refer aggression to the Court for prosecution of aggressive 
leaders from any nation, regardless of whether it has joined the Court. Alter-
natively, if a State party or the Court’s Prosecutor refers aggression to the 
Court, then the Prosecutor must see if the Security Council has determined 
that an act of aggression by the accused nation has occurred.26
In the past, the Security Council rarely determined that acts of aggression 
occurred. It has been much easier for the political and executive organ of 
the United Nations to determine a threat to or breach of international peace 
and security. This is one of the reasons why most governments pressured 
some means for the Court proceedings, in the absence of an explicit Secu-
rity Council decision on aggression. The compromise reached in Kampa-
la requires that if the Security Council fails to reach any such decision on 
acts of aggression after six months from any referral, the Court’s pre-trial 
judges can deliberate on the issue. If the chambers authorise the Prosecutor 
to investigate aggression however, the Security Council can still block the 
inquiry by adopting a mandatory resolution. Such ultimate decision given 
to the Security Council was essential to bring the UK and France on board, 
as permanent members of the UN political body, while also appealing the 
25 Although article 5(1) of the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC), included in its jurisdiction the crime of aggression as one of the core 
crimes, the Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction with regard to this crime until the adop-
tion of a defi nition and jurisdictional conditions was agreed upon. The negotiations 
in this regard have stirred considerable debate among States. In 1998 when the Rome 
Statute was formally adopted, States decided to continue with the longstanding legal 
debate. In 2002, the subsequent Preparatory Commission concluded its work with a 
Discussion Paper proposed by the Coordinator of the Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression which refl ected the status of the negotiations. In September 2002, the Assem-
bly of States Parties (ASP) established a Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggres-
sion (SWGCA), open to all States including non-States Parties, to continue discussions 
on the crime. Since 2003, the SWGCA has met both formally during ASP sessions and 
informally at Princeton University. A revised Discussion Paper was proposed by the 
Chairman in January 2007 and new version was issued for the resumed sixth ASP ses-
sion in June 2008. In February 2009 the Group agreed on a set of proposals on aggres-
sion that left only a few questions open, mainly related to the role of the Security Coun-
cil. Finally the proposal was ready for the review conference in Kampala as described 
above. For an overview and analysis of such intersection between international law and 
politics see, S. Barriga, W. Danspeckgruber, C. Wenaweser, The Princenton Process on the 
Crime of Aggression, Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, 2009. See also M. Gil-
lett, “The Anatomy of an International Crime: Aggression at the International Crimi-
nal Court”, International Criminal Law Review, Volume 13, Issue 4, at 829, accessible at: 
http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/15718123/13/4
26 See ICC-ASP/1/Res.1; ICC-ASP/8/Res.6; ICC-ASP-RC/Res.6, 2010, accessible at: 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf
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American observer delegation in Kampala, which exerted influence despite 
the fact that the United States is not a party to the Rome Statute. Another 
particular aspect of such compromise is that the nationals of non-States Par-
ties are excluded automatically from the jurisdictional liability of the Court.
Thus, it can be said that the interaction frameworks between institutional 
premises preserving peace, justice and human security in international 
conflicts, and the fight against the impunity of serious breaches committed 
during military aggression still wait to be universally enforced. The jurisdic-
tional regime of the crime of aggression is currently on hold, if we consider 
the outcome of the first review of the Rome Statute in Kampala.27 The review 
conference based the definition of the crime of aggression on the UN Gen-
eral Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974. In this context, if 
agreed, to qualify aggression as a crime committed by a political or military 
leader which, by its character, gravity and scale constituted a manifest viola-
tion of the UN Charter. As regards the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction, the 
conference agreed that a situation in which an act of aggression appeared to 
have occurred could be referred to the Court by the Security Council, acting 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, irrespective as to whether it involved 
States Parties or non-States Parties. Moreover, while acknowledging the 
Security Council’s role in determining the existence of an act of aggression, 
the conference agreed to authorize the Prosecutor, in the absence of such 
determination, to initiate an investigation on his own initiative or upon 
request from a State Party. In order to do so, however, the Prosecutor would 
have to obtain prior authorization from the Pre-Trial Division of the Court. 
Also, under these circumstances, the Court would not have jurisdiction in 
respect to crimes of aggression committed on the territory of non-States Par-
ties, or by their nationals, or with regard to States Parties that had declared 
that they did not accept the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.
27 The 8th session of the Assembly of the States Parties (ASP), which took place on 18-26 
November 2009, was foreseen to serve as a fi ltering mechanism of the issues that were 
discussed at the Review Conference in Kampala, Uganda (31 May to 11 June 2010). The 
ASP decided to forward to the Review Conference for its consideration only the pro-
posals for amendments concerning the revision of Article 124 of the Rome Statute, the 
possible adoption of provisions for the crime of aggression and the fi rst of the proposals 
put forward by Belgium to extend the jurisdiction of the Court to cover the use of certain 
weapons in the context of armed confl icts not of an international character. In addition, 
discussions were held regarding other proposals presented by Belgium, Belize and Trini-
dad and Tobago, Mexico, the Netherlands and South Africa. None of those proposals 
gathered suffi cient support for their consideration at the upcoming Review Conference. 
Nevertheless, the ASP agreed to create an ASP Working Group on Amendments that 
will serve as a mechanism to continue discussions on all of the submitted proposals and 
any other future proposal toward the next ASP in 2010 and ahead.
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The most contentious issue relates once again to the relationship between 
the Security Council and the Court. In particular, the controversy exists 
regarding the situations where the Security Council would not yet have 
determined that a State committed an act of aggression.28 Some States have 
expressed the view that under Article 39 of the UN Charter, the Security 
Council has exclusive competence to determine an act of aggression com-
mitted by a particular State. Under this view, the Court would not be able 
to proceed with a case in the absence of a Security Council determination 
to declare a State aggressor by specific acts against another State. This was 
simply the view expressed by the permanent members of the Security Coun-
cil.29 Other States have argued that the Security Council has primary, but not 
exclusive authority to determine an act of aggression, and that the absence 
of a Security Council determination should not preclude the Court from 
proceeding with a case. Under the revised ‘green light’ option, the Security 
Council could make a decision not to object to the investigation of the crime 
of aggression instead of making a determination of an act of aggression. Oth-
er governments have insisted that since the Security Council may already 
refer a situation to the Court and defer an investigation in accordance with 
article 13 and 16 of the Rome Statute respectively, no additional provision on 
a prior determination of an act of aggression, or other prior decision would 
be necessary by the Security Council. Overall, many States have expressed 
the view that the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction must reflect a 
careful balance between the independence of the Court as a judicial body, 
and the fundamental role of the Security Council in maintaining peace and 
security under the UN Charter.
The journey to find consensus on such sensitive governance issues appears 
to be a long one. Only a couple of years ago the States clarified their agree-
ment exclusively on due processes and the way they would proceed on these 
several issues. The independence of the Court has been promoted by the 
majority of the States Parties and such view is more than welcome. Howev-
er, the way such view would be accomplished in the practice is still unclear 
and remains to be seen. In any case, the prior determination by the Security
28 Article 39 of the UN Charter provides that the Security Council shall determine the 
existence of any act of aggression and “shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security”. The act of aggression is the use of armed force by one 
State against another State without the justifi cation of self-defence or without authoriza-
tion by the Security Council.
29 The ideal formula for the crime of aggression expressed by the permanent members 
of the Security Council has simply been the opt-in jurisdictional procedure left to the 
discretion of the States. In order to bridge the gap between the permanent members and 
a considerable number of other States seeking some alternative to an exclusive fi lter by 
the Security Council on aggression, other options have been proposed. For an overview 
of additional proposed options see D. Scheffer, “A Pragmatic Approach to The Crime 
of Aggression”, in R. Bellelli (ed.) International Criminal Justice: Law and Practice from The 
Rome Statute to Its Review, 2010, at 609.
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Council, or another UN organ, would not be prejudicial to the Court’s own 
determination on its jurisdictional substance. The Court has to make its 
determination in accordance with the definition under the Rome Statute and 
in accordance with the rights of the accused. During the sixth session of the 
Assembly of the States Parties, the States welcomed the clarification that the 
jurisdictional triggers of article 13 of the Rome Statute would remain appli-
cable independently of the question of additional preconditions. With regard 
to other preconditions, the special working group on the crime of aggres-
sion (SWGCA) focused in particular on the revised ‘green light’ option and 
on the option to enlarge the role of the Pre-Trial Chamber.30 Nevertheless, 
both proposals were met with more reluctance than support by the perma-
nent members of the Security Council. Following long negotiations during 
the Review Conference of the Rome Statute in Kampala (Uganda), the States 
Parties finally adopted provisions governing the terms of the Court’s ability 
to investigate and prosecute individuals for the crime of aggression.31 The 
States Parties to the Rome Statute agreed upon a jurisdictional regime for 
the crime of aggression, which provides separate procedures depending on 
whether the situation was referred by the UN Security Council, or whether it 
came before the Court through a State referral or upon the ICC Prosecutor’s 
initiative. The review conference determined that the activation of jurisdic-
tion is still subject to a positive decision by the Assembly of the States Parties 
which cannot be taken before 1 January 2017 and one year after the ratifica-
tion or acceptance of the amendments by 30 member States.32 The regime of 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute is once again confirmed, while the provisional 
change appears in the Article 15 of the Rome Statute.33
In conclusion, another element to be emphasized is that the emerging regime 
of international criminal justice is not able to regulate the cluster of humani-
tarian interventions and counter terrorism actions by individuals in a posi-
tion to exercise control, or empowered to direct political-military actions 
against another State. In the practice, the unilateralism of the national secu-
rity policy of some States to affirm military supremacy in international rela-
tions still takes place at the expense of the citizens of fragile and disintegrated 
States. In the military operations in Iraq, and later in Afghanistan, the inter-
national community witnessed that the national security policy of a couple of 
States (US and UK) might take the proportions of military coalitions involv-
30 See International Criminal Court, Assembly of the States Parties (ASP), Report of the Spe-
cial Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2, 20 February 2009.
31 See ICC Press Release, Review Conference of the Rome Statute concludes in Kampala, ICC-
ASP-20100612-PR546, accessible at: www.icc-cpi.int
32 For a provisional overview see the Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression, Annex I, ASP/RC/Res.6, 28 June 2010, acces-
sible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf
33 Article 15 bis: Exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression (State referral, proprio 
motu), Article 15 ter: Exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression (Security Coun-
cil referral).
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ing multinational forces causing humanitarian casualties and human rights 
violations including the risk of a crash of international stability.34 These 
breaches of international humanitarian law represent serious violations but 
do not fall under any supranational jurisdiction.35 Moreover, such military 
interventions rely on old mechanisms of conflict management, while reflect-
ing an unlawful concept of international security and a distortion of interna-
tional law which is still weak vis-à-vis non-state actors.36
2.2.3 The triggering mechanisms of jurisdiction
In this study the complementary role of the Rome Statute institutions with 
the United Nations system receives clarifications, as well as the controver-
sial challenges characterizing their interaction. Such interaction was com-
promised by the provisions of the Rome Statute setting the initial stage of 
‘triggering mechanisms’ of jurisdiction during intra-state armed conflicts. 
As we have seen, the crime of aggression characterizing inter-state conflicts 
has been extensively delayed for political reasons.37 Hopefully such juris-
dictional mechanisms will receive appropriate re-configurations depending 
on the evolution of the Court’s jurisdiction and the universal ratification of 
the Rome Statute. In any case, the ways public authorities interact with each 
other sharing their specific insight in devastating conflicts, deserve discus-
sions for the sake of entire communities. It is important to review some of 
the initial assessments in the formation of the Court’s jurisdiction. Right 
after the Rome Statute came into force and with regard to the debate on the 
lacuna of law enforcement in the treaty-based and brand new judicial insti-
tution, the American Society of International Law clarified its scholarly stand-
ing point that what emerged from the diplomatic compromise during the 
Rome Conference, which shaped the provisional nature of the treaty, was a 
Court with a ‘two-track’ system of jurisdiction. Scharf in his ‘Results of the 
Rome Conference for an International Criminal Court’ described that ‘track one’ 
would constitute situations referred to the Court by the Security Council.
This track would create binding obligations on all States to comply with 
34 See P. Shiner, A. Williams, The Iraq War and International Law, 2008.
35 Besides, during the investigation by the ICTY and its prosecution strategy, when the 
NATO forces intervened in the former Yugoslavia, atrocities were allegedly committed 
by its forces and the resultant investigations by the UN on the allegations were damn-
ing. The NATO forces escaped indictment only by a single vote in the UN Security 
Council. This has functioned to discourage the western powers to be hesitant at includ-
ing the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute.
36 See P. W. Singer, ‘War, Profi ts, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and 
International Law’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 42:2, Spring 2004, at 521.
37 The crime of aggression is a crime forming part of customary international law, there-
fore can be prosecuted by any State. The problems it currently faces are purely political 
manipulations by nations manifesting their political intent to frustrate the ICC. This was 
the case of the policy orientations by the US, especially during the previous administra-
tion under George W. Bush, including the distant positions taken by China and Russia 
as the permanent members of the UN Security Council.
54 Part I  The Quest of Complementarity and the Dilemma of Human Security 
orders of evidence or surrender of indicted persons under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. Track one would be enforced by Security Council “imposed 
embargoes, the freezing of assets of leaders and their supporters, and/or by 
authorizing the use of force”. In other words, the possible authorization of 
military enforcement by the Security Council under the flag of international 
criminal justice, humanitarian interventions and the duty to protect civilians.
According to Scharf it is indeed the ‘track one’ that the US favoured during 
the Rome Statute negotiations. With all respect to this theory, the question is 
whether such primary ‘law enforcement track’ falling under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter is translated in concrete actions, considering the practice in 
the case of Sudan, against President Al Bashir, since the International Crimi-
nal Court received jurisdiction by the Security Council.38 With the Court’s 
arrest warrants to the Sudanese leaders, the pressure for an international 
action grows, but there is no agreement in the Security Council on what this 
action should be. Due to unilateral economic interests in Sudan, China is 
even contrary to the isolation of the government in Sudan. While the US is 
supporting the arrest warrants, the Security Council may give priority to 
such political standpoints and even freeze the charges against the President 
of Sudan. Moreover, the negative political reactions became visible from the 
African Union against the judicial decisions of the Court in the Darfur’s case. 
The credibility of the Court’s judicial deliberations is at a crossroad between 
double standards and politicized positions of nation-states not cooperating 
with the Court, including a distortion from the Security Council authorizing 
the use of military force under the flag of the responsibility to protect civil-
ians, which characterizes also the situation and the referral addressed from 
the Security Council to the Court in Libya.
The ‘second track’ described by Scharf would constitute situations referred 
to the Court by individual countries (States Parties), or initiated by the ICC 
Prosecutor (proprio motu powers). This track would have no potential for any 
law enforcement action, but rather would rely on the good-faith cooperation 
of the States Parties to the Rome Statute. Thus, it was widely understood 
according to such theory that for the US “the real power was in the first 
track”. The US however, still demanded protection from the second track 
of the Court’s jurisdiction. As a consequence, the Court is facing serious 
difficulties regarding the judicial assistance, law enforcement and coopera-
tion in situations unable to end the impunity of gross violations of human 
rights. An example would be the case in Uganda where peace and justice 
were not seen as the two sides of the same coin. The peace processes would 
neutralize and freeze the arrest warrants, including the necessary coopera-
38 UN Doc. S/RES/1593 (2005), Referral to the International Criminal Court of the situ-
ation in Darfur (Sudan). For an overview of the lack of support received in Sudan, see 
ICC-02/05 the situation in Darfur, Sudan, ICC reports to the UNSC, accessible at: http://
www.icc-cpi.int/cases/Darfur/s0205/s0205_un.html
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tion to enforce the judicial decisions of the Court. In addition to the political 
rejection and the controversial relation between peace, justice and reconcili-
ation, the investigations of the Court are all characterized by serious security 
problems, especially reaching and protecting witnesses and victims in the 
field.39 Moreover, another security issue refers to the fact that for the ICC 
staff and the field offices, the assistance of the UN peacekeeping operations 
is extremely vital but still insufficient. In the DRC, several violations have 
been committed by the parties involved in the field including peacekeepers, 
which requires an internal UN justice system dealing with such matters, as 
the Court does not have jurisdiction over it.
According to Scharf and in order to address the US concerns during the 
negotiations of the Rome Statute, the following protective mechanisms were 
incorporated into the Court’s Statute pressured by the US: first, the Court’s 
jurisdiction under the second track which only relies on the cooperation of 
the States, would be based on a concept known as complementarity which was 
defined “as meaning the Court would be a last resort tool which comes into 
play only when domestic authorities are unable or unwilling to prosecute”.40 
At the insistence of the US, “the delegates at the Rome Conference added an 
additional clause to the concept of complementarity by providing in Article 18 
of the Rome Statute that the Prosecutor has to notify States with a prosecu-
tive interest in a case of intention to commence an investigation. If, within 
one month of notification, such a State informs the Court that it is investi-
gating the matter, the Prosecutor must defer to the domestic investigative 
activity, unless it can convince the Pre-Trial Chamber that such investigation 
is unlawful. The decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber is subject to interlocu-
tory appeal to the Appeals Chamber (e.g. the Appeals Chamber delibera-
tion on the situation in Kenya). Article 8 of the Court’s Statute specifies that 
the Court would have jurisdiction only over ‘serious’ war crimes that repre-
sent a ‘policy or plan’. Thus, random acts of personnel involved in a foreign 
peacekeeping operation would not be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.
Article 15 of the Court’s Statute monitors complaints addressed to the Pros-
ecutor by requiring the approval of a three-judge pre-trial chamber before 
the prosecution can launch an investigation, as in the situation addressed 
by the Prosecutor in Kenya and Ivory Coast after the post-election violence. 
The decision of the chamber is subject to interlocutory appeal to the Appeals 
Chamber. Article 16 of the Statute allows the Security Council to affirma-
tively vote to postpone an investigation or case for up to twelve months, on 
a renewable basis. “While this does not amount to the individual veto the 
US had sought, this does give them and the other members of the Security 
Council a collective control over the Court, if no permanent member ‘vetoes’ 
39 UN doc. Security Council Resolutions 1422/2002 and 1487/2003.
40 M. P. Scharf, ‘Results of The Rome Conference for an International Criminal Court’, 
August 1998, ASIL Insights, accessible at: http://www.asil.org/insigh23.cfm
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the resolution calling for postponement. These measures were considered 
sufficient for other major powers, including the United Kingdom, France 
and Russia, which voted in favour of the Rome Statute. But without what 
would amount to any veto of jurisdiction over US personnel and officials, 
the US felt bound to vote against the Rome Statute”.41
Even no experts of international relations and international law are aware 
of the devastating consequences of such rejection of the Rome Statute 
under the Bush administration. On the contrary the ‘agendas’ of the current 
Obama administration focusing on ‘repair’, ‘resume’, ‘renew’ contain prag-
matic new policy elements for international law considering what President 
Obama has called a “new era of engagement” in his remarks addressed to 
the UN General Assembly. The Rome Statute institutions however, are still 
waiting for such global engagements.42
2.2.4 The impact and progress of the Review Conference
Regarding the jurisdictional progress of the Court in terms of article 123 of 
the Rome Statute the review conference in Uganda (Kampala) has so far 
been the only statutory one. As a result of discussions at the sessions of the 
Assembly of States Parties (ASP), a number of proposals did not gather suf-
ficient support for their consideration at the review conference, such as ter-
rorism, the use of weapons of mass destruction and other serious threats in 
the sense of receiving crime definition globally recognized. Nevertheless, 
the ASP agreed to create a working group on specific amendments, which 
will serve to continue discussions on the submitted proposals and any other 
future proposal.43
Participation in the conference was open to representatives of States Par-
ties to the Rome Statute, observer States, States not having observer status, 
representatives designated by intergovernmental organizations and other 
entities that received a standing invitation from the UN General Assembly, 
representatives designated by regional intergovernmental organizations or 
other international bodies invited to the Rome Conference, representatives 
41 See M. P. Scharf supra.
42 See H. Koh, S. J. Rapp, The US Engagement with the ICC and the Outcome of the Recently 
Concluded Review Conference, Special Briefi ng to the US Department of States, June 15 
2010, accessible at: http://www.state.gov/s/wci/us_releases/remarks/143178.htm
43 The eighth session of the ASP of November 2009 (ICC-ASP/8/20) was foreseen to serve 
as a fi ltering mechanism of the issues to be discussed at the Review Conference in Kam-
pala, Uganda (31 May to 11 June 2010). Thus, the ASP decided to forward to the Review 
Conference for its consideration only the proposals for amendments concerning the revi-
sion of Article 124 of the Statute, the possible adoption of provisions for the crime of 
aggression, and the fi rst of the proposals put forward by Belgium to extend the jurisdic-
tion of the Court to cover the use of certain weapons in the context of armed confl icts not 
of an international character.
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of subsidiary bodies of the Assembly of States Parties (ASP), officials and 
staff of the Court, officials and staff of the United Nations, non-governmen-
tal organizations invited to the Rome Conference, and other persons accred-
ited or invited to attend the conference. The States Parties officials, national 
judicial and prosecutorial authorities, NGOs and other members of civil 
society, reported on the status and impact of international criminal justice 
and the Rome Statute regime.
The initiation of a ‘stocktaking’ process of the Court’s presence in the inter-
national legal order and its impact in mass atrocity situations, including the 
perspective of victims and communities affected by the Court’s work on the 
ground, was proposed as an important topic by numerous States, by the 
ASP, NGOs and other members of civil society. With regard to the case-law 
and its jurisprudence, the main task for the Court is to guarantee fair trials, 
giving back the voice to the victims of crimes with participation and repara-
tion programs. The review conference included assessments to consider the 
holistic success and impact of the Rome Statute to date, with a particular 
focus on the following areas: a) the impact on victims and affected commu-
nities; b) the principle of complementarity; c) the status of cooperation; and 
d) the dilemma of peace and justice.44
Political and legal challenges on the role of complementary global regimes 
complementing domestic governance institutions for the fight against the 
impunity of international crimes are important preconditions for decision-
making. Only time will prove if such ‘systemic’ assessments during the 
review conference in Kampala will raise the standards of policy making 
and strategy building, fostering peace, justice and security altogether. The 
role of parliamentarians and the legislative implementation at national level 
remains the key. At international level measuring the effectiveness of such a 
‘system’ of governance should not preclude the basic requirement to harmo-
nize the treaty law in the Rome Statute and the UN Charter, strengthening 
the political consensus on structural and substantial reforms. These are con-
sidered essential topics before any other future ‘systemic’ assessment would 
take place.
An important aspect that limits the current progress of the emerging regime 
of international criminal justice, is the distance taken by political standpoints 
on global threats in the way of being defined as crimes falling under inter-
national law. Some proposals on terrorism have been put on the table of the 
negotiations and addressed to the political premises of the Assembly of the 
States Parties but there seem to be an impasse in the decision making about 
44 ICC RC/WGOA/1/Rev.2, RC/WGOA/2, RC/ST/V/INF.1, RC/ST/V/INF.2, Review 
Conference of the Rome Statute, Kampala, Uganda, 31 May – 11 June 2010. For an over-
view of the offi cial documents see: http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/ReviewCon-
ference/Review+Conference.htm
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the international regime under which such global threat would fall. In gen-
eral, the current exercise of the powers of the Security Council relating to 
the maintenance of international peace and security can directly affect indi-
vidual rights. This is in particular true for targeted sanctions. In this case, 
the respect due to human rights requires that the affected individuals enjoy 
certain procedural safeguards, including an effective remedy against a list-
ing decision. The Security Council Committee established pursuant to para-
graph 6 of resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and 
associated individuals and entities (hereafter referred to as the “Al-Qaida 
and Taliban Sanctions Committee”) oversees the implementation by States 
of the three sanctions measures (freeze of assets, travel ban and arms embar-
go) imposed by the Security Council on individuals and entities associated 
with the Taliban and the Al-Qaida organization.
It needs to be noted that the 1267 Sanctions Committee maintains a Consoli-
dated List of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures in the 
context of counterterrorism. By Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1390 
(2002), as reiterated in resolutions 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1735 
(2006) and 1822 (2008), the Security Council has obliged all States to: freeze 
without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources, 
including funds derived from property owned or controlled directly or indi-
rectly; prevent the entry into or the transit through their territories; prevent 
the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer of arms and related material, 
including military and paramilitary equipment, technical advice, assis-
tance or training related to military activities, with regard to the individu-
als, groups, undertakings and entities placed on the Consolidated List. In 
accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1822 (2008), the Al-Qaida/Tali-
ban Sanctions Committee makes accessible a narrative summary of reasons 
for the listing for individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included 
in the Consolidated List.45 After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the last decade 
has been characterized by an approach against terrorism which created seri-
ous issues for human rights law including serious violations of humanitar-
ian principles.46 Real consensus is still required in the fight against terrorism 
including its definition as international crime. Unfortunately, the advent of 
the first review of the Rome Statute did not progress on terrorism and we 
will discuss later some of the political reasons behind such an impasse.
45 For an overview of the narrative summaries of reasons for listing, see http://www.
un.org/sc/committees/1267/narrative.shtml See also M. Bothe, “Security Council’s tar-
geted sanctions against presumed terrorists: The need to comply with human rights stan-
dards” 6(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice (2008), at 541-555. See also I. Cameron, 
‘UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the ECHR’, 2006 Nordic Journal of Interna-
tional Law 72, 1 at 56. See C. Warbrick, ‘The European Response to Terrorism in an Age of 
Human Rights’, (2004) 15 EJIL, at 989. See also J. Farrall, K. Rubenstein (eds), Sanctions, 
accountability and governance in a globalised world, 2009.
46 See the US National Strategy for Counterterrorism, White House, June 2011, accessible at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/fi les/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf
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2.3 The Normative and Policy Orientations
Section Outline
The previous section addressed the lacuna of human security measures 
between legal and political frameworks preserving international order, 
peace and security and fundamental individual rights. It pointed out the 
role of the emerging regime of international criminal justice in multiple situ-
ations of war and crime; the jurisdictional nature deriving from previous 
ad hoc models based on double standards; the rule of law as a principle of 
governance in extremely violent political transitions, aggressive domestic 
regimes and political élites far from preserving human security. It examined 
the transition of global regulatory frameworks and the intersection between 
policy and law about international interventions in intra- and inter-state con-
flicts. It demonstrated the limits of complementary global regimes dealing 
with international threats and crimes and their democratic governance. This 
section debates the missing priorities of normative and policy orientations 
securing individuals in times of turmoil and violations of international law. 
It examines the concept of human security in international law and world 
politics serving the quest of peace and justice. First of all, it needs to be veri-
fied whether civilian protection measures would ever be applied to victims 
and witnesses of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity, during both security operations and judicial activities, when at 
least the international community decides to intervene with last resort inves-
tigations and prosecutions of States parties and/or not parties to the Rome 
Statute. This is only one of the reasons why the complementary role of the 
Rome Statute regime to the United Nations system deserve clarification in 
order to define the governance of justice during humanitarian interventions 
in ‘failed’ States. Moreover, it is also important to understand the possible 
evolution of the Court’s jurisdiction and its public authority once the judi-
cial outcomes have been released. In other words, the ways complementary 
global regimes would translate in practice reliable measures of protective 
justice towards the proceedings of security systems, law enforcement and 
sustainable order, including capacity-building of domestic governance sys-
tems dealing with retributive and restitutive justice. This section discusses the 
missing priorities in the governance of peace, justice and security. It offers 
some observations about the dilemma of human security in international 
law and global politics and the importance of regimes of complementary 
nature governing sustainable peace towards justice and accountability and 
possible capacity-building.
2.3.1 The missing priorities
The analysis of empirical data shows that the major constraint detected in 
the governance of peace and justice is the lacuna of human security mea-
sures. Human security depends on an understanding of preventive mea-
sures capable of preventing international threats and crimes, and on the 
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willingness of the actors involved to apply those measures, especially 
by the States themselves and their political will to follow such measures, 
but also by international governance institutions in accordance with their 
roles to provide applicable models to be followed by domestic governance 
structures, including regional and international realities. The problem of 
‘stateless’’ territories, their sensitive statehood issues, and the conflicts and 
violations deriving from them, are still left out of any support by global gov-
ernance systems. These systems are still correctly defined as state-centered, 
even if lately the harm suffered by the individuals in conflict zones charac-
terized by severe human rights violations requires regulatory frameworks 
of governance. In this study the governance model proposed is based on 
the principle that the proper referent for security should be the individu-
al rather than the State. Human security holds that a people-centred view 
of security is necessary for national, regional and international stability. It 
advocates that more efforts and resources need to be invested in an accurate 
knowledge of early warning, identifying the fragility of the situation and the 
risks associated with it, in order to anticipate a possible attempt to peace and 
serious violations of international humanitarian law. Unfortunately, such 
an approach did not materialize in the practice and methods applied in the 
referrals of the Security Council to the Court in the Sudan and Libya, while 
still keeping the Court far from ending the impunity of the mass atrocity 
crimes committed in Syria, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and other country-
situations where jurisdiction, support and cooperation are required.
The establishment of an international judicial institution, advocated for 
decennia, dealing with individual perpetrators outside the UN premises, 
while fighting against the impunity of serious crimes internationally recog-
nized, represents a revolutionary development for the promotion of global 
values, such as integrity and universality. However, the creation of a reliable 
architecture and mechanisms fostering peace, justice and security is charac-
terized by important challenges which are related to the absence of separa-
tion of powers between legislative, judicial and executive international man-
dates and by the negative repercussions on the creation of a state-building 
apparatus applicable in ‘failed’ States for the sake of human security. The 
lack of political support of the judicial decisions of the Court in the Sudan, 
Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for instance, show 
that the comprehensive efforts of the United Nations to stop conflicts and 
atrocities visible in peace negotiations, peace enforcement operations, and 
escalations of humanitarian disasters are not taking part in support of the 
regime of international criminal justice. Besides, in the debate on the nor-
mative provisions that led to the adoption of Article 16 of the Rome Statute 
relating to the possible tensions or disconnection between peace and justice 
and their governance, including real-life experience to govern internation-
al humanitarian escalations, were indeed underestimated. The lacuna of 
human security measures still persists when preventive diplomacy would 
fail, while the links between justice, human development and sustainable 
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peace are weak and inconsistent in the majority of the conflict and post-con-
flict situations assessed in this study.
2.3.2 Human security and international law
The questions addressed in this section relate to the lack of protection 
measures of civilians during intra-state conflicts. The Court is expected to 
receive appropriate consideration in the configuration of peace enforce-
ment mandates including the findings of inquiry commissions of the UN 
Human Rights Council. It is essential to focus on the ways the policy of the 
responsibility to protect (RtoP), and the fight against domestic criminal 
regimes would centralize fundamental individual rights and the univer-
sality of human rights principles when dealing with escalations of mass 
atrocity crimes. The preventive efforts of armed conflicts wait for concrete 
accomplishments of global governance. It needs to be noted that in accor-
dance with the principle of proportionality, the incidental and unintended 
harm caused to civilians, or civilian property, must be proportionate and 
not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage antici-
pated by an attack on a military objective. Under international humanitar-
ian law (IHL) and the Rome Statute indeed, the death of civilians during an 
armed conflict, no matter how grave and regrettable might be, does not in 
itself constitute a war crime. International humanitarian law and the Rome 
Statute permit belligerents to carry out proportionate attacks against mili-
tary objectives, even when it is known that some civilian deaths or injuries 
will occur.47 With the war in Iraq some important features of international 
law have been compromised. Unfortunately, the establishment of the Rome 
Statute institutions would not signify the solution of longstanding issues in 
the realm of compliance of international law. If some of its branches received 
consistent jurisprudence in the criminality domain, including the fact that 
international law is no longer solely concerned with relations between sov-
ereign States, there is much less progress about possible alternatives that 
could further preserve the international legal order by the foundational and 
systemic changes occurring in the world society.
47 Article 52 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions provides a widely-
accepted defi nition of military objective: “In so far as objects are concerned, military objec-
tives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an 
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a defi nite military advan-
tage”, see L. Moreno-Ocampo, OTP letter to senders re Iraq, 9 February 2006, page 4-5, foot-
note 11, accessible at: http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F596D08D-D810-43A2-
99BB-B899B9C5BCD2/277422/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf
See also H. E. Shamash, “How Much is Too Much? An Examination of the Principle of Jus 
in Bello Proportionality”, in Israel Defense Forces Law Review, Vol. 2, 2005-2006, acces-
sible at http://ssrn.com/abstract=908369
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2.3.3 Human security and world politics
Another problem is that the ‘responsibility to protect’ (RtoP) ‘norm’ does 
not have as yet a firm legal character but is left to the fluctuations of global 
politics. The Protection of Civilians (POC) and the Responsibility to Protect 
(RtoP or R2P) for instance, are distinct but very closely linked from a theo-
retical perspective. The POC has its roots in universal principles of interna-
tional humanitarian law (IHL) as well as human rights and refugee law. The 
POC constitutes the full range of activities that intergovernmental organiza-
tions, States, international NGOs, and individuals can pursue to advance the 
legal and physical protection of civilians, particularly in the context of armed 
conflicts. This notion of protection can be understood to include: physical 
protection from immediate harm; satisfaction of the needs essential for the 
sustenance of life, and freedom to exercise fundamental human rights. The 
RtoP calls on national authorities, regional organizations and global institu-
tions to cooperate in the protection of civilians from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Much work needs to be done 
to identify the scope of civilian protection, the measures needed to protect 
civilians and the best practices applicable. The RtoP is a framework for real-
izing the POC in the most egregious cases, such as the prevention of, and the 
protection from mass atrocity crimes. The whole POC agenda is substan-
tially wider than that one covered by the RtoP, and aspects of the preven-
tive components of the RtoP extend beyond the POC. So said, what kind of 
interrelation can be found between the two, and how this would be applied 
by complementary global regimes? How did the RtoP work in situations of 
war and crime such as in the DRC, in the Sudan and in Libya, whereas the 
humanitarian assistance on the ground was constantly compromised by the 
military operations deployed in the field and by the lack of cooperation by 
criminal regimes?
Unfortunately, apart from providing some definitions of volatile inter-
national policies, the operational relationship between the POC and the 
RtoP remains unclear. More work is needed to understand what protection 
activities contribute to preventing the escalation, or constitute an effective 
response to the commission of mass atrocity crimes, and hence, how and 
where the two concept are symbiotic. In the Horn of Africa for instance, there 
is clearly a drought but the reason why thousands of people are leaving their 
homes in search of food is also because a violent insurgency in Somalia, 
along with the forced recruitment of youths, which is making things worse. 
Much of southern and central Somalia is controlled by al Shabaab Islamist 
militants linked to al Qaeda who imposed a ban on food aid in 2010.48 
48 See Abdisaid M. Ali, The Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidiin: A profi le of the fi rst Somali terrorist 
organisation, Institut für Strategie Politik Sicherheits und Wirtschaftsberatung (ISPSW), 
Berlin, Germany, June 2008, accessible at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/
Publications/Detail/?id=55851
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These al Shabaab militants have since maintained the embargo on the World 
Food Program (WFP), calling the world food aid program a ‘spy agency’. 
Al Shabaab accused the United Nations of invasion and determined not 
to allow humanitarian agencies with ‘hidden agendas’ to return on the 
ground. Part of the problem according to reliable analytical reports is that 
much of the fundings for WFP and some other humanitarian aid agencies 
come from the United States, opening them to charges of controversial 
objectives which again relate to security policy and its anti-terrorism agen-
da, much more than humanitarian assistance to the population starving to 
death.49 Furthermore, it needs to be noted that with East Africa facing its 
worst drought in 60 years affecting more than 11 million people, the United 
Nations has declared a famine in the region for the first time in a genera-
tion. The overcrowded refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia are receiving 
some 3,000 new refugees every day, as families flee from famine-stricken 
and war-torn areas. The situation of East of Africa is characterized by the 
slow response of Western governments, local governments to terrorist 
groups blocking access, terrorist and bandit attacks, including anti-terror-
ism laws that restrict who the aid groups can deal with, not to mention the 
massive scale of the current humanitarian crisis. The unfortunate informa-
tion is that in the Sudan as well both the POC and the RtoP agendas have 
constantly failed, and are still in the hands of controversial international 
political engagements which are compromising the stability in the country, 
and with the criminal and violent leaderships, undermining the credibility 
of the international judicial outcomes falling under the Rome Statute. So 
said and avoiding speculations, the substantial progress in the normative 
and policy frameworks centralizing individuals in international affairs, and 
the governance institutions dealing with them, needs to be verified. In fact, 
the involvement of the Court in mass atrocity crimes in the African con-
tinent could be interpreted as the hope of having a deterrent effect of the 
serious violations of individual rights committed in several countries, and 
which hopefully would take full ownership of their fight against the regime 
of impunity of international crimes of common concern.
Since the early 1990s the African Great Lakes Region, politically and geo-
graphically defined as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burun-
di, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania, has been convulsed by genocide, civil 
wars, inter-state conflict and flawed democratic transitions. The conflicts 
of the last decade across this region must be understood in the context of 
ethnic and religious conflict, the struggle of State formation and the role of 
natural resources originating such conflicts. Three factors have been identi-
49 See B. Malone, ‘Horn of Africa aid caravan too late, again’, Somalia on msnbc.com, 26 July 
2011, accessible at: http://msnbc.msn.com/id/43900689/ns/world_news-africa/ For 
an insight into the struggle against terrorism in the Horn of Africa, in the situations in 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen, see R. I. Rotberg, Battling 
terrorism in the Horn of Africa, Brookings Institution Press, 2005.
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fied as key contributors to conflict and mass atrocities in the region: ethnic-
ity, absence of domestic systems of governance and exploitation of natural 
resources (pillage). Peace-building strategies and post-conflict recovery have 
increasingly sought to address both political and economic issues, incorpo-
rating the national, regional and the international dimensions. The empirical 
results regarding African countries point out that in the majority of these sit-
uations, conflicts returned to be the reality after a very short break through 
from war to peace. This is the reason why the governance of complementary 
global regimes requires attention. Such governance represents the opportu-
nity to maximize both actions and results fostering peace, justice and secu-
rity. However, it requires to be challenged in the right direction with a strong 
political road map.
2.4 The paradigm shift of global ‘complementarity’
Section Outline
The political determination to establish an independent, permanent, univer-
sal, International Criminal Court in ‘relationship’ with the United Nations 
system, “with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the inter-
national community as a whole”, was settled in the preamble of the Rome 
Statute. The preamble of the treaty recognizes the link between peace and 
justice, stating that “grave crimes threaten the peace, security, and well-being 
of the world” and affirming that States Parties are “determined to put an end 
to the impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus, contribute to 
the prevention of such crimes”. Considering the practice of the last decade, 
the pursuit of peace and justice in conflict and post-conflict societies presents 
some controversial challenges. Several problems occur in the coordination of 
efforts of independent political and judicial mandates, particularly between 
the configuration strategies of international peacemakers and peacekeep-
ers, and the interests of victims and witnesses of international crimes on 
relocation, protection and reparation in the context of human security.
Even if peace and justice complement each other in the long term, in the 
short term tensions have arisen between efforts to secure peace, and efforts 
to ensure accountability of international crimes. In theory, the principle 
of the interdependence between peace, justice and security at global level 
should focus on strengthening relationships and partnerships between com-
plementary international mandates, such as the Rome Statute institutions 
and the United Nations system, particularly considering the main charac-
teristic of the emerging regime of international criminal justice, based on 
cooperation networks at domestic, regional and global levels. In practice, 
the interdependence between peace, justice and security is compromised by 
the obstacles on balancing powers at international level. In my view this is 
particularly true looking at the interaction between political, executive and 
judicial mandates and the ‘governance’ that derives from such compromise.
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At structural level, none of the Rome Statute institutions is formally part of 
the United Nations system, however their mandates are complementary. 
Such global governance institutions are involved respectively on interna-
tional threats, peace and crime control, but their partnership is not suffi-
ciently defined, while the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the most serious 
crimes of international concern. The legal relationship between the Court 
and the United Nations is governed by the relationship agreement.50 Any 
amendment of such agreement shall be approved by the UN General Assem-
bly and by the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) in accordance with article 2 
of the Rome Statute.51 Several basic principles, such as discretion and confi-
dentiality, preside over the cooperation between the Court and the United 
Nations, which is also based on specific arrangements regulating such poor 
interaction in the field missions.
2.4.1 The challenges in global regimes
Since the Court’s establishment several States Parties referred to the Court 
their inability to investigate and prosecute serious crimes on their own 
(e.g. Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Central African Republic, 
Ivory Coast and Mali), while preliminary assessments are performed by 
the Court to verify whether investigations should be opened in Afghani-
stan, Colombia, Palestine, Guinea, Georgia, Honduras, Nigeria, Democratic 
Republic of Korea and Ukraine. A preliminary assessment is the first phase 
of the Court’s Prosecutor activities. It is a phase during which the office of 
the Prosecutor first examines the jurisdiction of the Court, whether crimes 
falling under the ICC jurisdiction may have been, or are committed in a 
given situation.52 If the conditions are met, whether genuine investiga-
tions and prosecutions are being carried out by the competent authorities 
in relation to these crimes and, as a third step, whether the possible open-
ing of an investigation by the Prosecutor would not go against the inter-
50 As reported in the addendum to the note of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/58/874/
Add. 1, the draft relationship agreement was approved by the Assembly of States Parties 
to the Rome Statute on 7 September 2004 at The Hague. The Netherlands recommended 
the adoption of the draft resolution by the General Assembly without a vote, thereby 
approving the draft relationship agreement between the UN and the ICC. Because the 
several concerns about the ICC, the United States rejected the consensus on the draft 
resolution. See UN doc. General Assembly, A/58/PV.95, 13 September 2004, Agenda 
item 154, at 5.
51 UN Doc. A/RES/58/79, UN doc. A/58/874 (2004).
52 Offi ce of the Prosecutor, Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 2010, accessible at:
http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Offi ce+of+the+Prosecutor/
Policies+and+Strategies/Draft+Policy+Paper+on+Preliminary+Examinations.htm
66 Part I  The Quest of Complementarity and the Dilemma of Human Security 
ests of justice.53 During this phase, and in accordance with Article 15 of the 
Rome Statute, the Office of the Prosecutor proactively evaluates all infor-
mation on alleged crimes from multiple sources, including communications 
from individuals, non-governmental organizations and other parties con-
cerned. The triggering of a preliminary examination does not imply that an 
investigation will be opened. The extensive literature existent since the first 
phase of existence of the Court on such policy orientations, which fall under 
the normative framework of the Rome Statute, is the result of a longstanding 
scholarly debate on issues such as the selection of situations and admissibil-
ity, the complementarity and the impact on affected communities, including 
public outreach and witnesses and victims’ rights.
2.4.2 The challenges in policy and law
It should be clear at this stage that this study explores practical steps in fur-
thering the international rule of law as a principle of governance. It offers 
an analysis of the challenges characterizing the emerging regime of inter-
national criminal justice arguing on the imperfect interaction between the 
International Criminal Court and the United Nations, particularly during 
the operations on the ground fostering human security. The rule of law as a 
principle of governance centralizing human rights and justice is extensively 
argued by scholars and practitioners, while international governance insti-
tutions struggle with the preservation of such fundamental principle accord-
ing to their respective mandates. The supranational lacuna characterizing 
the international legal order is not resolved by the presence of institutions 
of universal character. A legal framework regulating such interactions does 
not contain a defined strategy or road map and it is considered very poor. 
Political deadlocks slow down the transition of humanitarian interventions, 
use of force, protection duties of civilians, reconciliation and reconstruction, 
which should create the premises of global justice. Appropriate interaction 
strategies between independent and complementary mandates for the sake 
of individuals are an opportunity to preserve further the rule of law. After 
all, such public authorities operate in accordance with the constitution of 
the international community and need democratic ‘triggering mechanisms’ 
monitoring serious international threats and crimes. The precondition of 
appropriate triggering mechanisms however, depends on real consensus 
in balancing powers between such complementary global entities. In other 
words, the intersection between international law and global politics by the 
research community is further required.
53 Offi ce of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, 2007, accessible at: http://
www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BF09-73422BB23528/143640/
ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice.pdf
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The domestic jurisdiction of any sovereign State includes the right to 
define and punish crimes. Every State decides for itself, according to its legal 
traditions and within the limits of international law.54 International law does 
not determine which point of view is to be preferred between monism and 
dualism. International law only requires that its rules are respected, and that 
States are free to decide on the manner in which they want to respect these 
rules and make them binding on their citizens. In theory, the supremacy of 
international law is a rule in both dualist and monist legal systems, while in 
practice if a treaty is accepted for purely political reasons, and States do not 
intend to fully translate it into national law, or to take a monist view on inter-
national law, then the implementation of the treaty is very uncertain. The 
impasse of a treaty depends indeed on the combination of several factors. 
The institutions deriving from such treaties need to be proactive in prevent-
ing whatever impasse. The institutional design established by the treaties 
may limit the level of uncertainty, firstly proposing a model of harmoni-
zation between the international legal systems of the world, and secondly 
enhancing definitions of crimes of serious common concern, offering assis-
tance in the implementation of national legislations. The theory applicable 
in this doctrinal context is balancing public powers to maximize results. The 
precondition is a good delimitation of competences, working methods and 
good relationships between complementary actors especially on the ground. 
The policy of cooperation between such independent, and most importantly 
complementary institutions, is extremely important and needs to be visible 
in their respective legislations. It is still argued by many policy observers 
that the extent of such cooperation preserving peace, justice and security is 
treated as matters of common concerns. In my view, only towards an accu-
rate interaction between complementary global regimes it would be possible 
to maximize the results with the use of minimal resources. Such interaction 
depends of course on a defined strategy settled by the decision-making 
enforcing global governance institutions towards democratic reforms, which 
are still pending. The political convergence on such issues does not receive 
54 For an overview of the debate regarding the substantive criminal matters, international 
cooperation and implementing solutions of the Rome Statute, R. S. K. Lee, States’ Respons-
es to Issues Arising from the ICC Statute: Constitutional, Sovereignty, Judicial Cooperation, and 
Criminal Law, (2005), at 215. This is a comparative study focusing on the legislative meth-
ods and techniques used in 12 countries to give effect to the ICC, which covers both com-
mon law and civil law countries: Argentina; Brazil; South Africa; The Netherlands; Liech-
tenstein; France; Sweden; Germany; Norway; Italy; Canada; and the UK. The practice of 
each State forms a chapter focusing on constitutional, sovereign, and criminal issues. Two 
additional chapters discuss such issues now facing Japan and Mexico. The contributors 
focus on real issues encountered and methods and techniques actually employed with 
the purpose of serving as a practical guide to those countries still looking for methods 
to give effect to the Rome Statute. In each case the authors explain why certain legisla-
tive approaches were used and why others were not selected. The authors are all experts 
with years of experience in the fi eld; most of them participated in preparing the relevant 
domestic laws and in the making process of the Rome Statute.
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any progress, if we consider the positions of the permanent members of the 
Security Council in regard to the situation in Syria.
2.5 The Political Impasse of Multilateralism
Section Outline
The analysis of the legislative history of the United Nations and the Rome 
Statute institutions during the first decade of their existence shows that there 
have been delays for the International Criminal Court to enter into a sub-
stantive relationship with the United Nations. In addition to such delays 
the relationship between the United Nations and the African Union (AU) 
failed to design a road map for the peace process in the Sudan. The Darfur’s 
peace talks by the UN, which called on all parties to cease hostilities and 
prepare for forthcoming negotiations, did not work. As a result, the human-
itarian disaster in the whole Sudanese region considerably increased. The 
Court would then receive the first referral from the UN Security Council as 
massive humanitarian escalation of last resort, where serious crimes fall-
ing under its jurisdiction had been committed.55 Right after the opening of 
an independent investigation in Darfur the Court’s officials declared that 
such an investigation “will require sustained cooperation from national and 
international authorities. It will form part of a collective effort, complement-
ing African Union and other initiatives to end the violence in Darfur and 
to promote justice”.56 The Court however, remained completely isolated. 
Not any political and diplomatic support was ever provided by the Secu-
rity Council, by the Assembly of the States Parties and by the other relevant 
organs in order to re-shape the relations between the Court and the several 
members of the African Union which, as States Parties to the Rome Statute, 
took severe distance from the judicial institution. In this collapse of coop-
eration, the discrepancy of law enforcement and the lack of engagement in 
such humanitarian escalations became visible very soon. The Court would 
not receive any support right after the extension of its jurisdiction to a non-
State party by the UN Security Council in Darfur. Its judicial outcomes did 
not receive any follow up. The cooperation between the Security Council 
and the Court shows the lacuna of political and diplomatic support and the 
complete absence of law enforcement engagements. The consensus in the 
55 UN doc. S/RES/1593 (2005).
56 See Report of the former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Luis Moreno-
Ocampo to the Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 29/06/2005 accessible 
at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/exeres/2386f5cb-b2a5-45dc-b66f-17e762f77b1f.htm On 25 
May, 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) ordered the 
ICC Registrar to transmit the decision informing the United Nations Security Council 
about the lack of cooperation by the Republic of the Sudan in the case of the Prosecutor 
v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (Ahmad Harun) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al Rahman (Ali 
Kushayb), in order for the Security Council to take any action it may deem appropriate. 
See ICC-02/05-01-07 accessible at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc868180.pdf
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UN political organs resulted to be weak. The unilateral interests of China 
with regard to Sudan and also the abstention of the US characterized the 
vote of the Resolution 1593 (2005). Even referring the situation to the Court 
in light of the findings of the International Commission of Inquiry on vio-
lations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur, 
the so-called Cassese Commission, the collective efforts have been neglected 
compromising further the authority of the international judicial institution. 
The same controversial political trends characterized the involvement in the 
situation in Libya and the inaction with regard to Syria.
2.5.1 Engaging in relationships and partnerships?
This section argues not exclusively on the relationship between the Security 
Council and the Court but refers to deep-rooted systemic issues still wait-
ing for political convergence and democratic solutions. The actual overlaps 
obviously point out the absence of the separation of powers in international 
relations and the failure of democratic reform of the political and executive 
organ of the UN empowering the voice of less represented States. In the case 
of the African States and their obligations falling under the Rome Statute 
including the controversial position of the African Union (AU), the politi-
cal solution would be to avoid with every means the distance between the 
AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council. In accordance 
with the UN Charter the regional dimension is extremely important. In my 
view, such dimension should receive a specific role in any systemic change 
of democratic governance. The interaction between the Security Council and 
the Court is characterized by the inexistence of law enforcement solutions 
between executive and judicial, and by the absence of a supranational judi-
cial organization which should monitor the accountability regime at global 
level. The ‘triggering mechanisms’ regulating humanitarian escalations of 
last resort need attention.
In the presidential statement issued by the Security Council on the rule of 
law, the Council notes that “the fight against the impunity for the most seri-
ous crimes of international concern has been strengthened through the work 
of the International Criminal Court” and “it intends to continue to fight 
impunity and uphold accountability with appropriate means…”.57 The ques-
tion is at which extent there is genuine political determination to establish 
global ‘partnerships’ between such complementary global mandates deal-
ing with humanitarian escalations of last resort in conflict and post-conflict 
societies. So said, which is the extent decision-makers are committed to build 
up a credible international state-building apparatus, assisting ‘failed’ States 
and societies in transition from mass atrocities to rehabilitation? What kind of 
strategy or road map will characterize such ‘system’ of interventions in mass 
57 UN doc. SC/9965, 29 June 2010, accessible at: http://un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/
sc9965.doc.htm
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atrocity escalations? How such interventions would comply with the stan-
dards of legality in international law? Furthermore, the interaction between 
the Court, the Security Council and the General Assembly involves clusters of 
assistance at legal, political and operational levels. Issues such as law enforce-
ment of judicial decisions, protection of witnesses and victims, security of 
field offices on the ground, security of personnel and threat assessments of 
country-specific situations, including resource sharing, seem to remain under 
discussion in the years to come.58 The first step currently dealt with, involves 
logistics, communication channels and information exchange, while such 
‘relationship-building’ is currently in the ‘work in progress’ phase on legal 
assistance, institutional liaison and cooperation. This study merely clarifies 
where the Court comes from and how far it can go in the absence of the neces-
sary conditions implementing its public judicial authority.
2.5.2 International governance institutions and the rule of law
The extensive literature on the disintegration of the nation-states in modern 
society points out that one unequivocal aspect of globalization is that any of 
the problems afflicting the world today compromise domestic, regional and 
international stability at the same extent. Poverty, armed conflicts and viola-
tions of international humanitarian law are some of the problems originat-
ing the dilemma of human security. These global problems are increasingly 
transnational in nature, and cannot be dealt only at the national level, or by 
“state to state” negotiations. The comprehensive approach of this study con-
siders the symptoms of the current shifts in the international order, includ-
ing the necessity of political decision-making to find concrete remedies of 
democratic global governance of humanitarian affairs. Whilst today with the 
use of modern technology the outcome of international criminal judicial pro-
ceedings in a fair trial against a ‘war lord’, has at some point the chance to 
circulate around the planet providing the signal of fairness, truth and deter-
rence, the impact of globalization on the breakdown of the nation-states in 
war-torn societies are the main causes of serious humanitarian violations, 
including instability and serious attempts to peace and security.59
58 For the debate see M.H. Arsanjani, W.M. Reisman, “The Law in Action of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 99, No. 2 (April 
2005), at 399.
59 For some useful research fi ndings on the impact of globalization on the nation-states, 
including the role and evolution of universal organizations in democratic governance 
processes in the last decade, see G. Bertucci, A. Alberti, ‘Globalization and its impact on 
the State: The role of the State in domestic and international governance’ in World Public 
Sector Report: Globalization and the State, ST/ESA/PAD/SER.26, 2001, United Nations, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, at 29, accessible at: http://unpan1.un.org/
intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN012761.pdf
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Globalization pressures on democratic global governance of international 
threats and crimes requiring the implementation of the rule of law and global 
justice. Such motivations have indeed forced “international governance insti-
tutions to redefine their role of universal provider as one that encompasses 
the roles of catalyst, enabler, gatekeeper, consensus builder, mediator and 
negotiator”.60 The view of globalization is a “process of essentially increas-
ing intense interconnectedness, interactions, interdependence, and integra-
tion across borders, State and communities, local, national, global, and in dif-
ferent spheres of human life. This process is leading to the emergence of one 
world, a global society. Consequently, it is often reduced to a process reducing 
the power and the importance of nation-state, increasing the idea of a global 
world ruled by global rules and global organizations. The point that divides 
scholars, involved in theories about globalization, is indeed if globalization 
announces the death of the modern nation-state.61 The evident disintegra-
tion of the nation-states in conflict and post-conflict situations, or so defined 
in the policy circles ‘failed’ States, causes a crisis of the governance institu-
tions and public powers at domestic level in the majority of such situations. 
Such breakdowns at national level challenge the tools of democratic gover-
nance at international level for the preservation of security and their compe-
tence to rehabilitate law and order complementing such complex domestic 
realities. This thesis does not discuss such globalization theories. They have 
been extensively dealt by relevant literature but emphasizes however, the 
required process of democratization of global governance institutions foster-
ing peace, justice and security towards further definition of their comple-
mentary roles and responsibilities one another.62
The rule of law is one of the most important components of public demo-
cratic governance at the same extent of political processes. The basic prin-
ciples of the rule of law are found in the authority of the judiciary, human 
rights, freedom of information, civil society participation and human devel-
opment. The preservation of the rule of law at domestic and international 
levels relates to processes of democratization and maintenance of human 
rights, extending issues of mutual concern towards multilateral approaches. 
States and non-States parties of international governance institutions need 
to comply with norms universally recognized, while being flexible and open 
to democratic reforms. International governance institutions, which share 
complementary universal mandates, have to be prepared to assist domestic 
realities with all their means, especially in extreme conflict and post-conflict 
situations identifying the right choice of international intervention on each 
60 See A. Bertucci, supra.
61 See A. M. Slaughter, A New World Order: Government Networks and the Disaggregated State, 
(2004). For the debate see also K. Choudhary, ‘Globalisation, Modernity and Nation-
building’, in K. Choudhary (ed.), Globalisation Governance Reforms and Development in 
India, (2007), at 523.
62 See also K. H. Ladeur, Public Governance in the Age of Globalization, (2004).
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case, while being able to interact and serve other complementary actors on 
the ground. For the fight against the impunity of serious breaches of human 
rights, even non-member States should prepare themselves to such a process 
of democratization, but is this the case considering the position taken by the 
permanent members of the Security Council?
The question is whether international governance institutions give yet 
momentum to a universal system in respect of international humanitarian 
law and human rights, and thus “contributing to freedom, security, justice 
and the rule of law, as well as to the prevention of armed conflicts, the pres-
ervation of peace and the strengthening of international security, including 
the advancement of post-conflict peace-building and reconciliation…”.63 
The number of international regimes, as a form of governance coordinating 
behavior among countries around an issue, has increased dramatically since 
WWII, and today international regimes cover almost all aspects of interna-
tional relations that might require coordination among countries and other 
international actors, from security issues (such as weapons non-prolifera-
tion, conflict management or collective security), human rights (internation-
al criminal justice, humanitarian assistance), development, environment, 
information and communication, just to name a few. The emerging regime 
of international criminal justice has its fundaments to fight against the impu-
nity gap worldwide. It offers deterrence, reconciliation and jurisprudence on 
victims’ rights. The argument is that such regime cannot function in isola-
tion from peace and security, but should be part of it for the sake of human 
security and global justice.64
2.5.3 International humanitarian policies, norms and principles
Since its  establishment, the role of the United Nations institutional design 
is confronted with the main challenges occurring in conflict and post-con-
flict societies and the necessary adjustments required by the international 
features fostering peace, justice and security. As Kofi Annan stressed in the 
Millennium Report addressed to the UN institutions and Members States, 
“a new understanding of the concept of security is evolving. Once synony-
mous with the defence of territory from external attack, the requirements 
of security have to embrace the protection of communities and individuals 
from internal violence”.65 The former Secretary-General in his important 
report underlined that “while the post-cold war multilateral system made 
63 Resolution ICC-ASP/9/Res.3, Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the 
Assembly of States Parties.
64 For an overview of the legal struggle creating the premises of an emerging world system 
of justice in which individual rights will be enshrined in laws secured by both States and 
the world community see  G. Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global 
Justice, (2002).
65 UN Doc. A/54/2000, Fifty-fourth session Agenda item 49 (b), The Millennium Assembly 
of the United Nations, Report of the UN Secretary-General, Kofi  Annan.
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it possible for the new globalization to emerge and flourish, globalization, 
in turn, has progressively rendered its institutional designs antiquated”.66 
While democratic institutional reforms seem to receive a political impasse 
and peace operations are in danger of systemic failure, the achievement of 
the UN’s 2005 World Summit was the adoption of the ‘responsibility to pro-
tect’ principle.67 That year, the UN General Assembly voted unanimously in 
favour of a major new concept of international protection duties of civilians. 
The responsibility to protect norm represents a major paradigm shift for the 
protection of victims of international crimes worldwide. But does this mean 
that the emerging regime of international criminal justice would receive a 
specific place in such global policy formulation?
Despite the fact that during the UN World Summit outcome in 2005 the 
heads of State and government unanimously affirmed that “each individual 
State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”, the parties explicitly 
referred to the duty to protect civilians in conflict and post-conflict situa-
tions, stating that “when a State manifestly fails in its protection responsi-
bilities, and peaceful means are inadequate, the international community 
must take stronger measures including Chapter VII measures under the UN 
Charter, including but not limited to the collective use of force authorized 
by the Security Council”.68 Such duty did not provide sufficient elements, 
either at strategic, normative levels, or a comprehensive review of existing 
United Nations capacities to prevent or halt genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. There is still the need to develop 
strategies, standards, processes, tools and practices to implement the ways 
such responsibility can best encourage States to live up to their duty to pro-
tect their populations, and discourage States or groups of States from misus-
ing the responsibility to protect for inappropriate purposes, as a dangerous 
version of military humanitarian intervention. In accordance with the rule 
of law, as the basic principle of governance such duty does not provide any 
additional basis for the use of force under international law. On the contrary, 
it reinforces the prohibition of the use of force, and the limited exceptions 
66 K. Annan, We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the twenty-fi rst century, 2000, at 
11, accessible at: http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/wethepeople.pdf
67 For an overview of the UN peace operations debate see, A. J. Bellamy, P. Williams (eds.), 
Peace Operations and Global Order, 2005. See B. Jones, R. Gowan, and J. Sherman, “Build-
ing on Brahimi Peacekeeping in an era of Strategic Uncertainty”, NYU Centre for Interna-
tional Cooperation, April 2009, accessible at: http://www.alnap.org/resource/11243 See 
UN doc. A/63/677, Report of the Secretary-General, “Implementing the Responsibility 
to Protect”, 12 January 2009. See also A.J. Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and the 
problem of military intervention”, in International Affairs, Volume 84, Issue 4, July 2008, 
at 615–639.
68 Paragraphs 138-139 of the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document.
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to that prohibition set out in the UN Charter in the case of self-defence, or 
authorisation by the Security Council.69
Right before the adoption of the norm of the ‘responsibility to protect’ there 
have been some new trends in the establishment of treaty-based interna-
tional public authorities which are complementary to the holistic duty of 
the UN, namely, the establishment of an independent international judiciary 
dealing with individual criminal responsibility and based on the principles 
of universality and integrity. In other words, a legal framework that might 
serve as a deterrent of war and mass atrocity crimes, infringements of the 
Geneva Conventions, its protocols, and serious violations of humanitarian 
and human rights law. Such framework received the setting up of the Inter-
national Criminal Court by the Rome Statute outside the institutional system 
of the United Nations. Just more than a decade ago, the Rome Statute paved 
the way for the establishment of a Court capable of prosecuting individu-
als allegedly responsible for serious breaches of international humanitar-
ian law (IHL) and with jurisdiction over crimes internationally recognized.
Human rights and international criminal justice advocates have empha-
sised the importance of such emerging regime to help achieve justice for 
all, by filling a gap in the international legal system by dealing with indi-
vidual responsibility as an enforcement mechanism of the rule of law. The 
ratio behind is to end the impunity of serious crimes by establishing the 
principle of individual criminal accountability for all who commit crimes 
against international law as a cornerstone of international criminal law; to 
help end conflicts, since violence often leads to further violence, by provid-
ing the deterrent that at least some perpetrators of war crimes or genocide 
may be brought to justice; to remedy the deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals, 
which immediately raise the questions of ‘selective justice’, by establishing 
a Court that can operate in a more consistent way and regardless of the time 
and place in which atrocities occurred; to take over when national criminal 
justice institutions are unwilling or unable to act in times of violent conflict, 
when institutions collapse or national judicial systems lack of the political 
will to pursue their own perpetrators; to deter future war criminals by estab-
lishing more clearly that mass atrocities will not go unpunished any longer.
69  The traditional legal issues that advocates of the ‘responsibility to protect’ must con-
front are similar to those concerning whether there currently exists an international legal 
right of humanitarian intervention in the absence of a Security Council authorization. 
For a general review of the various perspectives within the legal debate useful previous 
references include A. Boyle, “Kosovo: House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 
4th Report, June 2000”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2000) Vol. 49, at 876; 
L. Henkin, “Editorial Comments: NATO’s Kosovo Intervention Kosovo and the Law of 
‘Humanitarian Intervention”, American Journal of International Law (1999), Vol. 93, at 824; 
C. Greenwood, “International Law and the NATO Intervention in Kosovo”, Internation-
al and Comparative Law Quarterly (2000), Vol. 49, at 927; S. Chesterman, Just War or Just 
Peace: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 2001.
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2.5.4 Conclusions
In conclusion, some commentators of the outcomes of the Review Confer-
ence of the Rome Statute in Kampala would argue “whether the Court will 
ever be truly universal in its ability to protect individuals from the worst 
forms of abuse” in conflict zones, without the support of the Security Coun-
cil. For these analysts “the Court, like any international mechanism intended 
to promote human rights, faces the impossible task of acting morally in a 
political world characterized by power inequalities, domination and vio-
lence. Because the Court lacks of an independent law enforcement capacity, 
it must often accommodate itself to political powers instead of challenging 
it”.70 Hopefully, democratic interaction strategies between complementary 
global regimes will neutralize such extreme assumptions or speculations. 
Only through initiating an appropriate interaction strategy there will be 
a real chance of more public authority for the Court not only vis-à-vis the 
States, but also between the Court and the UN. In any case the Court as an 
ex-ante tribunal is only one aspect of the features in the governance of justice 
falling under the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute, while the parallel activ-
ity of the Security Council promoting ex post mixed courts and tribunals on 
crimes falling outside the Rome Statute is still active, although the historical 
ad hoc tribunals are in the completion phase of their activities (ICTY, ICTR).
The fact that a political outline characterizing the ex-ante international secu-
rity situations in a specific country will impact both the Security Council 
and the International Criminal Court, the configuration of their mandates 
in the field operations need to be based on a specific strategy of interactions, 
including the implementation of legal responsibilities of cooperation. It has 
been argued that just as the international military intervention in modern 
warfare has been destructive in fighting an enemy, so also can the use or bet-
ter say the abuse, of laws dealing with perceived or an actual political enemy 
in the name of humanitarianism. It has further been argued that the con-
duct of the Security Council so far has worked to legitimize these fears from 
States and within their regional political realities. Many countries therefore, 
fear that the Court could be used by powerful nations to intimidate weak-
er opponents. This is the reason why the emerging regime of international 
criminal justice will need a specific role within the arrays of peace and secu-
rity maintenance, including the States and regional entities which have been 
marginalized even if the peace and security concerns regard closely their 
own territories and their own domestic jurisdictions.
70 S. Al-Bulushi, A. Branch, In Search of Justice: The ICC and Power Politics, 2010, at 4, acces-
sible at: www.almasryalyoum.com
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The civilian protection duties need to be associated to the emergencies of 
relocation and protection of witnesses and victims. With the advent of the 
Rome Statute it is also important to verify in the long term the impact on 
affected communities by the new features offering participation, reparation 
and rehabilitation, in other words the mechanisms implementing the rights 
of the victims. The examples that are of main interest for us are those that 
witnessed courts and tribunals operating in the absence of powers of law 
enforcement and in the majority of the situations, even against the execu-
tive power, as in the case of the UN ad hoc tribunals. As many observers 
have emphasized, “although international laws and tribunals are devoid of 
enforcing powers, they still serve a decisive function in forcing major play-
ers to assume more virtuous behaviour”.71 In agreement with such doctrinal 
approach, further clarification of the assessment performed in this chapter 
follows in the next section.
2.6 The paradigms in the making of human security
Section Outline
This section reflects on the human security doctrine and its paradigms in 
the making between peace-building, civilian protection duties and the links 
of cooperation with investigations and prosecutions of serious international 
crimes. It concludes the assessment of the sensitive transitions in the legal 
and political world order of the post-cold war era and the adjustments 
required by complementary global tools. It examines some of the national, 
regional and international approaches governing international threats and 
crimes and the concept, application and the critics of the human security 
doctrine. In this chapter the limits encountered by legal and political frame-
works centralizing human security have been extensively discussed. In 
conclusion this section supports the idea of an integrated approach of gov-
ernance offering capacity-building on the ground for the sake of human 
security and human development. After all, the interactions between com-
plementary global regimes advocated in this study endorse the main aspects 
of global justice, respectively its retributive, protective and restitutive aspects. 
A greater and amplified complementarity between global regimes fostering 
human security would be beneficial for their own evolution. It would unlock 
any political impasse of multilateral tools of global governance, including 
the universal aspirations dealing with peace, justice and security in compre-
hensive and effective manners. This section demonstrates that for an inter-
national architecture of governance fostering peace and justice, the human 
security measures applicable in conflict and post-conflict situations require 
an integrated approach of governance.
71 See D. Archibugi, ‘The Rule of Law and Democracy’, in European Journal of International 
Relations, 2004, Vol. 10(3), at 462.
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The global humanitarian policy formulation and the transition of gover-
nance systems concern the evolution of security at domestic, regional and 
global levels. Security is a concept in transition. The word security itself 
comes from the Latin etymology securus, which literally means ‘free from 
care’. Its concept remains volatile if we consider the several approaches in 
the chronological formulation of humanitarian policy and law, including the 
treaties and conventions deriving from them. There are valid reasons to for-
mulate appropriately the different aspects of the concept of security and the 
interrelation between human security, domestic security and international 
security. What we have seen in the course of history is that at international 
level the concept of security centred mainly on the issues of war and peace 
between States, or inter-state conflicts. In particular, it focused on the ques-
tion of the nature of conflict and the use of military force. Today, the intra-
state failure in the governance of domestic security sectors (army, police 
and judiciary), their inexistence in several undeveloped countries, and their 
political transitions are central for the governance of international conflicts 
and humanitarian crimes. Such failure in domestic security perturbs the 
minimal requirements of human security and requires both national and 
international responsibilities which go beyond State sovereignty. This is a 
good reason to advocate for reliable governance systems centralizing indi-
viduals, challenging behaviours in trafficking weapons, avoiding the milita-
rization of corrupted regimes and the mentality of armed groups using child 
soldiers, which are constantly violating the basic requirements of the rule of 
law and fundamental individual rights. There are no doubts of the global 
responsibilities in such governance which wait for further accountabilities 
of non-state actors.
The inter-state insecurities are also in transition. Although there is today 
a definition of the crime of aggression, as the traditional component of 
regional and international security, its governance is still in a sort of politi-
cal deadlock waiting for consensus. The important theoretical and unifying 
aspect, valid either for domestic, international or regional human security 
approaches, is to neutralize the risks of militarization in the policy formula-
tion for each of them. In such context, it is fundamental to provide assess-
ments of the governance of complementary global regimes reacting to a 
governance crisis in ‘fragile’ or so-called ‘failed’ States responding to threats 
and crimes on individuals. The question is whether complementary global 
regimes adjust their roles in the current transition of international security 
with an appropriate interaction strategy between them. In other words, it 
is important to verify whether there is a common search of human security 
measures towards their complementary and universal nature. The legisla-
tion of the last decade by the political organs (e.g. by the UN institutions 
and the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute) shows a lacuna of 
civilian protection measures on the ground while serious crimes are com-
mitted. Once the selection of situations would bring complementary interna-
tional mandates on the same ground of war and crime, they should allocate 
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protection measures at least of the groups of individuals selected as victims 
and witnesses. Such complementary mandates should work together for the 
protection, relocation and rehabilitation of individuals affected by war and 
crime. Furthermore, the inter-state insecurities require the extension of mul-
tilateral action against international crimes.
2.6.1 National, regional and international approaches
The policy formulation regarding international threats and crimes is an 
important paradigm in the making. It remains to be seen how it evolves in 
global governance systems of complementary character. If on one side it can 
be affirmed that since the terrorist attacks on 9/11 the international commu-
nity a) deepened the legal framework that provides grounds for going after 
terrorists; b) increased the obligations of the UN Member States to undertake 
concrete efforts to fight against terrorism; and c) launched a framework of 
actions to overcome the financing to terrorist organizations;72 on the other 
side, there are still divisions on the multilateral governance of such inter-
national threat including the legal problems to define terrorism as a recog-
nized international crime. After 9/11 the US, for instance, focused on some 
improvements after the failure of communication and intelligence between 
the expensive apparatus of internal security in the country, while its public 
authorities currently struggle on rebuilding approachable security policies 
in the international sphere, which have been reluctant to human security, if 
we evaluate the devastating effects of the security policy of the ‘global war 
against terror’, and its impact incurred and reflected at global scale.
With regard to the fight against al Qaeda, the US, under the first Obama 
administration, opposed the use of the words ‘global war on terror’ to 
describe much of George Bush’s hazardous national security policy and 
embracing the White House’s legalistic approach to terrorism, defining 
instead the conflict an ‘overseas contingency’. Before taking office for the 
first presidential round Obama clarified to the audience of voters his inten-
tion to revise the prevailing policy on terrorism. Obama made clear he 
would seek ‘to use the language more precisely and to bring actions in line 
with intentions’. But this did not mean the end of the global war on terror. 
72 See the UNSC approach in the resolution on ‘Threats to international peace and secu-
rity caused by terrorist acts’ which criminalize terrorist activities, UN doc. S/RES/1373 
(2001). Including over 16 UN conventions on terrorism and the UNSC resolution on 
the ‘Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’ which also constitute a threat 
to international peace and security and in which the Security Council “decides that all 
States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt 
to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical 
or biological weapons and their means of delivery…”, see UN doc. S/RES/1540 (2004) 
accessible at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/
N0432843.pdf?OpenElement
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He only rephrased using the term war ‘against a far-reaching network of 
violence and hatred’. Hopefully, the slogan of such global ‘war’ would not 
only change in the language used. Within hours of taking office, the new 
president ordered the closure of the Guantánamo detention facility which 
still waits to be dismantled, and in the following days he outlawed detainee 
torture and re-established the binding force of the Geneva Conventions on 
the US. The new president also went on Arab television to begin reversing 
the perception that the US is engaged in a conflict against all Muslims or 
Islam, and announced that the US has ‘a stake in the well-being of the Mus-
lim world’. The new president declared, too, that his administration would 
refrain from using the familiar Bush phrase ‘global war on terror’, but main-
tained that it ‘is very important to recognize that the US has a battle or a war 
against some terrorist organizations’. Obama’s words and actions aimed to 
puncture the inflated drama that has characterized international relations’ 
scholarship and literature on peace and security studies. Rather than ‘a 
battle to the death between the forces of good and evil’ as expressed by his 
predecessor, the war was to become ‘a human-sized conflict between States 
pledged to act in accordance with agreed rules of warfare and a reasonably 
well-defined adversary’.73
Such new approach however, would currently lack of concrete actions tak-
ing in considerations international governance institutions able to take the 
lead on such global security issues, influencing the deterrence of targets by 
the adversary at global scale, namely the UN and the Rome Statute institu-
tions. The multilateral perspective of such actions is still not measurable. 
The UN premises for instance, are a constant target worldwide of attacks 
in the last couple of decades. Instead, according to former US Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates ‘president Obama has made it clear that the situa-
tion in Afghanistan should be a top overseas military priority. The ideology 
the US face was incubated there when Afghanistan became a ‘failed’ State, 
and the extremists have largely returned their attention to that region in 
the wake of their reversals in Iraq. As we have seen from attacks across the 
globe, on 9/11 and afterwards, the danger reaches far beyond the borders 
of Afghanistan or Pakistan’. The consequence being NATO’s main role in 
Afghanistan, pressuring again its allies through its UN-mandated Inter-
national Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which for some analysts became 
73 See the President Obama’s Speech, A New Beginning, Cairo University, Egypt, June 4 2009,
accessible at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_offi ce/Remarks-by-the-President-
at-Cairo-University-6-04-09 See also L. van den Herik, N. Schrijver (eds.), Counter-terror-
ism Strategies in a Fragmented International Legal Order. Meeting the Challenges, CUP, 2013.
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a protectorate of the corrupted Afghan State.74 So said, if we try to mea-
sure the accomplishments of importing democracy in the region, delusion 
would be the right word.
The situation of terrorist recruitment training in Yemen, the situation in 
Afghanistan and the struggle for other countries in the region not to become 
a new refuge for Al-Qaeda (as the jihadists’ franchise in the impoverished 
Arabian peninsula which urge new attacks against Western targets), is a mat-
ter of mutual concern and needs an international approach, with a detailed 
jurisdiction, intelligence and resources. As Galtung asserts, on the necessity 
of policy change needed on terrorism, in his article “To End Terrorism, End 
State Terrorism”, he explains that “Hitler’s success can be explained by the 
humiliating 1919 Versailles treaty, which called Germany alone responsible 
for WWI and imposed huge reparations for 50 years. Of course, nothing can 
justify what Hitler did. Understanding is not forgiving. But without under-
standing, we are condemned to repeat history”.75 In the Middle East civil-
ians are expressing on their own the readiness and the courage for a dem-
ocratic change, against the autocracy and dictatorship of lasting criminal 
regimes. They need solidarity and support during and after such difficult 
political transitions. In other words, they will deserve to raise their voice in 
domestic governance. But are we really able and prepared to provide tools 
and assistance to raise their domestic governance? Or weapons and military 
arsenals would remain the only exchange and option?
After the multiplicity of terrorist attacks in western societies, Galtung 
addressed important issues for policy makers in the US which are still on the 
table considering the failure of current national security and intelligence in 
the US to prevent such attacks. Galtung clarifies that “there are serious flaws 
74 For an overview of the US military strategies in the region, see R. Gates, ‘Submitted State-
ment to the Senate Armed Services Committee’ January 27, 2009, accessible at: http://
armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/January/Gates%2001-27-09.pdf For an exten-
sive political analysis challenging the US policy on terrorism since Clinton’s administra-
tion, later Bush and currently Obama, and the quest of the global war on terror as a mili-
tary strategy, see A. Zalman, J. Clarke, ‘The Global War on Terror: A Narrative in Need of 
a Rewrite’, 2009, 2 Ethics & International Affairs Vol. 23, accessible at: http://www.cceia.
org/resources/journal/23_2/essays/002#_footnote16 For an analysis of the statements 
of President’s Obama released to the media and his communication strategy adjust-
ing policy wordings, see L. C. Baldor, ‘Obama: US Choosing Words Carefully in Terror 
War’, Associated Press, 2009, February 3, accessible at: http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
wireStory?id=6798802 For scholars’ views considering the war on terror as a symptom 
of current shifts in the international order shaped by globalization, rather than as a con-
sequence of political decision-making, see P. Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: The Wars of the 
Twenty-First Century, (2008). For an early historical perspectives analyzing the roots of 
the resentments that dominate the Islamic world today and that are increasingly being 
expressed in acts of terrorism, see B. Lewis,  The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, 
(2004).
75 See J. Galtung, D. Fisher, To End Terrorism, End State Terrorism, in Transcend Research 
Institute, 2002, accessible at: http://www.transcend.org/tri/
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in foreign policy formulations, however well intended. We create enemies 
through our insensitivity to the basic needs of the peoples around the world, 
including their religious sensitivities. Suggesting democratic policy steps 
to the US, Galtung clearly highlights to “withdraw the military bases from 
Saudi Arabia; recognize Palestine as a State; enter into dialogue with Iraq to 
identify solvable conflicts; resolve the tensions with Iran; pull out militar-
ily and economically from Afghanistan; stop the military interventions and 
reconcile with the victims”. With such resolutions Galtung clarifies that the 
same day such actions would be taken by the decision-makers “1.3 billion 
Muslims would embrace America; and the few terrorists left would have no 
water in which to swim. It would take a speech-writer of half an hour, and 
ten minutes to deliver it; as opposed to, say $60 billion for the Afghanistan 
operation. This is not easy for the national security policy, says Galtung, “but 
the benefits would be immeasurable”.76 While this may be somewhat con-
sidered as a demagogical assessment, it clearly suggests that the solution 
must be shown by multilateral actions in contrast with unilateral interests 
and national security approaches, which have resulted to be inappropri-
ate in the policy formulations and resulted in devastating consequences at 
national, regional and international levels.
2.6.2 The governance of international threats and crimes
In theory, the role of international criminal justice has also the potential to 
play an important role in the realm of terrorism and organized crime. For 
such governance the policy making of the permanent members of the Securi-
ty Council does not seem to be appealing, however, the interaction between 
threats and crimes can surely serve for the maintenance of peace and secu-
rity globally under important conditions of multilateral governance. In 
addition to the legal, political and jurisdictional obstacles in the definition 
of urgent threats, waiting to be internationally recognized as serious crimes, 
such as terrorism, the international community will need to take concrete 
strategic steps preserving democratic governance towards an institutional 
design of global interactions between complementary mandates, which will 
76 With a very pragmatic approach in his peace study work, Galtung underlines that the 
State system is yielding to regionalization and globalization. State foreign policies can 
no longer be based on (dominant) nation interests only, but have to be aligned with 
regional and nature-human-global interests towards action for peace, education and 
training for peace, dissemination of knowledge for peace, based on research which goes 
beyond empirical and critical studies of past and present, into constructive studies of the 
future, focusing on problems of peace studies proposing concrete actions. For sugges-
tions to policy maker on terrorism see J. Galtung, D. Fisher, To End Terrorism, End State 
Terrorism, in Transcend Research Institute, 2002, accessible at: http://www.transcend.
org/tri/ For the debate on globalization policy issues see J. Galtung, B. Gosovic, A. Kho-
sla, A. Zammit, ‘The Millennium Development Goals: Missing Goals and Mistaken Poli-
cies’ in MDGs: A Costly Diversion from the Road to Sustainable Development, 2008, 20 at 37, 
accessible at: http://www.transcend.org/tri/downloads/the_mill.pdf
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need to share intelligence, resources and best practices in their respective 
fields of expertise, which are without any doubt complementary. In 2010, 
the States Parties to the Rome Statute institutions met for the possible adop-
tion of some provisions in the Rome Statute defining the crime of aggression 
and reviewed the transitional provision in Article 124 of the Rome Statute. A 
proposal has been tabled by the Belgian delegation regarding the addition 
of the use of specific weapons to the definition of War Crimes in Article 8. 
A proposal offered by the Netherlands, in accordance with ‘Resolution E’ 
regarding the adoption of the crime of terrorism as a distinct crime under the 
Rome Statute, has been addressed to the Assembly of the States Parties to the 
Rome Statute. Trinidad and Tobago has put forward a proposal on the crime 
of international drug trafficking for inclusion in Article 5, which concern also 
proposals received regarding terrorism.77 For such global threats in the way 
of being defined as international crimes the jurisdiction of the Court has not 
been considered by the Assembly of the State Parties to the Rome Statute, 
and the discussions are on-going. This is the sign that the political organs 
are well aware of the gaps in such governance. After all, without political 
convergence, systemic change, and a reliable structure of cooperation, the 
current architecture would not be ready to deal with any extension of the 
Court’s jurisdiction. As previously discussed, the same view is also appli-
cable to the crime of aggression, including terrorism and the use of weapons 
of mass destruction.
The priority would be first to challenge the approach of policy making on 
such sensitive issues. Nobody knows how long this process will take. Since 
the beginning of the new century persistent terrorist activities (9/11 in the 
US, 2004 in Madrid and attacks in some other parts of the world) forced 
the UN General Assembly to maintain its focus on the ways to eliminate 
the scourge of international terrorism, stressing the need of a multilateral 
approach for the suppression of such crimes. Over the past decade, terror-
ism has been a global challenge underscoring the imperative of effective 
multilateralism. The literature and the views of scholars also highlight the 
weaknesses of multilateralism in its current form. The so-called ‘war on ter-
ror’ needs a different approach. In my view, even the word “war” has been 
indeed inappropriate since the beginning of such policy formulation.78
77 See the reports of the Review Conference in Kampala, 11/02/2011: RC/11, annex  IV, 
Report of the Working Group on other amendments; RC/WGOA/1/Rev.2, Draft resolu-
tion amending article 8 of the Rome Statute; RC/WGOA/2, Draft resolution on article 
124 of the Rome Statute, accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/review-
conference/Pages/review%20conference.aspx#offi cialdoc
78 For valid contributions on such debate see H. Duffy, “Harmony or Confl ict? The inter-
play between human rights and humanitarian law in the fi ght against terrorism”, in L. 
van den Herik, N. Schrijver (eds.), Counter-terrorism Strategies in a Fragmented Interna-
tional Legal Order. Meeting the Challenges, CUP, 2013.
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The concept of ‘effective multilateralism’ emerged as the basic doctrinal 
foundation of the EU deliberations in the past decade. Since 2003, it has also 
been the basis for the EU’s external relations, with the aim of expressing the 
global need for effective international institutions and decisive international 
action. In order to offer an updated version of the implementation neces-
sary by governments of the legislative instruments listed in the Declaration 
on terrorism of the European Council of 25 March 2004, and subsequent 
major instruments identified by the United Nations, the EU Counter-Ter-
rorism Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove addressed a couple of years ago to 
the European Council, the document in the context of an EU Action Plan 
on combating Terrorism. The first version of the EU Action Plan to Combat 
Terrorism is contained in 7233/1/07 REV 1. This report is a response to the 
European Council’s request to the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator for a 
report every six months on the implementation of the Action Plan to combat 
terrorism adopted in June 2004. In 2005, the EU decision-makers established 
a high level political dialogue on counter-terrorism, between the European 
Council, the Parliament and the Commission, meeting once per EU Presi-
dency to ensure inter-institutional governance on these sensitive security 
threats. The main strategic commitment of the EU is based on the political 
determination “to combat terrorism globally, while respecting human rights, 
and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, 
security and justice”. The strategic elements characterizing the EU policy are 
“prevent, protect, pursue, and respond”.79 Although such policy develop-
ments as global threat, it is still not possible to refer to terrorism as a crime 
under the Rome Statute and international law. It remains to be seen whether 
such policy formulations at European level would help. Limited as it is at 
regional scale. Multilateralism is in any case the key and complementary 
regimes have a specific call, which requires further efforts in order to reach 
the global dimensions.
2.6.3 The conceptualization of human security
The short outline of the challenges characterizing complementary global
regimes deserves some reflections on the principles from which they derive. 
There seem to be the shared view that the human security doctrine points out 
both the causes and the long-term implications of conflicts instead of sim-
ply reacting to problems, as the traditional international security approach
is often accused of doing. The preventive efforts should focus on reducing, 
and hopefully eliminating, the need of (military) intervention altogether, 
79 For a detailed overview of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy established since 2005, 
see 14469/4/05 REV 4, accessible at: http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st14/
st14469-re04.en05.pdf For an updated overview of concrete actions to be fulfi lled by EU 
delegations at legal and policy level on the implementation of the Strategy and Action 
Plan to Combat Terrorism, see last Report 9715/1/09 REV 1 accessible at: http://register.
consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st09/st09715-re01.en09.pdf
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while an investment in rehabilitation or rebuilding should ensure that past 
conflicts do not increase future violence acting on the causes of such conflicts. 
We look at the gaps between the theory and the practice of such governance 
approach. The first responsibility to apply human security parameters bears 
on the domestic jurisdictions themselves, and only at a secondary stage an 
international community concern, which still struggles with the basic mea-
sures applicable when, where and how to intervene. Such international concern 
became visible during the escalations of severe humanitarian crisis charac-
terized by mass atrocity crimes and after the failure to act in a timely and 
decisive manner, holding the promise which the States made to each other of 
‘never again’ with regard to genocide and other mass atrocity crimes.
The human security theories influencing the agenda in the new century con-
clude that such concept of security stands for a ‘paradigm in the making’ as 
exemplified by the main organizations established around such policy orien-
tations, as for instance the Rome Statute institutions.80 For the first time with 
a multilateral treaty international governance institutions received provi-
sions centralizing restitutive justice for the victims of mass atrocity crimes. In 
fact, human security ensures that a better knowledge of the rapidly evolving 
large-scale threats has respectively a major impact on individuals and com-
munities, and also strengthening mobilization of the wide array of actors 
actually involved in participative policy formulation in the various fields of 
the rule of law and democratic self-determination. So said, what character-
izes concretely the emerging paradigm of human security in the governance 
of complementary global regimes fostering peace and justice? The question 
is whether the knowledge, advocacy and policy formulation of human secu-
rity have been translated in governance systems for the sake of individuals 
in situations of war and crime. Otherwise, what else do we need?81
80 The concept of human security, which emerged in the 1994 UNDP Development Report, 
is on its way to changing the practice and institutions of global governance. The under-
lying issues of human security, a focus on the individual, the waning of State sover-
eignty and the rise of new actors, the shift in our understanding of security, the need 
and risks of humanitarian intervention, the reform of the Security Council, the conduct 
of complex peace missions, and the adequate reaction to new threats, pose a challenge 
to international law. As a value-based and people-centered approach to security, human 
security will contribute to normative changes in the international legal order. For an 
overview of this approach see G. Oberleitner, ‘Human Security: A Challenge to Interna-
tional Law?’ In Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organiza-
tions, Apr.-June 2005, Vol. 11, No. 2, at 185-203.
81 See M. Goucha and C. Maresia, What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-fi rst Centu-
ry? Published by UNESCO, second edition, 2005. See also O. Richmond, ‘Human Securi-
ty, the Rule of Law, and NGOs: Potentials and Problems for Humanitarian Intervention’ 
in Human Rights Review, Vol. 2, No. 4 (July–September 2001).
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2.6.4 The applicability of human security
We have seen that the human security conceptual framework embraces the 
transition from past restrictive notions of security tending to identify it sole-
ly with defensive, aggressive or retributive behaviours, to a much more com-
prehensive multidimensional concept based on the respect for all human 
rights and democratic principles. It contributes to sustainable development 
and especially to the eradication of extreme poverty, which is a denial of 
all human rights. It reinforces the prevention at the root of different forms 
of violence, discrimination, conflict and internal strife mainly on civilian 
populations in all regions of the world and without exception. It provides 
a unifying theme for multilateral action to the benefit of the populations 
most affected by interrelated political, social and economic insecurities in 
the context of global solidarity. This revolutionary unifying concept stands 
for strategic approaches adopting an interdisciplinary intersection between 
development goals, including a domestic, regional and global humanitar-
ian approach and the empowerment of civil society. For the UN Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjöld, the United Nations had a primary responsibil-
ity to do everything within its means to protect successive generations from 
the ravages of war. In his final Annual Report to the General Assembly, Dag 
Hammarskjöld argued that this objective was to be progressively achieved 
via the international community’s realization of four fundamental prin-
ciples, namely: (i) equal political rights, both in terms of sovereign equal-
ity and individual respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; (ii) 
equal economic opportunities, thereby promoting higher standards of living 
through the creation of conditions conducive to development and economic 
and social advancement; (iii) a firm rule of law framework underlying the 
actions and activities of the international community; and finally (iv) the 
prohibition of the use of force contrary to the common interest of the interna-
tional community.82 A strategy based on human security anticipates and pri-
oritizes international threats, focusing on the preventive actions of the actors 
needed, or involved on the ground, for the preservation of law and order.83 
82 For an overview of this legacy, see Kofi  Annan, Dag Hammarskjöld and the 21st Century, 
Uppsala, 6 September 2001, accessible at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/dag/legacy.htm
83 In examining the development of international law, it becomes apparent that the goals of 
international law are not distinct from those of human security. The principles underly-
ing human security have been latent in international law and are evolving with increas-
ing dynamism to encompass many of the basic principles of human security. For an 
overview see H. Owada, ‘Human Security and International Law’, United Nations Audio-
visual Library of International Law, 2011, accessible at: http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/
faculty/Owada.html See also H. Owada, “Human Security and International Law”, in 
U. Fastenrathat et al (eds.), From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of 
Judge Bruno Simma, 2011, 505.
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The question is whether nation-states and global actors are prepared and 
equipped to follow some of the recommendations formulated in the field 
of legal and political sciences, creating governance systems based on the 
human security doctrine.
The centralization of decision-making of international humanitarian inter-
vention exclusively in the domain of the Security Council risks undermining 
the human security expectations to intervene in situations of mass atrocity 
crimes. In order to maximize the multidimensional character of human secu-
rity a strategy of interactions between complementary global actors is funda-
mental. An example would be whether the protection measures of civilians 
in conflict zones are currently taken care of, or the establishment of other 
treaties and international governance institutions are required. Moreover, 
are victims and witnesses of serious humanitarian violations falling under 
such protection measures? In order to respond to such issues the interaction 
of complementary global regimes on the ground in the last decade is exten-
sively analysed. In situations of war and crime only a deep understanding 
of the causes may have an impact on the effects. The emerging paradigm is 
to challenge the traditional notion of national security by arguing that the 
proper referent for security should be the individual rather than the State. 
Human security holds that a people-centred view of security is necessary 
for national, regional and global stability. The United Nations and the Rome 
Statute institutions are based on such view of security which is supposed to 
centralize fundamental individual rights. The question is whether their con-
tribution to the ‘paradigm in the making’ of human security is really mea-
surable according to the current interaction between them, including their 
necessary reforms still waiting to be fulfilled.
In the struggle of shaping a consistent policy at global level harmonizing 
human security measures in conflict and post-conflict societies with devel-
opment programs, the former UN Secretary-General and current Chair of 
the Advisory Board of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court 
(CICC) Kofi Annan, in his report Larger Freedom, clarified that “the protec-
tion and promotion of the universal values of the rule of law, human rights 
and democracy are ends in themselves. They are essential for a world of jus-
tice, opportunity and stability. No security agenda and no drive for devel-
opment will be successful, unless they are based on the sure foundation of 
respect for human dignity”.84 In the African Great Lakes Region, in Cen-
tral African Republic, Kenya, Ivory Coast, cross-related programs for jus-
tice, institutional building, reconciliation and victims rehabilitation should 
be able to anticipate and complement the model proposed by the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), its strategic plan on the rule of law, 
and domestic access to justice, falling within the areas of both democratic 
84 Report of the Secretary-General A/59/2005, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, 
Security and Human Rights for All, 2005.
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governance, crisis prevention and recovery in societies in transition. The 
policy shaped through the last decades over ‘failed’ States is to destabilize 
criminal and corrupted regimes with militarized peace enforcements before 
development programs and security sector reforms (army, police and justice 
systems) would take place. Such policy trends deserve attention.
2.6.5 The critics to the human security doctrine
The critics of the human security concept argue that its vagueness under-
mines its effectiveness;85 that it has become little more than a vehicle for 
activists wishing to promote humanitarian causes, that it does not help 
the research community to understand what security means; or help deci-
sion makers to formulate good policies.86 This chapter critically questioned 
the progress of complementary global regimes fostering the centralization 
of individuals in situations of war and crime. In other words, it offered an 
assessment of international regimes fostering peace, justice and security 
and their complementary role to be seen on the ground in conflict and post-
conflict situations. International security relies on political processes and in 
the long term the tools at disposition by the international community have 
to create the premises of global justice focusing on reconciliation and recon-
struction. In one word: sustainability. These tools should focus, in particu-
lar, on the transition of societies from conflict and crime, to stability and 
order. The current resolutions of the UN Security Council contain targeted 
sanctions against identified groups of individuals responsible of serious 
crimes, including the responsibility of the actors on the ground to protect 
civilians. The UN Security Council, emphasizing ‘all necessary measures’in 
certain specific country-situations, also relies on the referrals to the emerg-
ing regime of international criminal justice. The question is whether in such 
context, the counterbalance of centralizing specific human security measures 
of protection, relocation and rehabilitation of individuals in conflict zones is 
part of a strategy of interaction between complementary global regimes and 
whether peace diplomacy would not neutralize judicial decisions. In one 
simple word: the truth as recognition of the human suffering of individuals.
This chapter concludes anticipating the importance of the requirement of 
an integrated approach of governance which is dealt in the next one more 
extensively. The search of a model of governance of peace and justice as 
tools of human security deserve attention by the decision-making. With par-
ticular regard to the justice responses at domestic level, research findings 
are extremely necessary to address appropriate methodologies of external 
interventions, firstly measuring the societal impact of international criminal 
85 See R. Paris, ‘Human Security. Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?’ in International Security, Vol. 
26, No. 2, 2001.
86 For a comprehensive analysis of all defi nitions, critiques and counter-critiques, see S. 
Tadjbakhsh, A. M. Chenoy, Human Security. Concept and implications, 2007.
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proceedings in domestic jurisdictions on a case by case basis, and secondly 
influencing the institutional capacity-building and the rule of law in such 
difficult conflict and post-conflict situations. Only the use of such knowl-
edge, fostering local adaptation of governance institutions in shifting crimi-
nal and dictatorial regimes, would ultimately allow these countries to profit 
of development and cooperation programs. The scholars promoting such an 
idea in the context of the politics of transitions would prioritize: the political 
pressure on governments reluctant to prosecute perpetrators; the assistance 
required in building legal frameworks and training legal officials; the sup-
port provided for investigations, including forensic analysis and security 
sector reform; and at last but not least, creating trust in the justice system 
among the local population. With regard to further research required in the 
field of the human security sectors, the impact of international governance 
institutions on communities and individuals also needs empirical assess-
ments. The approach on lessons-learned studies based on the experience of 
other international and hybrid criminal courts of relevance to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, may only be useful in some areas and might result 
partly to be insufficient, considering that the Court’s challenges “are and 
will remain unique”.87
87 For an overview of the US foreign policy orientations provided by the Council on For-
eign Relations, see D. Kaye, Justice Beyond The Hague. Supporting the Prosecution of Inter-
national Crimes in National Courts, Council on Foreign Relations Press, June 2011. This 
report provides important insights into the strengths and limitations of current interna-
tional justice mechanisms. It makes a clear case for increasing support to national legal 
systems and outlines a variety of ways that the US government can improve and coor-
dinate its aid with others. While there will always be a place for international courts in 
countries that cannot or will not prosecute perpetrators themselves, this Council Special 
Report argues that domestic systems can and should play a more meaningful role, the 
report is accessible at: http://www.cfr.org/international-criminal-courts-and-tribunals/
justice-beyond-hague/p25119?co=C009603 See also G. Boas, G. Oosthuizen, ‘Suggestions 
for Future Lessons-Learned Studies: The Experience of Other International and Hybrid 
Criminal Courts of Relevance to the International Criminal Court’, January 2010, Interna-
tional Criminal Law Services, at 1, accessible at: www.icisfoundation.org
Preliminary remarks
The previous chapter wanted to shed some light on the transition of global 
regulatory frameworks fostering human security. It clarified the construc-
tion, meaning and subject matter of global regimes of legal and political 
nature dealing with international threats and crimes. It offered some back-
ground information of the emerging regime of international criminal justice 
and the foundation of its jurisdiction. It examined the normative and policy 
orientations of human security based on both the rule of international law 
and world politics. It focused on the paradigm shift of complementarity 
between global regimes and the interpretation of its meanings. It attempted 
to clarify the challenges and opportunities and the expectations of human 
security from different perspectives and views. It indicated that in order to 
progress with the architecture of governance fostering human security in 
conflict and post-conflict situations multilateral engagements are absolutely 
required. The multilateral perspective should expand further the principle 
of complementarity between statehood, sovereignty and the tools of inter-
national governance in accordance with the constitutions of the world com-
munity. This chapter examines the governance of peace and justice as tools 
of human security. It wants to stimulate further progress in accordance with 
the expectations of human security and the policy formulations required 
at domestic, regional and international levels responding to mass atrocity 
crimes. It underscores the prospects and the lasting debate of peace, justice 
and security, the unresolved governance issues, and the requirement of an 
integrated approach of governance of peace and justice.
This chapter explores the lasting debate between peace and justice and the 
unresolved governance issues between peace operations, law enforcement 
and civilian protection duties. It argues about the importance of interactions 
between complementary global regimes and underscores the preventive 
strategy of mass atrocity crimes required at global level. It recalls the back-
ground of the emerging regime of international criminal justice after decades 
of political efforts to reach consensus for the ratification of an international 
treaty, which would finally regulate the jurisdiction of a permanent criminal 
tribunal. As previously clarified, the Court was established with the scope 
to generate further jurisprudence after the judicial activity of the ad hoc UN 
tribunals, and among other purposes such as the preservation of the rule of 
law and human rights. Its potential to become a global tool of human secu-
3 The Governance of Peace and Justice 
as Tools of Human Security
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rity depends, however, on many factors. Some of them have already been 
debated in the previous chapter. This chapter recalls the necessity to find an 
integrated model of governance that would have sustainable results on the 
ground in conflict and post-conflict situations. Such model of governance 
requires appropriate reforms, capacity-building and a greater complementar-
ity. The governance model proposed would centralize the rights of individu-
als, including their protection, safety and security in situations of war and 
crime. All actors involved in such policy formulations (States, international 
and regional organizations and civil society) have to take complete owner-
ship of their responsibilities towards individuals. In this way the evolution of 
international law preserving the fundamental rights of individuals in situa-
tion of war and crime would absolutely progress.
3.1 Renewed responsibilities to respond to Mass Atrocity Crimes?
Section outline
This section points out some of the issues characterizing the intersection 
between legal and political regimes of complementary nature based on 
cooperation, and the practice of delivering justice in conflict and post-con-
flict societies devastated by mass atrocity crimes. It underscores further the 
importance of an integrated approach of governance fostering peace, jus-
tice and security in conflict and post-conflict situations realizing the protec-
tive, retributive and restitutive principles of global justice. In the last years, the 
unresolved tensions between peace and justice resulted in a long and open 
debate between scholars, practitioners, representatives of governments and 
civil society, including officials of international organizations. It needs to be 
noted that an analytical framework to properly understand the positive and 
negative effects of accountability during or after conflicts combined with 
peace processes and peace negotiations is weak and somewhat unreliable. 
The debate over whether pursuing international criminal justice is helpful 
or harmful to peace processes during political violence has become a man-
tra in the realms of international relations and international law.1 The les-
sons learned from the interaction between peace and justice in conflict and 
post-conflict societies indicate that the occurrence of short term methods to 
secure peace, incorporating individuals with records of past abuses into local 
governments, caused negative long-term effects on affected communities 
by war and crime. The analysis of the UN missions and the activities in the 
1 See L. Arbour, Doctrines Derailed?: Internationalism’s Uncertain Future, Global Briefi ng 2013 
opening speech from the International Crisis Group’s President & CEO Louise Arbour, 
accessible at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2013/arbour-
doctrines-derailed-internationalism-s-uncertain-future.aspx See also M. Kersten, “The 
ICC and its impact: more known unknowns”, Open Democracy, 5 November 2014, acces-
sible at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/mark-kersten/icc-and-its-
impact-more-known-unknowns
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field operations confirm this unfortunate trend in several situations such as 
in the Sudan and in the DRC. In extreme conflict situations the amnesties on 
the table of peace negotiations produced a dangerous message that abuses 
would be tolerated encouraging more violence. The clusters of peace and jus-
tice, including the issues of victims, cooperation and complementarity, have 
been debated during the stocktaking exercise of international criminal justice 
during the Review Conference of the Rome Statute in Kampala. Such debates 
concluded that in conflict and post-conflict situations “the negative conse-
quences that had been predicted would occur on peace processes from pur-
suing international criminal justice, had fortunately not materialized”.2 Thus, 
are there renewed responsibilities responding to mass atrocity crimes in sus-
tainable ways? Are we finally able to respond internationally to the political 
violence against civilians in conflict and post-conflict situations?
3.1.1 The ongoing debate
The complementary nature of legal and political regimes, and the way they 
interact for the sake of human security in conflict and post-conflict situations 
is extremely important. In particular, the controversial relations between 
global politics and the rule of international law deserve discussions between 
the responsibility to protect civilians and the fight against the impunity of 
mass atrocity crimes. In other words, the idea of an architecture govern-
ing international relations towards a comprehensive international strategy 
establishing the primacy of the law, while using it as a fundamental tool of 
global governance, is the paradigm shift deserving attention. This study 
proves that the political expectations centralising individuals in global mat-
ters require first of all the clarification about the use of justice involving the 
lives of civilians in situations of war and crime, and those legal frameworks 
prioritizing the rule of law and the universality of their provisions, challeng-
ing the criticism of what Koskenniemi defined in The Politics of International 
Law “the corruption of the rule of law either in the narrow chauvinism of 
diplomats, or the speculative utopias of an academic elite”.3 In 1848 Lacor-
daire rightly noted that “between the strong and the weak, between the rich 
and the poor, between master and servant, it is freedom that oppresses and 
the law that sets free”.4 Arbour would emphasise that “the purpose of law in 
a free and democratic society is to liberate, not to restrain. It is to create a safe 
and just environment in which human conduct is regulated, and power is 
constrained so that maximum freedom and safety is attained by all”.5
2 Review Conference of the Rome Statute. Stocktaking of International Criminal Justice: 
Peace and Justice. Draft Moderator’s Summary: Introduction by Kenneth Roth. RC/ST/
PJ/1, 7 June 2010.
3 See M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’, in 4 EJIL, 1990.
4 See H. Lacordaire, Conférence s de Notre-Dame de Paris, éd. Sagnier et Bray, 1848, at 246.
5 See L. Arbour, supra. See L. Arbour, ‘The Rule of Law’, in The New York Time, 26 Septem-
ber 2012.
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When observing the dynamics characterizing the formulation of internation-
al regimes it is clear that the political process comes before the supremacy 
of legal frameworks dealing with international disputes and international 
humanitarian affairs. The protective, retributive and restitutive aspects of global 
justice require some important decisions to be taken by the relevant decision-
makers, considering the political convergence of expectations projected in 
contemporary governance systems. According to the principle of complemen-
tarity and the policy of the responsibility to protect civilians recalled in sev-
eral UN fora, the Court will monitor national judicial proceedings, offering 
assistance as appropriate on the ground to end the impunity regime of inter-
national crimes. The simple question is how? The hope is that many States as 
soon as possible would become parties to such a system. The accession to the 
Rome Statute would mean for the nation-state a concrete option to protect its 
citizens from the danger of authoritarianism of its own leadership or crimi-
nal regime. At global level, in the field of international criminal law there 
will finally be a permanent standard and a reference institution in the con-
text of the proliferation of international tribunals. However, there seem to be 
little chances to centralize the trias politica balancing the legislative, executive 
and judicial powers in the international order. The Court’s presence, after 
all, does not solve the absence of the trias politica in international relations 
including the killings by dictators to retain their power such as in the Sudan, 
Syria and Lybia, just to name a few situations. Besides, the African Union is 
taking serious political distance from the Court. The risk is that some of the 
African States would neglect their legal obligations as States Parties to the 
Rome Statute expressing the wish to withdraw their memberships.6 From a 
legal perspective and ignoring political standpoints the Court will have to 
continue its fight against the impunity and go ahead with its judicial pro-
ceedings. This section recalls the responsibilities of cooperation between the 
States, regional and international organizations.
Obviously with regard to the collective security and global threats there 
will be plenty of limits in defining the legal link between the State and the 
individual responsibility. This must be the ambition of the UN-ASP politi-
cal and institutional interactions. The Court’s responsibility is to ensure 
the quality of criminal justice, to be a well-understood and well-supported 
institution and to become an outstanding model of public administration. 
6 The African Union (AU) has accused the ICC of singling out Africans for prosecu-
tion and has previously called for the Court to drop the Kenya cases. Kenyatta and 
Ruto, as well as Joshua Arap Sang, face crimes against humanity charges for their 
alleged roles in planning ethnic violence after disputed 2007 elections in Kenya. The 
violence between their respective Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities left at least 1,100 
dead and more than 600,000 homeless. See AU to discuss ICC trials of Kenyan leaders, 
Aljazeera, 20 September 2013, accessible at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/afri-
ca/2013/09/20139209543865471.html
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The question is if the Court’s jurisdiction is able to end the impunity regime 
of international crimes. Like the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwan-
da, the ICC is not essentially set up to deal with international conflicts, but 
rather to provide and administer “international justice” to internal conflicts, 
in countries too weak to perform justice. The difference with the ad hoc tribu-
nals is that the ICC is institutionally independent from the Security Council 
and power politics. But is this assumption true considering the provisions 
of the Rome Statute such as Article 13 and 16 and the power of the Security 
Council to defer investigation or prosecution? Besides, are the States willing 
to find consensus on the reform of the UN Charter applying a constitutional 
approach, or pluralism would continue as the liberal ideology applicable to 
international normative frameworks?7
3.1.2 The rule of law advocates
In this study the views of the rule of law advocates are absolutely welcome. 
Some important aspects determining the evolution of international law are 
the policy formulation and law-making process of its institutions, and their 
capacity-building to interact with each other to maximize the results, and 
further preserving the concept of international society. In regime theory 
international governance institutions are by definition instances of interna-
tional cooperation with legal personality which derive from international 
treaties. Their enforcement depends on the political process supporting par-
ticular sets of ideas and values expressed in political convergence of expecta-
tions, legal provisions and normative frameworks. Their rules of coopera-
tion may create governance functions which might result not appealing by 
a particular policy, political interest and further formulation of laws.8 This is 
the case of the cooperation regime of not binding character settled between 
the United Nations and the emerging regime of the Rome Statute.
7 For an extensive contribution and analysis of the legal requirements of the United 
Nations and the future of the Charter see, N. Schrijver, “Applying, Interpreting and de 
facto Modifying the Charter”, The Future of the Charter of the United Nations, (2006) Max 
Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, at 13. See also N. Schrijver ‘et al’, The United 
Nations of the Future. Globalisation with a Human Face, (2006), at 304. For an overview of 
the discussion on the constitutional character of the UN Charter and the legal conse-
quences arising from that characterization, see B. Fassbender, The United Nations Charter 
as the Constitution of the International Community, (2009).
8 See E. C. Luck and M. W. Doyle (eds.), International Law and Organization: Closing the 
Compliance Gap, 2004.
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The current paradigm shift is at which extent the interaction between 
the United Nations and the Rome Statute system is important for the gov-
ernance of peace, justice and human security. This interaction represents 
a responsibility of both the nation-state and the international community 
to implement constitutional standards for a universal jurisdiction protect-
ing fundamental individual rights. The view expressed in this study is that 
the complementary character of such regimes represents the key for further 
progress: a) in the regime of human rights (rehabilitation, reconstruction 
and victim rights, including humanitarian and socio-economic issues,); b) 
in the regime of international peace and security maintenance and restora-
tion, or better say supporting the main purposes and tools at disposition 
for humanitarian interventions in conflict and post-conflict societies (civil-
ian protection duties, including conflict prevention and peace enforcement, 
peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building); and c) in the emerging 
regime of international criminal justice (jurisdictional matters and the ref-
erence of the jurisprudence, harmonization of domestic judicial channels 
with appropriate assistance to national implementation of laws, and for the 
preservation of fundamental individual rights). The rule of law has a funda-
mental task defining the complementary character of international regimes. 
However, the practice displays the difficulties in keeping the compliance of 
legal frameworks based on cooperation.
3.1.3 The gaps of the globalist approach
The examination of the theory and the practice of international regimes 
points out the sensitive gaps of complementary governance based on inter-
national cooperation. The disintegration of the nation-states contains the 
idea that the international community could do something about the issues 
listed above preserving law and order at global level. This study simply 
underscores the politics of international criminal justice in the context of 
maintaining peace and security which governance indicates serious gaps of 
human security measures, among other serious problems of legal, institu-
tional and political nature. It debates the challenges, obstacles and concerns 
in the governance of complementary global regimes based on cooperation 
by the relevant stakeholders. The case studies argue about the potential to 
maximize the results on the ground by using the limited ‘arrangements and 
agreements’ between international governance institutions without chal-
lenging the primary law. What is simply argued is the absence of a political 
road map to govern peace, justice and security at global scale. In the preamble 
of the Rome Statute, its members, or so-called States Parties, expressed their 
political determination to establish an independent permanent International 
Criminal Court in relationship with the United Nations system. The pur-
poses and principles of the Charter of the United Nations were reaffirmed 
once again in the Rome Statute over national sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and the use of force, as crystallized in the UN Charter since the end of WWII. 
Today, situations in which one or more crimes appear to have been commit-
Chapter 3  The Governance of Peace and Justice as Tools of Human Security 95
ted can be referred to the International Criminal Court by the Security Coun-
cil, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, by a State Party to the Rome 
Statute, or by the Court itself, under specific conditions.
This section points out, among other problems, the unresolved governance 
issues of mass atrocity crimes considering the lasting debate between peace 
and justice, respectively, between the political determinations and the legal 
frameworks fostering peace, justice and security at domestic, regional and 
global levels. In the complex scenario of international relations, the rule of 
international law as a principle of governance is undergoing a substantial 
impasse between the constitutionalist and the pluralist different theoretical 
approaches of the international legal order. Between a centralized norma-
tive framework able to assume the existence of a constitution of the world 
community, and the liberal view of the pluralistic approach of comple-
menting global mandates, able to respond to the challenges of the time. In 
other words, the assumption that the rule of law, conceived at domestic 
level, would be also applicable in the organization of the international soci-
ety depends by the relationship and partnership between complementary 
global mandates. As Delmas-Marty correctly points out “we must therefore 
go beyond models to find a flexible relationship between law and politics 
that will make the future European and world orders at least sustainable, if 
not entirely stable”.9 I would say that in order to accomplish such important 
goal we need a clear road map alongside the uncertain future of international-
ism and its doctrines.10
3.1.4 The practice of delivering justice
The concern is that the idealistic prospects to establish an appropriate archi-
tecture, dealing with the causes and the effects of mass atrocity crimes, in 
accordance with the challenges of the time, is for many an unrealistic vision, 
while for others this requires consensus and political convergence about 
institutional reforms and systemic changes. The humanitarian escalation 
of last resort in the conflict in the Sudan, including the following inaction 
after the judicial outcomes of the Court by the executive and political organs 
of the United Nations and by the Sudanese authorities, indicate ample dis-
crepancy in the politics of international criminal justice and its governance. 
Moreover, the compromised provisions of the Rome Statute between the 
Security Council and the Court, which give the priority to peace processes 
on investigations and prosecutions, also produced sensitive consequences 
in the effort to destabilize the criminal and still active regime of the LRA in 
Uganda, or the leadership of the Sudanese government responsible of mass 
9 See M. Delmas-Marty, “Models of Transformation: in the Land of Orderly Clouds”, in 
Ordering Pluralism, 2009 at 164.
10 See L. Arbour supra .
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atrocity crimes. Among other natural resources Uganda has oil, and the uni-
lateral action by the US to send a few military advisers to fight against the 
LRA in 2011, has been heavily criticised as the typical resource addiction of 
the US, characterizing the interests of the global economy, instead of acting 
under the flag of humanitarian solidarity. The appropriate action should be 
pressuring the Ugandan government to enforce the arrest warrants against 
the LRA rebels. The Ugandan government has a specific responsibility 
fighting against the impunity of international crimes, and if military action 
would be authorized, it should come from the multilateral premises in accor-
dance with the rule of international law. The US should promote multilateral 
action against the LRA and become a member of the Rome Statute system. 
Until that moment, the risks of unilateral interests in Africa would always 
receive as many critics as possible, including the unfortunate reaction of Chi-
na and Russia in regard to the situation in Syria, and their interests to keep 
the Syrian regime in place. In summary of these arguments, the criteria for 
humanitarian intervention in the wake of regime change in Libya, and the 
on-going humanitarian crisis in Syria, including the law enforcement capac-
ity of the Court’s involvement and its judicial decisions in the DRC, Central 
African Republic, Kenya, and Ivory Coast, including the new investigative 
situations of the Court, need an integrated approach of governance.
It is a decade that the international judicial institution is operational, how-
ever, no solution has been found in the law enforcement dilemma of its 
judicial decisions. In regard to the situation in the Sudan on 1 March 2012, 
Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a warrant of arrest against Mr. Abdel Raheem 
Muhammad Hussein (“Hussein”) for 41 counts of crimes against humanity 
and war crimes allegedly committed in the context of the situation in Darfur 
(Sudan). Mr Hussein is currently Minister of National Defence of the Suda-
nese Government and former Minister of the Interior and former Sudanese 
President’s Special Representative in Darfur. In the situations where crimi-
nal domestic regimes and their leaders still in power would use the civil-
ians as hostages, the criteria to guarantee civilian protection measures are 
not defined by governance systems based on international cooperation. The 
three aspects of global justice, namely, the protective, retributive and restitutive 
aspects are not satisfactorily fulfilled by complementary global regimes. The 
links between humanitarian intervention, law enforcement and reconstruc-
tion in conflict and post-conflict situations wait to find a place in comple-
mentary governance systems. Unfortunately, even with the advent of the 
Rome Statute system a preventive strategy of mass atrocity crimes is still 
required. The current challenges, obstacles and concerns, including the 
debate deriving from them, require appropriate attention by the decision-
making in the short, middle and long terms. Let us proceed further with the 
analysis of this sensitive debate and the prospects of peace and justice.
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3.2 The Prospects of Peace and Justice
Section outline
This section examines the quest of civilian protection and some of the chal-
lenges, obstacles and concerns in the governance of peace and justice. It 
advocates for further progress of the rule of international law to regulate 
the complementarity character of global regimes fighting against war and 
crime and intervening in situations of political violence against civilians. The 
maintenance of international peace, justice and security after the cold war 
indicates that the international community became soon powerless to the 
new international threats and massive crimes spreading at local, regional 
and global scale. In these conflicts the civilian population is targeted more 
than ever before. Dictatorship and despotism cause instability, disrupt eco-
nomic activity, and reduce opportunities for civilians. In many countries, 
bad governance, authoritarian regimes, opportunistic political élites and the 
availability of weapons have led to weak States and their domestic gover-
nance structures to undermine fundamental individual rights. Corruption, 
abuse of power, weak institutions and the lack of accountability corrode 
States from within and contribute to regional insecurity. Intra-state conflict 
not only destroys infrastructure but also encourages further criminal behav-
iours making governance activities impossible. A number of decolonized 
regions, like the African Great Lakes, became soon caught in a downward 
spiral of conflict and serious violations of international humanitarian law. 
The rhetoric, however, that the Court would be against the African continent 
is groundless and this section demonstrates some of the reasons why.
3.2.1  The quest of civilian protection
Soon after the cold war a renewal of ethnic conflicts in Africa resumed into a 
state of anarchy and political violence in many countries. In addition, inter-
national terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remain 
important threats to peace and security among nations worldwide, includ-
ing the transition of Arab politics and the risk that autocratic regimes could 
hijack pro-democracy movements, as it happened in Iran in 1979, in Libya 
or currently in Syria. Looking back to the historic transition which occurred 
in Iran at the end of the 1970s, the uprising against the shah was led by pro-
democracy youths who took the streets. In the end the regime created a 
closed and an autocratic society. Across the Middle East the common phe-
nomenon is that authoritarian regimes try to stop unprecedented peaceful 
protests with brutality and unacceptable violence. These countries struggle 
between liberation and enormous bloodshed, including the protesters’ abil-
ity to reach the eyes of the world, not really able to determine the outcomes 
of difficult political processes, which are all characterized by the potential 
of authoritarian regimes. The approach by the international community in 
these situations characterized by serious humanitarian escalations is exten-
sively examined by scholars in the field of international law and interna-
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tional relations. They are supposed to work hand in hand in order to advise 
policy makers about feasible solutions in the short, middle and long term.
If it could be said that the transition of the Arab region has similarity with the 
events occurred in Eastern Europe in 1989 following the decline of the Soviet 
bloc, the situation in the Arab region is characterized by other concerns.11
However, it is not possible to predict what happens next. What is well 
known is that the authoritarian regimes in these countries kept control giv-
ing rewards to supporters and punishing opponents, military and police 
power, redirecting hostility toward targets in the West and other means. The 
majority of these countries are not States Parties to the Rome Statute. This 
means that the Court could receive jurisdiction by the Security Council as it 
happened for the situation in Libya. The Court, however, has a limited place 
in the preservation of peace and security as shown by the challenges also 
debated in the next paragraph.
For many observers the sponsor of the doctrine of the Muslim Brotherhood 
could intensify revolutionary Islamist terrorism and also attacks on the West. 
Despite the existence of the risks in such political transitions, people in the 
Arab world have expressed their democratic wishes with courage and deter-
mination. There are new opportunities to combine democracy and Islam 
but also threats of conflicts of intra-state nature. In Egypt for instance, the 
power given to the army and police in the transition after Mubarak’s regime, 
requires political balancing between religion, Islam and the formation of the 
State. In this uncertain context the question is whether complementary glob-
al regimes and the political forces empowering them will focus on a preven-
tion strategy of mass atrocity crimes by fighting against serious violations of 
human rights. These countries will need support in their transitions giving 
the priority to the security sector reforms (army, police and judiciary). There 
are moments in history in which the impossible becomes unavoidable to 
challenge political violence. The changes occurring in the Middle East were 
unimaginable to nearly everyone like the dissolution of the Soviet Union just 
before its fall. But the power of people movements has a logic and timeline 
on its own. In the Middle East, the hopes of its people are interrelated with 
those of the world. In moments like these, it is inspiring to know that global 
solidarity, in hope and in action, can play a small part in such difficult politi-
cal transitions. The international community is called upon deeper respon-
sibilities if we also consider the political, economic and social disintegration 
11 The pressure of the international community to probe human rights violations is growing, 
see N. Pillay, High Commissioner of Human Rights, Egypt: Change system that bred rights 
abuses, 1 February 2011, accessible at: http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/Dis-
playNews.aspx?NewsID=10695&LangID=E See also for an extensive statement addressed 
to the government, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights urges Government restraint and 
respect for human rights in Egypt, 28 January 2011, accessible at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10688&LangID=E
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of regional organizations and their unity of intents based on the policy of 
global solidarity.
3.2.2 Challenges
Right at the beginning of the new century the world’s first permanent inter-
national tribunal became a reality. Its establishment will be preserved in 
some form as an historical record of global proportions for the sake of civil-
ians in conflict and post-conflict societies. The Court has jurisdiction over 
the most responsible individuals accused of committing serious interna-
tional crimes. This is to some extent considered by social scientists as the 
result of the ‘failure’, ‘collapse’ or ‘disintegration’ of the nation-states unable 
to protect civilians namely their own citizens, while for human rights activ-
ists the governance of justice is responding to a crisis in international democ-
racy and to the unilateral security policy of some nation-states neglecting 
human rights. Others would refer to the national security and criminal poli-
cies applied in the last decade in many countries. Namely the classic, lib-
eral ‘rule of law’ concept as a tool for regulating globalization and security 
threats in modern information societies. This type of criminal law “parades 
legislatively in the guise of security law, intervention and occupation law, 
and, most recently, in the development of a special criminal law solely appli-
cable to the ‘enemy’. Such unilateral approach goes hand in hand with a dis-
mantling of human rights, first gradually, but now with increasing rapid-
ity, which frequently occurs in the name of human rights”.12 There are no 
doubts that the emerging international criminal justice and the Rome Statute 
regime neutralize such unilateral approaches for the sake of the preservation 
of human rights standards in international criminal proceedings. The ques-
tion is whether such emerging regime is governed as sub-regime comple-
menting the United Nations system preserving human rights, and if both 
would create an architecture fostering peace, justice and security applicable 
on a case-by-case basis in situations of war and crime with early warning 
and prevention strategies including law enforcement.
The way justice is governed is an important matter for all of us. The pur-
pose of the governance of justice is to reach affected communities unable 
to see justice on the ground, to be the judiciary evidence that the dignity of 
life has been violated, influencing the change in disintegrated nation-states, 
where the civilians do not have any right left, and even no fundamental right 
for their own life. The aim of the governance of justice is to repair the harm 
caused on civilians. They could finally see justice prevail in their communi-
ties despite the inability or unwillingness of their own State. For the first 
12 For an overview of the debate on the erosion of the human rights protection see, J. Arnold, 
“Protection of Human Rights by Means of Criminal Law: On the Relationship between 
Criminal Law and Politics” in W. Kaleck. M. Ratner, T. Singelnstein (eds.), International 
Prosecution of Human Rights Crimes, (2007), 3 at 12.
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time in history victims will be recognized in the judicial proceedings accord-
ing to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, however the 
obstacles these reparation programs are facing are also a matter of mutual 
concern (insufficient funds, victims threatened and withdrawing and con-
siderable delays in the prosecution of perpetrators). The first decisions of the 
ICC demonstrate that child applicants for victim status are confronted with 
particular difficulties: children struggle with the proof of their identity and 
age; uncertainties exist about their ability to submit an application for par-
ticipation on their own behalf among other issues.13
In accordance with the challenges approached in this study and from a prag-
matic approach, as Richard Goldstone notes, “international law cannot exist 
in isolation from the political factors operating in the sphere of international 
relations”.14 This is the reason of the multidisciplinary approach required 
in this field to prove that there is a substantial evolution of public interna-
tional law which has evolved in use and importance vastly over the twenti-
eth century, due mainly to the increase of human rights violations in armed 
conflict. New threats in modern society allow the laws and customs of war, 
or the law of armed conflict to regulate the conduct and responsibilities of 
belligerent leaders, referring to individuals engaged in warfare, in relation 
to each other, and against protected witnesses, usually meaning civilians. 
The Rome Statute reflects the positive evolution of international (criminal) 
law and the humanitarian policy in case a State is unable or unwilling to do 
otherwise centralizing victim rights. The problem for the Court is that it does 
not receive sufficient support in the collective responsibility to protect vic-
tims and witnesses.15 The implementation of such responsibility depends on 
several factors. In the current architecture of the governance of peace, justice 
and security the creation of a new institution responsible for the protection 
of victims and witnesses is recommended to the decision-making respon-
sible of such lacuna.
13 For an overview, see C. Ferstman, M. Goetz and A. Stephens, Reparations for Victims of 
Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Systems in Place and Systems in the 
Making, (2009). See also C. Chamberlain Bolaños, Children and the International Criminal 
Court : analysis of the Rome Statute through a children’s rights perspective, Leiden University, 
Series of the E.M. Meijers Institute (2014).
14 See R. Goldstone, “International Criminal Court and Ad Hoc Tribunals”, The Oxford 
Handbook on the United Nations, in T. Weiss, S. Daws (eds.), (2007), 463 at 474. See also 
R. Goldstone, A. Smith, International Judicial Institutions: The Architecture of International 
Criminal Justice at Home and Abroad, (2008).
15 On the debate between security and human rights and the features of international law 
protecting civilians, see O. A. Hathaway, ‘Looking Ahead: Can Treaties Make a Differ-
ence?’ 2002 111, The Yale Law Journal 8, at 1935. Three months before Kenya’s deputy pres-
ident is due to go on trial at the International Criminal Court several victims of violence 
that followed a disputed election in late 2007 have pulled out of the proceedings, see T. 
Maliti, “Dozens of victims write to ask to withdraw from trial, says victim’s lawyer”, ICC 
Kenya Monitor, Open Society Justice Initiative, 13 September 2013, accessible at: http://
www.icckenya.org/
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3.2.3 Obstacles
The problem is that the principle of inter-dependence between peace, justice 
and security, characterizing complementary global regimes is not applied 
in the practice. The decisions of the Court have been undermined in many 
fronts in Darfur,16 in the DRC and in Uganda.17 The Court urges an appro-
priate governance strategy with the United Nations in conflict and post-
conflict societies. In Uganda for instance, the political orientation of the 
Security Council diluted the judicial decisions of the Court. Uganda served a 
two-year term in the Security Council just a few years ago. According to the 
diplomatic channels of the country representatives in the Security Council, 
Uganda had to be the most prominent voice of Africa, as the Security Coun-
cil focused on several African issues, including a) violence in the DRC, Cen-
tral African Republic, chaos in Kenya and the absence of State in Somalia; b) 
the war in the Sudanese region of Darfur; and c) the worsening violence on 
Uganda’s own doorstep in the eastern DRC. The position of the government 
of Uganda was to bring closer international attention on African conflicts, 
which might warrant the Security Council to approve international inter-
vention, safeguarding the international security dimension of international 
relations in other African countries more than on the Ugandan territory. On 
the other hand, the expectation to have the Court dealing with the last resort 
escalations of humanitarian crises, as it happened in Darfur, is character-
ized by the political uncertainties in the current transitional phase of law 
and order. The African States, under the premises of the newly established 
African Union, pressure the decision-making process regarding peace and 
justice, the governance of threats and crimes, the monitoring deferral activ-
ity of criminal proceedings giving priority to the role of the Security Coun-
cil in peace processes and negotiations, thus neutralizing the truth and the 
judicial outcomes of the Court. In other words, the regime established under 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute is at a crossroad. In the situation in Darfur, 
the Security Council should guarantee an increased force on the ground to 
protect civilians, stabilize the deteriorating security situation, and follow 
up on the arrest warrants of the Court according to the reports received by 
16 Following the referral from the United Nations Security Council on 31 March 2005, the 
Prosecutor received the document archive of the International Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur. In addition, the Offi ce requested information from a variety of sources, leading 
to the collection of thousands of documents. The Offi ce also interviewed over 50 inde-
pendent experts. After thorough analysis concluded that the requirements for initiating 
an investigation were satisfi ed.  See ICC-OTP-0606-104 accessible at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/
17 In December 2003 the President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda took the decision to refer 
the situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army to the Prosecutor of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court. The Prosecutor determined that there was a suffi cient basis to 
start planning for the fi rst investigation of the International Criminal Court. See the 
case ICC-02/04-01/05 accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20
and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/related%20cases/icc%200204%20
0105/uganda
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the Court on the Sudanese cases against the leaders of the country.18 In the 
past, international criminal justice has been managed by the Security Coun-
cil with selective enforcement and this still remains a problem, as it did the 
“victor’s justice” of post-WWII.
At normative level, Cryer points out that one solution would have been hav-
ing the Rome Statute ratified as part of the UN Charter. Alternatively the 
Security Council might impose duties upon all member States.19 The point 
is whether the States are ready to compromise such a universal codification 
regulating the public authority of humanitarian violations and law enforce-
ment capacity, while combining the accountability of measures of humani-
tarian intervention.20 A pragmatic approach underscores the fact that for 
an implementation of the governance of justice, structural and normative 
adjustments are necessary. Such adjustments would create the background 
of crime control at global scale allowing progress of the treaty law on ter-
rorism, fraud and corruption, trafficking of drugs and weapons and other 
‘globalized’ crimes. This step however is far to be reached if we look at the 
features of the governance of justice and the struggle between ownership, 
independence and public authority between political, executive and judi-
cial international mandates. The promotion of a ‘systemic change’ is nec-
essary for an empowerment of the Court in the peace and security regime, 
with the purpose of balancing powers in the international legal and politi-
cal order. This issue is very delicate considering the negative impact of the 
Court’s arrest warrants on several members of the African Union and the 
Arab League. The Security Council has a specific responsibility with regard 
to these very sensitive political issues before escalating situations to the 
Court, or freezing them using Article 16 of the Rome Statute. Even with a 
serious lack of resources received by the Security Council, the Court deliv-
ered its judicial decisions remaining detached from political compromises. 
18 See ICC-CPI-20091009-MA49, The Prosecutor v. Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, Case ICC-02/05-
01/07 Pre-Trial phase, The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) 
and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”) accessible at: http://www.
icc-cpi.int/cases/Darfur/c0205.html See, ICC-02/05-01/09, tthe warrant of arrest for Al 
Bashir lists seven counts on the basis of his individual criminal responsibility under Article 
25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute as an indirect (co) perpetrator including: fi ve counts of crimes 
against humanity: murder, Article 7(1)(a); extermination, Article 7(1)(b); forcible transfer 
Article 7(1)(d); torture Article 7(1)(f); and rape Article 7(1)(g); two counts of war crimes: 
intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population as such or against individual 
civilians not taking part in hostilities -Article 8(2)(e)(i); and pillaging – Article 8(2)(e)(v) 
accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/
Situation+ICC+0205/Related+Cases/ICC02050109/ See also Sixth Report of the Prosecu-
tor of the International Criminal Court, to the UN Security Council pursuant to UNSC 
1593 (2005) accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/otp_events/RP_20071205.html
19 See R. Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal 
Regime, (2005), at 237.
20 See N. D. White, Empowering Peace Operations to Protect Civilians: Form over Sub-
stance? (September) 13 Journal of International Peacekeeping (2009) 3-4, at 327.
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However, the Court needs a more structured support by the UN institutions, 
a) especially under the General Assembly which should consider the gover-
nance of justice as a matter of mutual concern mandatory for all States; b) by 
the Security Council and possibly by the UN judicial channel before the UN 
political organs; c) by the International Court of Justice which would be the 
most appropriate dealing with disputes between States and the UN Charter 
obligations.
In the long term, the promotion of a ‘systemic change’ of governance would 
have a positive impact on the project of universal jurisdiction, making the 
Rome Statute institutions, especially its political organ (the Assembly of the 
States Parties), able to monitor aggression, terrorism, drug trafficking and 
other crimes in the Court’s jurisdiction. Considering the obstacles in the 
regulation of humanitarian escalations, it is however not feasible to see the 
Court’s jurisdiction implemented, if such obstacles in the governance of jus-
tice are not solved. There are still several limits in the governance of justice 
dealing with both humanitarian crises and collective security in the absence 
of a supranational organization and separation of legislative, executive and 
judicial powers in the international legal order. The escalation of humanitar-
ian disasters in times of war under the premises of the maintenance of peace 
and security, and the judicial outcomes of serious human rights breaches do 
not receive appropriate follow up. The risk of such discrepancies is compro-
mising the future of international criminal justice.21 Moreover, the current 
status of the governance of international criminal justice reflects the real-
ity characterizing the project of universal jurisdiction between theory and 
practice. The emerging practice of a permanent International Criminal Court 
dealing with the accountability of individuals responsible of serious crimes 
is still too weak, comparing its jurisdiction with the international humani-
tarian crises occurring in Africa, Middle East and other regions. The intra-
state African conflicts are all characterized by severe violations and abuses 
of human rights and by old models of conflict management. These conflicts 
destabilize peace and security, as also shown by the Security Council resolu-
tion on Darfur, where protections duties of civilians under the R2P norm did 
not work. Another challenge deriving from such humanitarian escalations 
is that the Court’s jurisprudence will need to keep alive the rights of the vic-
tims.
21 For research contributions, in the area of international crime, law, and criminal jus-
tice which considers the globalization of international criminal justice see, M. Defl em, 
‘Review of Governing Through Globalized Crime: Futures for International Criminal 
Justice’, 2009  38 Contemporary Sociology, at 153.
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3.2.4 Matters of international mutual concern
The jurisprudence of the Court will need to confirm the contribution of the 
Rome Statute to the rule of international law and the fulfilment of obliga-
tions by the States Parties on matters of international mutual concern. The 
Rome Statute represents a carefully drawn compromise between two ideas: 
countries should be first of all responsible for administering their état de 
droit within their territory, and respect the assumption that holding people 
accountable for the most serious crimes under international law is ultimate-
ly an international, but firstly a domestic concern.22 The Court is intended 
to complement national justice systems, not to replace them, as the Pre-
paratory Ad Hoc Committee for the Court and the ILC discussions made 
clear.23 From an historical perspective, the Rome Statute became operational 
while the struggle of the international community determined concrete and 
fair reforms of the United Nations, specifically: over the use of force, after 
decades of Security Council resolutions about security,24 peace operations, 
humanitarian intervention and about the institutional struggle of the Gen-
eral Assembly to receive an empowered role for the protection of human 
rights and collective security.25 The United Nations reform, specifically the 
enlargement of the Security Council, has been an issue under discussion 
in the General Assembly for a long time. The issue of reform also figured 
prominently in the Assembly’s debate in the last decade, but consensus is 
far to be reached. The discussions, however, contributed to improving the 
transparency of the Council’s work and also clarified its role by develop-
ing policies and doctrines for the prevention of conflicts, managing increas-
ingly complex crises, identifying the needs of peacekeeping and peacebuild-
ing, and dealing with new threats such as the fight against terrorism. Many 
observers would believe that the political impasse in international relations 
currently manifesting under the UN premises, would receive a new input 
through the Rome Statute. The question is whether the empowerment of the 
Court’s mandate really becomes a matter of international mutual concern, 
or it remains in the hands of just a few stakeholders. The responsibility to 
protect civilians between peace enforcement and the protection measures of 
victims and witnesses among other governance issues still require solutions.
22 For an extensive overview on the problems related to implementing legislation and 
cooperation on the Court in domestic regimes, see C. Stahn, “The International Criminal 
Court and the Shortcomings of Domestic Legislation: Introductory Note”, (2007) LJIL 20, 
at 165. For a legal analysis of the Court’s relationship with domestic jurisdiction see C. 
Stahn and G. Sluiter, The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (2009), 208 at 
400.
23 For the discussion within the ILC see Report on the work of its forty-seventh session, 2 May 
– 21 July 1995, GA, offi cial records, fi ftieth session, supplement No 10 (A/50/10), par. 47.
24 For reference reports and materials on the UN reform see the web portal accessible at: 
http://www.un.org/reform/peace_security.shtml
25 See Certain Expenses Case, ICJ Reports (1961) at 166. See also UN doc. A/RES/377(V) A 
(1950), the “Uniting for Peace” resolution.
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In the Resolutions ICC-ASP/6/Res.2 and ICC-ASP/11/Res.8, Strengthening 
the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of States Parties, the Assem-
bly of States Parties declared:
“Mindful that each individual State has the responsibility to protect its population from 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, that the conscience of humanity con-
tinues to be deeply shocked by unimaginable atrocities in various parts of the world, and 
that the need to prevent the most serious crimes of concern to the international commu-
nity, and to put an end to the impunity of the perpetrators of such crimes, is now widely 
acknowledged; Convinced that the International Criminal Court is an essential means of 
promoting respect for international humanitarian law and human rights, thus contribut-
ing to freedom, security, justice and the rule of law as well as to the prevention of armed 
conflicts, the preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security and the 
advancement of post-conflict peace-building and reconciliation with a view to achieving 
sustainable peace, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations; Convinced also that there can be no lasting peace without justice and that 
peace and justice are thus complementary requirements; Convinced further that justice and 
the fight against impunity are, and must remain, indivisible and that in this regard uni-
versal adherence to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is essential […]
This resolution points out the importance to strengthen the Rome Statute 
system and refers to the following important factors: a) the Rome Statute 
and the relation with other multilateral organisations; b) institution-build-
ing; c) cooperation and implementation; d) the role of the Assembly of States 
Parties. The Annex I and II deal respectively with the “Recommendations 
on the Plan of Action for achieving universality and full implementation of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” including the “Rec-
ommendations on international cooperation”. In delivering the Court’s 
annual report to the UN in 2014, ICC President Song acknowledged the fun-
damental partnership that exists between the UN and the ICC, as both orga-
nizations are “based on the ideals of peace, security and respect for human 
rights, and the realisation that these goals can only be attained through the 
rule of law and international cooperation”. He called upon all States to join 
the ICC, stressing that “the values of the Rome Statute reflect global solidar-
ity and commitment to peace, security and international law”.26
3.2.5 The unresolved governance issues
The previous observations referred to the United Nations and the Court’s 
role in the governance of international criminal justice since the Court’s 
establishment, considering the referrals received by multiple States from 
the volatile and strategically important region for its natural resources: 
the African Great Lakes Region, including the first referrals from the Secu-
rity Council (Sudan and Libya and the missing referral of the situation in 
26 See Judge Sang-Hyun Song, Annual Report to the United Nations General Assembly, 30 
October 2014, accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/presidency/UNGA-PS-30-
10-2014-Eng.pdf
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Syria).27 In general, the exchange of expertise, study and working groups 
to keep international complementary mandates alive would promote their 
relationship as expected in the Preamble of the treaty establishing the Court, 
which is complementary to the UN Charter. The purpose of this analysis is 
to improve the ways the UN, together with the Court’s judicial mandate, 
would influence the contemporary international legal order on the creation 
of a capacity-building apparatus applicable in conflict and post-conflict sit-
uations. The international governance of justice is based on compliance of 
treaty obligations and accountability of serious breaches of human rights; 
nevertheless, there are still gaps of law enforcement capabilities, protection 
duties of civilians including victims and witnesses, and the rehabilitation 
of communities affected by war and crimes. The ideal would be that when 
mass atrocity crimes would be referred to the Court under the premises for 
the preservation, restoration and maintenance of international peace and 
security, the Court would receive binding support and cooperation by com-
plementary stakeholders such as the UN institutions.
In order to offer sustainable peace in fragile States, while fighting against 
the impunity of serious international crimes, preserving and restoring order 
requires reforms of the army, police and judicial systems. Such efforts respond 
to the challenges of domestic security sectors. The consolidation of the rule of 
law at domestic and international levels is among the priorities of the United 
Nations. In the emerging regime of international criminal justice the States 
empower mechanisms to put an end to the impunity of serious crimes which 
also requires compliance and accountability through national implementation 
of legislations. In peace operations mandates for instance, the Security Council 
increasingly included the improvement of security institutions and legal sys-
tems in fragile States. The wide range of institutional reforms proposed in the 
UN brought as limited result a new approach in the configuration of the Secu-
rity Council mandates unifying peacekeeping and the rule of law. The only 
institutional restructuring process occurred in the last decade concerns the uni-
fication of peacekeeping entities (DPKO) and the Office of the Rule of Law and 
Security Institutions (OROLSI) with the scope to provide an integrated and 
forward-looking approach to the UN post-conflict assistance. The Office of the 
Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) brings together the follow-
ing entities of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO): the Police 
Division (PD), the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Section 
27 The term Great Lake African Region is likewise somewhat loose. It is used in a narrow 
sense for the area lying between northern Lake Tanganyika, western Lake Victoria, and 
lakes Kivu, Edward and Albert. This comprises Burundi, Rwanda, north-eastern Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and north-western Kenya and Tanzania. It is used in a 
wider sense to extend to all of Kenya and Tanzania, but not usually as far south as Zam-
bia, Malawi and Mozambique nor as far north as Ethiopia, though these four countries 
border one of the Great Lakes. See www.wikipedia.com
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(DDR), the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the Security Sector Reform 
Unit (SSR) and the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service (CLJAS).28
As Arbour points out the “rule of law institutions are important and the 
development agenda has long neglected them even under the heading of 
governance. In most conflict-prone areas we spend, for example, more mon-
ey and political capital on elections and support for the executive than on the 
establishment of a competent, professional and independent judiciary. This is 
true from Afghanistan, the DRC and Somalia to Guatemala, Sri Lanka and the 
Central Asian republics: weak or corroded judicial systems are both a prod-
uct of crisis and a sign of crises to come”.29 With regard to the rule of law dis-
course in peace and capacity-building operations and as a tool of governance, 
Hughes and Hunt would emphasize that “although the rule of law is now 
widely recognized as indispensable to effective peace operations, its delin-
eation remains elusive. Researchers contest its substance, while those most 
responsible for its implementation, as for instance the United Nations pro-
mulgate only abstract notions needed to disseminate detailed decisions. At 
its worst, this means that competing reform activities undermine each other, 
making long term success less likely”. The questions addressed by scholars 
are about the deficiencies in how the rule of law is conceived between States 
and non-states actors.30 Either at conceptual or operational levels there should 
be space for more engagement in the configuration of peace operations offer-
ing assistance and resources to complementary international mandates.
When addressing to the Rome Statute Conference to create a permanent 
Court, Benjamin B. Ferencz resumed his speech with the following remarks: 
“human rights must prevail over human wrongs. International law must 
prevail over international crime”.31
3.3 Peace and Justice: The Lasting Debate
Section outline
The lasting debate in the international political circles on peace and justice has 
an important function for the promotion of the broad concept of global justice. 
It is important to emphasize that such concept would shed some light 
on the dichotomy between peace and justice in devastated societies by 
war and crime. This standpoint clarifies the position taken in world 
politics by some nation-states, regional and inter-governmental orga-
28 For an overview of such internal governance structure in the UN Peacekeeping opera-
tions see: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/orolsi.shtml
29 See L. Arbour, supra.
30 See B. Hughes, C. Hunt, “The Rule of Law in Peace and Capacity Building Operations: 
Moving beyond a Conventional State-Centred Imagination”, 2009 (September) 13 Jour-
nal of International Peacekeeping, 3-4, at 267.
31 B. Ferencz, former Nürnberg prosecutor at Pace Peace Center, June 16, 1998, accessible 
at: http://www.un.org/icc/speeches/616ppc.htm
108 Part I  The Quest of Complementarity and the Dilemma of Human Security 
nizations on the formulation of the humanitarian policy, human rights 
and international law. So said, are international governance institu-
tions able to handle peace and justice as the two faces of the same coin?
The tensions between peace and justice have long been debated. Both 
legal theory and policy must be refined for practical application in situa-
tions emerging from violent conflict or political repression. Some formative 
research addresses these dilemmas through an overview of the legal obli-
gations and the implications of the coming into force of the International 
Criminal Court on the following issues: a) as a deterrent tool of judicial and 
legal nature influencing law and order at domestic level; b) for a holistic 
approach including sustainable peace and development; and c) throughout 
‘hard’ case studies regarding the tensions between peace and justice in con-
flict and post-conflict situations. This section offers some direction on the 
way forward to build a future on peace and justice between accountability 
versus conflict stabilization, international responses based on peace sustain-
ability expanding further the concept of global justice.
3.3.1 The centralization of individuals in global affairs
In the past, the topic of peace and justice would have been approached 
exclusively as peace versus justice, instead of being considered as interde-
pendent and complementary factors. Despite the new trend in approaching 
the peace and justice debate there still are, however, real tensions and issues 
that need to be addressed. The important policy element of human secu-
rity as sustainable catalyst of domestic stability in conflict and post-conflict 
situations waits to be implemented. International humanitarian escalations 
between political, executive and judicial mandates, characterized by severe 
humanitarian atrocities need an appropriate configuration of law enforce-
ment mandates centralizing civilian protection and victims’ rights. The 
question is whether such idealistic approach would be feasible in conflict 
situations fulfilling the expectations of global justice, which purpose is to cen-
tralize individual rights in global matters. Between the sensitive priorities 
in conflict and post-conflict situations the interactions of complementary 
public authorities present specific responsibilities. International governance 
institutions need to keep abreast of appropriate communication channels 
and focal points, including institutional liaisons. The question is whether 
such level of interaction is sufficient, or much more would be required in 
order to maximize the results on the ground. For many observers, the solu-
tions need to be found in the political forces empowering complementary 
global regimes and such an approach is absolutely right.
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3.3.2 Accountability vs. conflict stabilization?
In the wake of intervention in serious intra-state conflict spreading at larg-
er scale, as the situations in the African Great Lakes Region, controversial 
debates often arise between those who advocate for ‘justice’ through domes-
tic or international prosecutions, and those who prioritize ‘peace’ and argue 
that efforts to provide criminal accountability may impair or undermine the 
fragile post-conflict settlement. This debate became more evident regard-
ing Uganda, where peace negotiations between the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) and the Ugandan government took place while the International 
Criminal Court had indicated the senior rebel leadership responsible for the 
crimes. The sequence of peace and justice and the interaction between the 
Security Council and the judicial institution resulted to be quite controver-
sial for several reasons.32 This situation was referred by the Ugandan gov-
ernment to the Court in January 2004. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 
opened its investigation in July 2004. Five arrest warrants had been issued 
against top leaders of the Lords Resistance Army (LRA): Joseph Kony, Vin-
cent Otti (allegedly killed in 2007 on order of Kony), Okot Odhiambo, Raska 
Lukwiya (killed on 12 August 2006, whose arrest warrant has been with-
drawn), and Dominic Ongwen. These four arrest warrants are outstand-
ing.33 Over the last two years reliable sources confirm that the LRA killed 
more than 1,250, abducted more than 2,000 and displaced close to 300,000 in 
the DRC alone. In addition, there have been substantial numbers of killings 
and abductions by the LRA in both the South of Sudan and in the Central 
African Republic. Thus, accountability is required, but how does account-
ability work between domestic, regional and international structures of gov-
ernance?
32 Uganda has twice previously been chosen for a Security Council seat, in 1966 and 1981. 
Some critics sought unsuccessfully to block the country’s return to the prestigious posi-
tion in the UNSC with a two year mandate until 2010. The US reporter Georgianne 
Nienaber noted that Uganda has been accused of wanton human-rights violations and 
resource plundering in the eastern part of the DRC. Her posting was headlined: “Uganda 
does not deserve seat on UN Security Council; it’s time to pay attention.” Nienaber’s com-
mentary cited remarks by a leader of the US-based advocacy group Friends of the Congo 
who described Uganda as “certainly an agent of the US wreaking havoc on the African 
continent, particularly in Congo.” See G. Nienaber, “Uganda does not deserve seat on 
UN Security Council. It’s time to pay attention”, The Huffi ngton Post, 1 October 2008, 
accessible at: http://www.huffi ngtonpost.com/georgianne-nienaber/uganda-does-not-
deserve-s_b_130853.html
33 For an overview of the situation in Uganda see W. Burke-White, “Reconciling Peace and 
Justice: The International Criminal Court in Uganda” 2007 (July). Paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the The Law and Society Association, TBA, Berlin, Germany, acces-
sible at: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p182030_index.html See also the report 
of the Offi ce of the Prosecutor, “Investigations and Prosecutions”, 2009 (Weekly Num-
bers) published by the offi ce in the OTP Weekly Briefi ng, issue 6, accessible at: http://
www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Offi ce+of+the+Prosecutor/
Weekly+Briefi ngs/
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3.3.3 The international responses
While the maintenance of peace, justice and security in conflict and post-
conflict societies has been challenged drastically since the end of the bipo-
lar world order, old models of conflict management and military features of 
civilian protection duties might undermine the safeguard of human rights, 
if not appropriately governed. The evolution of the human security policy 
at domestic and global scale, the legal mechanisms to centralize individual 
rights, and the interaction of universal mandates fostering peace and justice 
in conflict and post-conflict situations, play a central role in defining objec-
tives, setting standards and monitoring compliance of States and non-States 
actors. These interdependent factors of governance can be evaluated by 
measuring their impact on devastated communities with the use of empiri-
cal data according to each situation where international governance institu-
tions are involved. The ideal would be to have appropriate configurations 
between peace operations and direct protection mechanisms of witnesses 
and victims of international crimes, while enforcing judicial arrest war-
rants of warlords at large. After all, the legislative chronology of the Security 
Council indicates that humanitarian violations have to be handled as threats 
to peace and security in accordance with the UN Charter requiring mea-
sures under Chapter VI and Chapter VII.34 Despite the new orientations in 
humanitarian policy and the legal frameworks applicable in armed conflicts 
on violations of international humanitarian law, the international responses 
include on the one hand the risk of enforcement practices moved by strategic 
and political interests of military coalitions. On the other hand, a communi-
tarian-oriented approach is based towards building a community of global 
justice rehabilitating societies unable or unwilling to do it themselves. The 
simple question between these different approaches is: how to proceed?
The concern is whether communitarian approaches are currently applied 
in the practice in the field operations. The failure of the African Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS) on the protection of civilians in Darfur is one of the examples 
of the emerging controversy of the responsibility to protect (R2P). Scholars 
as Barber argue that while the existence of the responsibility to protect has 
been widely endorsed in the Sudan, there has been relatively inadequate 
attention paid to its content. The treaty on the founding of the African Union 
stipulates that the Union has the right to intervene on humanitarian grounds 
34 For an overview of the different approaches between prevention and response to mass 
atrocity crimes see D. Kuwali, ‘Old Crimes New Paradigms: Preventing Mass Atrocity 
Crimes’ in R. I. Rotberg (ed.), Mass Atrocity Crimes. Preventing Future Outrages, 2010, at 
25. See S. Sewall, ‘From Prevention to Response: Using Military Force to Oppose Mass 
Atrocities’, in R. I. Rotberg (ed.), Mass Atrocity Crimes. Preventing Future Outrages, 2010, at 
159. See also G. Evans, ‘During the Crisis: The Responsibility to React’, in G. Evans (ed.), 
The Responsibility To Protect. Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All, 2008, at 105.
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in a member States that ‘gravely and massively violates human rights’.35 In 
the context of the AMIS intervention in Darfur it is important to clarify the 
question of “what the responsibility to protect actually entails: for peace-
support operations, for the States that send them, and most importantly, 
for the civilian population that expects to be protected by the soldiers sent 
to protect them”. Because the responsibility to protect, as described by the 
International Commission on State Sovereignty (ICISS) and endorsed by the 
UN Secretary General, by the General Assembly and by the Security Coun-
cil, says little as to positive obligations such as might require peace support 
operations to actively protect civilians, solutions are expected refining such 
legal framework. It is suggested by Barber, emphasizing the peacekeeping 
failure in Darfur, “that it is in the law of occupation that we come closest to 
finding a legal responsibility to protect, more than other features of inter-
national law”.36 This important standpoint found in the literature considers 
whether there are obligations that can be drawn from international human 
rights or international humanitarian law that may assist in locating a sub-
stantive content for the responsibility to protect. Some scholarship would 
emphasize the gaps in monitoring humanitarian interventions under the 
flag of the responsibility to protect in armed conflicts, including the fact 
that there are any legal parameters of jurisdiction in case of violations and 
abuses. In fact, the emerging regime of international criminal justice did 
not receive any place in the configuration of such mandates, neither can use 
such civilian protection forces, nor monitoring or indicting them in case of 
serious human rights breaches. Peacekeepers have been simply left out from 
the ‘independent’ judicial regime of the Rome Statute. Thus, how does the 
global fight against impunity works and evolves, and which are the issues 
on the table waiting for solutions by the decision-makers?
3.3.4 The concept of global justice
A couple of years ago, 60 years after the famous judgement of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, a distinguished gathering in the same 
courtroom launched a conference entitled Building a Future on Peace and Jus-
tice addressing the causes of sensitive issues. The outcome was a political 
document called the Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice which was 
addressed to the United Nations General Assembly in 2008 (A/62/885). The 
promoters believed that such document may be useful to the United Nations, 
35 See article 4 (h) of the founding treaty of the African Union (2000) on the right of the 
AU to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect 
of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. 
See also A. A. Yusuf, ‘The right of intervention by the AU: A paradigm shift in regional 
enforcement action?’, African Yearbook of International Law, vol. 11 (2003), pp. 3-21.
36 See R. Barber, “Refl ections on the Peacekeeping Failure in Darfur: Is There Any Sub-
stance to the Responsibility to Protect?” (2009) 13 Journal of International Peacekeeping 33, 
at 294. See also G. Evans, The Responsibility to Protect. Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once 
and For All, 2008.
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its members, including those involved at the local, national and international 
levels in all phases of conflict transformation, including mediation, post-con-
flict peace-building, development, and the promotion of transitional justice 
and the rule of law, and thus, being able to influence the future practice of 
making and building “just and lasting peace”. Although this is not a legal 
document, it contains definitions, principles and recommendations on issues 
of peace, justice and impunity, and making peace and dealing with the past, 
as well as promoting development. In this document ‘peace’ is understood as 
meaning sustainable peace. Sustainable peace goes beyond the signing of an 
agreement. Sustainable peace requires a long-term approach that addresses 
the structural causes of conflict, and promotes sustainable development, rule 
of law and governance, including the respect for human rights, making the 
recurrence of violent conflict less likely. The cessation of hostilities, restora-
tion of public security and meeting basic needs are urgent and legitimate 
expectations of people who have been traumatized by armed conflict, ‘Jus-
tice’ in such debates is understood as meaning “accountability and fairness 
in the protection of rights, and the prevention and redress of wrongs”. Justice 
must be administered by institutions and mechanisms that enjoy legitimacy, 
comply with the rule of law, and are consistent with international human 
rights standards. Moreover, justice combines elements of criminal justice, 
truth-seeking, reparations and institutional reform, as well as the fair distri-
bution of, and access to, public goods, and equity within society at large.37 
The next sessions of this chapter debate the prospects of justice governance; 
the interaction between complementary legal and political regimes; and the 
preventive strategy required of mass atrocity crimes.
3.4 The Governance of Peace and Justice
Section outline
There are no doubts that the governance of peace and justice as tools of 
human security requires further political efforts to maximize the results of 
complementary global regimes involved in conflict and post-conflict situa-
tions. The rule of law and multilateralism, including the policy formulations 
regarding collective responsibility, global solidarity and mutual account-
ability require further evolution. This section explores the prospects of the 
governance of peace and justice considering the different views to preserve 
the international legal and political order. In addition to the principle of com-
plementarity with domestic jurisdictions international criminal justice has 
been associated to the maintenance of peace and security and its enforcement 
tools. Its governance requires specific responsibilities, political determina-
37 See K. Ambos; J. Large; M. Wierda (eds.), Building a Future on Peace and Justice: Studies on 
Transitional Justice, Peace and Development The Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice, 
(2009). See also C. Bassiouni, D. Rottenberg, “Facing Atrocity: The Importance of Guiding 
Principles on Post-Confl ict Justice”, in The Chicago Principles on Post-Confl ict Justice, 2008 at 9.
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tions and legal frameworks defining measures of humanitarian protection in 
conflict and post-conflict situations. The young regime of international crimi-
nal justice can only be effective if all actors are committed to contribute to 
the universal goal of ending the impunity of serious crimes. The cooperation 
frameworks offering sustainable peace in conflict and post-conflict situations 
is now complemented by the regime of justice. Such regime seems to be cus-
tomized by dealing with a defined category of serious humanitarian breach-
es, while it is nearly paralyzed about further jurisdictional progress. These 
doctrinal assumptions derive from a middle ground between the pluralist and 
solidarist (or constitutionalist) international relations theories and foreign poli-
cy principles of States members and non-members of both organizations (the 
UN and the Rome Statute institutions), which are explored in this section. 
Let us proceed per steps exploring the governance of justice in world politics 
between the maintenance of international peace and security, and the pres-
ervation of the rule of law and human rights. In other words, the diplomatic 
compromise resumed in the legal provisions which characterize the nature 
of the Rome Statute based on soft-law of cooperation with the UN system.
3.4.1 Governance of justice and world politics
The emerging regime of justice provides the moral basis for very different 
types of international responses on humanitarian grounds. At doctrinal lev-
el international ‘solidarism’, or ‘monism’ in legal theory, is a political and 
legal process in which sovereignty is transferred from domestic governance 
institutions to be held by an independent and ‘supranational’ jurisdiction. 
Legally, the ‘solidarist’ approach stands on the assumption that “the more 
closely international law approximates to national law, the more the individ-
ual has the chance to become the direct bearer of legal rights and duties”.38 
International pluralism, or ‘dualism’ in legal theory, refers to public power 
held to remain at the disposal of a government authority after the enumera-
tion or delegation of specified powers to other public authorities or mul-
tilevel jurisdictions. Such trends in world politics divided the approach of 
the nation-states on the Rome Statute and its provisional codification. The 
‘solidarist’ approaches of the EU members, for instance, became visible in 
the establishment, assistance and support to the Rome Statute institutions, 
as well as towards their relation with some members of the African Union 
(AU), in particular the African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) and some 
members of the Arab League.39 Linklater and Suganami argued on defined 
38 See G. Schwarzenberger and E. D. Brown, A Manual of International Law, 1976, at 65.
39 EU Member States support the International Criminal Law Network’s annual confer-
ence on the ICC and Arab States. In 2007 this was supported by the United Kingdom, 
Germany and Ireland. In 2006 by the United Kingdom, Belgium and Ireland. In 2005 it 
was supported by Denmark, Germany and Ireland (together with other non-EU States). 
Further information is available at www.icln.net see also General Secretariat of the EU, 
Council Consilium, The EU and the ICC, February 2008, accessible at: http://www.con-
silium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ICC_internet08.pdf
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humanitarian responsibilities for minimizing harm to the members of vul-
nerable societies. Subject to UN approval such ‘solidarist’ States can exer-
cise a collective right of humanitarian intervention when gross violations of 
human rights occur. In their views the solidarists would have a prima facie 
duty to avoid complicity in human rights violations in other societies. The 
basic assumption of the ‘solidarist’ approach is that the ‘pluralist’ commit-
ment to sovereignty and sovereign immunity should be replaced by the 
notion of personal responsibility and accountability for infringements of the 
laws of war. For the ‘pluralists’ the breaches of the laws of war should be 
punishable in both domestic and international courts. The assumption of 
this foreign policy is that the sovereignty of States is conditional on compli-
ance with international law and human rights, and that States have responsi-
bility as custodian of human rights everywhere.40
In theory, there are no doubts of the relationship between global solidarity 
and universality of the humanitarian policy of the ‘solidarist’ group. The 
critics to the majority of the EU members as States Parties of the Rome Stat-
ute, however, refer to the delay in implementing national legislations includ-
ing their soft political approach taken during the Review Conference in Kam-
pala on the peace and justice debate, and all the sensitive governance issues 
deriving from it, which are still waiting for pragmatic solutions. Moreover, 
the EU encourages the group of ACP to be part of the regime of internation-
al criminal justice and implementation of human rights through the clause 
settled in the cooperation agreement for development and trade relations, 
the EU-ACP (or so-called Cotonou Agreement).41 These clauses inserted in 
2005 on the occasion of the first revision of the agreement regulate the steps 
towards ratifying and implementing the Rome Statute and related instru-
ments. Other novel provisions of the revised Cotonou Agreement include rein-
40 See A. Linklater, H. Suganami, The English School of International Relations, 2006. For dis-
cussions on how these principles were debated and/or ignored within different States 
(US, UK and France) and international institutions (Security Council) in relation to Dar-
fur see D. R. Black, P. D. Williams, The International Politics of Mass Atrocities: The Case of 
Darfur, 2010, at 5. See also R. Jackson, Solidarism or Pluralism? Political Ideas of the Ameri-
can Union and the European Union, McGill University-Université de Montreal Research 
Group in International Security (REGIS), October 10, 2008, accessible at: http://www.
cepsi.umontreal.ca/uploads/gersi_chronicles.fi le/WP28RobertJackson.pdf
41 The Cotonou Agreement entered into force in 2003 and was subsequently revised in 
2005 and 2010. It innovates with obligations to ensure prosecution of the most serious 
crimes at the national level and through global cooperation. Additionally, article 11.6 
of the Agreement includes a clear-cut provision that obliges States parties to: “(a) share 
experience on the adoption of legal adjustments required to allow for the ratifi cation and 
implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and (b) fi ght 
against international crime in accordance with international law, giving due regard to 
the Rome Statute. The parties shall seek to take steps towards ratifying and implement-
ing the Rome Statute and related instruments”. The consolidated version of the second 
revision in 2010 is accessible at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/
cotonou-agreement/index_en.htm
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forcing political dialogue and rendering the provisions on good governance, 
human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, more constructive 
and operational.42 The governance of justice depends on the different and 
controversial political positions between support and rejection, either by 
some permanent members of the Security Council, or by the African Union 
and the Arab League, including the political distance of the Asian continent. 
The important assumption in this study is that the democratization process-
es and reforms in the international system delayed for too long, and thus, the 
consequences deriving from such a delay deserve further debate in order to 
reach the political convergence of expectations required. The political con-
vergence found at global level should be able to influence and interact with 
the regional and domestic realities offering autonomy and capacity-build-
ing, overcoming in some ways, the current crisis of governance systems at 
all levels fostering peace, justice and security.
3.4.2 Governance of justice and peace and security
Through the findings of this study there should be awareness of the main 
challenges arising in the governance of international criminal justice as a 
tool of peace and security. The absence of police and law enforcement after 
supranational judicial decisions of the International Criminal Court is only 
one example of such governance controversy. The United Nations estab-
lished the first generation of special international criminal tribunals in Yugo-
slavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone to prosecute those responsible for mass 
atrocity crimes which mandates are under completion. Judicial convictions 
of political and military leaders were meant to bring justice to victims and to 
deter others from committing such crimes in the future. These special or ad 
hoc tribunals established by the political and executive organ of the United 
Nations gave jurisprudential impetus to the formation of an independent 
International Criminal Court, as a judicial institution making individuals 
accountable of serious crimes outside the political realm or ‘selective justice’ 
of the Security Council, which nevertheless, remains still active in the estab-
lishment of a second generation of mixed courts or tribunals, while tasking 
peacekeeping with comprehensive mandates in conflict and post-conflict 
situations characterized by serious humanitarian violations. Such multidi-
mensional activity on the ground by the Security Council in peace enforce-
ment mandates excludes any assistance to the judicial decisions of the Court. 
In some cases, as in the DRC, the unpreparedness of troops on the ground 
42 See document of the European Commission (EU-ACP), Second Revision of the Coto-
nou Agreement, Agreed Consolidated Text, 11 March 2010. Regarding the organization 
of the negotiations, three thematic negotiation groups were set up: i) political dimen-
sion, institutional issues and sector specifi c policies; ii) economic cooperation, regional 
integration and trade; iii) development and fi nance cooperation, accessible at: http://
ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/second_revision_cotonou_agreement_
20100311.pdf
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represented a serious risk aggravating serious violations of human rights, 
after obtaining weak and unreliable commitments during peace processes 
and negotiations with domestic criminal regimes.
The occurrence of public international authorities involved in investiga-
tions and prosecutions of the most responsible perpetrators of serious crimes 
internationally recognized is not new, as well as the shortcomings of domes-
tic jurisdictions dealing effectively with such crimes in different legal and 
institutional systems of the world. The past failure of the international com-
munity to prevent, halt and punish genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleans-
ing and crimes against humanity, currently stands for global regimes based 
on international cooperation, which can be seen as setting responsibilities 
at domestic, regional and international levels. International cooperation, 
including the harmonization or integration of international complementary 
mandates working for peace and justice in conflict and post-conflict envi-
ronments, are sensitive issues waiting to be explored by theoretical and 
empirical research in the field of public international law. Further research 
is necessary, revealing the extent and the nature of the problem of dispersing 
international responsibilities of States and international organizations as a 
result of international cooperation. One of the struggles for international law 
is that when the responsibility for policies is shared among several actors, 
the responsibility of every individual actor is likely to diminish proportion-
ately. Legal accountabilities and responsibilities are further expected in the 
current process of legal and political theorizations.
3.4.3 Governance of justice and human rights
According to recent judicial proceedings occurring in Dutch courts about the 
role of the UN peacekeeping force in Srebrenica, whose mandate was to pre-
vent mass atrocities, the immunity of the United Nations seems to prevail.43
In determining whether the immunity of the United Nations was in con-
flict with other rights under international law, the Dutch District Court 
addressed the standards set out in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Geno-
cide Convention. The domestic court in The Netherlands concluded that its 
inquiry into the possible conflict between the absolute immunity of the UN 
and other standards of international law did not lead to an exception to the 
immunity, and determined that it was therefore not competent to hear the 
case, which could ultimately end up before the European Court of Human 
Rights. The exclusion of the UN to appear in national courts restricts the 
43 Court of Appeal The Hague, Case Number District Court: 07-2973, Mothers of Srebrenica 
et al. v. State of the Netherlands and United Nations, Judgement of 30 March 2010. Supreme 
Court of The Netherlands, Final appeal judgment, LJN: BW1999; ILDC 1760 (NL 2012), 
12 April 2012. For the analysis of the judgement see, R. van Alebeek, Oxford Reports on 
International Law in Domestic Courts, ILDC 1760 (NL 2012), 1 May 2012.
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right of access to domestic courts. It is clear that the responsibility of the 
UN needs to be refined, before any changes are likely to occur in national 
courts on the UN immunity. In fact, as the Dutch Court of Appeals stated 
correctly, the UN is the international organization with the most far-reaching 
powers, but with the recent rulings national courts would have no jurisdic-
tion even to hear civilian cases brought against the UN. According to the 
claim of the representative of the Dutch Foundation Mothers of Srebrenica, 
“human rights should prevail as it is the ultimate objective of human rights 
to provide protection against the strong powers of public authorities. If the 
UN is the only organization in the world that stands above the law, human 
rights lose their fundamental function. How credible is the UN as the fore-
most human rights organization if the organization itself severely disregards 
these fundamental rights?”44 In this study such sensitive issue arises with 
regard to the UN peace operations and the role of justice, emphasizing the 
necessity to redefine the accountability of peacekeeping forces in the UN, 
while revisiting the regime of immunities which seems to be only at its initial 
stage and only dealt internally in the organization.
3.4.4 The rule of law and international cooperation
The nature of modern warfare is in constant transition, while conflicts are 
increasingly interrelated, involving non-state actors and including the delib-
erate targeting of civilians. This has led some observers to question the rel-
evance, or at the least the applicability of international humanitarian law 
(IHL) while others would see the challenge to have those legal frameworks 
respected and put into practice by all actors dealing with modern warfare. 
Others would refer to a sort of ‘new law’ which undermines the binding 
character of legal frameworks based on cooperation. In international law, 
however, the responsibility to hold individuals accountable of serious 
crimes lies with the States as well as with the international community as a 
whole. If appropriate consideration is not given to the challenges of the time 
with appropriate reform, the concept of legal responsibilities of international 
governance institutions would remain volatile. Another important aspect 
characterizing such debates is that the rule of law would be considered as 
the main drive of global governance systems. This is contested by the fact 
that the rule of law relies on political principles when dealing with mass 
atrocity crimes such as fighting against the impunity of international crimes. 
44 For discussion see A. Hagedorn, “UN-immunity disregards fundamental human rights: 
A decision by the Court of Appeals at The Hague in the case of the Mothers of Srebren-
ica”, The Hague Justice Portal, 2010, accessible at: http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/
eCache/DEF/11/659.html See B.E. Brockman-Hawe, “Questioning the UN’s Immunity 
in the Dutch Courts: Unresolved Issues in the Mothers of Srebrenica Litigation”, 10 Wash-
ington University Global Studies Law Review 727 (2011), accessible at: http://openscholar-
ship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss4/3 See also T. Henquet, “The Jurisdictional 
Immunity of International Organizations in the Netherlands and the View from Stras-
bourg”, 10 International Organizations Law Review 2 (2014), at 538.
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Despite cooperation is a legal obligation of States according to the regime 
established by the Rome Statute there are still no mechanisms to enforce it. 
The only formal possibility for the International Criminal Court to deal with 
non-cooperation issues is to refer to political organs (the Assembly of States 
Parties to the Rome Statute, the United Nations Security Council).
The concern addressed is how the regimes based on international coop-
eration currently function, according to the universal purpose of creating a 
global ‘system’ of international criminal justice. New perspectives are neces-
sary on the question how international cooperation can be better matched 
by a corresponding system of international responsibility, which would 
facilitate compliance and accountability, as the fundamental prerequisite 
of a global ‘system’ of international criminal justice. The challenge is still 
to convert broad political proclamations and engagements into policy, law 
and practice for the creation of such a ‘system’. The dominant principle of 
individual responsibility of States and international organizations, and the 
scholarship based on it, provide neither the concepts nor the perspectives for 
addressing shared responsibilities between States and other actors involved 
in humanitarian interventions in conflict and post-conflict situations. Now 
that the International Law Commission concluded its longstanding project 
to develop principles and doctrine on international responsibility of IOs,45 
without even having addressed the problem of shared responsibilities, there 
is a critical need to move beyond such an impasse. Until such responsibili-
ties are not clearly set and defined, either compliance or accountability in the 
international legal order remain both a distant and complex ambition of the 
international community and its global governance institutions. After all, 
the lasting peace and justice debate could only be resolved embracing such 
responsibilities, especially on the ground in the field operations.
3.4.5 Political determinations and legal frameworks
In conclusion, it needs to be noted that the legislation of the UN political 
organs is very poor with regard to the Court’s presence and activity in the 
field missions and operations, including diplomatic and political pressure 
to the States in question offered by the UN. The triggering mechanisms 
between such organizations of universal character will need further atten-
tion in the near future. Further evolution will depend on the jurisdictional
45 UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.778, Responsibility of international organizations, International Law 
Commission Sixty-third session, Geneva, 26 April–3 June and 4 July–12 August 2011. See 
ILC, “Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations” in Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission, 2011 vol. II, Part Two, accessible at: http://legal.un.org/
ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_11_2011.pdf See also J. Wouters, J. 
Odermatt, “Are all International Organisations created equal? Refl ections on the ILC’s 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations” (DARIO), Global 
Governance Opinions March 2012, accessible at: https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publica-
tions/opinions/opinions13-wouters-odermatt.pdf
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progress of the Court, and hopefully on the universal ratification of the 
Rome Statute. The Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute (ASP), 
as the political and legislative organ, has specific responsibilities in this 
regard. In theory, the principle of universality is not limited to the number 
of States that become parties to the Rome Statute but to the universal obli-
gation of any State to fight against the impunity of serious crimes. As it is 
understood by the analysis of the Rome Statute regime, universality is defi-
nitely implemented when States execute their obligation to investigate and 
prosecute the most serious crimes under international law at the national 
level, in their national courts. Nevertheless, the obligation of domestic jus-
tice systems to fight the impunity of crimes of common concern is essential 
at the same degree of insisting on compliance in the political and executive 
bodies of the United Nations. The issue of cooperation of binding character 
deserves to be put on the table in political fora and finally resolved in order 
to maximize the results in the field operations.
The policy approach of some powerful States divided very soon the posi-
tions over the authority of the International Criminal Court, particularly on 
the notion of the rule of international law, its preservation, implementation 
and institutions. The rejection of the Rome Statute by some relevant mem-
bers of the United Nations would be in their view a reason of their strong 
commitment to the rule of law and not an opposition to it. Political stand-
points would refer to the discourse over the rule of international law, includ-
ing constitutional and legal matters at domestic level. The success of the 
Rome Statute institutions on the other hand, is directly related to the will of 
the States and intergovernmental organizations to support it, either at bilat-
eral or multilateral levels, with the unique role of the Assembly of States Par-
ties (ASP) ensuring adequate assistance to the independent judicial institu-
tion on one side, and to the States on the other in order to harmonize their 
legislations to the Rome Statute which activity, of course, also faces quite a 
few challenges. The institutional design of the Rome Statute still needs to 
determine the evolution of the emerging regime of international criminal jus-
tice. Such ‘contours’ are extremely important for the preservation of the rule 
of international and domestic law between compliance and accountability.
With regard to the enforcement dilemma and the ‘observer’ status of the 
Rome Statute by the US, some political analysts have noted that the dan-
ger for the Court is to compromise itself with a government that not only 
refuses the role of international law, but that has also been accused of aggres-
sion in Iraq as a situation outside of the Court’s jurisdiction. The indirect 
requests of political engagement addressed to the US to assist in apprehend-
ing criminal suspects have been lately discussed. The Obama administration 
has declared its interest in working more closely with the Court, not with 
the intent of becoming a party to the Rome Statute, but executing arrest war-
rants. In any case, “an alliance between the US and the Court that fails to 
demand the US ratification of the Rome Statute is a perfect example of the 
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risk for the Court accommodating itself to political power, and risks pro-
viding justification for the direct use of US military force under the guise of 
capturing war criminals”.46 Such policy trends will need to be seriously and 
effectively dealt by the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute in the 
immediate, middle and long terms in order to avoid opportunistic and uni-
lateral advantages of whatever States, jeopardizing the independence and 
multilateral character of the International Criminal Court.
3.5 An integrated approach of governance
Section outline
This last section underscores the necessity to find an integrated model of 
democratic governance between complementary global regimes fostering 
peace, justice and security. It suggests interactions challenging domestic 
realities affected by war and crime, and also for the preservation of the rule 
of law at regional and international levels. It reflects on the principles, the 
requirements, and the search of governance models universally applicable. 
It questions the status of the rule of law as a principle of governance and the 
model of governance proposed fostering peace and justice. There is aware-
ness that while the 20th century brought the development of international 
norms and agreements, the 21st century opened with an abundance of inter-
national law (and treaty-based organizations) but a problem of compliance 
by the States became more evident. The compliance in the areas of arms con-
trol, justice and human rights has become a major challenge of the new mil-
lennium for international law and its institutions. The States do not always 
live up to the standards they set for themselves in international treaties. The 
explosion of international provisions has not been followed by a comple-
mentary development of international institutions able to monitor States’ 
efforts to implement these norms and to facilitate their compliance, especial-
ly towards individual rights. On the other hand, to illustrate the prominent 
ways in which norms, law enforcement, and national interests inseparably 
interact in world politics, it suffice to think about the US political rejection 
46 See S. Al-Bulushi, A. Branch, Review Conference of the Rome Statute. In Search of Justice: 
The ICC and Power Politics, 23 June 2010, Egypt, accessible in Arabic at: www.almasry-
alyoum.com See also B. Willson, ‘US Aggression Against Iraq: Historical and Political 
Context’, 1st January 2000, accessible at: http://www.brianwillson.com/u-s-aggression-
against-iraq-historical-and-political-context/ For some controversial legal basis see W. 
H. Taft, T. F. Buchwald, “Preemption, Iraq, and International Law”, 97 The American 
Journal of International Law 3, (Jul., 2003), at 557, accessible at: http://www.jstor.org/sta-
ble/3109840 See also L. Everest, “Oil Power and Empire: Iraq and the US Global Agen-
da”, Common Courage Press, 2004, accessible at: http://www.worldcantwait.net/mate-
rials/OPE-CHAPTER%20ONE.pdf R. C. Kramer, R. J. Michalowski, “War, Aggression 
and State Crime. A Criminological Analysis of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq”, 45 
The British Journal of Criminology (2005), at 446, accessible at: http://homepages.wmich.
edu/~kramerr/BJC.pdf
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of the International Criminal Court, including the controversial position of 
other permanent members of the Security Council.47 It is clear that for an 
integrated approach of the governance of peace and justice it is fundamental 
the political convergence between the actors empowering complementary 
global regimes. In this section it is emphasized that human security requires 
systemic reforms. This section debates an integrated approach of governance 
to reach the domestic realities with preventive strategies of war and crime.
New responsibilities are common to ‘sister’ organizations such as the UN 
and the Rome Statute institutions. In order to influence the domestic sphere 
in situations of war and crime their interaction is important and needs atten-
tion in the years to come. Effective strategies of cooperation between univer-
sal mandates are necessary to create the precedents of deterrence destabiliz-
ing criminal regimes, while assisting national courts and domestic systems 
for the sake of fundamental rights (victims’ rights). Global institutions 
reforms are extremely important for the implementation of such strategies 
preserving the rule of law at micro and macro levels. The interaction of uni-
versal institutions complementing domestic realities recall the necessity of 
implementing new rules regulating mandates involved in complex interna-
tional affairs, while policy makers need to promote human security mea-
sures, incorporating justice in all stages of such interventions with programs 
and projects focusing on institutional capacity building.
3.5.1 The search of models of governance
Today, universal organizations have an important monitoring function 
for the sake of the rule of law at national and international levels comple-
menting domestic realities. Global institutions came about to preserve the 
international order with global norms and values, mandated to preserve 
compliance by States and non-States actors during and after civil wars. The 
prohibition of the use of force contrary to the common interest of the inter-
national community through the remedy of accountability should charac-
terize the progress of collective security. Making War and Building Peace for 
instance, examines the peacekeeping missions before and after civil wars, 
among other important issues. Doyle’s work compares peace processes that 
received the UN involvement, to those that did not. Considering the failure 
of humanitarian interventions, Doyle and Sambanis argue that in order to 
optimize the results on the ground, each UN mission must be designed to 
fit the conflict, with the right authority and adequate resources being able to 
initiate projects of reconstruction, while serving other actors involved in the 
47 See for the debate E. Luck, M. Doyle (eds), International Law and Organization. Closing 
the Compliance Gap, (2004). See J. R. Katalikawe, H. M. Onoria, B. G. Wairama, ‘Crises 
and Confl ict in the African Great Lakes Region: The Problem of Non-Compliance with 
Humanitarian Law’, in International Law and Organization: Closing The Compliance Gap, 
(2004), 121 at 152.
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field.48 Between such relevant actors the International Criminal Court should 
receive an integrated position in the arrays of peace and security. However, 
for such an integrated approach of governance to take place, political con-
vergence and institutional reforms are required. According to the existing 
binding treaties and in respect with the pillars of the modern international 
legal order (international human rights law, international humanitarian law, 
international criminal law and international refugee law) finding remedies 
of governance of today’s international society must reflect the institutions 
of the twenty-first century, which need more than further legislative imple-
mentation at domestic, regional and international levels. The search of politi-
cal convergence making systemic reforms is the right priority.
3.5.2 The reformist approach
The reform of global institutions and a new approach of mandate configu-
rations on the ground are central for the governance of peace, justice and 
security at national, regional and international levels. According to the UN 
institutional sources, laying down strong legal foundations for transparent, 
accountable and efficient democratic institutions is crucial for the success 
of the establishment of lasting and sustainable peace. With the purpose to 
challenge policy making not yet sufficiently focusing on such interactions, 
an outline of the institutional contours preserving the rule of law at national 
and international levels for peace, justice and security is fundamental. In 
order to identify areas of interaction in respect of the delimitation of com-
petences and complementary intervention between different mandates, the 
debate needs to engage on a prevention strategy of mass atrocity crimes 
including the reconstruction of disintegrated nation-states and institution 
building, monitoring, advising, planning, and assisting domestic realities in 
both conflict and post-conflict situations.
First of all, appropriate structural and normative adjustments are the impor-
tant prerequisites for the creation of a system of international criminal jus-
tice. The adjustments and the reforms of modern institutions are necessary 
in order to optimize the results on the ground. In practice their interaction 
depends on: a) the determination to define appropriate political strategies 
and objectives to maximize the results in conflict and post-conflict situations 
towards accountability, integrity, effectiveness and transparency; b) the cre-
ation of a legal pillar of global institutional interactions and their responsi-
bilities, complementing the compliance of international humanitarian law 
and human rights, thus contributing to freedom, security and justice and 
regulating further the international legal order preserving the rule of law as 
the basic prerequisite of democratic governance, towards the accountability 
of all actors involved in accordance with basic principles, such as legality 
48 See M. Doyle, N. Sambanis, ‘War-Making, Peacebuilding, and the United Nations’, in 
Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, (2006), at 23.
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and equality in the eyes of the law; c) further legislation at national, regional 
and international levels implementing democratic governance of justice and 
human rights d) and by making international justice locally relevant towards 
the awareness of victims’ rights in domestic judicial systems.
The causes of the commission of serious crime in Africa are argued to be 
more of a capacity-building concern rather than a law enforcement issue 
during difficult political transitions. However, weak institutional capacity 
for effective policing, coupled with scarce basic information of criminal jus-
tice systems such as prosecutorial, courts and detention data, hamper efforts 
to make appropriate diagnostic solutions. The clear indication is a lack of 
efficiency and effectiveness of their criminal justice system including the 
main security sectors. Since 2004, the World Bank emphasized the need to 
focus on the security of developing countries. Security was defined as a pub-
lic good that was conditional for development. The main concern is indeed 
State repression and ineffective security and justice systems. Development 
in Africa thus, requires a secure environment summarized by the so-called 
‘security first’ or ‘security and development’ approach. Human security 
requires, first and foremost, an appropriate functioning of the State. Some 
current projects aim to encourage greater focus on State responsibility and 
capacity building to provide security. Such projects focus on the efficacy of 
the criminal justice system in these countries. This means offering the capac-
ity building to deal with the nature of mass atrocity crimes with army, police 
and judiciary including the safeguard of victims and witnesses. In doing so, 
the implementation of such projects offers respect for human rights and the 
rule of law as key requirements for security and development. In order to 
build confidence among the public and the political leadership in countries 
where respect for human rights and the rule of law have been largely absent, 
the benefits of these actions have to be demonstrated from an empirical per-
spective on a case by case basis. The countries selected by the relevant global 
actors should receive sufficient support from electoral processes to domestic 
judicial systems preserving law and order.49
3.5.3 The principles
The rule of law as a principle of governance of complementary mandates 
needs attention. The interaction between the UN and the Rome institu-
tions is extremely relevant and it is without any doubt a reflection of find-
ing remedies preserving further the rule of law. The concept of the rule of 
law found in the UN reports has been defined as a principle of governance 
in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, includ-
49 For a good example of such assistance provided to Sub-Saharan countries and further 
implementation, see the project of the African Human Security Initiative (AHSI) 2 Country 
Assessment on Crime and Criminal Justice, 2001, accessible at: http://www.africanreview.
org/docs/background/masterquest.pdf
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ing the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, 
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent 
with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, 
measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equal-
ity before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of 
the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal cer-
tainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.50 
The rule of law as a principle of governance represents the tool for measur-
ing democracy.51 In order to approach the debate of global interactions the 
theory of the rule of law and its necessary re-conceptualisation in a global 
environment, is fundamental. In relation to global law and its application 
in new and existing institutions of global governance, Zifcak points out 
primarily that “the values that should underlie the rule of law globally are 
legality, equality, legitimacy, accountability and a commitment to funda-
mental human rights”. The impact of globalization upon the rule of law is 
a fundamental value within liberal democratic sovereign States. Not many 
scholars have focused on studies to relate globalization exclusively to law.52 
The rule of law in the globalization process is important not only to influ-
ence domestic realities but also to regulate interactions between global man-
dates with regard to security, law enforcement and crime control in conflict 
and post-conflict societies. In 2006, the UN General Assembly adopted a 
resolution on “the rule of law at the international and national levels”. The 
resolution noted that many organs, departments, bodies, offices, funds and 
programmes within the UN system are currently devoted to the promo-
tion of the rule of law at international and national levels. It requested the 
Secretary-General to prepare an inventory of all the activities, as well as a 
report on how to strengthen and coordinate them”.53 As anticipated earlier 
“although the rule of law is now widely recognised as indispensable to effec-
tive peace operations, its delineation remains elusive”. Researchers contest 
its substance while those most responsible for its implementation (e. g. the 
United Nations) promulgate only abstract notions needed to inform detailed 
50 See UN doc. S/2004/616, Report of the Secretary-General on “The Rule of Law and 
Transitional Justice in Confl ict and Post-Confl ict Societies”. In this report the Secretary-
General invited all States Members of the United Nations to move towards the ratifi ca-
tion of the Rome Statute at the earliest possible opportunity. See S/2004/616 para. XIII. 
See also UN doc. A/RES/66/102 (2012) and A/66/749 (2012). For an extensive assess-
ment of the future of accountability and the struggle of defi ning international crimes, see 
S. R. Ratner, J. S. Abrams, and J. L. Bischoff, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in 
International Law: beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, 2009.
51 See G. L. Munck and J. Verkuilen, ‘Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluat-
ing Alternative Indices’, February 2002, Comparative Political Studies Vol. 35, Nº 1, 5 at 34.
52 Regarding security and human rights and the new ways of thinking about global law 
and its application in new and existing institutions of global governance see, S. Zifcak, 
‘Globalizing The Rule of Law: Rethinking Values and Reforming Institutions’, Globaliza-
tion and the Rule of Law, (2006), 32 at 62.
53 See UN doc. A/RES/61/39, 18 December 2006.
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decisions”.54 Some views underscore the current limits of the rule of law as 
a principle of governance. A report of the UN Secretary-General A/66/749 
in preparation of the High-level Meeting on the Rule of Law was submitted 
to the General Assembly in March 2012, as requested in the Resolution A/
RES/66/102. In order to galvanize collective efforts to strengthen the rule 
of law at the national and international levels, the Secretary-General pro-
posed in his report that the General Assembly adopt a programme of action 
for the rule of law, agree to a process to develop clear rule of law goals and 
adopt other key mechanisms to enhance dialogue on the rule of law. The 
Secretary-General also encouraged Member States to take the occasion of the 
High-level Meeting to make individual pledges related to the rule of law.55
3.5.4 The requirements
The current debate on the impact of the Rome Statute system on victims and 
affected communities, the issues of positive complementarity and coopera-
tion, the impact of international justice on peace processes and peace build-
ing, are all related to interaction strategies and to the rule of law at nation-
al, regional and international levels centralizing the rights of the victims.56 
Attention is necessary on finding remedies of interactions between the UN 
and the Court’s mandate in peace building operations and the necessary 
reforms thereof in order to have in place prevention strategies of mass atroc-
ity crimes. This is an important requirement for the creation of a global jus-
tice system. The prerequisite of such a system interacting with the UN refers 
54 For an overview of the current debate see, B. Hughes, C. Hunt, ‘The Rule of Law in 
Peace and Capacity Building Operations: Moving beyond a Conventional State-Centred 
Imagination’, September 2009 Journal of International Peacekeeping, Volume 13, Numbers 
3-4, pp. 267-293 (27).
55 See UN doc. A/66/749, 16 March 2012, Delivering justice: programme of action to strengthen 
the rule of law at the national and international levels: Report of the Secretary-General, acces-
sible at: http://www.unrol.org/fi les/SGreport%20eng%20A_66_749.pdf See also UN 
doc. A/RES/67/1, 30 November 2012, Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General 
Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels.
56 For an extensive overview of the debate on reparations for victims see C. Ferstman, M. 
Goetz, A. Stephens, Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity: Systems in place and Systems in the Making, (2009). On the current debate over 
complementarity and the practice of the Court during the fi rst year of its activity, see W. 
A. Schabas, C. Sthan and M. M. El Zeidy, ‘The International Criminal Court and Com-
plementarity: Five Years On’, 2008 Criminal Law Forum, at 3, accessible at: http://www.
springerlink.com/content/n86h134236147107/ For other contribution see also H. Take-
mura, A Critical Analysis of Positive Complementarity, accessible at: http://www.defens-
esociale.org/xvcongreso/pdf/cfp/16)_A_critical_analysis_of_positive_complementar-
ity_Takemura.pdf For an overview of the discussions on the key strategic and policy 
issues facing the Offi ce of the Prosecutor see a description of the fi rst three years of the 
OTP’s work; (Three Year Report June 2006); as well as to the strategy for the coming years 
(Prosecutorial Strategy September 2006) and the Interest of Justice paper. See Report on 
Prosecutorial Strategy (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011), accessible at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Offi ce+of+the+Prosecutor/
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to solving the legislative lacuna between the responsibility to protect, peace 
operations and the empowerment of the Court’s authority in law enforce-
ment.
In recent years, with regard to democratization processes of global gover-
nance, a number of the resolutions of the United Nations General Assem-
bly and its Economic and Social Council have called upon both the member 
States and the UN itself to gather information on governance innovations 
that hold promise for overcoming the challenges of exclusion, and that con-
tribute positively to improve public governance systems and procedures. 
Such remedies should not only become transparent, but should foster and 
sustain accountability and, most importantly, participation. In response, 
several divisions, departments and sections of the UN institutions have 
launched several initiatives to support such participatory governance. The 
same trend of participatory governance should follow the activity of the 
Assembly of the States Parties of the Rome Statute which needs to be insti-
tutionally engaged for the assistance required to the States implementing 
legislation at national level, providing support for governmental processes 
and institutional capacity-building, comparative policy research and analy-
sis, information sharing, training programmes, including advisory services. 
The legislative activity of the Assembly of States Parties including the year-
ly resolutions of the UN General Assembly on the Rome Statute system of 
institutions should support such implementation profiting the domestic har-
monization of legislations according to the Rome Statute provisions. Such 
participatory governance need to include support also for non-State Parties, 
civil society organizations, research institutions and academics.
3.5.5 The model of governance proposed
Recent general reports on peace operations conclude how failed States can 
be helped to pave the road to peace after violent conflicts avoiding the risks 
of going back to the regime of war which characterize international crimes 
and mass atrocity scenarios.57 New models are proposed to governments 
which are responsible of reviewing their policy work. At international level, 
as extensively clarified by Voorhoeve in his report From War to the Rule of 
Law, the role of the UN and the ICC in the peace building operations needs 
a systematic ‘case by case’ approach considering the following tasks: end-
ing violence, emergency assistance, disarmament, economic reconstruc-
tion, transnational justice and reconciliation. The UN should ensure that the 
Court’s activity is integrated into the strategic and operational planning of 
peace operations (peace-building). In his pragmatic book Voorhoeve under-
57 In his report “In Larger Freedom” Secretary General Kofi  Annan prefaced his proposal 
for the creation of a United Nations Peacebuilding Commission with the alarming esti-
mate that “roughly half of all countries emerging from civil war lapse back into violence 
within fi ve years”, Kofi  Annan, In Larger Freedom, UN Doc. 59/2005.
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lines that “in order to succeed, each task is often dependent on the effec-
tive execution of the others”. International organizations are called upon to 
specific responsibilities, consolidating complementary regimes with a result-
oriented approach in all stages of peace operations.
With regard to the dilemma of peace and justice in conflict societies, Voorho-
eve makes clear that “it is particularly bitter to the population if war crimi-
nals are given amnesty as part of a cease-fire agreement or peace deal. This is 
one of the harshest examples of the trade-off between peace and justice. Dis-
tant theoreticians believe that peace and justice are basically the same. Mak-
ing such compromises is one of the hardest tasks of the diplomatic media-
tors, political leaders and peacemakers, which often get them into trouble 
afterwards, once the situation has stabilised”.58 Peace and justice operations 
have to meet in the middle somewhere in order to maximize the results on 
the ground. Regarding the peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Barber’s 
legal assumption is that “because the responsibility to protect59 says little 
as to positive obligations, such as might require peace support operations to 
actively protect, it is important to assess whether there are obligations that 
can be drawn from international human rights or international humanitar-
ian law that may assist in locating a substantive content for the responsibil-
ity to protect.60 Considering the research findings on the failure of the Afri-
can Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to provide protection to civilians in Darfur, 
and of the emerging doctrine of responsibility to protect, Barbers’s argument 
is that “while the existence of the responsibility to protect has been widely 
endorsed, there has been limited attention paid to its content”.61
The success of global institutions involved in peace, justice and security 
will depend on a number of critical factors. Among them there is the need 
to ensure a common basis in international norms and standards and to 
mobilize the necessary resources for a sustainable investment in justice. As 
underlined by Ryngaert “the casual link between international criminal jus-
tice and a durable peace, political reconciliation, and the entrenchment of 
the rule of law has not yet been conclusively proven”.62 In order to have 
58 See J. Voorhoeve, ‘From War to the Rule of Law. Peace Building after Violent Confl icts’, 
2007, WRR, Dutch Scientifi c Council for Government Policy, accessible at: http://www.wrr.
nl/content.jsp?objectid=4143
59 As described by the International Commission on State Sovereignty (ICISS) and 
endorsed by the UN Secretary General, the General Assembly and the Security Council.
60 For peace-support operations, for the States that send them, and most importantly, for 
the civilian population that expects to be protected by the soldiers sent to protect them.
61 See R. Barber, Refl ections on the Peacekeeping Failure in Darfur: Is There Any Substance 
to the “Responsibility to Protect”? September 2009 Journal of International Peacekeeping, 
Volume 13, Numbers 3-4, pp. 294-326 (33).
62 For an exhaustive overview of the case studies contributing to the rule of law and structur-
al peace, towards the creation of a global criminal justice system, including models of post-
confl ict and restorative justice since the work of the international military tribunals, see C. 
Ryngaert, The Effectiveness of International Criminal Justice, Introduction, (2009), at vii-xvii.
128 Part I  The Quest of Complementarity and the Dilemma of Human Security 
a reliable evaluation of the effectiveness of international criminal justice 
in various post-conflict situations, empirical research by social scientists is 
necessary. In the context of sequencing peace and justice, however, it is well 
proved that sacrificing justice in the hope of securing peace is often projected 
as a more realistic option to end conflict and bringing about stability than 
holding perpetrators to account. Such option does not work, because crime 
would be committed over again, and stability further compromised. Inter-
national law and humanitarian policy should evolve to the point where both 
peace and justice should be the objectives of negotiations aimed at ending 
a conflict where the most serious crimes under international law have been 
committed. At the very least, peace agreements should not foreclose the 
possibility of justice at any stage of the negotiations.63 Arbour’s suggestion 
that “we need to be more strategic about the convergence of justice with the 
resolution of armed conflicts” is absolutely right. This cannot be done by 
either peace or justice trumping the other, she clarifies, “as in effect it would 
through sequencing one before the other, but rather by seeking in every case 
an outcome that maximises both. This in turn requires compromise both 
sides have to give”.64 The second part of this work offers an in-depth analy-
sis of complementary global institutions and the politics of justice. Particu-
larly, between the responsibility to protect civilians and the fight against the 
impunity of international crimes, which should progress towards the imple-
mentation of human security measures advocated in this study.
3.6 Concluding remarks
It is now time to summarize and conclude the first part of this study deal-
ing with the dilemma of human security and the quest of complementary 
global regimes fostering it. It can be concluded that human security requires 
an integrated approach of governance of international regimes of comple-
mentary character dealing with international criminal justice and peace 
enforcement, civilian protection duties and the responsibility to protect civil-
ians, and the rule of international law and comlementarity with domestic 
jurisdictions. War and crime are frequently manifesting in modern societies. 
The danger is constantly what history defines as a repetition of the spiral of 
war, if no action will influence domestic and international criminal regimes. 
There is no chance of achieving peace without justice. After Rwanda we are 
still witnessing to genocide, alleged crimes against humanity, crimes of war 
63 See for a very useful overview of fact-fi ndings, informing the debate on justice v. peace 
specifi cally over accountability and peace, Human Rights Watch, Selling Justice Short. 
Why Accountability Matters for Peace, Report July 2009, accessible at: www.hrw.org
64 See L. Arbour, Doctrines Derailed?: Internationalism’s Uncertain Future, Global Briefi ng 
2013 opening speech from the International Crisis Group’s President & CEO Louise 
Arbour, 28 Oct 2013, accessible at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/
speeches/2013/arbour-doctrines-derailed-internationalism-s-uncertain-future.aspx
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and extreme violence against civilians during difficult political transitions. 
Extreme tyranny and dysfunction of power bring both civil society and insti-
tutions to refer situations where the dignity of life of the human being seems 
to be forgotten. The international community is deeply concerned by the cha-
os characterizing modern societies, this considering the large regional inter-
state conflicts which represent a grave threat to peace and security. Human 
rights offences are presently taking place in the Middle East, Africa, South 
America,65 Asia, and even in some parts of Europe, with the Security Coun-
cil politicizing intervention with resolutions creating merely some ad hoc tri-
bunals under its own regime of selective justice which started decades ago.
At the beginning of the 21st century some critical developments took 
place and suggested that the world was getting ready to make individuals 
accountable for violations of human rights. Ethnic and religious micro-con-
flicts, aggression between nations, crises of domestic governance systems, 
constitutional disregarding of regional and global organizations, new threats 
to peace and security, and severe violation of international humanitarian 
law, are some of the fundamental causes and effects of international crimes. 
Providing retributive and restorative justice after violent conflicts has received 
more attention by the international community. Since 1945 there have been 
some 250 conflicts in almost every region of the world which have caused, at 
the low end, an estimated 70 million casualties, and at the high end, 170 mil-
lion human lives. Yet, only a few of those responsible for such atrocities have 
been prosecuted. Most of the perpetrators have benefited from impunity, 
in part due to the absence of post-conflict justice mechanisms.66 On the top 
of strengthening accountability it is absolutely necessary to implement the 
emerging norms and practices associated with the protection of individuals 
in situations of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes; includ-
ing the international criminal prosecution of such crimes; and the provisions 
of humanitarian interventions under the flag of the responsibility to protect. 
Such an approach would help to understand the interactions and trade-offs 
associated with these various international responses and the conditions 
under which one or more of the responses may be used by the international 
community. In this part of this study the protection, relocation and rehabili-
tation of civilians is considered as a shared responsibility between the two 
regimes, UN and ICC, during armed conflicts and in the post-conflict stages.
65 See Human Rights Watch, Child Soldier Global Report 2010, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Chile, Paraguay, Peru, accessible at: http://hrw.org/doc?t=south_america&document_
limit=300,20
66 For an extensive overview of the rise of international criminal law principles see, C. 
Bassiouni, “Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Oth-
er Serious Violations of Human Rights” in Post-Confl ict Justice, (2002), at 3. For some 
reports on Armed Confl icts and Confl ict Management see www.sipri.org. See also T. B. 
Seybolt, “Controversies about Humanitarian Military Intervention” Humanitarian Mili-
tary Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure, (2007), at 294.
130 Part I  The Quest of Complementarity and the Dilemma of Human Security 
The universal principles regulating the UN and the ICC are respectively 
expressed in the UN Charter and in the Rome Statute. These principles 
represent the moral values for the promotion of international criminal 
justice and the foundations of public international law. They are applica-
ble either for member States or for international governance institutions. 
This assumption refers to the interaction between complementary global 
regimes and their shared responsibilities when dealing with the account-
ability of States and individuals. Such interaction permits to evaluate the 
evolution of governance in peace and justice issues. The rule of internation-
al law and the human security policy are the tools to determine a global 
constitutional strategy of the world community. New legal techniques are 
necessary for international lawyers in the innovative field of public inter-
national law enhancing also the accountability of governance. The question 
is whether such legal approaches would regulate the interactions of com-
plementary public mandates and their shared responsibilities in the cur-
rent state of affairs of international relations. The argument is based on the 
urgent priority to keep alive the constitutional struggle of the international 
community for international criminal justice, while national implementa-
tion of legislations would progress at domestic level.
The fight against serious crimes of common concern of the international 
community is an important aspect preserving the human security doctrine. 
It requires strategies of prevention, retribution and restoration strengthen-
ing the international legal and political order dealing with conflict and post-
conflict societies. This part discussed the importance of complementary 
global regimes fostering peace and justice for the sake of human security at 
domestic, regional and global scale. In order to verify if there is a preventive 
strategy in place between the maintenance of peace and security and the 
emerging regime of international criminal justice, normative, political and 
institutional mechanisms applied at domestic, regional and at internation-
al level, either for humanitarian protection or collective security, received 
reflections.67 This part offered some legal and political considerations in 
respect to the responsibility to protect civilians promoted by the United 
Nations. It recalled the discrepancies characterizing the humanitarian 
intervention regime in conflict scenarios without following and enforcing
67 For an overview of the debate to enforce international criminal law by the use of uni-
versal jurisdiction in national courts, see C. K. Hall, “Universal Jurisdiction: Developing 
and Implementing an Effective Global Strategy” in W. Kaleck, M. Ratner, T. Singelnstein, 
(eds.), International Prosecution of Human Rights Crimes, 2007, at 85.
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the judicial outcomes of the International Criminal Court.68 Obviously, 
this analysis focuses on the dichotomy of the administration of justice of 
last resort of the Court on one side, and the conflict management, includ-
ing humanitarian intervention and peace operations of the United Nations, 
on the other. It advocates the necessity of an effective preventive strategy, 
deepening the determination of States to put an end to the impunity regime 
of international crimes and human rights violations. Such a strategy would 
reconcile the fight against international crimes for peace, justice and deter-
rence in conflict and post-conflict societies. The target is to prove in the end 
that this very basic theory to be sustained in both policy and law making 
processes, recalls the interdependence between the administration of con-
flicts, warfare, peacekeeping and post-conflict justice.69
The current status of the Court’s jurisdiction; its lack of law enforcement 
resources; the current interaction with the UN; and the weak cooperation 
pillar established with the States Parties and non-parties to the Rome Stat-
ute are further characterized by the following concerns: are complementary 
global regimes focusing on the implementation of a preventive strategy of 
mass atrocity crimes in place? Is the regime of the Rome Statute sufficient 
and self-reliant in the application of human security measures, such as relo-
cation, and rehabilitation, while broadening victims’ protection in situations 
of mass atrocity crimes? Besides, observing the political standpoints and the 
legal obligations of the African States in accordance with the Rome Statute, 
is there space for a preventive strategy of mass atrocity crimes? The Afri-
can Union requires a clear and well defined working relationship between 
the Security Council and the Court.70 From a legal perspective, the AU deci-
sions against the Court with regard to the Bashir case in the Sudan, and the 
Kenyan situation granted under Article 15 of the Rome Statute, point out 
issues such as: a) the ability of the Security Council to refer matters to the 
ICC under Article 13 of the Rome Statute; b) the Security Council’s exclu-
sive deferral powers under Article 16; c) the role of regional bodies such as 
68 “Humanitarian intervention,” defi ned simply, is military action taken to prevent or termi-
nate violations of human rights that is directed at and is carried without the consent of a 
sovereign government. In the last decade this manifested in authorizing military interven-
tion in the affairs of sovereign States for “humanitarian reasons.” For an analysis of the 
controversiality of such intervention, see L. S. Sunga, “The Role of Humanitarian Inter-
vention in International Peace and Security: Guarantee or Threat?” in H. Köchler (ed.), The 
Use of Force in International Relations, 2006, 41, at 83. See also G. Evans, Rethinking Collective 
Action, 2004 CASR, edited excerpts, accessible at: http://www.casr.ca/ft-evans1.htm
69 See for an extensive overview, C. Bassiouni, Post-Confl ict Justice, International and Com-
parative Criminal Law Series (2002), at 286.
70 See D. Akande, M. Du Plessis, C. Chernor Jalloh, Position Paper, An African Expert Study 
on the AU concerns about Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, Institute for Security 
Studies, 2010.
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the AU with respect to ICC decisions on prosecutions and investigations; 
d) the position of immunities for individuals from non-ICC member States; 
e) the relationship between Articles 27 and 98, which respectively place a 
requirement on States to arrest individuals and a requirement to observe 
other international obligations, including international customary law aris-
ing from immunities.71
This part reflected the controversial debate of authority in humanitarian 
intervention, the maintenance of peace and security by the Security Coun-
cil, and the possible role of international criminal justice, which seems to 
be considered as a deterrent tool without receiving a road map of gover-
nance between peace, justice and applicable measures of human security on 
the ground in the field operations. The analysis of complementary global 
regimes indicates the lack of progress about the theory of checks and bal-
ances in the international legal order. The controversial debate between the 
choice of peace processes and criminal proceedings needs to be re-opened. 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute immediately follows several provisions (Arti-
cles 13-15) establishing how situations can be referred to the ICC for investi-
gation and prosecution. Entitled, “Deferral of investigation or prosecution,” 
Article 16 reads, “No investigation or prosecution can be commenced or 
proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Secu-
rity Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may 
be renewed by the Council under the same conditions”. In order to provide 
reliable answers, institutional, legal and political settings deserve analysis, 
including the part of the Rome Statute linked to the authority of the Secu-
rity Council and to the Charter of the United Nations on peace and security 
maintenance. Strategically, and hopefully in the short term, the UN and the 
ICC need the African Union on their side in order to have a fundamental 
contribution on a prevention strategy and early warnings of mass atrocity 
crimes. Testing the political convergence required by the African continent 
would open the door to further regional support, and hopefully, also com-
ing from other intergovernmental organizations, such as the League of Arab 
States. This remains the expression of the genuine wish of advocacy for these 
groups of States to protect their own citizens in their own territories. Hope-
fully their political reality would not turn out their position in the opposite 
direction of human security.
71 See D. Akande, “The African Union takes on the ICC Again: Are African States Really 
Turning from the ICC?” Blog of the European Journal of International Law, 2011, accessible 
at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-african-union-takes-on-the-icc-again/
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The second part of this study deals with the challenges, obstacles and con-
cerns in the evolution of democratic governance of complementary global 
regimes fostering peace, justice and security universally, and the political 
convergence required between different legal systems and traditions injured 
by the disintegration of nation-states. It examines the challenges, the struc-
ture and the political convergence required in the governance of comple-
mentary global regimes, including the global responsibilities preventing and 
responding and also rebuilding situations affected by mass atrocity crimes. 
These global responsibilities are considered as important opportunities to 
further progress and neutralize any impasse in such governance. The defi-
nition of the complementary character of global institutions for the sake of 
human security is without any doubt an important opportunity. The gover-
nance systems centralizing the rights of individuals towards their institu-
tional structures, operational mandates, judicial proceedings and rehabilita-
tion programs will require further attention in the years to come. The next 
part provides the views about: a) the place that the emerging regime of inter-
national criminal justice should receive in the arrays of peace and security, 
and b) the meaning of complementary regimes governing peace, justice and 
security at global scale. The evolution of an institutional architecture dealing 
with international threats and crimes and the possible extension of universal 
jurisdiction require political convergence of expectations, policy definitions 
and complementary policy requirements. Before exploring the current prac-
tice applied on the ground in the peace operations, the second part of this 
study offers an overview of the frameworks involved in peace enforcement, 
including the protective, retributive and restorative aspects of justice based on 
international cooperation. It emphasizes the challenges to preserve further 
the rule of law and human rights as important prerequisites of democratic 










The governance of complementary global regimes dealing with war and 
crime requires significant efforts from relevant stakeholders, such as States, 
regional and multilateral organizations and civil society, just to name a few. 
There are still several obstacles to centralize individuals in situations of 
war and crime. The accomplishment of sustainable peace in many of them 
is problematic. The deterrent impact deriving from the fight against impu-
nity is not self-sufficient in such situations. The previous part of this study 
explored the global values and the requirement of an integrated approach 
of governance between frameworks fostering human security. Such an 
approach requires systemic changes at structural, normative and function-
al levels. The interaction between international governance institutions of 
complementary character is not configured by primary but only by second-
ary law. The secondary law regulates the operational activities in the field, 
or so-called arrangements and agreements, where international governance 
institutions of complementary nature are both involved. In such context, 
an integrated approach of governance based on compulsory cooperation is 
required. These issues will also be extensively discussed in the case stud-
ies dealt with in the third part of this study. The purpose of this part is to 
promote the idea of an effective interaction strategy between complemen-
tary global regimes according to the human security doctrine and the rule 
of law in international relations. Before the recommendations addressed to 
the decision-makers would take place in the last section of this chapter, the 
attempt now is to explore the main challenges, obstacles and concerns in the 
governance of complementary global regimes at structural, normative and 
functional levels.
This part underscores the fact that the key to solve some of the relevant gaps 
governing war and crime is seen in the interaction between global regimes 
of complementary character. Hopefully, political convergence will be found 
in the immediate, middle and long terms with mandatory cooperation in 
both referral and non-referral activity coming from the Security Council to the 
Court. Unfortunately, the transition of governance systems fostering human 
security is compromised by several factors. The three chapters of this part 
deal respectively with the challenges in the governance of complementary 
regimes, the structure and competence of their institutions, and the require-
ment of political convergence to become complementary in accordance with 
4 The challenges in the governance of 
complementary global regimes
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the constitution of the world community. This part will focus respectively 
on the governance of humanitarian escalations of last resort in the context of 
international peace and security, including the possible extention of jurisdic-
tion of international crimes, and the gaps of law enforcement and civilian 
protection duties. It concludes that further evolution of global regimes gov-
erning war and crime depends from the policy formulations of their comple-
mentary character. The ideology and the political determination to end the 
impunity of serious crimes of common concern deserve some progress in the 
policy-making establishing human security measures at domestic, regional 
and international levels. Joint efforts between the UN and the Rome Statute 
institutional system should also help national capacities coping with mass 
atrocity crimes, while strengthening their national justice systems. A political 
road map of interactions for the sake of good governance is still not defined 
and in transition. Such a road map is considered an important opportunity. It 
would solve the gaps in the current legal and political frameworks uphold-
ing governance structures of complementary and universal character.
This part demonstrates that the supranational character of pluralistic legal 
frameworks and multilevel jurisdictions require further efforts for the pres-
ervation of the world order and the rule of law as an important principle of 
governance. The question of whether a global constitution exists or is emerg-
ing, and if so, what form it takes, is one of the most intriguing and controver-
sial topic of recent international theory and has been extensively studied by 
several legal and political theorists.1 Since in our globalized society the real-
ization of an immutable world order is impossible and considered utopia, 
Delmas-Marty suggests policy adjustments that would preserve diversity. 
The rule of law “must be called upon to invent a flexible process of harmoni-
sation that leaves room for believing we can agree on, and protect, global 
values”.2 In line with such considerations this part explores the new practice 
of international humanitarian escalations and the reach of universality of 
global institutions, including the first generation of referrals of the Security 
Council to the emerging regime of justice falling under the Rome Statute. 
The lacuna of civilian protection mechanisms calling for a ‘culture of civilian 
protection’ reminds the actors involved the importance to understand how 
their responsibilities for the protection of civilians during armed conflicts 
should be translated into action. Such view is also valid in regard to the non-
referral activity when complementary actors function on the same grounds 
in the same situations. This part concludes that the design of a supranational 
global architecture fostering peace, justice and security lacks political con-
vergence on the following clusters: a) collective security and the use of force 
based on humanitarian purposes and civilian protection duties; b) peace 
enforcement and peacekeeping deployed with mandates integrating and 
1 See C. E. J. Schwöbel, Global Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective, 2011.
2 M. Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism. A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Trans-
national Legal World, 2009.
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supporting law enforcement; and c) post-conflict peace-building measures 
to guarantee sustainable peace in situations affected by war and crime.
In this part Chapter IV provides an analysis of global regimes and their tran-
sition in the new world order dealing respectively with the responsibility of 
the States and the accountability of the individuals. The ways these regimes 
are governed is important to preserve further the rule of law and its reach 
of universality. Their complementary character deserves clarifications and 
appropriate policy formulations in the direction of integrated governance 
systems. This chapter discusses some of the unresolved issues in the frame-
works of international governance dealing with collective and human secu-
rity and the important requirement of political consensus on such issues. 
Chapter V offers an overview of the governance structure of complemen-
tary global regimes including their competence and relationship, and points 
out the requirement of political convergence to reach global regimes of 
complementary character. These chapters indicate that systemic changes 
are required at structural, normative and functional levels in accordance 
with the constitution of the world community. There are uncertainties and 
instabilities about last resort international escalations based on humanitar-
ian grounds. Justice is disconnected from peace. Security operations, civilian 
protections duties and law enforcement failed in regard to peace sustainabil-
ity in several country-situations. This part also discusses the current political 
impasse in the formulation of international threats and crimes and the pos-
sible extension of their complementary governance (aggression, terrorism, 
weapons of mass destruction, etc.). The important requirements rewarding 
the idealistic view of an architecture fostering peace, justice and security 
based on further responsibilities (and against the practice currently applied 
when dealing with the international escalations of serious violations of inter-
national humanitarian law and human rights) is debated taking in consider-
ation the theoretical dichotomy between constitutionalism and pluralism and 
further preservation of the world order. Thus, is it time for a change?
4.1 The reach of ‘universality’
Section Outline
This section makes the point about the reach of universality between double 
standards in the selection of situations devastated by war and crime, and 
the challenges and opportunities in the application of civilian protection 
measures. The global support to the investigation and prosecution of serious 
crimes of common concern is absolutely required, including any monitor-
ing and capacity-building activity for the use of police, army and judiciary 
supposed to protect civilians in situations of war and crime. The impact of 
international governance institutions on criminal behavior of States and 
individuals in situations of war and crime has been extensively dealt by 
valuable observers, while the complementary interaction between them is 
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still open for debate. In spite of their small sized character and the very few 
resources allocated outside the constellation of the UN entities, the institu-
tions established under the Rome Statute have the potential to re-propose 
new approaches for the preservation of the international legal and political 
order. Such influence depends on several factors, and the most important of 
them require discussions. This section debates the gaps in the civilian protec-
tion measures detectable on the ground, as a reflection of the global humani-
tarian policies currently in place, the current practice of humanitarian escala-
tions, and the dynamic of intervention in several situations of war and crime 
against the principles of universality and sustainability.
There are no doubts of the potential for the UN to play a key role in the 
strengthening of national justice systems by increasing the importance of the 
Rome Statute in the rule of law programming and development aid, includ-
ing the security sector reforms of shattered domestic systems. The establish-
ment of inquiry commissions by the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) 
in the situations where the Court is investigating would also benefit the col-
lection of information and evidence useful for its judicial activities, while 
providing the Security Council with fundamental inputs regarding its refer-
rals. Another important role for the UN would be the configuration of man-
dates on the ground supporting the activities of the Court as a prerequisite 
of an architecture fostering peace and justice in the context of human secu-
rity. The current challenge is to provide real protection and halt the enduring 
violence in multiple situations of war and crime, while following judicial 
decisions enforcing the rule of law. The ideal would be that judicial decisions 
would not be neutralized by political approaches, but instead supported by 
legal and political responsibilities fulfilling the gaps in the relocation, reha-
bilitation and reparation as the main civilian protection measures, includ-
ing law enforcement measures authorized, configured, and deployed on the 
ground in conflict and post-conflict situations.3
4.1.1 The limitations of civilian protection
An extension of capacity-building in situations of war and crime towards 
law enforcement and civilian protection measures is required. The simple 
question is: how? An initial step for the regime of international criminal jus-
tice would be to receive immediate support in the field operations by the 
political configurations of the peace-building mandates of the Security 
Council. The problem is that the responsibility to protect civilians in con-
flict zones with ‘all necessary measures’ (RtoP or R2P), and its language 
used in addition to the ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention with military 
means, are characterized by flawed decision-making based on the inter-
ests and alliances within political organs, and not upon an established legal 
3 See M. W. Brough, J. W. Lango, H. van der Linden (eds.), Rethinking the Just War Tradition, 
2007.
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procedure of compulsory character, as a prerequisite of democratic gover-
nance. In contrast with the R2P, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
may be referred as military intervention in a State without the approval of 
its domestic authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread 
suffering or death among the inhabitants. This differs from the R2P on at 
least three grounds. First, the remit of humanitarian intervention which 
aims at preventing large scale suffering or death, whether artificial or not, 
is far broader than that of the R2P which focuses on the prevention of four 
crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleans-
ing. Second, the right of humanitarian intervention automatically focuses on 
the use of military force, by a State or a group of States against another State 
without its consent. As such, humanitarian intervention overlooks the arrays 
of preventive and non-coercive measures that are essential for the R2P. Last 
but not least, to the extent that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is 
predicated on the basis of the right to intervene, it can proceed without the 
need to secure legal authorization by the Security Council, whereas any R2P 
action involving military force is not.4 It is clear that the problem of delimit-
ing the responsibility to protect, between sovereign nation-states, interna-
tional governance institutions, and between them, shaping the legal frame-
works in accordance which such norm, still remains.5
The same limitation applies to the humanitarian escalations referred to a 
treaty-based organization dealing with crimes internationally recognized, 
the jurisdiction of which struggles to hold accountable non-states actors 
without reliable law enforcement measures. Besides, the support and coop-
eration falling under such referrals precludes any mandatory character of 
political organs including their responsibility. The same limits apply in the 
configuration of mandates on the ground where peace enforcement opera-
tions do not follow up the international judicial activities and their out-
comes. In other words, are we simply dealing with the arrays of ‘symbolic 
politics’ of law enforcement, or can we refer to a ‘paradigm in the making’ 
of governance systems dealing with sensitive human security issues in situ-
ations devastated by war and crime? In order to strengthen the role of com-
plementary global regimes fostering human security towards civilian pro-
tection measures, further debate on such sensitive issues is required.
4 See E. Passarelli Hamann, R. Muggah (eds.), Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: New 
directions for international peace and security? Igarapé Institute, 2013, accessible at: http://
igarape.org.br/wp-content/themes/igarape_v2/pdf/r2p.pdf
5 For an extensive overview see E. Gareth, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atroc-
ity Crimes Once and for All, 2008. A. J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort 
to End Mass Atrocities, 2009. J. Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to 
Protect: Who Should Intervene? 2010.
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4.1.2 The practice of humanitarian escalations
The complexity of universality and a sustainable impact of complementary 
global regimes in difficult situations affected by war and crime are evident 
for several reasons. Some of them have been approached in the first part of 
this work and are further examined in the case studies selected. The mem-
berships of the nation-states and the territoriality issue are only a couple of 
them, including the constitutional, legislative and institutional adjustments 
to be applied in their domestic capacity. There are currently 193 Member 
States in the United Nations.6 Each member has a seat in the UN General 
Assembly. At the present 123 States joined the membership of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court. Out of them 34 are African States, 19 are Asia-Pacific 
States, 18 are from Eastern Europe, 27 are from Latin American and Caribbe-
an States, and 25 are from Western European and other States.7 Afghanistan 
for instance, is part of both regimes of the UN and the Rome Statute as well 
as the Republic of Korea; 34 African States are parties to the Rome Statute as 
well as 18 Asian States; 18 are from Eastern Europe, 27 from Latin America 
and Caribbean States, and 25 are from Western European and other States. 
Libya, Bahrain, Egypt, Yemen, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and other States 
of the Arab League including some North African States such as Morocco 
and Algeria, are part of the UN system but not parties to the Rome Statute. 
Palestine struggles to become a party of both systems but its sensitive state-
hood issue still waits for solution. Israel is also not a State party to the Rome 
Statute nor is China, Russia and the US, as permanent members of the UN 
Security Council. The current practice in the humanitarian escalations of last 
resort in the maintenance of peace and security, the absence of law enforce-
ment after the Court’s judicial outcomes, and the gaps in civilian protection 
duties represent the main challenges in the governance of complementary 
global regimes.
As we know, the Sub-Saharan African situations are characterized by the 
recent formation of nation-states in the post-colonial phase between serious 
shortcomings of domestic systems dealing with ethnic and religious con-
flicts, gender crimes, corruption, resource exploitation and State’s failure 
investigating and prosecuting serious breaches of international humanitar-
ian law. Dangerous political transitions are characterized by one character-
istic: the presence of warlords and criminal regimes profiting and abusing of 
the weakness of communities to express their political choice in a democratic 
context. The common issue characterizing such situations is the absence of 
6 The Republic of South Sudan formally seceded from Sudan on 9 July 2011 as a result of 
an internationally monitored referendum held in January 2011, and was admitted as a 
new Member State by the United Nations General Assembly on 14 July 2011.
7 See for updates the chronological list of States Parties with the membership of Pales-
tine recorded on 02 January 2015, accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/
Pages/asp_home.aspx
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the nation-state securing basic rights and the protection of individuals. Some 
of the national regimes in place prioritize militarization and autocracy in 
their own domestic governance systems, while political transitions are in 
place and criminality is the main threat for civilians struggling for democratic 
governance and the respect of their fundamental individual rights. The ques-
tion is simple: how are different situations of war and crime governed by 
complementary global regimes and which are the current expectations deriv-
ing from their complementary character?
Targeted sanctions centralize the individual responsibilities during sensi-
tive political transitions, all of them characterized by severe violations of 
international humanitarian law. With regard to the responses of the inter-
national community fighting against war and crime we have seen that the 
escalation of the situation in Libya delayed the attention required by the 
violence spreading in Ivory Coast, including Kenya, Uganda, Central Afri-
can Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali, particularly during 
the ectremely violent political transition in these countries. The commis-
sion of serious crimes spreads at regional scale. The option of international 
diplomacy by the United Nations, the US, France and the European Union 
for instance, represented a severe test to avoid that Ivory Coast would be 
dragged back into a more violent civil war as the consequence of the post-
election violence. The so-called Security Council ‘targeted measures’ pressed 
the President Laurent Gbagbo to end months of post-election violence and 
finally transfer power to his rival Alassane Ouattara who won the presiden-
tial election earlier. Laurent Gbagbo had refused to step down even though 
the United Nations helped organise earlier the election and recognized the 
political victory of Alassane Ouattara. In the end, a military operation of the 
UN pressured by France became part of a neutralization campaign against 
heavy weapons that Gbagbo used against the civilian population. The most 
serious crimes, including alleged widespread sexual violence, were com-
mitted in 2002-2005. The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over 
the situation in Ivory Coast by virtue of an Article 12(3) declaration, submit-
ted by the Ivorian government on 1 October 2003. The country accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court as of 19 September 2002 and became a State Party to 
the Rome Statute in 2013.8
8 See Statement of the Offi ce of the Prosecutor, 6 April 2011, Widespread or systematic killings 
in Côte d’Ivoire may trigger OTP investigation, accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/
exeres/2386f5cb-b2a5-45dc-b66f-17e762f77b1f.htm
144 Part II  The Governance of Complementary Global Regimes: Challenges, Obstacles and Concerns
The former president Gbagbo allegedly bears individual criminal respon-
sibility, as indirect co-perpetrator, for four counts of crimes against human-
ity: a) murder, b) rape and other sexual violence, c) persecution and d) other 
inhuman acts, allegedly committed in the context of post-electoral violence 
in the territory of Ivory Coast between 16 December 2010 and 12 April 2011.9 
Currently, the post-election crisis seems to be over, but the struggles remain: 
reconciliation and reconstruction, including the restoration of security sec-
tors and basic governance systems. The situation and the violence character-
izing the political transition of this country seems to be similar to the one 
occurred in Kenya during and after the general elections,10 where the securi-
ty sectors including a reliable judicial system collapsed, and will surely need 
the support of international governance institutions in accordance with the 
findings of the accountability system falling under the Rome Statute. When 
Kenya was preparing itself for the elections in 2007 the State completely 
failed its own national reform and the justice agenda initiated years earlier 
ended in the disputed presidential elections. The violence and chaos follow-
ing the 2007 elections led to the displacement of more than 600,000 people, 
the deaths of more than 1,200 citizens, the cruel destruction of property and 
ethnic polarization that is unprecedented in Kenyan history. This paved the 
way for the negotiations led by a team of eminent African personalities and 
chaired by Kofi Annan around the Four Agenda Items, which negotiations 
resulted in the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconstruction Agreement 
to which the government bound itself to implement.11 The willingness and 
ability to deal with the post-electoral violence of Kenya were soon seriously 
compromised.
9 According to the sources quoted by the ICC prosecution in the application to the Judges 
to open an investigation in Ivory Coast, at least 3000 persons were killed, 72 persons 
disappeared and 520 persons were subject to arbitrary arrest and detentions during the 
post election violence. There are also over 100 reported cases of rape, while the number 
of unreported incidents is believed to be considerably higher. See ICC-02/11, Situation 
in the Republic of  Côte d’Ivoire in the pre-trial phase; see also ICC-02/11-3, 23 June 2011, 
Request for authorization of an investigation pursuant to Article 15, accessible at: http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1097345.pdf With regard to Kenya on 30 August 2011, 
the Appeals Chamber of the ICC confi rmed Pre-Trial Chamber II’s decisions of 30 May 
2011 on the admissibility of the cases The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono 
Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang and The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai 
Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali and dismissed the appeals fi led by the Government 
of Kenya. See ICC-01/09-02/11 OA, 30 August 2011, accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.
int/iccdocs/doc/doc1223134.pdf
10 See Kenya background information accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
26D853E3-83A6-45F1-BEE9-8B64E3723C55/0/BackgroundNoteKenyaJanuary2012.pdf
11 The Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), The Kenyan Section of the Internation-
al Commission of Jurists (ICJ-K) and International Centre for Policy and Confl ict (ICPC) 
presented in 2010 the Transitional Justice in Kenya: A Toolkit for Training and Engagement 
which is both an information source on transitional justice, as well as a training manual 
for engagement with the on-going TJ processes in Kenya that were restarted in the after-
math of the 2007/8 post-election violence.
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The proposals by the commission of inquiry into the post-election violence 
(CIPEV, or so called Waki Commission) establishing a local tribunal with an 
alternative for pursuing the Court to investigate and try those responsible 
for the post-election violence were not feasible, considering the findings of 
the Court to end the impunity regime. The judicial proceedings are current-
ly held in The Hague.12 In Kenya and Ivory Coast the Court would settle 
down the limits and main responsibility of national sovereignty prosecuting 
violence against civilians during political transitions. There is, however, a 
long way ahead to undermine the limits between statehood, sovereignty and 
international governance. The problem is to strengthen the global support 
necessary for such determinations, upholding the importance of the rule of 
law to the volatile peace processes influencing complementary actions for 
peace and stability. Besides, the political threat to the Court in the Africa 
region started because it was simply doing its job. It charged Kenya’s Dep-
uty President for killing people who assembled against him during an elec-
tion, and Sudan’s President for murdering women and children in Darfur. 
Kenya and Sudan are lobbying in the AU to pull out the Court and destroy 
its chance for success. But in Darfur, DRC, Uganda, Ivory Coast, Kenya and 
lately in Mali, the Court plays a key role in bringing hope to those terrified 
by the armies, militias and warlords that have waged war against innocent 
civilians. The main argument of some leaders with a guilty conscience and 
blood-dirty hands is that the Court is a Western witch-hunt as most of the 
investigations focus on Africa. This is not the truth. The Court is an institu-
tion created by many African countries, 5 of the Court’s 18 judges are Afri-
cans, and the chief prosecutor is also African, including the president of the 
Assembly of the States Parties.13 The Court represents a light in the darkness 
of war and crime in Africa and everywhere. It cannot be allowed to end. The 
African drama of serious attempts to the dignity of civilian lives is not the 
only concern. Unfortunately, its involvement in other regions is also some-
what compromised by political standpoints, by the limits of its jurisdiction 
and by the lack of global support.
12 The Second Vice President of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has informed the 
top leadership of the African Union (AU) that the Court can only consider suspend-
ing the Kenya cases before it if an application is made to the Court. See T. Maliti, “ICC 
asks AU to address concerns on Kenya cases through legal channels’, ICC Kenya Moni-
tor, 20 September 2013, accessible at: http://www.icckenya.org On 19 September 2014, 
Trial Chamber V(b) vacated the trial commencement date in the case The Prosecutor v. 
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, which had been provisionally scheduled for 7 October 2014. On 
3 December 2014, ICC Trial Chamber V(b) rejected the Prosecution’s request for further 
adjournment and directed the Prosecution to indicate either its withdrawal of charges or 
readiness to proceed to trial. Subsequently, on 5 December 2014, the Prosecutor fi led a 
notice to withdraw charges against Mr. Kenyatta.
13 See ICC-ASP-20141002-PR1047, Minister of Justice of Senegal, H.E. Mr. Sidiki Kaba, endorsed 
for the position of President of the Assembly, meets with States Parties in New York, Press 
Release: 02/10/2014.
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What we currently see in other parts of the globe is that the autocracy of 
regimes in the Middle East twisted revolutions in some of them, or civil wars 
in others, after ‘peaceful’ protests of their citizens. In Libya, according to reli-
able sources, the situation had since 2011 the typical grounds of mass atroc-
ity crimes including the risk of a political transition posing serious global 
threats to the peace and security in the region. The UN General Assembly 
resolution of 1 March 2011 unanimously suspending Libya’s membership 
from the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) was the first 
sign of the position taken by the international community. According to 
the UN and the ICC sources, the actions taken by the regime in Libya were 
clear violations of all norms governing international behaviour and seri-
ous transgressions of human rights and international humanitarian law.14 
Libya holds important natural resources as well as weapons and military 
arsenals acquired in the course of the years by the traffic in the Mediterra-
nean, and which reached the hands of the rebel groups and a tyrant that for 
too long was tolerated by the world community for several reasons, one of 
them being the mitigation of North African migration in the South of Europe 
and another interest of western multinationals for its natural resources. After 
the Darfur referral of the situation in the Sudan by the Security Council to 
the Court, the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya followed. Therefore, 
let us further examine in the next paragraph the humanitarian escalations 
occurred between international governance institutions and the referral 
activities so-called of last resort by the Security Council to the Court.
4.1.3 The first generation of referrals from the Security Council: Sudan and Libya
In the past and from a legalistic approach, the Security Council acted as a 
legislator even if the UN Charter did not give such powers to act in that way. 
The reform of the collective security system did not succeed.15 The Security 
Council addressed situations through legislative resolutions that, as a mat-
ter of principle, should have been regulated by international treaties. With 
the Rome Statute it does not seem that the distortion of constitutionalism 
dealing with peace, justice and security is definitely solved, but it becomes 
more complex. When the Court received the referral from the Security Coun-
cil and the extension of jurisdiction in the Sudan, a non-State party to the 
14 See ICC-01/11  Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Prosecutor’s Application Pursu-
ant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi , Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi  
and Abdullah Al-Senussi, 16 May 2011, accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc1073503.pdf See also I. Vetrhus, ‘Gaddafi : Game Over?’, New Africa Analysis, 1st 
of August 2011, accessible at: http://newafricaanalysis.co.uk/index.php/2011/08/gad-
dafi game-over/ See also All Africa Reports, Libya: Gaddafi  Killed, 20 October 2011, acces-
sible at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201110201410.html
15 For the discussions and contributions of effective multilateralism and the importance of 
policy formulation and institutional reforms see N. Pirozzi, N. Ronzitti, ‘The EU and the 
Reform of the UN Security Council: Toward a New Regionalism?’, in IAI Working Papers, 
12-12, May 2011, at 9, accessible at: http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1112.pdf
Chapter 4  The challenges in the governance of complementary global regimes 147
Rome Statute, it should have been defined a clear strategy of support from 
the Security Council during and after the Court’s judicial activities.16 In 
response, the government of Sudan, supported by Russia, China, Libya, the 
African Union (AU), and the League of Arab States, argued that the Secu-
rity Council should exercise its authority under Article 16 to request the sus-
pension of the proceedings in Darfur, claiming that the issuance of an arrest 
warrant against President al-Bashir would undermine ongoing efforts to 
find a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Darfur. Soon it became very clear 
that the Court would not receive any space in the maintenance of peace and 
security with law enforcement measures. On the contrary, there is still uncer-
tainty of support in the referral activity coming from the Security Council. 
The risk is to undermine the credibility of global regimes of complementary 
character governing war and crime.
Although Article 16 permits the Security Council to act in exceptional cir-
cumstances, the situation in Darfur did not present such exception for the 
Security Council to exercise its deferral power. All promises by al-Bashir of 
ceasefires and peace negotiations had been broken. Therefore, the deferral of 
the proceedings against al-Bashir could not be seen as a means to maintain 
peace and Article 16 of the Rome Statute was definitely inapplicable. The 
same approach of the Security Council is repeated in Resolution 1970 (2011) 
referring the situation of Libya to the Court. The Security Council demands 
an end to the violence and decides to refer the situation to the Court. This 
time the resolution has been adopted unanimously under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter (Article 41). Although the situation has the main characteristic 
of an intra-state conflict, the Security Council used the legal provisions of 
Chapter VII emphasizing the necessity of civilian protection duties. It needs 
to be noted that in paragraph 8 of the Resolution 1970 (2011) addressing the 
referral to the Court, the Security Council ‘recognizes that none of the expens-
es incurred in connection with the referral, including expenses related to 
investigations or prosecutions in connection with that referral, shall be borne 
by the United Nations and that such costs shall be borne by the parties to 
the Rome Statute and those States that wish to contribute voluntarily’. Such 
an approach is of course very far from a democratic and supportive interac-
tion strategy, if we only consider the complementary nature of the emerging 
regime of international criminal justice in the context of peace and security 
in the region. This view deserves some clarification through a quick inter-
pretation of the international military response authorized by the Security 
Council in Libya.
16 See UN doc. S/RES/1593 (2005).
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4.1.4 The international military engagement in Libya
The military intervention in Libya had partly the same political motiva-
tions of the situations in Kosovo and ex-Yugoslavia at the time of Slobo-
dan Milošević, or by Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Apart from preventing mass 
atrocities they meant to destabilize regimes no longer desired by the politi-
cal circles characterizing international relations. This time in particular in 
Libya, the intervention was characterized by a controversial mandate by the 
Security Council oriented on civilian protection duties as expressed in the 
Resolution 1973 (2011) with a voting record of 10-5 and recalling the Reso-
lution 1970 (2011). These modalities resulted already to be compromised in 
the Sudan and in the Democratic Republic of Congo as will be proven in the 
third part of this work.
The Libyan territory is characterized by a larger area not easily accessible on 
the ground similar to Afghanistan and Iraq. The risk is that the same crimes 
under international humanitarian law are common to all situations in the 
Middle East, where unarmed citizens protest against autocratic and criminal 
domestic regimes. The so-called Arab Spring and its hot-blooded situations 
in the quest of democracy are only at their initial stage. Several violations 
under international law characterized the civilian protests in Yemen, Bahrain 
and Syria. The domino effect of political, economic, and humanitarian crisis 
proceeds in the main region, with Israel being in the middle of them and 
ready to defend its borders with any (military) means. A couple of years ago, 
thousands of Palestinians passed from Syria and Lebanon reaching the Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank toward Israeli border positions, hurling rocks and 
surging across one frontier before the Israeli army opened fire, killing and 
injuring hundreds of them. On the top of that, the tensions and the diplo-
matic fracture in the region become more and more visible in particular with 
Iran, and at the borders between Syria and Turkey, with the NATO debating 
again about military action.
The question is whether the selectivity and double standards of referrals 
from the Security Council to the Court under Chapter VII of the UN Char-
ter, would not only transfer jurisdiction to the complementary regime of the 
Rome Statute, but also cooperation and resources, including accountabil-
ity of potentially unlawful actions under international humanitarian law. 
The political responsibility of the Security Council has a local and regional 
impact with the League of Arab States (or Arab League) as the important 
interlocutor in peace and security matters in the region, including the Afri-
can Union. It is unfortunate to note that such political impact does not profit 
the regional support to the Rome Statute regime. Another issue was also 
to verify the standards of humanitarian support to migrants fleeing from 
the Libyan coast to Italy by the NATO, which had obligations on civilians 
according to the responsibility to protect (RtoP) including other interna-
tional obligations. The Council of Europe, which is not an EU institution, 
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but charged with monitoring compliance with the European Convention 
on Human Rights within the 49 Member States, conducted an investigation 
to find out why so many people died in 2011 in the Mediterranean despite 
monitored more closely than ever before.17
When intervening in the situation in Libya the priority was given to the 
military operations and the delusion of quick fix under the flag of humani-
tarian global solidarity. For many observers entering a war in Libya, while 
the international community was still involved in one in Afghanistan, and 
while Iraq appeared far from stable, was a very bad choice. After referring 
the situation in Darfur, Sudan (which situation receives assessment in the 
case study), the UN Security Council voted unanimously Resolution 1970 
(2011) to impose sanctions against the Libyan regime, slapping the country 
with an arms embargo and freezing the assets of its leaders, while referring 
the on-going violent repression of civilian protesters to the Court.18 With the 
Resolution 1973 (2011) the Security Council approved the no-fly zone and 
the civilian protection mandate trying to involve the Arab League in ‘all nec-
essary measures’ against the Libyan regime. The military command of the 
operations in Libya was similar to the mission in Afghanistan (ISAF – Inter-
national Security Assistance Force) enlarged to the non-parties of the NATO 
but still part of the military coalition, as for instance Qatar and the Arab 
Emirates. In any case, the absence of any Arab involvement during the first 
air strikes on Libyan air defence systems underlined the Western nature of 
the mission. It was very important for the public opinion in the Arab world 
to know that this was not simply the West acting against the violent regime 
in Libya. But was this really the case? Furthermore, it needs to be noted that 
for the first time Europe would take the lead of the NATO military opera-
tions in such explosive area albeit US air support was indispensable.
17 During the month of August 2011 the Italian coastguards have found death bodies 
of men on a boat crowded with refugees fl eeing Libya, see for the reports BBC, 1st of 
August, article accessible at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14363905 See 
also ‘NATO does not respond to humanitarian SOS: verifi cations required by the Ital-
ian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, 4 of August, accessible at:  http://palermo.repubblica.it/
cronaca/2011/08/04/news/nave_nato_non_risponde_a_sos_umanitario_la_lega_non_possono_
solo_bombardare-20039567/?ref=HREC1-1 See also the recent jurisprudence of the ECHR, 
Hirsi and others v. Italy, which judgment unambiguously upholds the right of persons 
intercepted at sea not to be pushed back and to request asylum. For the legal details see 
the Submission by the Offi ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 
this case, March 2010, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b97778d2.
html  See Council of Europe report, Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: who is responsible? 
29 March 2012, accessible at: http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2012/20120329_
mig_RPT.EN.pdf
18 See ICC-CPI-20110504-PR659, 4 May 2011, First Report of the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court to the UN Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011). See also State-
ment to the United Nations Security Council on the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), the full version is accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/
NR/exeres/DCBD3E2C-C592-4FB8-B7CB-E18E67F692D1.htm
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4.1.5 The absence of civilian protection measures in Libya and Syria
A quick interpretation of the Resolution 1973 (2011) indicates that the use 
of military force authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter results 
from the mandate of the responsibility to protect civilians (RtoP). Does 
then the RtoP also means to take sides during armed conflict, with the rebel 
groups deserving military support even prior a civil war would take place 
in a particular country? France was behind this military strategy with other 
European States ready to provide weapons to the rebel groups. The mili-
tary operations in Libya engaged initially France, the UK, the US and Can-
ada, with Italy, Spain and Qatar (and other States) possibly joining at a later 
stage. With this military engagement the RtoP becomes controversial as in 
the Sudan, where the partial mandate of the Security Council was swapped 
in the hands of the African Union and then back to the UN operations in the 
field. The Arab League immediately took political distance, as some of its 
leaders feared the same treatment reserved to the Libyan regime. The same 
political reserve was previously taken by the African Union after the indict-
ments against the Sudanese leaders. The nature of the resolutions in Libya, 
being quite different from the language of peace and security maintenance 
in the region, authorize to protect civilians prioritizing the military opera-
tions, which again raises issues of proportionality, double standards and a 
willingness of regime change under the premises of dubious and hassled 
civilian protection measures.
It needs to be also noted that with the enforcement of the no-fly zone in Lib-
ya the European countries engaged in the civil war were likely to confront 
some of their own weapons previously purchased to the Libyan regime. The 
NATO air strikes had the scope to quickly destroy the major weapons of the 
Libyan regime. The situation is very similar to what happened in the case 
of Kuwait and Iraq in 1990. The Resolution 1973 (2011) was adopted in the 
Security Council by a vote of 10 in favour, to none against, with 5 absten-
tions (Brazil, China, Germany, India, Russian Federation) with the mandate 
to protect civilians and civilian populated areas. The main concern about the 
political preferences by the permanent members of the Security Council is 
once more confirmed if we look at the positions of China in regard to Sudan, 
and with Russia blocking global action for the humanitarian intervention in 
Syria.19
19 China, which has major oil interests in the Sudan did not arrest Sudanese President 
Omar al-Bashir during his visit to Beijing on 29 June 2011. See S. Ho, ‘China Pledges 
Lasting Friendship with Sudan’, in Voice of America, 29 June 2011, accessible at: http://
www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/China-Pledges-Lasting-Friendship-with-
Sudan-124701259.html
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There have been obvious negative consequences creating the precedent of 
militarization in Libya. The intervention force in Libya was not allowed to 
occupy the territories and required several stages of interaction between the 
UN operations on the ground and the International Criminal Court, in case 
a reliable judicial system would not be in place, and also to protect relocate 
and rehabilitate victims and witnesses of international crimes, including the 
enforcement of judicial decisions against the individuals most responsible 
of such crimes. In any case, the fact that the rebels in the country received 
weapons outside the arms embargo confirmed the willingness of regime 
change in the country. Hopefully, the domestic system established by the 
National Transitional Council (NTC) will receive other forms of assistance 
oriented to a civil formation of a democratic State and its constitution. After 
the arrest and killing of former President Gaddafi, the National Transitional 
Council, which by then controls the whole territory of Libya, declared the 
country liberated. The NTC has issued a constitutional declaration which 
sets out a plan for a transitional process that would lead to the drafting of a 
new constitution and the holding of legislative and presidential elections.20
Despite the several critics of politicization the Court remained out of the way 
from the political dynamics of international relations and their compromise. 
After all, the bad guy (Gaddafi) who was left for more than a generation at his 
place by the international community had been neutralized in a way abso-
lutely not comparable with court’s room or any judicial system. A simple 
question arises: if in Libya the devastating attacks on civilians required the 
‘protective’ mandate by the Security Council, why the attacks on civilians 
in the Gaza Strip during the Israeli operation Cast Lead have been ignored? 
After all, as Schabas emphasized on his blog “the Gaza war occurred in 
2008 after the R2P norm was taking shape, the conflict resulted in between 
1,166 and 1,417 Palestinian and 13 Israeli deaths, and was not far away from 
where the Libyan regime was currently executing his own people”.21 The 
same political controversy would also apply to the repressive and violent 
regime on civilians in Syria, which in my opinion represents the ‘Pandora’s 
box’ compromising peace and security in the region, if we only consider the 
vicinity to the regimes in Iran and Lebanon and with Israel in the middle of 
them. The risk is that the Syrian authorities would use the support from Iran 
to repress civilians with the same brutal methods previously used by the Ira-
nian regime. It needs to be noted that the Syrian security forces sent troops 
to the south of the country firing on unarmed protesters. The rebels claim 
20 For an extensive overview of the fragmented security landscape in Libya see Interna-
tional Crisis Group, Holding Libya Together: Security Challenges after Kadhafi , in Middle 
East/North Africa Report N°115 – 14 December 2011.
21 V. Tsilonis, “Interview with Professor William Schabas. International Protection of Human 
Rights and Politics: an Inescapable Reality”, Intellectum 7, (2010), at 46–61. On 11 August 
2014, the United Nations Human Rights Council appointed William Schabas to chair 
the Gaza commission of inquiry, see more at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.
asp?NewsID=48459#.VC7LOfmSxws
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that thousands of civilians have already died since the initial clashes with 
the troops in the South and in the North of the country. This stage seems 
to be only the beginning of extreme violence on civilians escaping in the 
south of Turkey and Lebanon, compromising the fragile diplomatic relations 
between Turkey, Israel, Syria and Lebanon.22 The Syrian authorities on their 
side claim that the troops have been sent at the request of civilian residents 
with the scope to protect them against armed criminal groups. According 
to human rights organizations this undermines further the truth of severe 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the country. The 
statistics of the brutal attacks against civilians confirm the trend that Syria is 
taking the same devastating large scale proportions of political violence as 
the situation in Kosovo.23
The current disturbing information disclosed by reliable sources operating on 
the ground in Syria is that the government shoots, poison, and gas, its own 
people. In the meanwhile, the Security Council failed to agree on a resolution. 
It is clear that there is international division over condemning the violence in 
Syria. A draft proposal prepared by France, UK, Northern Ireland, Germany 
and Portugal was opposed by several States within the 15 members of the 
Security Council.24 Russia and China are using their veto powers opposing a 
resolution falling under the maintenance of peace and security in the region 
including a referral to the International Criminal Court.25 The US requests 
the UN Human Rights Council to start an independent investigation. In the 
speech-making of the OHCHR, the former High Commissioner for Human 
Rights Navi Pillay emphasizes that “the Syrian government has an inter-
national legal obligation to protect peaceful demonstrators and the right to 
peaceful protest. The first step is to immediately halt the use of violence, then 
to conduct a full and independent investigation into the killings, including 
22 See M. Chulov, ‘ Syrian refugees in Turkey: People see the regime is lying. It is falling 
apart’, The Guardian, 9 June 2011, accessible at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/
jun/09/syria-turkey-refugees-denounce-regime Early this year the NATO members con-
vened in Brussels to consider a response to the cross border attack by Syria on Turkey 
as a member of the organization with France offering the military lead. After the mortar 
rounds fi red from Syria the NATO discusses the military stra tegy. The United Nations 
Secretary-General voiced growing concern over the risk that the confrontation might 
have on the regional peace. See the article ‘Nato will defend Turkey from Syria attacks’, 
The Telegraph, 12 November 2012, accessible at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/europe/turkey/9672199/Nato-will-defend-Turkey-from-Syria-attacks.html
23 H. Guindy, ‘Mass Atrocities Across Syria’, in Al-Ahram Weekly On-line, 2-8 February 
2012, accessible at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1083/re2.htm
24 See UN doc. S/2011/612 (Draft resolution not approved).
25 Despite repeated appeals by senior United Nations offi cials for accountability for crimes 
being committed in Syria, the Security Council was unable to adopt a resolution that 
would have referred the situation in the war-torn nation to the ICC, due to vetoes by 
permanent members Russia and China. See UN News Centre, Russia, China block Secu-
rity Council referral of Syria to International Criminal Court, 22 May 2014, accessible at: 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47860#.VOxSp3zF_RA
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the alleged killing of military and security officers, and to bring the perpe-
trators to justice”.26 Simple questions arise: why the Security Council did 
not use the remedy of international criminal justice falling under the Rome 
Statute referring the situation of Syria to the International Criminal Court?27 
And independently from the last resort option of international criminal jus-
tice, where have been left the solidaristic civilian protection measures falling 
under the RtoP? In order to provide a comprehensive response the next sec-
tion clarifies further the concerns characterizing the difficult reach of univer-
sality in its dark side, including some of the challenges and opportunities.
4.2 The globalist approaches of governance systems
Section Outline
The concerns regarding the transition of global security systems, the legal 
and political responsibilities of their governance, and the unresolved state-
hood issues denote the globalist approaches of governance dealing with 
the accountabilities of States and individuals at the same extent, including 
the accountabilities of non-state actors in situations of war and crime. Even 
if the criteria to isolate violent and criminal regimes by the international 
community seem to be the current political trend, reliable models of gov-
ernance are still waiting to be defined. It needs to be noted that the global-
ist approaches can have at least two different and opposing meanings. One 
meaning refers to the policy formulations placing the interests of the world 
community above those of single nation-states towards a constitution of the 
world community. Another view perceives the entire world community as a 
proper sphere for one powerful nation or a group of leading nations to proj-
ect political influence globally. In both cases there seem to be any agreement 
about alternative theories that could make sense of systemic changes in the 
global legal and political order. In the policy formulation and the creation of 
normative frameworks deriving from it, the advocates of constitutionalism 
or pluralism still do not find common grounds. Such dichotomy is easily 
detectable when we look at the empowerment and institutional design of 
26 The OHCHR provides a forum for identifying, highlighting and developing responses 
to contemporary human rights challenges, and act as the principal focal point of human 
rights research, education, public information, and advocacy activities in the United 
Nations system. See OHCHR Media Center, Pillay urges Syria to halt its assault on its 
own people, 9 June 2011, accessible at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/
Media.aspx?IsMediaPage=true
27 After months of deadlock, the Security Council fi nally responded to the escalating 
violence in Syria which escalated with the use of force against civilians in the city of 
Hama, 130 miles (210 kilometers) north of the capital Damascus, condemning President 
Bashar Assad’s forces for attacking civilians and committing human rights violations. 
See UN News and Media Division, SC/10352, Security Council, in Statement, Condemns 
Syrian Authorities for Widespread Violations of Human Rights, Use of Force Against Civilians, 
3 August 2011, accessible at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10352.doc.
htm
154 Part II  The Governance of Complementary Global Regimes: Challenges, Obstacles and Concerns
global regimes and the international governance institutions deriving from 
them, which complementary nature is still not applied in the practice. This 
section recalls some of the lessons deriving from the past, before the transi-
tion of global security systems would receive further analysis and debate in 
accordance with the human security doctrine and the quest of complementar-
ity already approached in the first part of this study.
The fact that there is not a world government but rather multilateral set-
tings to debate issues and determine collective course of actions, does not 
mean that the international community is not responsible to improve demo-
cratic legitimacy of international governance institutions. On the contrary, 
such legitimacy depends on democratization processes balancing powers 
between complementary public authorities, while also defining policies 
and legal responsibilities. In order to explore the current standpoint of such 
democratic processes the controversial long-running debates a) on peace and 
justice priorities; b) on the law enforcement and cooperation dilemmas; c) on 
the human rights defence and implementation of human security measures; 
d) on the preservation of the rule of law at domestic, regional and global 
levels; e) on the political determinations to implement democratic interac-
tions in conflict and post-conflict situations where complementary global 
actors are currently involved, require all of them appropriate solutions. In 
other words, the nature of the responsibilities of cooperation those comple-
mentary governance institutions might share in the middle and long terms, 
require further debate in international political fora, on the nature, identi-
fication, prevention and prosecution of mass atrocity crimes. The expec-
tation is that from the debate in the General Assembly and in the Security 
Council and other stakeholders, such as the Assembly of the States Parties 
to the Rome Statute, a political road map would be translated into action, not 
only limited to the support of pluralistic frameworks based on cooperation, 
but implementing and integrating a constitution of the world community 
able to unify global efforts and values. After all, the fight against impunity 
and accountability for the most serious crimes of international concern has 
been strengthened throughout the Rome Statute, in ad hoc and mixed tribu-
nals, as well as specialized chambers in national tribunals. In this regard, 
the General Assembly and the Security Council should engage not only in 
situation-related forms of commitment but as mandatory obligation for all 
UN member States, thus for both categories of States Parties and non-Parties 
to the Rome Statute. After all, the call for such political fora should promote 
the global engagement in the fight against impunity and also draw attention 
to the full range of justice and reconciliation mechanisms, including truth 
and reconciliation commissions, national reparation programs, guarantees 
of non-recurrence, while promoting institutional reforms, rule of law and 
security sector reforms in domestic jurisdictions. In other words, the interna-
tional community and its tools of governance should be prepared to adopt 
appropriate measures aimed at those who violate international humanitar-
ian law and human rights law.
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4.2.1 The global concerns
In my opinion, and considering the chronology of the current humanitar-
ian escalations between political and judicial international mandates, the 
first argument is the lack of preventing mass atrocity crimes towards timely 
intervention, as well as finding an integrated approach of governance. To 
clarify the concerns the following may be helpful. What we currently see is 
that national constitutions and domestic governance institutions are collaps-
ing even in modern democracies such as in Greece, Italy, Spain and Portu-
gal and not exclusively in the so defined ‘failed’ States. The problem is that 
such phenomena compromise much deeper the national legislations and the 
separation of powers of public authorities at local, regional and international 
levels centralizing the fundamental rights of individuals in constitutional 
frameworks. We all know that the preservation of universal values depends 
on the ways they are enforced and governed. The potential that multilat-
eral premises would further contribute to the implementation of a world 
constitution according to the challenges of the time deserves discussions. 
A political strategy of interactions between law enforcement institutions is 
still pending, while there are discrepancies between domestic, regional and 
international responsibilities. The global solidarity, and the moral advent 
of humanitarianism to govern issues such as the humanitarian interven-
tions under the flag of civilian protection duties (R2P or RtoP), mass atroc-
ity crimes, terrorism, drug trafficking, migration and refugees, prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction, are characterized by serious political 
deadlocks. Besides, the lack of a global strategy challenging the traditional 
concept of international security compromised in several occasions human 
rights and the rule of law (e.g. the wide scale conflict during the Iraq War 
encompassing a military campaign by a multinational force led by troops 
from the United States and the United Kingdom, or the policy formulation 
after the terrorist attacks launched by the Islamist terrorist group al-Qaeda 
upon the United States in New York City and the Washington DC areas). The 
governance of humanitarian crisis in conflict and post-conflict situations is 
characterized by serious controversy. If on one side States and global actors 
refer to the international responsibility to intervene in case domestic systems 
collapse and are not ‘able’ or ‘unwilling’ to protect civilians, on the other 
side an architecture of such governance represents a problematic ‘paradigm 
in the making’.
There are no doubts that the emerging regime of international criminal jus-
tice gives authority to the two bodies of international law dealing with the 
treatment of individuals, such as human rights and international humani-
tarian law. We can easily acknowledge that international law has evolved 
in its use and importance due to the increase in armed conflict and mass 
atrocity crimes, but it still struggles to regulate criminal behaviors of States 
and non-state actors, including the civilian protection measures in conflict 
zones. Further progress of the rule of law seems to depend on the devel-
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opment of effective and complementary treaty regimes centralizing funda-
mental individual rights. Previous assessments of the international legal 
order suggest that the solutions depend on the international governance 
institutions, which deserve further constitutional parameters by the politi-
cal actors enforcing them in and out their own governance systems. In the 
current system of international governance, however, the problem of the 
absence of a supranational system and trias politica in international relations 
is not solved by the existence of complementary international governance 
institutions. The lacuna of checks and balances systems between international 
public authorities dealing with peace, justice and security is not solved and 
still remains. The paradigm shift of complementary global regimes is that 
they try to find possible solutions through cooperation but an interaction 
strategy between them is still to be found. Their respective relationship vis-
à-vis the States receives priority with the consequence of tensions between 
peace and justice mandates, which also derive from the absence of a well-
defined interaction strategy between international regimes and emerging 
sub-regimes. The consequence is well known in the gaps of civilian protec-
tion measures either in the context of peace processes and justice mandates 
in conflict and post-conflict situations and the difficult task to provide sus-
tainable peace.
4.2.2 The global responsibilities
The multilateral frameworks under the UN premises of preventive diplo-
macy, crisis prevention, early warning and accountability are absolutely con-
sidered an important part of the interaction strategy advocated in this work. 
This study promotes the predictability of assessments and legal definition 
of collective or shared responsibilities between international regimes which 
will need further legal research. This work focuses on the complementary 
role of international regimes fostering peace diplomacy, without compro-
mising judicial proceedings of legal institutions such as the International 
Criminal Court. It denotes the importance of justice, intended as the restora-
tion of the rule of law considered as centralizing individual rights during 
humanitarian crisis in conflict zones. This study emphasizes the necessity of 
joint solutions promoting the development of ‘accountable’ and ‘democratic’ 
governance, which is critical to building the capacity to manage conflicts, 
violence and crime in conflict and post-conflict situations. There seem to be 
new opportunities after the failure of international security systems and the 
shortcomings in the fight against the impunity of mass atrocity crimes in 
Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia and Angola. Such opportunities require reliable 
interaction strategies. In Srebrenica for instance, the UN peacekeepers were 
the witnesses of massive ethnic cleansing. They had to leave the truth of 
the Bosnian enclave behind. The events included the killing of thousands of 
Bosnian Muslims as well as the mass expulsion of millions of them, in and 
around the town of Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In July 1995 the 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), represented on the ground 
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by a few hundreds of Dutch peacekeepers, failed to prevent the town’s cap-
ture by the Serbian army and the subsequent massacre. The protection man-
date by the UN did not work, the alliances did not respond, the configura-
tion of the international mandate did not have solutions to the Srebrenica 
massacre, which became the largest mass murder in Europe since WWII.28 
These serious humanitarian crimes of common concern were committed 
by the units of the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) under the command 
of General Ratko Mladić, who has evaded arrest by the ICTY and remained 
at large for 16 years just remaining in Serbia under an assumed name. His 
capture was considered as one of the pre-conditions for Serbia to join the 
European Union. According to the lessons learnt from the past in Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone and in the Balkans, an assessment is required on the ways the 
international community would ‘prevent’, ‘react’, and ‘rebuild’ conflict and 
post-conflict situations affected by mass atrocity crimes in multiple conflict 
zones enforcing appropriately complementary governance institutions. The 
question is whether we learn enough from the past experience deepening 
our shared responsibilities.
In general terms, the international governance institutions decide on coop-
eration agreements and arrangements providing some structure to their 
mutual interests. Notwithstanding this field of law is mostly underestimated 
in the advancement of a world constitution, it gives at least some weight 
to the definition of complementary global regimes and their transition. The 
ideal would be to merge constitutional provisions of a humanitarian char-
acter dealt by the Rome Statute in the UN Charter, perhaps combined with 
the amendments of the UN Charter advocated for years. We are all aware 
that this depends on several factors, the most important of which would be 
the universal ratification of the Rome Statute. In any case, the resource and 
knowledge sharing between the United Nations and the Rome Statute insti-
tutions remains an important conditio sine qua non of good governance, but 
such fundamental step is only at its initial stage and still waiting for vis-
ible engagements. With the Rome Statute, the emerging regime operating 
in the field of retributive and restitutive international criminal justice would 
be based on the cooperation with relevant partners, such as the United 
Nations institutions and its specialized agencies. Such cooperation is still 
in the implementation phase and is not legally binding for the UN politi-
cal institutions such as the Security Council. The practice indicates that the 
interaction between complementary global regimes depends on political 
processes enforcing international mandates on the ground, combined with 
jurisdictional triggering mechanisms in accordance with the treaty provisions. 
28 See S. Perkins, ‘The Failure to Protect: Expanding the Scope of Command Responsibility 
to the United Nations at Srebrenica’, 62 University of Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 193: 2004, acces-
sible at: http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/utfl r62&div=14&g_
sent=1&collection=journals
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The challenges occurring in the context of statehood, sovereignty and inter-
national governance deserve attention measuring how far complementary 
global regimes centralize individual rights, with the States and the crimi-
nal perpetrators being in the middle of them. Once judicial proceedings 
would find out about the truth there should not be any political approach 
able to neutralize it. Besides, only a judicial institution would be able to 
define the degree of inhumanity, or better say criminality, considering the 
range of crimes committed, while offering valid justifications for the ‘right’ 
of humanitarian intervention. And last but not least, this right should be 
appropriately used in civilian protection measures for the victims and wit-
nesses of international crimes of common concern upholding the important 
protective aspect of international criminal justice.
4.2.3 The unresolved statehood issues
In the context of jurisdictional matters including the sensitive statehood 
issues and the pressure of referral activities from the UN to the Court, a val-
id controversial example is that the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) 
adopted a resolution (A/HRC/RES/22/25) as a follow-up to the report of 
the UN fact-finding mission on the Gaza conflict, which contains the recom-
mendation to the UN General Assembly to submit the previous report on the 
human rights violations in the Gaza war to the UN Security Council for its 
consideration and appropriate action. The Human Rights Council explicitly 
recommends the referral of the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territo-
ry to the International Criminal Court, pursuant to article 13(b) of the Rome 
Statute.29 It also recommends that the General Assembly remain apprised of 
the matter until it is satisfied that appropriate action has been taken at the 
domestic or international level to ensure justice for the victims and account-
ability for the perpetrators, and also remain ready to consider whether addi-
tional action within its powers is required in the interests of justice.30 The 
real matter waiting for solutions is still the issue of statehood of the Occu-
pied Palestinian Territory and the admissibility of the violations occurred 
against civilians during the Gaza war. This confirms the unresolved issue by 
the UN legal and political institutions about the public international author-
ity recognizing Palestine as a State, which seems unlikely that would be the 
29 Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. “The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to 
a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if…a situ-
ation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred 
to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations…”.
30 See UN doc. A/HRC/12/48 (2009), Report of the United Nations Independent Fact-
Finding Mission on the Gaza Confl ict. See also UN doc. A/HRC/16/72 (2011), Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories 
occupied since 1967, Richard Falk.
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International Criminal Court and neither the United Nations.31 The recogni-
tion of a new State or government is an act that only other States and govern-
ments may grant or withhold. It generally implies readiness and ability to 
assume diplomatic relations. The United Nations is neither a State nor a gov-
ernment, and therefore does not possess any authority to recognize either a 
State or a government.
On 1 January 2015, the Government of Palestine lodged a declaration under 
article 12(3) of the Rome Statute accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC over 
alleged crimes committed “in the occupied Palestinian territory, including 
East Jerusalem, since June 13, 2014”. On 2 January 2015, the Government of 
Palestine acceded to the Rome Statute by depositing its instrument of acces-
sion with the UN Secretary-General. Upon receipt of a referral or a valid dec-
laration made pursuant to article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor, 
in accordance with Regulation 25(1)(c) of the Regulations of the Office of 
the Prosecutor, and as a matter of policy and practice, opens a preliminary 
examination of the situation at hand. Accordingly, on 16 January 2015, the 
Prosecutor announced the opening of a preliminary examination into the 
situation in Palestine in order to establish whether the Rome Statute criteria 
for opening an investigation are met. Specifically, under article 53(1) of the 
Rome Statute, the Prosecutor shall consider issues of jurisdiction, admissibil-
ity and the interests of justice in making such determination.
Over 140 nations from the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Latin America and 
Europe have already endorsed the initiative of the UN recognition of the 
State of Palestine, but Israel’s right-wing government and the US vehement-
ly oppose it. Europe is still hesitant, but a massive public push brought them 
to vote for this momentum to end 40 years of military occupation. While the 
roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are complex, most analysts agree that 
the best path to peace would be the creation of two States as also endorsed 
by the UN Security Council. However, repeated peace processes have been 
undermined by violence on both sides, extensive Israeli settlement-building 
in the West Bank, the humanitarian blockade on Gaza and Israeli strike on 
civilians, as well as rockets from Gaza on South Israel. The Israeli occupa-
tion has fragmented the territory for a Palestinian State and made daily 
life misarable for the Palestinian people. The UN, the World Bank and the 
IMF have all recently announced that Palestinians are ready to run an inde-
pendent State, but confirm that the main constraint to success is the Israeli 
occupation. The US President has called for an end to settlement expan-
sion and a return to the 1967 borders with mutually agreed land-swaps, 
but Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has furiously refused to cooperate. 
31 For an overview of the military occupation and the limits of the Court’s jurisdiction see 
M. Glasius, ‘The ICC and the Gaza War: legal limits, symbolic politics’, 28 March 2009, 
accessible at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/the-icc-and-the-gaza-war-legal-
limits-symbolic-politics
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The UN resolution to upgrade Palestine from its status as an observer entity 
to an observer State does not change the Palestinians lives on the ground. 
Most important, the UN resolution shapes the urgent need for the resump-
tion and acceleration of negotiations within the Middle East peace process.32 
That remains the key according to both Israel and the Palestinian author-
ity to a real two-state solution. As correctly point out by Stork “the argu-
ment that Palestine should forego the International Criminal Court because 
it would harm peace talks rings hollow when 20 years of talks have brought 
neither peace nor justice to victims of war crimes. People who want to end 
the lack of accountability in Palestine and deter future abuse should urge 
President Abbas to seek access to the ICC”.33
The legal and political determinations of the UN Human Rights Council 
addressing issues in the legal framework of governance and referral activ-
ity between the UN institutions and the Court confirm the necessity to 
establish the complementary character of both global regimes preserving 
the rule of law and human rights. There are no doubts that complementary 
organizations, such as the UN Human Rights Council and the International 
Criminal Court, have to relate to each other in situations of serious breaches 
of human rights. Such complementary role is also at its initial stage and 
also in transition. It needs to be noted that the Human Rights Council is an 
inter-governmental body within the UN system made up of only 47 States 
responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights 
around the globe. As previously emphasized the Human Rights Coun-
cil was created by the UN General Assembly on 15 March 2006 with the 
main purpose of addressing situations of human rights violations and make 
recommendations on them. For many, and particularly for the permanent 
members of the Security Council, it accommodates better if the complemen-
tary role of the Court to the UN would fall in the peace and security mainte-
nance. But then, can we still simply assume that the UN Security Council is 
still the predominant authority dealing with serious human rights breaches 
in conflict and post-conflict situations? If yes, should it not be the case to 
provide resources to the emerging regime of international criminal justice 
established under the Rome Statute? This is a matter to be absolutely dealt 
with by the UN General Assembly and the outcome of it remains to be seen 
considering the needs for an emerging international regime to accomplish 
its universality.
32 See UN doc. General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/67/19 (2012), recorded vote of 138 
for the recognition of observer State to 9 against, with 41 abstentions.
33 HRW, Palestine: Go to International Criminal Court, May 8 2014, accessible at: http://
www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/08/palestine-go-international-criminal-court
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4.3 The transition of global security systems
Section outline
This section further debates the transition of governance systems in the new 
order fostering human security and which surely need further accomplish-
ments. The transition deserving attention regards the system of collective 
security and the nature of civilian protection measures when human secu-
rity is seriously compromised. Another aspect refers to the policy defini-
tion of international threats in international crimes which would enhance 
the jurisdiction falling under the Rome Statute and its future extension. It 
needs to be noted that in the context of global order, international regimes 
simply deal with the governance without a government, depending on 
their provisions, policy formulation and the cooperation with their stake-
holders and partners. The lasting struggle for the legal doctrine delineating 
domestic and international responsibilities in situations of war and crime 
brought some results but there is still a long way ahead. Further progress 
depends on the jurisprudence of legal institutions and by the determination 
to enforce the rule of law and the standards of human rights at domestic, 
regional and international levels. The dilemma is the governance of politi-
cal transitions that are internal to collapsed nation-states and their failure 
vis-à-vis the security of individuals during civil wars. In many situations 
of war and crime, the engagement in military actions by States and global 
actors would appear legal but not fully legitimate, while promising unreal-
istic civilian protection duties during humanitarian interventions. The same 
concern is valid for the governance of conflicts between States, or inter-state 
conflicts, as in the case of the commission of the crime of aggression. Such 
governance also represents a controversial ‘paradigm in the making’ for 
complementary global regimes, considering the triggering mechanisms 
between the UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court 
respectively dealing with the accountability of States and individuals, and 
which received further postponement by the political forces responsible of 
their empowerment.
It needs to be noted that the term supranational has sometimes been used in 
an undefined sense as a substitute of international, transnational, or global 
decision-making. Both the UN and the Rome Statute institutions are to a 
large extent not supranational. The majority of the nation-states of the world 
community have dualist systems, meaning that they will only accept inter-
national obligations through the process of incorporation, as for instance, 
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by signing, ratifying and adopting international treaties and conventions.34 
In contemporary international regimes the intergovernmental decision-
making still plays a prominent role centralizing individuals in conflict and 
post-conflict situations. The formulation of the global humanitarian policy 
and the legal frameworks deriving from it, deserve discussions to verify the 
meaning and the nature of the governance of complementary global regimes 
fostering human security, including the status quo of the idea of cosmopoli-
tan democracy. The idea of cosmopolitan democracy has been advocated 
with reference to the reform of international organizations. This includes the 
implementation of the Rome Statute institutions about victims and witness-
es protection, the institution of a directly elected world parliament or world 
assembly of governments, and more widely the democratization of interna-
tional organizations such as the UN.35 This section reflects on the possible 
transitions from collective security to human security towards appropriate 
interaction strategies balancing powers between complementary global 
regimes fostering peace and justice. The purpose is to stimulate the debate 
in order to find urgent consensus by the relevant decision-making embrac-
ing the transition and challenges of human security and the complementary 
responsibilities of global regimes. Appropriate reforms of working methods 
should be in line with a political road map visible in a defined strategy of 
interactions.36
4.3.1 What kind of civilian protection measures?
It is clear that the role of the UN and the regulation of collective security 
are in transition given the rise of intra-state conflicts since the end of WWII. 
The interventions of the world community in such conflicts require systemic 
changes and adjustments which appear to be partial when we look at the 
empowerment and interaction between complementary global regimes. 
Besides, collective security is more ambitious than the systems of alliance 
security or collective defense. It seeks to encompass the totality of States 
34 For an overview of the various aspects of crimes against humanity, which unlike geno-
cide and war crimes were never set out in a comprehensive international convention, 
including discussions on gender crimes, universal jurisdiction, the history of codifi ca-
tion efforts, the responsibility to protect, ethnic cleansing, peace and justice dilemmas, 
amnesties and immunities, the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, the defi nition of 
crimes against humanity in customary international law, the defi nition of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, the architecture of international criminal justice, modes of crimi-
nal participation, crimes against humanity and terrorism, and the inter-state enforce-
ment regime see L. N. Sadat (ed.), Forging a Convention for Crimes Against Humanity, 
Cambridge University Press, 2011.
35 For an overview of the debate on cosmopolitan democracy and the relation between the 
governance at local, regional and global levels see D. Archibugi, ‘Cosmopolitan Democ-
racy and its Critics: A Review’, in European Journal of International Relations, 2004, Vol. 
10(3), at 437-473).
36 See R. Thakur, The United Nations, peace and security: from collective security to the responsi-
bility to protect, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
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within a region, or indeed globally, addressing a wide range of possible 
international threats. While collective security is an idea with a long histo-
ry, its implementation in the practice has proved to be problematic. Several 
prerequisites have to be met for it in order to have a chance to work in an 
appropriate way and with an integrated approach of governance.37 Collec-
tive security may have to evolve ensuring stability and a fair international 
resolution to intra-state conflicts. Whether this will involve more powerful 
peacekeeping forces or a larger role for the UN diplomatically, will likely 
be judged from a case to case basis. In any case, according to the outcomes 
of the studies of four decades of peacekeeping operations, it is proved that 
“turning peacekeepers into a fighting force erodes international consensus 
on their functions, encourages withdrawals by contributing contingents, 
converts them into a factional participant in the internal power struggle, and 
turns them into targets of attacks from rival internal factions”.38 These are 
the factors characterizing the practice on the ground in the multidimensional 
operations in the DRC, and in other peacekeeping operations which meant 
severe loss of human lives. These forces have to be trained and prepared for 
humanitarian protection measures and the emerging regime of international 
criminal justice should profit from such forces deployed on the ground.
First of all, in the context of civilian protection measures it needs to be noted 
that the Court’s victims and witness protection program should help encour-
age witnesses to be more confident in contributing to the investigation, 
assisting the goal of accountability that the victims and civil society have 
been campaigning towards the Rome Statute. As the UK delegation stressed 
during their contribution to the Special Fund of the Court on relocation of 
victims and witnesses39 “we remain concerned about continuing reports of 
witness intimidation and official interference. Those who attempt to subvert 
the search for justice should be aware that they also could find themselves 
37 See A. Roberts and D. Zaum, Selective Security: War and the United Nations Security Coun-
cil since 1945, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Abingdon: Routledge, 
2008.
38 See R. Thakur, ‘From Great Power Collective Security to Middle Power Peacekeeping’ 
in H. Smith (ed.), Australia and Peacekeeping, Canberra, Australian Defence Studies Cen-
tre, 1990, at 20. See also R. Thakur, ‘From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The UN 
Operation in Somalia’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 32, No. 3 (Sep. 1994), 
at 387-410.
39 The purpose of the Special Fund of the Court on relocation is to assist States Parties that 
are willing to host witnesses at risk but are not in a position to fi nance such support, and 
aims at fostering regional solutions for the relocation of witnesses at risk, thereby reduc-
ing the impact of relocations on their life. Using such arrangements, the Court also seeks 
to galvanize cooperation partners into strengthening national capacity to protect wit-
nesses in regional States such as Kenya. This new modality developed by the Registry 
of the Court is complementary, and does not replace traditional Framework Agreements 
on Relocations, which are still very much needed by the Court.
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accountable for their actions in The Hague, at the Court’s premises”.40 The 
protection duties of civilians in situations of conflict and crime by the Securi-
ty Council should embrace the Court’s activities pressuring the States to pre-
serve the right of the victims enforcing the law, while upholding operational 
measures of protection, relocation and rehabilitation. A joint international 
institution dealing with victims’ protection measures would be absolutely 
required. It is important to recall the current trends in the practice applied 
on the ground during difficult political transitions characterized by serious 
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, and which 
disturb international peace and security spreading at regional level, as in the 
case of the African Great Lakes Region, or in other regions and in the Middle 
East.
4.3.2 The politics of transition in conflict zones
What we currently see is that in many countries national security systems 
based on oppressive security are no longer tolerated by their own citizens. In 
situations of war characterized by humanitarian violations, the security sec-
tors, especially armies, might even become a source of widespread insecuri-
ty by themselves (see the situations in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Bahrain, just 
to name a few). In several countries in Africa, Asia and in the Arab world 
for instance, including countries in Europe and other western societies, the 
political transitions are characterized by the ambition to accomplish civil 
States and democratic governance.41 The civilian revolutions against dicta-
torial, corrupted and violent regimes require a deep understanding of the 
local actors in order to provide appropriate support and civilian protection 
measures, while fighting against the impunity of serious crimes. The inter-
national (military) responses focusing on old methods of security, whereas 
in large-scale humanitarian crisis the security systems have collapsed, or are 
simply in the hands of autocratic and dictatorial regimes, or have always 
been inexistent, are controversial and not sustainable in the search of demo-
cratic order and stability. The current military engagements characterizing 
the international responses in internal armed conflicts undermine the cred-
ibility of multilateral treaties fostering stability and the rule of law, includ-
ing the international governance institutions deriving from them. It needs to 
be noted that international treaties, their codification and the organizational 
structures deriving from them, suffered from the well-known shortcomings 
in the policy formulation with regard to the use or misuse of armies, their 
40 See ICC-CPI-20101126-PR601. The Court relies on the cooperation of States for a number 
of key protection issues. International organizations are also the main stakeholders for 
the Court; discussions have been initiated with the UN Offi ce of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights and the possibility of establishing a joint international authority on 
protection issues.
41 See R. Luckham, ‘The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: A Survey 
of Literature and Issues’, in African Studies Review, Vol. 37, Number 2, 1994, at 13-75.
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illicit traffics to dangerous warlords, the constant formation of armed group 
and a myriad of non-state actors’ not politically identifiable, which create 
chaos and violence exploiting resources and human lives. In several situa-
tions the members of the Security Council have violated the arms embargos 
compromising the neutrality of their intervention during violent political 
transitions (e.g. Libya and Syria). We can acknowledge that the politics of 
transition in conflict and post-conflict situations have to deal with massive 
atrocities with the absence or the ‘failure’ of the State and require appropri-
ate intervention under important conditions.
4.3.3 Collective security and human security
The current challenges in the international legal order between statehood, 
sovereignty and international governance deserve discussion, including the 
transition of collective security and the use of military force. Collective secu-
rity can be understood as a security arrangement in which all States cooper-
ate collectively to provide security for all, by the actions of all against any 
States within the groups, which might challenge the existing order by using 
force.42 The NATO was established to provide security for its member States 
against an external military threat. Since the end of the cold war the NATO 
has undertaken collective security missions in upholding the principles of 
the UN Charter on behalf of the UN showing its controversial modus ope-
randi. The use of military force upholding the principles of the UN Charter 
can only be taken up by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. In such cases, since the UN does not have a standing army on 
its own, it can call upon the collective military capabilities of member States 
or alliances, such as indeed the NATO. As relevant analytical outcomes 
would emphasize, “the most striking feature of NATO involvement in the 
management of international crises remains the progressive erosion of the 
Security Council authority, which culminated with the intervention in Koso-
vo. The crisis in Iraq also demonstrated that there was no agreement among 
the members of the NATO on whether obtaining an authorization from the 
Security Council before resorting to force, was a legal requirement or only 
a matter of political expediency”.43 So said the collective security system is 
meant to protect civilians and not to undermine human rights and is also 
supposed to be accountable for its actions. But is this really the case looking 
at the practice applied on the ground?
42 For major contributions see N. J. Schrijver, ‘Reforming the UN Security Council in Pur-
suant of Collective Security’, in Journal of Confl ict & Security Law, Vol. 12, No 1, 2007, at 
134. See also N. M. Blokker and N. J. Schrijver (eds.), The Security Council and the Use of 
Force, 2005.
43 For an analytical overview see T. Gazzini, ‘Nato’s Role in the Collective Security Sys-
tem’, Journal of Confl ict and Security Law, Vol. 8, No 2, 2003, at 231.
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In the situation in Libya, the resolution of the Security Council authorized 
the military response using the language of the responsibility to protect civil-
ians (RtoP or R2P). We will look at the ways such civilian protection duties 
have been performed earlier also in the Sudan and in the DRC. The protec-
tion of civilians during armed conflict is not a new concept but relatively 
established in international humanitarian law.44 With the advent of the R2P, 
the international community accepted for the first time the collective respon-
sibility to act, should States fail to protect their own citizens from mass atroc-
ity crimes. The R2P, thus, imposes two obligations: the first upon each State 
individually, the second on the international community of States collective-
ly. With embracing the responsibility to protect a long and unresolved debate 
over whether to act, became instead, a discussion about how and when to act. 
This was certainly progress. Unlike humanitarian intervention, the R2P 
aspires to ground national and international action in law and institutions 
of complementary nature. Rather than compromising sovereignty, the R2P 
aspires to tie together ‘responsible sovereignty’ and ‘international responsi-
bilities’ to ‘prevent’, ‘react’ and ‘rebuild’. In Libya, the arms embargos on the 
country had been violated prior to the military intervention reported by the 
Security Council. Even if it was the case that preventive measures had failed 
with the tyrant in charge and the violent regime in the country, the main con-
cern refers to the political choice to let weapons enter into the country, mak-
ing sure that they would reach the hands of the rebel groups, and finally tak-
ing part into the devastation of the armed conflict. So said, is such expression 
of militarization and regime change valuing the parameters of human secu-
rity and the supranational rules enshrined in the UN Charter and the Rome 
Statute? The idealistic view is that it would have been more appropriate to 
release arrest warrants against the perpetrators of the range of crimes falling 
under the R2P, and only after performing the required international police 
and law enforcement, authorizing the use of force with the determination 
to catch the most important individuals responsible of the serious crimes 
disturbing peace and security in the country, and in the region. In this way 
the credibility of complementary tools would have received another impact 
globally, especially in regard to the ratification campaign of the Rome Statute.
4.3.4 The risks in the policy formulations
The main concern is that the prevention of serious humanitarian breaches 
and the protection of civilians during difficult political transitions are cur-
rently applied towards international security measures of militarization. 
There are serious doubts that such an approach is a reliable preventive mea-
sure able to challenge the mentality of war and crime during armed conflicts 
of a non-international character or intra-state conflics. Moreover, does global 
solidarity mean that military coalitions have the potential to challenge the 
44 In this regard see the Geneva Convention IV, relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War, Geneva 12 August 1949.
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ideology of despotism? The controversial policy issue is also related to the 
governance of terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction, includ-
ing other serious global threats which have been left aside from any multi-
lateral (legal) system. The fight against terrorism, or ‘war on terror’ against 
the worst enemy, characterized the ‘fiction’ of ideology in the security policy 
of some modern democracies, with Osama Bin Laden wanted death or alive. 
Such approaches have undermined universal values shared by the world 
community. Torture, imprisonment, liquidations and other methods used 
by secret intelligence have violated the basic requirements of human rights 
law, creating further extremisms and international fracture. The problem is 
that terrorism, as an international security threat, including its legal defini-
tion as international crime, is only at its initial stage of being considered in 
multilateral governance systems. Moreover, the raid by US Special Forces 
in Abbottabad, Pakistan, killing Osama Bin Laden, raised a number of legal 
questions that are likely to have far reaching implications for future mili-
tary operations.45 Particularly, the legal issues that arise in situations where 
a decision is made to target individuals, potentially outside the hostilities 
of arm conflicts, using military force. The analysis of these issues requires 
determination of what legal framework(s) properly regulates such use 
of force. Respectively, a) the legal justifications and counterarguments for 
military intervention targeting members of armed groups on the territory of 
another State; b) the applicability of international humanitarian law and/or 
human rights law to such operations; c) the implications of such operations 
for the evolving concept of direct participation in hostilities by civilians; and 
d) whether there is a need for new norms to regulate such operations. In the 
near future it would be required to see whether there is some space left in the 
provisional domain of the Rome Statute on terrorism, limiting the extent on 
which terrorism would only be left to the Security Council’s domain.
4.3.5 Protecting civilians
In many civil wars combatants target civilians and relief workers with impu-
nity. Beyond direct violence, deaths from starvation, disease and the col-
lapse of public health the number of civilians killed by bullets and bombs 
increased. Millions more are displaced internally or across borders. Human 
rights abuses and gender violence are rampant. Under international law, the 
primary responsibility to protect civilians from suffering in war lies with 
belligerents, either by State or non-State actors. International humanitar-
ian law provides minimum protection and standards applicable to the most 
vulnerable in situations of armed conflict, including women, children and 
45 See A. S. Deeks, “Pakistan’s Sovereignty and the Killing of Osama Bin Laden”, ASIL 
Insights, Vol. 15, Issue 11, May 5, 2011, accessible at: http://www.asil.org/insights/vol-
ume/15/issue/11/pakistans-sovereignty-and-killing-osama-bin-laden J. Rollins, Osama 
bin Laden’s Death: Implications and Considerations, Congressional Research Service Reports, 
May 5, 2011, accessible at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41809.pdf
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refugees. Its compliance is an issue. Such laws must be respected. All com-
batants must abide by the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. All Mem-
ber States should sign, ratify and act on all treaties relating to the protection 
of civilians, such as the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions, the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and all refugee conven-
tions. Humanitarian aid is a vital tool for helping governments to fulfill this 
responsibility. Its core purpose is to protect victims, minimize their suffering 
and keep them alive during the conflict so that when war ends they have the 
opportunity to rebuild their shattered lives. The provision of international 
assistance is a necessary part of this effort. Donors must fully and equitably 
fund humanitarian protection and assistance operations.46 Models of gover-
nance and capacity-building are absolutely required. This section concludes 
on the problematic intersection between international law and global politics 
on sensitive matters waiting for political solutions. Once again, political con-
vergence is the key prior whatever institutional design and possible reforms 
of global governance systems which are explored in the next section and in 
the last chapter of this part. This paragraph reports the recommendations 
of the high-level panel on threats, challenges and change protecting civil-
ians. The Secretary-General based this report in part on work undertaken by 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and also on the strong 
advocacy efforts by nongovernmental organizations. The Secretary-Gener-
al prepared a 10-point platform for action for the protection of civilians in 
armed conflict. The Secretary-General’s 10-point platform for action should 
be considered by all actors: States, NGOs and international organizations, in 
their efforts to protect civilians in armed conflict.47
From this platform, particular attention should be placed on the question 
of access to civilians, which is routinely and often flagrantly denied. Unit-
ed Nations humanitarian field staff, as well as United Nations political and 
peacekeeping representatives, should be well trained and well supported to 
negotiate access. Such efforts also require better coordination of bilateral ini-
tiatives. The Security Council can use field missions and other diplomatic 
measures to enhance access to and protection of civilians. Particularly egre-
gious violations, such as those which occur when armed groups militarize 
refugee camps, require emphatic responses from the international communi-
ty, including from the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter of the United Nations. Although the Security Council has acknowledged 
that such militarization is a threat to peace and security, it has not developed 
46 See Report of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, Part 3, A more Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, ‘Collective Security and 
The Use of Force’, Protecting Civilians, Para. 239, at 74, accessible at: http://www.un.org/
secureworld/report2.pdf
47 See UN doc. S/2005/740, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians 
in Armed Confl icts, 28 November 2005, accessible at: http://www.responsibilitytopro-
tect.org/fi les/SGReportPOC.pdf
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the capacity or shown the will to confront the problem. The Security Council 
should fully implement resolution 1265 (1999) on the protection of civilians 
in armed conflict. Of special concern is the use of sexual violence as a weap-
on of conflict. The human rights components of peacekeeping operations 
should be given explicit mandates and sufficient resources to investigate and 
report on human rights violations against women. Security Council resolu-
tion 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security and the associated Indepen-
dent Experts’ Assessment provide important additional recommendations 
for the protection of women. The Security Council, United Nations agencies 
and Member States should fully implement its recommendations. The cur-
rent transition of global security systems requires political consensus. Such 
important requirement is discussed in the next section.
4.4 The requirement of political consensus
Section Outline
In this section it is argued that the structure of governance that has emerged 
after a series of decisions of the UN and the Rome Statute institutions rep-
resent an important step forward, but does not solve the fundamental prob-
lems in the global architecture dealing with international threats and crimes. 
The fact that seventeen years have elapsed since the adoption of the Rome 
Statute requires taking stock of the developments, assessing the collective 
achievements that have been made, and reflecting on those areas where 
action remains inadequate. The protection measures of civilians in conflict 
and post-conflict situations are still insufficient, while the principle of uni-
versality upholding the formulation of human security policy in governance 
systems is in transition. The following sections provide further clarification 
throughout the required risk assessments of the global architecture foster-
ing peace, justice and security, which requires political convergence to fight 
against international threats and crimes, and which is expected to deal with 
States and individuals at the same extent. The requirement of political con-
vergence is debated in the last chapter of this part dealing with the relation-
ship between the UN regime and the emerging regime of international crim-
inal justice falling under the Rome Statute. This section recalls the necessity 
to ‘prevent’, ‘react’ and ‘rebuild’ in mass atrocities situations with a constitu-
tional strategy and a political road map integrating the governance of peace 
and justice for the sake of human security. The last paragraph of this section 
reports the pragmatic recommendations addressed by the UN High Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change which, in addition to the institutional 
reform of the UN, focused on the governance of a) the collective security and 
the use of force; b) the peace enforcement and peacekeeping capability; c) the 
post-conflict peace-building and d) the civilian protection duties. All of these 
clusters of governance require consensus based on human security expec-
tations. For such sensitive governance issues human security is the most 
important requirement of the political convergence necessary.
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In contrast with the traditional meaning of domestic governance of nation-
states, which refers to decision-making defining expectations, granting 
public powers or verifying performance in domestic governing activities, 
we are well aware that the term global governance denotes the regulation 
of international relations between independent and sovereign States in the 
absence of a supranational authority. There is generally agreement between 
the different schools of governance that the extreme challenges taking place 
in societies in transition, combined with the shortcomings of domestic juris-
dictions, require solid rather than symbolic international governance institu-
tions based on the principles of neutrality, integrity and universality. The 
United Nations peacekeeping operations have traditionally followed three 
core principles: the consent among the parties to the conflict, the neutral-
ity and impartiality of the UN forces deployed, and the use of force by UN 
personnel only in cases of self-defence.48 The mission of mandates of uni-
versal character is to preserve norms and values internationally recognized 
for the sake of individual rights, while implementing strategies on matters 
of mutual concern and public good under the premises of ‘effective’ mul-
tilateralism.49 The last decades have been characterized by several short-
comings of multilateral options. The systemic crisis of governance institu-
tions became more complex with the economic and financial break downs 
occurred at domestic, regional and global levels. Nevertheless, while new 
opportunities arise for the governance systems of threats and crimes, on 
which the States may rely in case of serious domestic shortcomings, we are 
still far from the realization of any supranational system, which current inter-
action is only based on the early formation of mutual interests, including 
agreements and arrangements of cooperation based on secondary law, e.g. 
the relationship agreement between the United Nations and the Interna-
tional Criminal Court. The risk is the distance between governance systems 
of complementary character dealing with international threats and crimes. 
International governance institutions, States and non-States actors should 
forge a new consensus on a broader and more effective collective security 
system towards a deeper advocacy of systemic and global reforms central-
izing civilian protection measures.
48 See for valuable contributions to this debate N. Tsagourias, ‘Consent, Neutrality/Impar-
tiality and the Use of Force in Peacekeeping: Their Constitutional Dimension’, Journal of 
Confl ict and Security Law Volume 11, Issue 3, 2006, at 465-482. See also M. P. Karns, ‘The 
Past as Prologue: The United States and the Future of the United Nations System’, in F. A. 
Chadwick, G. M. Lyons, J. E. Trent (eds.), The United Nations System: The Policies of Member 
States, UNU, 1995, at 410. See for earlier legal contributions, T. Komarnicki, ‘The Problem 
of Neutrality under the United Nations Charter’, in Transactions of the Grotius Society, Vol. 
38, 1952, at 77. See also C. Reith, ‘International Authority and the Enforcement of Law’, in 
Transactions of the Grotius Society, Vol. 38, 1952, at 109.
49 For an overview of the debate see K. Krause and A. Knight, State, Society, and the UN 
System: Changing Perspectives on Multilateralism, UNU Press, 1995.
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4.4.1 The required actions to ‘prevent’ ‘react’ and ‘rebuild’ in mass atrocity 
situations
Simply reflecting on the efforts required by the world community it is obvi-
ous that a constitutional strategy at international level has the potential to 
influence national constitutions and vice versa. Such a strategy would neu-
tralize the risks of undemocratic positions compromising judicial decisions 
and the important role of justice, which simply deserves a place in the arrays 
of international peace and security. On the other hand, the visibility of such 
a constitutional strategy would harmonize universal values in the different 
legal systems and traditions of the world community. The efforts should 
focus on keeping pace of the dialogue with local communities and civil soci-
ety, including regional intergovernmental organizations, approaching the 
arena of non-state actors, groups, and activists promoting human rights, and 
also of others, extending the knowledge of political factions, armed groups, 
mercenaries and rebels characterizing each conflict situations. From another 
angle, the constant interaction between multilateral political actors enforcing 
international governance institutions is fundamental. In any case, the main 
responsibility remains in the hands of modern nation-states approaching 
such important issues in their constitutions and legal systems, while chal-
lenging the international legal order and vice versa. In our case, it is required 
to observe the constellation of international governance institutions and the 
necessary requirements of democratic governance of international threats 
and crimes, which require high standards of preventive diplomacy, media-
tion, negotiation and good standards of international cooperation preserv-
ing the progress of human security. Moreover, the development of capacity-
building models of domestic governance are also required, if we also look at 
the shortcomings even in modern democracies and well established nation-
states in western societies, including the collapse of regional governance sys-
tems, which are compromising the concept of security and global solidarity 
due to the disintegration of their unity of intents and their supranational char-
acter.50
It needs to be clarified that the International Criminal Court is not exclu-
sively seen as a criminal and/or a human rights Court, but also as an 
enforcement mechanism of universal humanitarian principles in modern 
international relations. The preservation of the rule of law has been per-
ceived as a principle of governance and as an important preventive tool 
of serious international crimes. In this study, the relationship between the 
United Nations and the International Criminal Court is interpreted as the 
50 See P. De Grauwe, The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone, Centre for European Policy Stud-
ies (CEPS), May 2011. See also D. Gros, T. Mayer, August 2011: What to do when the Euro 
crisis reaches the core, CEPS, August 2011, accessible at: http://www.ceps.eu/book/
august-2011-what-do-when-euro-crisis-reaches-core
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opportunity for further inputs for a constitution of the world community.51 
The establishment of norms and compliance mechanisms universally recog-
nized for the sake of stability in conflict situations characterized by extreme 
violence and by severe violations of international humanitarian law, the 
extension of multilevel jurisdictions and the way they are governed, are the 
main societal phenomena deserving detailed analysis. The establishment 
of global tools serving the domestic capacity-building with an impact on 
the security sectors in devastated nation-states (army, police and judiciary), 
including the protection duties of civilians during armed conflicts, violence 
and crime are interdependent phenomena which centralize the responsi-
bilities of the States towards the international community but also the other 
way around. The question is whether the international community will cen-
tralize human security measures during intra- and inter-state conflicts based 
on the theory of constitutionalism or pluralism. Or better say the establish-
ment of an international legal order able to control power politics through-
out the rule of law, or the alternative ways of dealing with conflicts between 
legal frameworks in the absence of the political will upholding a suprana-
tional legal order.
4.4.2 The important requirement of political convergence
This section debates the issue of political convergence required and not yet 
found. It should be clear at this stage that the international tools upholding 
the responsibilities to ‘prevent’, ‘react’ and ‘rebuild’ situations of war and 
crime need implementations. In the emerging governance of complemen-
tary global regimes two main factors require new orientations: the current 
shift in international relations after post-cold war, characterized by a dif-
ferent nature of political transitions, regime clashes and warfare, and the 
necessity for global governance institutions to interact with each other on 
consensus and strategy-building, including resource sharing, exchange of 
expertise, and lessons learned. The practice applied on the ground, in con-
flict and post-conflict situations during humanitarian escalations deriving 
from violent political transitions, indicates that the principles of responsibil-
ity and accountability wait for configuration and implementation of civilian 
protection duties, including law enforcement engagements in accordance 
with the judicial outcomes of an independent international judiciary. The 
dilemma is whether modern nation-states are willing to adjust their consti-
51 For an overview of the debate on constitutional protection of humanitarian rights, the 
internationalisation of law and transnational constitutional principles see the reports of 
the conference From Peace to Justice organised by The Hague Academic Coalition (HAC) 
and held on 15 and 16 May 2008 at the Peace Palace in The Hague. The overall theme 
of the conference was The Dynamics of Constitutionalism in the Age of Globalisation, acces-
sible at: http://www.hiil.org/events/past-events/ See also B. Fassenberg, ‘The Meaning 
of International Constitutional Law’, in R. St. John Macdonald, D. M. Johnston (eds.), 
Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community, (2005), 
at 837.
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tutional parameters to universal values, preserving the legal and political 
order based on national and international responsibilities. After all, nation-
states are responsible for the status quo of international relations not exclu-
sively based on political realism which prioritizes their national interest and 
security over ideology, moral concerns, and political and social reconstruc-
tions.52 Therefore, it is important to recall some of the challenges occurred 
in the post-cold war era in the context of international security;53 the inter-
national humanitarian interventions during violent political transitions; 
the reach of universal governance institutions, and the efforts to centralize 
individuals and their fundamental rights in conflict and post-conflict societ-
ies. Political consensus on such issues, among other matters, is absolutely 
required.
4.4.3 Summary of the recommendations
In conclusion, it is required to recall again and summarize the recommen-
dations of relevant observers of threats that have emerged since the end of 
the Cold War, including ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, threats of ter-
roristic attacks, and genocidal intra-states conflicts.54 Unfortunately, these 
are still waiting for collective achievements and reflect some areas where 
actions remain inadequate, very poor, or insufficient. The recommendations 
focus on: a) collective security and the use of force, b) peace enforcement 
and peacekeeping capability, c) post-conflict peace-building and d) civilian 
protection.
a) Collective security and the use of force
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations reads: “Nothing in the pres-
ent Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, 
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this 
right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council 
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Secu-
rity Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as 
52 See J. Baylis, S. Smith, P. Owens, ‘International and Global Security in the post-cold war 
era’, in The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations, IV edi-
tion, Oxford University Press, 2008, at 253.
53 While the wide perspective of international security regards everything as a security 
matter, the traditional approach focuses mainly or exclusively on military concerns. For 
an overview of the evolution of this fi eld of study see B. Buzan and L. Hansen, The Evo-
lution of International Security Studies, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
54 See The Secretary-General’s High-level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, 
A more secure world: our shared responsibility, A/59/565 (2004), Follow-up to the outcome of 
the Millennium Summit accessible at: http://www.unrol.org/doc.aspx?n=gaA.59.565_
En.pdf See also M. W. Brough, J. W. Lango, H. van der Linden (eds.), Rethinking the Just 
War Tradition, 2007.
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it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security”. The Security Council is fully empowered under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations to address the full range of security threats 
with which States are concerned. The task is not to find alternatives to the 
Security Council as a source of authority but to make the Council work bet-
ter than it has, as Kofi Annan often put it. The High-level Panel endorsed 
the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to 
protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military interven-
tion as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, 
ethnic cleansing or serious violations of humanitarian law which sovereign 
governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent. Such autho-
rization by the Security Council and further escalation to justice should be 
characterized by compulsory cooperation with the Court, including resourc-
es and robust peace-making and peace-building.
In considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of military force, the 
Security Council should always address whatever other considerations may 
be taken into account. As discussed by Brough, Lango and van der Linden 
the following “five basic criteria of legitimacy” should be carefully consid-
ered: a) seriousness of threat. Is the threatened harm to State or human secu-
rity of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use 
of military force? In the case of internal threats, does it involve genocide and 
other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of internation-
al humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended? b) proper purpose. 
Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to halt 
or avert the threat in question, whatever other purposes or motives may be 
involved? c) Last resort. Has every non-military option for meeting the threat 
in question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that other 
measures will not succeed? d) proportional means. Are the scale, duration and 
intensity of the proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet the 
threat in question? e) balance of consequences. Is there a reasonable chance of 
the military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with 
the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of 
inaction? The above guidelines for authorizing the use of force should be 
embodied in declaratory resolutions of both the Security Council and Gen-
eral Assembly.55 An important additional element should be the appropriate 
considerations of the commission of international crimes and the violence 
on civilians spreading in multiple countries with the configuration of peace 
enforcement mandates supporting international justice activities on the 
ground (investigations and prosecutions).
55 M. W. Brough, J. W. Lango, H. van der Linden (eds.), Rethinking the Just War Tradition, 
2007, at 3.
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b) Peace enforcement and peacekeeping capability
The developed States should do more to transform their existing force capac-
ities into suitable contingents for peace operations. Member States should 
strongly support the efforts of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Opera-
tions, building on the important work of the Panel on UN Peace Operations 
of the UN Secretariat, to improve its use of strategic deployment stockpiles, 
standby arrangements, trust funds and other mechanisms in order to meet 
the tighter deadlines necessary for effective deployment. The States with 
advanced military capacities should establish standby high readiness and 
self-sufficient battalions that can reinforce UN missions, and should place 
them at the disposal of the UN. In regard to peacekeeping operations the 
Brahimi report is a useful tool to evolve with civilian protection duties. In 
response to criticism, particularly of the cases of sexual abuse by peacekeep-
ers, the UN should take further steps toward reforming its operations. The 
Brahimi report was the first of many steps to review former peacekeeping 
missions, isolate flaws, and take steps to delimit mistakes ensuring the effi-
ciency of future peacekeeping missions. The UN has vowed to continue to 
put these practices into effect when performing peacekeeping operations in 
the future. However, Brahimi’s call that the UN missions have the means 
commensurate to their mandates has never been fully implemented. Man-
dates express ambitious protection of civilian agendas, while troop con-
tributing countries are wary of putting their forces in harm’s way to do just 
that.56
The technocratic aspects of the UN peacekeeping reform process have been 
continued and revitalized by the DPKO in its Peace Operations 2010 reform 
agenda. This included an increase in personnel, the harmonization of the 
conditions of service of field and headquarters’ staff, the development of 
guidelines and standard operating procedures, and improving the partner-
ship arrangement between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with the 
African Union and the European Union. Besides, the regional and interna-
tional support should be complemented through national cooperation at all 
levels. The ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines’, incor-
porates and build on the Brahimi analysis. This needs further updates about 
the presence of complementary actors on the ground such as investiga-
tions and prosecutions of international crimes and the support they would 
require.57
56 See L. Arbour, Doctrines Derailed?: Internationalism’s Uncertain Future, Global Briefi ng 2013 
opening speech from the International Crisis Group’s President & CEO Louise Arbour, 
accessible at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2013/arbour-
doctrines-derailed-internationalism-s-uncertain-future.aspx
57 See USG/DPKO, UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, 2008, acces-
sible at: http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf
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c) Post-conflict peacebuilding
Special representatives of the Secretary-General should have the author-
ity and guidance to work with relevant parties to establish robust donor-
coordinating mechanisms, as well as the resources to perform coordina-
tion functions effectively, including ensuring that the sequencing of United 
Nations assessments and activities is consistent with the priorities of gov-
ernments. The Security Council should mandate and the General Assembly 
should authorize funding for disarmament and demobilization programs 
from assessed budgets of United Nations peacekeeping operations. A stand-
ing fund for peace-building should be established and finance the recurrent 
expenditures of a nascent government, as well as critical agency programs 
in the areas of rehabilitation and reintegration of combatants, child soldiers 
and the victims and witnesses of international crimes.
d) Protecting civilians
All combatants must abide by the Geneva Conventions. All Member States 
should sign, ratify and act on all treaties relating to the protection of civil-
ians, such as the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions, the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court and all refugee conventions. The 
Security Council should fully implement resolution 1265 (1999) on the pro-
tection of civilians in armed conflict. The Security Council, United Nations 
agencies and Member States should fully implement resolution 1325 (2000) 
on women, peace and security. Member States should support and fully 
fund the proposed Directorate of Security and accord high priority to assist-
ing the Secretary General in implementing a new staff security system in the 
short, middle and long terms.58
58 See Report of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, A more Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Annexes, at 97, accessible at: 
http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf
Preliminary remarks
As reported in the previous chapters, at the end of the six-week diplomatic 
conference held in Rome in 1998, 120 countries voted in favour of the Rome 
Statute. The political support and the development of the treaty-law meant 
the establishment of new public institutions committed to end the impunity 
of the gravest crimes known to humanity and bring justice to the victims. 
The Rome Statute institutions are: the International Criminal Court with 
exclusively a judicial mandate, the Assembly of States Parties which is the 
management oversight and legislative body of the Court, and the Trust Fund 
for Victims implementing Court-ordered reparations and provide physi-
cal and psychosocial rehabilitation or material support to victims of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court. The US joined China, Libya, Iraq, Israel, 
Qatar, and Yemen as the only seven countries voting in opposition to the 
treaty, while twenty-one countries abstained. When looking at: a) the rejec-
tion of the Rome Statute by powerful States; b) the political impasse at the 
regional level as for instance in the African Union; and c) the difficulties of 
complementarity at international level, we notice that cooperation is very 
difficult to realize. In order to implement a global architecture fostering 
peace, justice and security able to influence ‘l’état de droit’ and the institu-
tional capacity-building in domestic realities, competence allocation, delimi-
tation of competence, institutional reform, mutual and complementing sup-
port between such international institutions, are fundamental preconditions 
of democratic governance involved in the prevention of mass atrocities, 
including the importance of their working methods in case of international 
interventions and judicial referrals in situations of war and crime.1
The first section of this chapter focuses on the institutional contours char-
acterizing the emerging regime of international criminal justice responsible 
of a systemic change promoting the links between human security and jus-
tice (Assembly of States Parties, Trust Fund for Victims and the Court). In 
order to build a model of international criminal justice it is important to 
start with strong fundaments at institutional, administrative and legislative 
levels complementing an independent international judiciary. Such institu-
1 See F. Bensouda, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Statement to the United 
Nations Security Council on the Subject of “Working Methods of the Security Council”, New 
York, United States, Thursday, 23 October 2014.
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tional contours dealing with human rights and justice represent the indica-
tor of public authority and the resources allocated in these fields of global 
governance. In the previous chapter it has been concluded that balancing 
powers in the international legal order will require the implementation of 
new fields of law and further political consensus enforcing the Rome Statute 
regime. For the political promotion of the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) 
the representation of such institution in regional and global organizations 
is recommended. In the last years the ASP adopted resolutions on several 
issues, including the Review Conference of the Rome Statute, the establish-
ment of an independent oversight mechanism, the possible establishment of 
a liaison office at the African Union Headquarters, the permanent premises 
of the Court in The Hague, and the programme budget useful for its strate-
gic plan for the next years. During the first Review Conference in Kampala 
the Assembly adopted resolutions on complementarity; cooperation; aggres-
sion; independent oversight mechanism; permanent premises; victims 
and reparations; amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence; the 
“omnibus” resolution; and the Court’s budget. In the long term the legisla-
tive activity of the ASP could have an impact on the maintenance of peace, 
justice, and security at global level. This section also offers an overview of 
the Trust Fund for Victims supporting the necessity of a comprehensive 
strategy for victims’ rights, implementing the tools of restorative justice.
The second section approaches the legal tools regulating the relationship 
between the Court and the United Nations, the procedural matters and the 
agreement provisions, including the inter-institutional liaison between the 
Court and the UN. It emphasizes the inevitability of further implementation 
of such legal and institutional tools creating the premises of international 
criminal justice and its place in the peace and security regime executing 
protective justice with civilian protection measures. The third section offers 
some conclusions on the necessary challenges to implement the interac-
tions between the Court and the UN. It examines the urgent proposals of the 
UN peacekeeping and peace building reforms, including the general pro-
posals addressed by the Secretary-General on the security sector reform in 
peace operations, with clarifications on the rule of law sectors incorporat-
ing justice. It offers an overview of the efforts integrating restorative justice 
and reconstruction, into the strategic and operational planning of new post-
conflict and peace-building operations. The fact findings deriving from the 
analysis of the current practice in the field operations indicate many gaps in 
these areas. This section concludes that there is the necessity to harmonize 
regimes working for peace, justice and security avoiding duplication, com-
petition or inaction. This of course, is only possible if a strong consensus is 
reached on democratic institutional reforms of the United Nations, includ-
ing the binding cooperation required by the regime of the Rome Statute.2
2 See ICC-CPI-20141031-PR1057, ICC President addresses United Nations General Assembly, calls for 
universal ratifi cation of the Rome Statute, Press Release : 31/10/2014. Speech, Statement and Report 
of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations for 2013/2014 are accessible at: http://
www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr1057.aspx
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In order to conclude the topics dealt in this chapter (on the governance 
structure of complementary global regimes in their respective competence, 
and their potential to establish an interaction framework), the fourth sec-
tion specifically debates on the rule of law and justice in conflict and post-
conflict societies under the UN premises, the sectors of the rule of law at 
international level, the coordination of the rule of law activities within the 
UN, and the criminal accountability of the UN officials and experts on the 
ground during the field operations. The purpose of such an assessment is 
useful to identify feasible solutions on the accountability gaps, including the 
implementation of interactions between complementary global regimes in 
the short, middle and long terms. After all, laying strong legal foundations 
for transparent, accountable and efficient democratic institutions is crucial 
for the fight against mass atrocity crimes in all aspects of peace and security, 
such as its preservation, maintenance and restoration.3
The view expressed in this chapter is that strengthening the International 
Criminal Court and the Assembly of States Parties needs political consensus 
on substantive reforms at structural and normative levels, challenging the 
relationship with the United Nations system with primary law. The report 
on cooperation for instance, which was submitted by the Court to the States 
Parties, contains a high number of United Nations related entries in all cat-
egories of cooperation. The United Nations is understood in this report as 
including all principal organs, as well as peacekeeping operations and mis-
sions, funds and programs but not the independent specialized agencies 
such as the World Bank, WHO and UNESCO. The working group on cooper-
ation between the organizations would offer significant progress about their 
interaction. Given the scope of the Court’s cooperation requirements and the 
States Parties’ obligations about cooperation, a working group is more suit-
ed to take this interaction forward than a single focal point. A working group 
could also be composed of a number of States Parties representatives based 
in key cities, including The Hague, New York, Brussels, Tokyo and Addis 
Ababa. The geographic reach of such a working group would have the 
potential to improve cooperation to the Rome Statute system from regional 
organizations such as the EU, and the AU, among others.4
Pursuant to paragraph 60 of resolution ICC-ASP/10/Res.5 of 21 December 
2011, the Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties submitted for consider-
ation by the Assembly the report on complementarity. The report reflects the 
outcome of the informal consultations held by The Hague Working Group of 
the Bureau with the Court and other stakeholders (including the UNDP and 
other UN specialized agencies). The Assembly of States Parties is the custo-
dian of the Rome Statute system. While the Assembly itself has a very limit-
3 This concept has been underlined by the UN Secretary-General and by any renowned 
scholars and practitioners, such as  Benjamin Ferencz, Cherif Bassiouni, Claus Kress, 
Antonio Cassese, and William Schabas, including other highly regarded authors.
4 See ICC-ASP/6/21, 2007, p. 16.
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ed role in strengthening the capacity of domestic jurisdictions to investigate 
and prosecute serious international crimes, it is a key forum for matters of 
international criminal justice. Combating impunity both at the national and 
the international level for the most serious crimes of concern to the inter-
national community as a whole, is the core objective of the Rome Statute. 
In this respect the Assembly has an important role in encouraging and pro-
moting capacity-building at the national level and thereby strengthening the 
States Parties pillar of the Rome Statute system. Assisting States in assuming 
their primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute through promot-
ing complementarity in new and existing rule of law programmes and other 
relevant instruments constitutes an important element in the fight against 
impunity.5 In this chapter, however, the idea is to extend complementarity 
between the UN system and the Rome Statute institutions promoting a gov-
ernance structure in accordance with their respective competence.
5.1 The Role of the Assembly of States Parties and the Trust Fund 
for Victims
Section Outline
It can be affirmed that an important element arising in the international con-
tours of international criminal justice is the presence of a new forum in the 
political apparatus of the Rome Statute: the Assembly of the States Parties. The 
legislative and political organ of the Rome Statute regime would prepare some 
grounds to the parliamentary activity of the UN General Assembly, either in 
the fight against the impunity of mass atrocity crimes or stimulate the debate 
on global threats and crime definitions. It has the potential to be a forum pro-
moting consensus much closer to the intra-state difficult realities of the African 
Union (AU), the Arab League (LAS), the permanent members of the UNSC, 
and other regional organizations, while promoting the Rome Statute at uni-
versal level in all judicial systems of the world. A comprehensive strategy for 
victims for instance, needs to be established towards the interaction between 
the ASP, the Trust Fund for Victims, the Court’s organs and the important part-
ners of the Rome Statute institutions, including the UN actors and regional 
intergovernmental organizations. Unfortunately, the enthusiasm about these 
liaisons was undermined by the decision of the AU rejecting the Court’s pres-
ence in the region. This section focuses on the institutional interaction current-
ly in place between the Court and the United Nations since the establishment 
of the liaison office (New York) and the permanent Secretariat of the Assembly 
of States Parties (The Hague) which both started their activities since 2004.6 
5 See ICC-ASP/11/24, 2012, p. 3.
6 See ICC-ASP/3/6 on the Establishment of a New York Liaison Offi ce for the International 
Criminal Court and the Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties.
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The report pursuant to the Assembly resolution ICC-ASP/2/Res.7 conclud-
ed that the Court and the Secretariat required a permanent presence in New 
York. This conclusion was shared by the Court and the Secretariat. The liai-
son office would liaise and have a representative function with: the United 
Nations; the States Parties and States that are not parties to the Rome Statute; 
the international and regional organizations; the non-governmental organi-
zations; the media organizations.
This section also offers an overview of the ICC-UN relationship agreement 
and the role of the Assembly of the States Parties (ASP) in order to establish 
an interaction strategy between the Rome Statute and the United Nations 
institutions.7 Furthermore, it explores the reporting activity of the Court to 
the United Nations; the general provisions regarding international coop-
eration between the UN and the Court; the features of judicial assistance, 
according respectively to Part III of the ICC-UN relationship agreement and 
Part IX of the Rome Statute; the legislative role of the ASP and the estab-
lishment of an independent oversight mechanism, including the operation 
of the inspection and evaluation functions of the Court within such gover-
nance control mechanism currently debated in the ASP. In order to provide 
an understanding of the necessary implementation, this section examines 
the institutional interactions including the information exchange, commu-
nication channels and resource sharing between the ICC and the UN institu-
tions, including mechanisms measuring their efficiency, transparency and 
economy. The purpose is to encourage concrete actions finding appropriate 
legal remedies of harmonization of complementary mandates dealing with 
international criminal justice, to be applied in both conflict and post-conflict 
situations. The States Parties should always promote the activities of the 
Court in regional and international organizations. This can be done through 
resolutions, declarations and other forms of political support, as well as dif-
ferent forms of technical assistance. These tools may also be used to facilitate 
arrest and surrender, with a last resort being the use of coercive instruments 
available within some of these organizations as international actors contrib-
uting to the enforcement of law. The second part of this section approaches 
the activity of the Trust Fund for Victims, the establishment by the Court of a 
strategy for victims’ rights, and the necessary elements for the implementa-
tion of an effective system of global justice which depends on the interaction 
between complementary global regimes.
7 See the Statement “President of the General Assembly meets with the President of the Assem-
bly of States Parties of the ICC”, New York 10 April 2012, General Assembly 66th Session, 
accessible at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/66/news/PRStatements/ps100412.
shtml
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5.1.1 Global interactions and political determinations
There are no doubts that international regimes of complementary character 
have an important role to play safeguarding individual rights in conflict and 
post-conflict societies, while challenging the traditional concept of national 
and international security. The political determination of the States Parties to 
the Rome Statute refers to the specific function of its institutions, monitoring 
and destabilizing criminal regimes, while contributing to the preservation of 
peace and security in accordance with the purpose and principle of the UN 
Charter. Such high expectations depend on the intersection of policy and law 
on global issues complementing conflict and post-conflict intervention with 
retributive and restorative justice in domestic realities, reaching victimized 
communities on the ground according to the principle of complementarity. 
Regarding the future expectations of remedies implementing interactions in 
the emerging regime of justice, the Assembly of the States Parties in the reso-
lution “Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of States 
Parties” declared:
“Convinced that the International Criminal Court is an essential means of promoting 
respect for international humanitarian law and human rights, thus contributing to free-
dom, security, justice and the rule of law as well as to the prevention of armed conflicts, 
the preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security and the advance-
ment of post-conflict peace-building and reconciliation, with a view to achieving sustain-
able peace, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations…Convinced also that there can be no lasting peace without justice and that peace 
and justice are thus complementary requirements”.8
For the judicial proceedings national courts have the priority under the 
Rome Statute system. The States have the opportunity to bring cases to an 
international judiciary that they might not otherwise pursue. In each of the 
situations that the Court is investigating policy efforts have been made to 
improve domestic justice mechanisms for serious international crimes as a 
result of the Court’s involvement (Uganda, DRC, Sudan, Central African 
Republic, Central African Republic II, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and Mali) 
including the situations under preliminary analysis (Afghanistan, Colom-
bia, Nigeria, Guinea, Georgia, Honduras, Iraq, Ukraine).9 At global level, 
additional legal mechanisms will be necessary regulating the principle of 
accountabilities in international legal relations of public organizations and 
private corporations, limiting the authority and the powers of the Security 
Council, while reinforcing legal features in the field of human rights. As pre-
viously argued the ideal would be a review of the UN Charter and the Rome 
Statute accordingly, after decennia of paralysis and fragmentation in peace, 
8 See ICC-ASP/6/Res.2 (2007), Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assem-
bly of States Parties.
9 See ICC website » Structure of the Court » Offi ce of the Prosecutor » Preliminary Exami-
nations.
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justice and security governance matters. Political consensus is necessary to 
balance powers in the international legal relations. This is true considering 
the question of judicial review of the acts of the Security Council which is 
one of the most urgent issues facing the United Nations.10 In order to have 
an overview of the institutional setting of the Rome Statute system inter-
acting with important global actors, it is important to look at the legislative 
activity of new institutions (ASP, TFV), including the norms regulating such 
interactions based on binding cooperation at least for the States being parties 
of such institutions.
a) The Assembly of States Parties
The Assembly of States Parties (ASP) is the management oversight and leg-
islative body of the International Criminal Court. It is composed of represen-
tatives of the States that have ratified and acceded to the Rome Statute.11 The 
Assembly of States Parties has a Bureau, consisting of a President, two Vice 
Presidents and 18 members elected by the Assembly for a three-year term, 
taking into consideration principles of equitable geographic distribution and 
adequate representation of the principal legal systems of the world. On its 
second session in September 2003 the Assembly of States Parties decided 
to establish the Permanent Secretariat (ICC-ASP/2/L.5). The Assembly of 
States Parties decides on various items, such as the adoption of normative 
texts and of the budget, the election of the judges and of the Prosecutor and 
the Deputy Prosecutor(s). According to article 112(7) of the Rome Statute, 
each State Party has one vote and every effort has to be made to reach deci-
sions by consensus both in the Assembly and the Bureau. If consensus can-
not be reached, decisions are taken by vote. 12
The ASP promotes international criminal justice through the Rome Statute 
and further empowerment of the jurisdiction of the Court. At this stage the 
Court, with multiple investigations, situation analysis and the issuance of 
10 See for discussions, H. Köchler, ‘The ICC: Signaling a Paradigm Shift in International 
Criminal Law?’ in H. Köchler (ed.) Global Justice or Global Revenge? International Criminal 
Justice at the Crossroads, 2003, 222 at 224. For an overview of the evolution of human 
rights law which provides a broad political history of the emergence and development 
of the human rights movement in the 20th century through the crucible of the United 
Nations, focusing on the hopes and expectations, concrete power struggles, national 
rivalries, and bureaucratic politics that modelled the international system of human 
rights law, see R. Normand, S. Zaidi, Human Rights at the UN The Political History of Uni-
versal Justice, (2007). For other scholars’ publications involved on the UN Intellectual 
History Project see the list accessible at: http://www.unhistory.org/ For an overview of 
the scholarly debate on the UNSC started since the nineties, see M. Bedjaoui, The New 
World Order and the Security Council: Testing the Legality of Its Acts, (1994), 56 at 90.
11 See Rules of Procedure of the ASP, ASP First session, New York, 3-10 September 2002, 
accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Publications/Compendium/
Compendium.3rd.08.ENG.pdf
12 See the Assembly of States Parties structure on the ICC-ASP Portal, accessible at: http://
www.icc-cpi.int/asp.html
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arrest warrants, needs further support by the States Parties and non-States 
parties. In order to receive it, the ASP engagement is vital. This for two rea-
sons, first, to secure cooperation from States, various agencies of the United 
Nations and other inter-governmental organizations, and second, to engage 
the ASP responsibilities allocating sufficient resources to the Court. There 
can be no doubt that active support by the States Parties will influence the 
future of the Court and determine whether the permanent judicial institution 
ultimately reaches the goals of its establishment. Moreover, the long-term 
success of the ICC depends on the ASP to act as a politically engaged and 
supportive body of international criminal justice. The ASP has an important 
role to play in ensuring that the Court is efficient and operates as intended, 
complementing national courts and making a meaningful contribution to 
the cause of justice. As a new and unique institution facing enormous chal-
lenges, the Court is responsible in developing best practices becoming an 
excellent model of public administration of criminal justice. The Court needs 
to benefit from close engagement by the ASP particularly in this early phase 
of considering reviews of the Rome Statute. Where there are shortcomings in 
practice, States Parties can point them out. Thus, aside from being essential 
to secure cooperation, the active involvement of the ASP with the Court is 
necessary to guarantee the most effective judicial institution possible.13 The 
responsibility of the ASP interacting with the UN liaises in the first part of 
the Rome Statute on the establishment of the Court. Article 2 states: “The 
Court shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations through an 
agreement to be approved by the Assembly of States Parties to this Statute 
and thereafter concluded by the President of the Court on its behalf”. The 
implementation of such interaction with the UN is a responsibility of the 
ASP.14 In the next paragraphs we will see how the ASP functions in practice.
b) Institutional, Managerial and Political Settings of Cooperation
The ASP represents the bridge between the States, the UN institutions and 
the Court, necessary for the promotion of the regime of justice. In the pro-
cess of allocating public powers and competences at global level, the judicial 
empowerment of the Court promoted by the ASP would influence the multi-
lateral system or regime for human rights protection, the national sovereignty 
and peaceful international disputes, promoting the rule of law at micro and 
macro level. However, the institutional identity of the ASP is still in progress, 
as many difficulties arise considering the absence on board of the majority 
13 See Resolution ICC-ASP/3/Res.8, Intensifying the Dialogue between the Assembly of States 
Parties and the International Criminal Court, 10 September 2004, accessible at: http://
www.icc-cpi.int/asp/documentation/doc_3rdsession.html
14 See Coalition for the ICC (CICC, Cooperation Team), Comments and Recommendations to 
the Tenth Session of the Assembly of States Parties, 12-21 December 2011, New York, 2 Decem-
ber 2011, accessible at: http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/CICC_Coopera-
tion_Team_Paper_(ASP10).pdf
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of the States of the Arab League, Israel, the US, Russia and China.15 Some of 
these States opposed the Court since the beginning of its existence. At politi-
cal level a strategic definition of the global fight against international crimes 
is expected by the ASP, the UN General Assembly, the Security Council an the 
Secretary-General. The Court’s relationship with the UN and the institutional 
matters will need further implementation, especially considering the impact 
on the accession campaign of the Rome Statute, the pillar of cooperation, the 
definition of crimes and universal jurisdiction, the accountability of corpora-
tions and the controversial issue of the UN peacekeepers.16 The Court itself 
cannot do anything about statutory matters, as the institution is only dealing 
with judicial assistance at ministerial level. This is an ASP political responsi-
bility. For any review in fact, the Statute provides the involvement of the ASP 
for whatever revision. Political consensus is indispensable.
Both the ASP and the UN institutions remain the premises where to address 
decision-making exclusively based on democratic consensus. Regarding the 
cooperation, since 2007 the working documents of ASP indicate an extensive 
activity of its working groups (The Hague and New York). The overall aim of 
the issues dealt by the two Working Groups has been to create and promote 
an enabling environment for the Court. It was sought to identify problems 
and barriers in providing cooperation of a general and structural nature, 
and highlight generic solutions and models dealing with these interactions 
which were based on the report submitted by the Court on cooperation, The 
Hague Working Group decided to organise its work in thematic meetings 
focusing primarily on the role of the States Parties. The New York Working 
Group decided to organise its work around two main themes, namely the 
relationship between the UN and the Court, and the role of the States Parties 
with respect to the Court in the UN context, in view of crosscutting nature of 
the UN related issues. Furthermore both working groups deal with the issue 
of international and regional organizations.17 From these reports it is clear 
that the ASP is engaged on one side on the managerial, institutional and 
15 See M. P. Scharf ‘Results of the Rome Conference for an International Criminal Court’, 
(August 1998), The American Society of International Law, accessible at: http://www.asil.
org/insigh23.cfm See also M. P. Scharf, ‘The Politics of Establishing an International 
Criminal Court’, (1996) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 6 , 167 at 173.
16 For an overview of the debate of human rights protection and criminal proceedings 
against corporations between the UN and the ICC see, C. Chiomenti, ‘Corporations and 
the International Criminal Court’, in O. De Schutter (ed.), Transnational Corporations and 
Human Rights, 2006, 287 at 312. See also L. van den Herik, “Corporations as future sub-
jects of the International Criminal Court: An exploration of the counterarguments and 
consequences”, in C. Stahn, L. van den Herik (eds.), Future Perspective of International 
Criminal Justice, (2010).
17 For an overview of the clusters of cooperation and the general legal mechanisms which 
will need further implementation in ASP see, ICC-ASP/6/21, Report of the Bureau 
on Cooperation, 19 October 2007, pp. 17-22. See also Resolution on Cooperation, ICC-
ASP/11/Res.5, 21 November 2012, accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_
docs/Resolutions/ASP11/ICC-ASP-11-Res5-ENG.pdf
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political settings of cooperation creating a system of interactions with impor-
tant partners, such as the UN, while empowering the public authority of the 
Court promoting its transparency, economy and efficiency. The problem aris-
ing in these reports is a lack of concrete actions or road map to be performed 
in the short, middle and long terms by the actors involved, respectively the 
Rome Statute institutions, the States Parties and the UN. Provisions should 
be made to ensure, that there is a platform for taking forward the work on 
cooperation as well as a general channel of communication between the 
Court and States Parties. Such clusters of cooperation and the general legal 
mechanism regulating them will need further implementation (information 
sharing, national focal points, procedures and structures of cooperation, 
and sensitive thematic aspects such as witness relocation and enforcement 
of sentences agreements) including institution-building between the Rome 
Statute institutions and the UN. The States Parties should ensure that ade-
quate implementing legislation and supplementary agreements are in place 
to enable cooperation and ensure that appropriate structures and procedures 
are established to make such cooperation run smoothly. In short, the States 
Parties should reinforce an enabling environment of interactions creating a 
global framework of cooperation.18
c) Transparency, economy and efficiency
In line with the supervision on the Court’s practice and the performance 
appraisals by the ASP, article 112, paragraph 4 of the Rome Statute gives 
the authority to the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) to establish subsid-
iary bodies in addition to the judicial (OTP, Presidency and Chambers) and 
non-judicial organs of the Court (Registry). The Court is evolving into a 
fully operational and complex international judicial institution. Institutional 
matters and resource allocations require the ASP to fully perform its over-
sight function for enhancing the efficiency, economy and transparency of the 
Court. This is in fact the scope of an independent oversight mechanism. This 
supervisory function is to be carried out at various organizational levels rel-
ative to the different activities of the Court, including through investigation, 
inspection and evaluation of administrative, managerial, organizational and 
budgetary measures, as well as on the implementation of the regulatory 
framework of governance in the several Court’s organs. The implementation 
of such organ is only at its initial stage but it is important to report on the 
provisional character of such mechanism.
18 For an overview of the set of recommendations that might further improve the coop-
eration between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, bearing in 
mind the fact that cooperation between the two institutions is a relatively new phenom-
enon, including the conclusions in the Report of the Bureau on Cooperation, see ICC-
ASP/6/21, 19 October 2007, Conclusions, p. 23, accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/asp_docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-6-21_English.pdf
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The Assembly of States Parties establishes, in accordance with a resolution, 
an independent oversight mechanism. The Registrar of the Court shall enter 
into a memorandum of understanding with the United Nations Office of 
Internal Oversight Services to provide support services on an annual cost 
recovery basis for the operationalization of the oversight mechanism.19 The 
documents consulted indicate that such organ which reports to the ASP 
would start with administrative investigative activities inside the Court 
and at a later stage with inspection and evaluation in the several organs of 
the judicial institution. The independent oversight mechanism itself will be 
expected to develop the rules governing its work, with the following recom-
mendations: a) the scope of the independent oversight mechanism will cover 
internal investigation, evaluation and inspection. The establishment of an 
independent professional investigative capacity will be implemented imme-
diately and additional elements of oversight, such as inspection and evalu-
ation as envisaged in article 112, paragraph 4, of the Rome Statute, shall be 
brought into operation following a decision of the ASP to be adopted; b) it is 
envisaged that the investigative unit of the newly established independent 
oversight mechanism will have proprio motu investigative powers and incor-
porate procedures and protection measures for staff; c) it is envisaged that 
the individuals covered by the oversight mechanism will include all Court 
staff subject to the Staff Rules and the Court, together with elected officials. It 
is also envisaged that the investigative unit of the oversight mechanism will 
be utilized for the conduct of investigations of any allegations of misconduct 
made against contractors retained by the Court and working on its behalf. 
Such investigations should be carried out in accordance with the terms of 
the contract. In circumstances where a contract is silent on the manner and/
or the modalities of any investigation, the oversight mechanism will con-
duct its investigation in accordance with its own established procedures and 
recognized best practice. The findings of any investigation will be used to 
determine the applicable sanctions, if any, under the existing contractual 
regime between the Court and the contractor. Within this context, it is recom-
mended that the Court develops and incorporates into its procurement con-
tracts a code of conduct and also appropriate disciplinary procedures to be 
followed in circumstances of alleged misconduct. d) In all cases, if criminal 
activity is suspected in the course of an investigation, the oversight mecha-
nism must notify the relevant national authorities, such as the State where 
the suspected crime was committed, the State of the suspect’s nationality, the 
State of the victim’s nationality, and where applicable, the host State of the 
seat of the Court.
19 See ICC-ASP/8/2/Add.3, Report of the Bureau on the Establishment of an Independent 
Oversight Mechanism, 4 November 2009, accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/E603F5B0-F342-4A25-A792-8947AAC8ABDC/0/ICCASP82Add3ENG.pdf
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5.1.2 The Trust Fund for Victims and a Strategy for their rights
The Rome Statute provided that the Court’s legislative body, the ASP should 
create a Trust Fund for the benefit of victims of crimes falling under the 
jurisdiction of the Court. The Court can order money and other property 
collected through fines or forfeiture or orders of reparations against a con-
victed perpetrator to be transferred into and distributed by the Trust Fund 
for Victims (TFV). The special target groups of the Trust Fund’s assistance 
efforts are the victims of sexual violence, former child soldiers and abducted 
children, the families of murder victims and victims of other brutal crimes, 
and victimized villages. The Fund’s assets are mainly used for the physical 
and psychological rehabilitation of victims. The Fund may also pay victims 
damages or other reparations by virtue of a decision given by the ICC dur-
ing a trial. Initiatives for assistance projects come directly from target areas 
approved by the ICC. At present, a number of projects are under way in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and in Uganda. The intention is to expand 
the scope of activities to the Central African Republic and to Sudan (Darfur). 
The volume of the funds used for assistance comes as voluntary donations 
from States. The donations can also be made, for instance, by corporations, 
private individuals and organizations. The Court may also order that fines 
or other assets obtained would be transferred to the Trust Fund.
The ASP established the Trust Fund in 2002 and a five member Board of 
Directors to oversee its activities.20 The States Parties have been grouped 
into geographical areas, each of which has a representative on the Board of 
Directors of the Trust Fund for Victims. The Board’s principal task is to guide 
the Trust Fund’s activities and allocation of resources and to coordinate and 
oversee assistance projects. The Board reports to the Assembly of States 
Parties. In 2004, a Trust Fund Secretariat was created as part of the Court’s 
Registry, funded by the Court’s regular budget, and not out of the funds it 
holds for the benefit of victims.21 In 2005 the ASP adopted the Trust Fund 
Regulations, and the Trust Fund began its operations in 2007. Since 2006, 
the Assembly of States Parties requested the Court to work further in the 
development of the strategic plan with regard to the “position of victims”.22 
The Trust Fund has started implementing projects to provide physical and 
psychological assistance and material support to victims. Over 34 projects 
in DRC and Uganda were approved by the Pre-Trial Chambers in 2009.23 
According to a recent submission filed with Pre-Trial Chamber II, the Fund 
20 ICC-ASP/1/Res.6. The ASP may, as and when the workload of the Trust Fund increases, 
create an expanded capacity, including the appointment of an Executive Director, and “as 
part of such consideration…consider the payment of expenses of the Trust Fund from 
the voluntary contribution accruing to it. An Executive Director was appointed in 2006.
21 ICC-ASP/3/Res.7. Establishment of the Secretariat of the Trust Fund for Victims, 10 Septem-
ber 2004, paras 2 and 4.
22 ICC-ASP/5/Res.2, Strategic Planning Process of the Court, para. 3.
23 See the Regulation 50 of the Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims.
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also plans to initiate assistance projects in CAR. This assistance is different 
by the judicial decisions on awards falling under victims’ reparations. The 
ICC-ASP/8/45 is the Report of the Court on the strategy in relation to the 
victims. The NGOs were critical on the draft strategy prepared in the course 
of 2008. The NGOs considered that it was a merely descriptive document 
which failed to set concrete objectives and strategies. Following the recom-
mendations made by the seventh session of the ASP (ICC-ASP/7/Res.3, 
Strengthening the ICC and the ASP), the Court continued to work on the docu-
ment with a view to its finalization and presentation to the next sessions 
of the ASP. The political approach given in 2009 is that such a strategy still 
lacks on security issues and participation of victims into the proceedings, 
including notification obligations, protection measures and relocation pro-
grams. This means the need to establish an additional organ dealing with 
such matters. With regard to the reparations, which focused mainly on assis-
tance projects implemented by the Trust Fund for some years, this does not 
address thoroughly how the Court will implement its reparations mandate.
The implementation of these projects has been ongoing in the last years. Vic-
tims have seen in the Rome Statute an unprecedented recognition of rights 
but the development of a comprehensive strategy is still in progress. The 
ASP will need to support the Court in such important implementation of 
victims’ rights. The Trust Fund faces challenges inherent to a new and sui 
generis institutions working in on-going conflicts. Resuming the recommen-
dations addressed by civil societies organizations during the Eight Session 
of the ASP in November 2009 three main points amongst others are extreme-
ly important: a) ensure greater transparency and visibility of the Trust Fund, 
both among international actors and potential beneficiaries; b) continue to 
devise and implement fundraising strategies; c) exercise effective oversight 
over the Trust Fund Secretariat and ensure appropriate coordination with 
other organs of the Court, especially considering the preparations that must 
be undertaken in view of the first reparations awards.24
Victims’ rights were not fully taken into consideration by previous inter-
national criminal tribunals. The lessons learned from those tribunals deter-
mined the drafters of the Rome Statute to give a privileged position to vic-
tims before the Court (participation and reparation). The consideration of 
the interest of victims is at the heart of the Rome Statute. The success of 
the Court will be measured by its ability to develop and fully implement 
its mandate with respect to victims. Victims continue to show interest in 
the Court’s proceedings and to participate actively in them. The first trial 
has seen the participation of 105 victims. Over 350 victims will participate 
in the Katanga and Ngudjolo trial (DRC). For CAR, 34 victims participated 
24 See FIDH, “Victims and TFV: Providing Physical and Psychological Assistance and 
Material Support to Victims, and Preparing for the First Reparations Award”, in Recom-
mendations to the Eight Session of the ASP, November 2009, n. 532a, pp. 12-13.
190 Part II  The Governance of Complementary Global Regimes: Challenges, Obstacles and Concerns
in the confirmation of charges hearing against Bemba, and 78 did so in the 
Abu Garda hearing. While these are exciting developments, the Court must 
continue to work hard in order to make victim participation truly meaning-
ful. The development of an adequate victims’ strategy is essential for that to 
happen. In addition, meaningful participation of victims in the proceedings 
requires increased efforts for adequate legal representation.
5.1.3 An effective system of criminal justice
The institutional overview offered in this section indicates that the features 
of international criminal law are only one element moving forward the effec-
tiveness of the emerging regime of international criminal justice centralizing 
victims’ rights. While empirical reports would try to measure such effective-
ness, new rules are necessary harmonizing the interactions of international 
governance institutions in order to maximize the results on the ground in 
conflict and post-conflict situations. Being effective is generally understood 
as having the quality of producing a desired or intended result, but the 
fight against the impunity of mass atrocity crimes is only at its initial stage 
of delivering results. The empowerment of an independent judicial chan-
nel balancing powers in the international legal order requires the imple-
mentation of interactions between complementary global regimes. The role 
of international governance institutions is fundamental in order to define 
areas of improvement in the institution building of complementary man-
dates involved in the administration of international criminal justice. Their 
involvement will need a well defined delimitation of competences, resource 
allocations and legal harmonization of administrative matters, including 
objectives and strategies with regard to their respective mandates in conflict 
and post-conflict situations. The purpose is to ensure that domestic legal sys-
tems, and other regional legal arrangements to which they are party, have 
the jurisdiction and the capacity to effectively prosecute international crimes 
or to extradite the suspects of such crimes.
This section clarified the competence and responsibility of the different insti-
tutions within the Rome Statute system. In particular, the capacity-building 
of the political and managerial channel of the Assembly of the States Parties 
(ASP) supposed to implement measures of assistance in the judicial systems 
of the member States and the rule of law sectors, profiting of the partnerships 
with the UN system in order to promote reforms in the post-conflict phase 
in domestic systems, preserving the security of individuals and the rule of 
law sectors (army, police and judiciary). In addition to the basic requirement 
of legal assistance, the ASP should develop a monitoring activity of national 
implementations of the Rome Statute provisions in national parliaments and 
constitutions, including their impact in domestic governance systems. Fur-
ther political reach in regional realities is also required, integrating emerging 
public authorities and institutions engaged in the fight against the impu-
nity of international crimes. The Trust Fund is the instrument to centralize 
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the rehabilitation and reparation of victims after long judicial proceedings. 
The Trust Fund needs a stronger commitment from all member States, global 
actors and relevant stakeholders. The UN remains of course one of the most 
relevant actors in order to promote country-specific programming activi-
ties of development in communities affected by war and crime, especially 
after the outcomes of an international judiciary assessing the truth in situa-
tions on a case-by-case basis, and which would require further assistance in 
domestic governance systems for the sake of order and sustainable peace. 
Humanitarian crisis and the impunity of serious human rights breaches 
have influenced the evolution of the rule of international policy and law 
developing multilateral tools for preventive, retributive and restorative justice. 
In order to fulfil the gaps between complementary but independent global 
mandates dealing with peace, justice and security, legislative adjustments 
and harmonization of laws are necessary. At this moment in time, the rela-
tionship between the United Nations and the Court has been established by 
secondary law, which is discussed in the next session.
5.2  The Institutional Liaison and the Relationship Agreement 
between the Court and the United Nations
Section Outline
In order to approach the causes of international threats and crimes with 
democratic tools, decision-makers need to focus on interaction strategies 
between complementary global actors. There are no doubts that the inter-
action between the United Nations and the Rome Statute system is a new 
phenomenon which needs implementation at institutional, procedural and 
operational levels. In order to deliver optimized results in the field where 
both mandates are involved, the UN operational support during peace 
operations to the Court needs attention. After the empirical analysis of the 
UN peacekeeping operations and their transition into peace-building in con-
flict and post-conflict situations, it can be concluded that the reconstruction 
phase can be effective in the field only by supporting new actors committed 
to peace and justice. The domestic realities in phase of reconstruction can 
only benefit of the UN peace-building when these are able to support other 
fundamental actors involved in such process of reconstruction improving 
human security. The Court of course is definitely one of these actors.25 In 
order to have an understanding on the further implementation of the inter-
action necessary between the Court and the United Nations, this section 
clarifies the legal instruments currently at disposition, including the inter-
institutional matters and liaison between the organizations. The purpose is 
to identify methods for a better relationship, cooperation and partnership in 
the regime of international criminal justice.
25 For the debate see M. Doyle, N. Sambanis, ‘War-Making, Peacebuilding, and the United 
Nations’, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, 2006, at 23.
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The relationship agreement between the Court and the United Nations 
envisages a number of ways in which each of the organs of the Court can 
cooperate with the United Nations and its organs, funds and programmes. 
Continued and active interface between the Court and the Security Council, 
inter alia with regard to referrals pursuant to article 13 of the Rome Statute, 
will be necessary. An analysis of the many functional and administrative 
links envisaged between the organs of the Court and the United Nations sys-
tem strongly confirms the need to implement such relationship between the 
two entities. Since the relocation of the ASP Secretariat to The Hague, there 
can be no doubt that the absence of official and effective contacts, if allowed 
to continue, between the Court and the United Nations will adversely affect 
the working relationship between the two entities. The liaison office of the 
Court to the United Nations represented a positive accomplishment.
5.2.1 The inter-institutional liaison
With regard to the inter-institutional liaison an important contribution to the 
ICC-UN interaction came from the establishment of the ICC New York UN 
Liaison Office, for a number of reasons.26 The Rome Statute institutions (the 
Court, the ASP and the TFV) sitting in The Hague are geographically remote 
from the Headquarters of the United Nations in New York. It was crucial to 
ensure that this geographical distance would not lead to the development of 
political and legal distance. To prevent the impact of such inter-institutional 
decentralization, the Court established a presence in New York, not only to 
keep the Rome Statute and its institutions on the international agenda, but 
also to reinforce the role of the Rome Statute institutions collectively, as an 
essential, dynamic and developing element of the international mosaic of 
peace and justice. In addition to these political reasons, there were strong 
practical and logistical justifications for having such a presence in New 
York. New York is and will remain the centre of international relations and 
diplomatic negotiations. New York-based representatives of States Parties 
are most likely to continue to be responsible for servicing the ASP meetings 
in The Hague. Indeed, almost all least developed and developing countries 
have representation in New York (as opposed to The Hague) at a level that 
allows them to follow closely the work of the Court. The next achievement 
for the Court would be to have support offices in regional organizations 
including the important requirement of focal points at ministerial level 
within the domestic governance structure by all States Parties.
26 See ICC-ASP/3/6(2004), “Desirability of a New York Offi ce”, in Establishment of a New 
York Liaison Offi ce for the International Criminal Court and the Secretariat of the Assembly 
of States Parties, p. 2, accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-3-6_
New_York_liaison_offi ce_English.pdf See the Report of the Committee on Budget and 
Finance on the Work of its Fifth Session, ICC-ASP/4/27, para.104.Offi cial Records of the 
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Fifth ses-
sion, The Hague, 23 November to 1 December 2006 (International Criminal Court publica-
tion, ICC-ASP/5/32), part II, D.6 (a).
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The value of developing direct contacts in various agencies of the United 
Nations is an important implementation issue. Now that the Court has 
entered its operational phase after the first decade of existence, a closer 
working relationship with the United Nations system is increasingly impor-
tant. Although the Court is an independent entity, it was born out of the UN 
system and their interaction will provide a permanent basis for a continuing 
relationship and information-sharing between the two organizations, while 
respecting their autonomy and confidentiality regime. Some of the most 
relevant UN agencies that may assist the Court under a more structured 
cooperation agreement include the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Special 
Adviser on Genocide and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Other part-
ners would be the other offices of the UN responsible for the overall coordi-
nation of the rule of law activities at international level such as the Depart-
ment of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO), the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Development Fund for Women 
(UNIFEM) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 
Most importantly, the UN humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, espe-
cially in conflict areas where atrocities are being committed, should pro-
vide the Court with vital information and services needed to achieve the 
Court’s goals. The cooperation agreement with the peacekeeping should 
also facilitate Court’s requests for testimony from UN officials, although the 
preference would be to have harmonization of such agreements with more 
detailed provisions on security issues of the Court’s field offices. In the area 
of information sharing and MONUC, the practice indicates that the UN con-
fidentiality regime brought some issues with consequences on the delay of 
DRC’s proceedings (Prosecutor vs. Lubanga).27
5.2.2 The ICC-UN Relationship Agreement
Pursuant to Article 2 of the Rome Statute in 2004 the Secretary General of the 
UN and the President of the ICC signed an agreement that provides for the 
structure of the relationship between these international governance insti-
tutions.28 The UN-ICC Relationship Agreement which entered into force 
27 See Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by 
Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, 
together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008 No. 
ICC-01704-01/06, 13 June 2008, accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-
01-04-01-06-1401-ENG.pdf
28 See Rome Statute Part I, Establishment of the Court. Article 2, Relationship of the Court 
with the United Nations. The Court shall be brought into relationship with the United 
Nations through an agreement to be approved by the Assembly of States Parties to this 
Statute and thereafter concluded by the President of the Court on its behalf. See Rome 
Statute accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/offi cialjournal/Rome_Stat-
ute_English.pdf
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upon signature recognizes the mandates and independence of both insti-
tutions, defines the scope of their relationship, and outlines the conditions 
under which the UN and the ICC cooperate.29 This relationship, as elabo-
rated in the agreement, deals with both institutional issues and matters per-
taining to judicial assistance and institutional cooperation. In this regard, it 
includes, inter alia, issues like the participation of the ICC in the capacity of 
observer in the UN General Assembly; exchange of information provisions; 
the obligation to consult each other on matters of mutual interest; exchange 
of representatives and high officials; administrative cooperation issues; the 
provision of conference services on a reimbursable basis; financial matters; 
and the possibility for certain ICC officials to use the UN laissez-passer as a 
valid travel document to the missions in the field. Concerning judicial assis-
tance, the UN, in accordance with the Agreement and its Charter, agrees to 
cooperate with the Court whenever the latter requests the testimony of an 
official of the United Nations or of one of its programs, funds or offices. The 
Agreement also addresses issues pertaining to the waiver of privileges and 
immunities of UN officials as well as the protection of the content of docu-
mentation rendered to the UN by States or intergovernmental organizations 
on a confidential basis.30 Article 18 of the Agreement sets out the terms of 
cooperation between the United Nations and the Office of the Prosecutor 
(OTP). The UN undertakes to cooperate with the OTP in particular when the 
Prosecutor exercises his or her duties and powers with respect to an investi-
gation and seeks the cooperation of the United Nations pursuant to Article 
54 of the Rome Statute. Such cooperation will consist mainly of the exchange 
of information for the purpose of generating new evidence, which can be 
subject to conditions of confidentiality of the information, protection of per-
sons and security of any operation or activity of the UN.
a) The Procedural matters
As noted above, Article 1 contains the purpose of the Relationship Agree-
ment “the present Agreement, which is entered into by the United Nations 
and the International Criminal Court, pursuant to the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations (“the Charter”) and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (“the Statute”) respectively, defines the terms 
on which the United Nations and the Court shall be brought into relation-
ship. The agreement contains 23 articles, divided into IV parts.31 Part III 
of the ICC-UN relationship agreement refers to the cooperation and judi-
29 See ICC-ASP/3/Res.1, Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International 
Criminal Court and the United Nations, Source: ASP/UN, Adoption: 04.10.2004 , acces-
sible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-3-Res1_English.pdf
30 On the issue see P. C. Szasz, T. Ingadottir, ‘The UN and the ICC: The immunity of the UN 
and its Offi cials’, (2001) 14 LJIL 867, at 885.
31 Preamble; I. General provisions (Articles 1-3); II. Institutional relations (Articles 4-14); 
III. Cooperation and judicial assistance (Articles 15-20); IV. Final provisions (Articles 
21-23). See the Relationship Agreement between the ICC and the UN accessible at: 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-3-Res1_English.pdf
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cial assistance, and contains the general provisions regarding cooperation 
between the UN and the Court. “With due regard to its responsibilities and 
competence under the Charter and subject to its rules as defined under the 
applicable international law, the UN undertakes to cooperate with the Court 
and to provide to the Court such information or documents as the Court 
may request pursuant to article 87, paragraph 6, of the Rome Statute”.32 
Article 17 regulates the cooperation between the Security Council and the 
ICC. When the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations, decides to refer to the Prosecutor “a situation in which 
one or more of the crimes referred to in article 5 of the Statute appears to 
have been committed, the UN Secretary General would transmit the deci-
sion to the Prosecutor together with documents and any other material that 
may be pertinent to the decision of the Council. The Court will keep the 
Security Council informed in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence”.33 This cooperation contains also the procedure to apply when the 
Security Council adopts a resolution requesting the Court not to commence 
or proceed with an investigation or prosecution under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. The Court will, where a matter has been referred to the Court 
by the Security Council, communicate any failure by a State to cooperate 
with the ICC. Article 18 of the agreement regulates the cooperation of the 
UN with the ICC Prosecutor on exchange of information.34
b) The Agreement provisions
The preamble of the relationship agreement between the ICC and the UN 
recalls the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In 
this light the Rome Statute, also in its preamble, reaffirms both purposes and 
principles of the UN Charter. The ICC-UN relationship agreement resumes 
the role assigned to the ICC in “dealing with the most serious crimes of con-
cern to the international community as a whole, as referred to in the Rome 
Statute and which threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world”. 
Furthermore, it clarifies the independence of the ICC from the UN system, 
and provides for an institutional interaction between the two organiza-
tions. The conclusion is that within the general provisions of the relationship 
agreement, the obligation of cooperation and coordination of the arrest war-
rants from the Security Council would be the part that needs some attention 
in the years still to come.
32  See Article 15, Relationship Agreement between the ICC and the UN. Article 87 (6) Rome 
Statute: “The Court may ask any intergovernmental organization to provide information 
or documents. The Court may also ask for other forms of cooperation and assistance 
which may be agreed upon with such an organization and which are in accordance with 
its competence or mandate”.
33 See Article 17, Relationship Agreement between the ICC and the UN, Cooperation 
between the UNSC and the ICC.
34 See Article 18, Relationship Agreement between the ICC and the UN Cooperation 
between the UNSC and the Prosecutor.
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The second part of the relationship agreement contains the institutional rela-
tions between the ICC and the UN. Article 4 refers to the reciprocal repre-
sentation. The Court “may attend and participate in the work of the General 
Assembly of the UN in the capacity as observer”, while the UN Secretary 
General shall have a standing invitation to attend public hearings of the 
Chambers of the Court “that relate to cases of interest to the United Nations 
and any public meeting of the Court”. Listing some areas of mutual interests 
it would also give more specification to the personnel arrangements and its 
presence on the ground, which seems to be a matter of concern, due to the 
fact that this is regulated by an additional treaty. In fact “strive for maxi-
mum cooperation in order to achieve the most efficient use of specialized 
personnel, systems and services” would mean to use specific training of staff 
involved in the ICC field office operations and in areas where there would 
be a need of exchange of expertise and intelligence.35 This would of course 
facilitate the gathering process of information and evidence and speed up 
the investigative activity. After all the UN peace operations on the ground 
and the political affairs department for country and situation specifics, is a 
useful tool for the ICC situation analysis. This would surely avoid dupli-
cations, at least sharing the general country background (statistics, military 
and factual data in ongoing conflicts), receiving information of the leader-
ship of the specific State monitored under UN premises would be then part 
of the evidence gathering of the ICC. Administrative cooperation, services 
and facilities, access to the UN Headquarters and laissez-passer procedures 
fall in the agreement. Article 13 contains no mandatory financial responsibil-
ity of the UN. Agreement on costs and expenses resulting from cooperation 
shall be subject to separate arrangements between the UN and the Court.36 
In brief, the UN needs to provide critical support to the ICC based on its 
relationship agreement. Member States are encouraged to ratify the Rome 
Statute without delay and to cooperate with the Court. This relationship will 
need to be implemented.
5.3 The United Nations and the pursuit of complementarity
Section Outline
At this stage the advocacy expressed in this study should be clear. It recalls 
the necessity of concrete actions incorporating justice between the peace 
and security operations of the UN and the necessary support needed by the 
Court (judicial assistance, logistical support, security of field offices, reloca-
tion of witness and victims, law enforcement of judicial decisions, includ-
ing the security of staff and assets). According to the theory that sustain-
35 See Article 8, Relationship Agreement between the ICC and the UN, accessible at: 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-3-Res1_English.pdf
36 See Part II; Article 4 – 14, Institutional Relations, Relationship Agreement between the 
ICC and the UN.
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able peace at domestic level is only feasible through justice establishing the 
truth, the Court’s role in peace operations (peace-making, peace-keeping 
and peace-building) will need to be legally clarified in the years to come. The 
Court is indeed an important actor deserving such support when investiga-
tions and prosecutions are taking place during ongoing conflict situations, 
including the assistance on security issues for witnesses and victims (pro-
tection, relocation, participation, reparation). At institutional and operation-
al levels and in order to provide such support to the Court the interaction 
between the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the political and legal affairs depart-
ments of the UN will need to strengthen their cooperation efforts.
The implementation of the interaction between the Court and the United 
Nations will only be possible towards a strong political support of State 
and non-State actors. Although both organizations are currently active in 
the same situations which are all characterized by judicial referrals, their 
interaction is left to further normative definition and harmonization in the 
peace building operations. Attention is needed to avoid duplications, com-
petition and lack of support between these mandates which are currently 
only shaped in memorandum of understanding between the Court and the 
UN peace operations in the field. For cooperation in relation to the DRC, 
a specific memorandum of understanding (MoU) was agreed between the 
Court and the UN concerning cooperation between the UN mission in DRC 
(MONUC) and the Court. The MoU was concluded as a supplementary 
arrangement within the general framework of cooperation set out in the 
Relationship Agreement (ICC/ASP/3/15). The MoU provides for a range of 
assistance measures to the ICC from MONUC/MONUSCO, including the 
area of logistical support and judicial assistance.37 As previously discussed, 
the reasons of the delay of finding appropriate remedies for such interac-
tions in conflict and post-conflict situations, is to be found in the consider-
ations about the status of reforms in the UN peace operations and the further 
commitment of the decision makers to optimize results on these sensitive 
governance issues.38 In order to offer an overview of the priorities, in the 
interaction model proposed between complementary global mandates, 
complementing the Court’s regime with the United Nations peace opera-
tions, this section recalls the recommendations on the concept of restorative 
justice in peace building operations; the “lessons learned” addressed to the 
37 See the Report of the International Criminal Court to the UNGA, UN Doc. A/61/217, 3 
August 2006, para. 47.
38 At institutional level the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) just cre-
ated in 2007 the Offi ce of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) to provide an 
integrated and forward-looking approach to United Nations post-confl ict assistance in 
the areas of rule of law and security institutions. Such offi ce brings together the following 
DPKO entities: the Police Division (PD), the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reinte-
gration (DDR) Section, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the Security 
Sector Reform (SSR) Unit and the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service (CLJAS).
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decision makers of governments in peace operations; the Court’s potential, 
and the indispensable enforcement of its judicial decisions in the field opera-
tions. In line with an harmonization model of complementary mandates any 
State or individual would be responsible of any action in the field, where 
relocation, protection of refugees, victims and witnesses, security and risk 
assessments will need a well-defined strategy of interactions between these 
actors (agencies, funds, programs of the UN system and the Court). General 
rules respecting statutory matters are necessary to define a normative cluster 
of support by the UN peace operations to the Court, where interdependent 
tasks from both sides will need to bring visible results in conflict and post-
conflict situations.
Besides, in order to verify the feasibility of the necessary support expect-
ed by the UN to the Court in the short, middle and long terms, this sec-
tion recalls first the controversial issue of peacekeepers and the necessity 
of implementing internal justice systems related to the UN peacekeeping 
operations on the ground, solving the lacuna of accountability, transpar-
ency and integrity. It also reports about the Court’s political rejection on one 
side, and on the UN efforts incorporating international criminal justice in 
the context of peace and security maintenance on the other. The legislative 
and reporting activity between the UN institutions regarding the Court, the 
Court’s reports to the General Assembly and Security Council includes the 
last developments at institutional level in the area of peacekeeping opera-
tions in order to verify the readiness of such tools assisting important actors 
such as the Court. The last paragraph approaches the theories of eminent 
scholars about restorative justice in peace building operations. The purpose 
of this section is to bring attention on the definition of a clear strategy imple-
menting the relationship and partnership of the UN and the Court fostering 
peace, justice and security.
5.3.1 The background of peace operations
The so-called ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention has been one of the most 
controversial foreign policy issues of the last two decades both when inter-
vention has happened, as in Kosovo, and when it has failed to happen, as 
in Rwanda. With the advent of the new century, shortly after the release of 
the UN-commissioned reports on the 1995 massacres at Srebrenica and on 
the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the administrative leadership of the United 
Nations determined that the peace operations needed serious re-evaluation 
“with a view to minimizing as far as possible the likelihood of such tragedies 
occurring again in the future”.39 The Secretary-General, in his report to the 
General Assembly at the beginning of the new century, challenged the inter-
39 UN doc. A/55/305, UN doc. S/2000/809, for an overview of the Report of the Panel 
on United Nations Peace Operations accessible at: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/
peace_operations/
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national community to try to forge consensus, once and for all, around the 
basic questions of principle and process involved, specifically “when should 
intervention occur, under whose authority, and how”. The same approach and 
policy trend is visible with regard to the relationship between peace and jus-
tice. In the report of the Secretary-General entitled The Rule of Law and Tran-
sitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies it is emphasized that “the 
question can never be whether to pursue justice or peace, but rather when and 
how”.40 Such controversial issues are still waiting to be clarified. It is hoped 
that this analysis will contribute not only to the debate about law versus poli-
tics, but also on the elevation of law over power politics, against old models 
of conflict management, national security and protection of human rights.41 
Many observers would see the Court as an enforcement mechanism to be 
associated with post-conflict assessments preventing further crimes, violence 
and instability, taking a specific role into the state-building activity initiated 
by the reform of domestic security institutions (army, police and judiciary). 
The problem is that the Court is involved during armed conflicts with poor 
resources and assistance and only once political transitions have already 
failed in the way of reaching sustainable stability.42 This study simply veri-
fies whether the interaction between complementary global regimes would 
represent the opportunity for a progress of international law in situations of 
war and crime, with measures and perhaps new institutions dealing with the 
protection of victims and witnesses. The implementation of the relationship 
between such complementary global regimes should be settled by the politi-
cal premises enforcing them, while their partnership further strengthen by 
agreements and arrangements between international governance institutions 
on a case-by-case basis. The protection of human rights, the fight against the 
impunity and the domestic governance of human security are the factors for 
40 UN doc. S/2004/616, para. 21.
41 For an overview of prosecution of human rights crimes on the national and interna-
tional level and a new demand for accountability and the universal jurisdiction of the 
ICC, see W. Kaleck ‘et al’, International Prosecution of Human Rights Crimes, (2006), at 5. 
See also An Agenda for Peace, the report written for the UNSC by the Secretary-General 
in 1992, introducing the concept of “post-confl ict peacebuilding”, defi ned as an “action 
to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in 
order to avoid a relapse into confl ict”. See B. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, UN 
doc. A/47/277 – S/24111, II.21, 17 June 1992, accessible at: http://www.unrol.org/
fi les/A_47_277.pdf See also J. S. Sutterlin, “An Agenda for Peace: Fifteen Years Later”, in 
Disarmament Times, August 2007, accessible at: http://disarm.igc.org/index.php?view=
category&id=59%3Adt2007fall&option=com_content&Itemid=2
42 Court’s offi cials constantly underline such lack of international cooperation. Right at the 
beginning of the Review Conference of the Rome Statute in Kampala the President of 
the Court stated: “Every year, the Assembly of the States Parties looks at the Court and 
how it is functioning. But the Court is only a small part of this system. Without coopera-
tion, there will be no arrests, victims and witnesses will not be protected, and proceed-
ings will not be possible”. See Judge Sang-Hyun Song, President of the International 
Criminal Court, Opening Remarks of the Review Conference, 31 March 2010, accessible at: 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/Statements/ICC-RC-statements-
JudgeSong-ENG.pdf
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the preservation of order in difficult political transitions. The links between 
human development and sustainable models of governance at national, 
regional and international levels are the keys in accordance with democratic 
principles and open societies. The basic parameters of civilization have to be 
preserved at all costs respecting the principle of self-determination, but also 
the interdependence between regimes at domestic, regional and international 
levels. The ideal would be the progress in the constitution of the world com-
munity and a regulatory framework dealing with peace and justice with an 
integrated model of governance.
In the theoretical background of peace operations according to the English 
school and by some other international relations theorists of international 
conflict management, the categories of peace support operations have been 
categorized in conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement and peace-building. The first categories of such operations 
focus on identifying the causes of conflicts and preventing their occurrence, 
persistence or resumption through military presence, while the second cat-
egory operates through diplomacy, ceasefire agreement or peace settlement 
to bring an end to violence. The peacekeeping relies on military forces and 
police operating with host consent of the national authorities to underpin 
a peace settlement or ceasefire agreement. The peace enforcement implies 
force used coercively to get compliance with agreements, impose a peace 
agreement, or protect civilians from hostilities. Peace-building operations 
support long term regeneration of war-torn societies establishing sustain-
able peace through institutional, judicial, military, economic and political 
capacity-building.43
The military role of peacekeeping has once more been dramatically reaf-
firmed in the last decades. The empirical data resulting from wide ranging 
conflict study, and the analysis of lessons learnt from past operations such as 
those in Rwanda and Somalia, in Kosovo, East Timor and in the DRC indicate 
that either prevention or peace-building strategies repeatedly failed in the 
context of offering sustainable peace. Another concern is that old models of 
conflict management by peacekeeping do not receive appropriate configura-
tions in conflict and post-conflict situations in order to serve the emerging 
regime of international criminal justice dealing with mass atrocity crimes. 
Such an approach is quite controversial as the peace enforcement resolutions 
by the Security Council (under Chapter VII) are all characterized by serious 
breaches of international humanitarian law and human rights law. This polit-
ical trend represents the evident consequence of the decision-making reject-
ing the use of multinational forces for the sake of justice; whether from a legal 
perspective the individuals involved in peace operations would also have 
immunity status by the emerging regime of international criminal justice.
43 See A. Linklater, H. Suganami, The English School of International Relations, 2006, at 8.
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The independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sov-
ereignty was established by the Government of Canada, shortly after the 
UN-commissioned reports to respond to the challenges of humanitarian 
intervention.44 In regard to the chronology of peace enforcement and the 
assessments of civil conflicts characterized by ethnic violence as in Kosovo, 
Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, international humanitarian 
intervention emphasised the challenges for the UN peacemaking role and 
the maintenance of collective security. The UN Secretary-General convened 
an international panel to conduct a major study on the United Nations peace 
operations chaired by the Under Secretary-General and former Algerian 
Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi. The panel was tasked to conduct a wide 
ranging study and analysis over lessons learnt from past peace and security 
operations from preventive to post-conflict peace building, including obser-
vation missions, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Confronted with 
the problems encountered by peacekeeping forces, the Security Council did 
not establish any operation in the late nineties. The inaction of the Security 
Council was indeed the consequence of humanitarian disasters and also of 
military intervention of States or coalitions guided by unilateral strategic 
interests. Continuing crises in the DRC, the Central African Republic, East 
Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia-Eritrea, successively led the Secu-
rity Council to establish six new missions in 1998-2000.45
In the practice the UN missions of the last decade, especially in sub-Saharan 
African countries, have been characterized by comprehensive mandates and 
multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Lately, the humanitarian pro-
tection duties of civilians would allow intervention, peace enforcement and 
the use of force. A regulatory system of governance of such sensitive issues 
is nearly inexistent. For some observers the operational character of such 
interventions should follow configurations and engagements in the form of 
international police of multinational nature, assisting international inves-
tigations and prosecutions of recognized international crimes.46 In theory, 
the UN tried to clarify the right of humanitarian intervention through the 
duty to protect civilians when the States would fail in their own responsibili-
ties, while the practice displays several overlaps. In the Sudan, UNMIS was 
not able to deploy to Darfur due to the government’s steadfast opposition 
to a peacekeeping operation undertaken solely by the UN as envisaged in 
Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006). The UN then embarked on an alter-
native and innovative approach to stabilize the region through the phased 
strengthening of AMIS, before transfer of authority to a joint AU/UN peace-
44 For an overview of the report see ‘The Responsibility To Protect” accessible at: http://
www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf
45 For an overview see the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Background Note, 30 
November 2007, accessible at: http://www.un.org/Dpts/dpko/bnote.htm
46 G. Day, C. Freeman, “Operationalizing the Responsibility To Protect. The Policekeeping 
Approach”, 11 Global Governance 2, 2005, at 139.
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keeping operation. Following prolonged and intensive negotiations with 
the government of the Sudan and significant international pressure, the 
government accepted the peacekeeping operation in Darfur. Successively, 
the Security Council by its Resolution 1769 (2007), authorized the estab-
lishment of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur 
(UNAMID).47 With regard to the controversial policy issue of civilian pro-
tection duties, political consensus has been emphasized several times at the 
UN on the mechanisms of humanitarian interventions, including the issue 
of public authority of the Security Council to authorize it.48 The eventual 
evolution from the ‘right’ to intervene in intra-state conflicts to the ‘respon-
sibility’ to protect deserve implementation of policy and law especially with 
regard to the operations in the field by complementary mandates.
In the DRC, unanimously adopting Resolution 1925 (2010) under Chapter VII 
of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council decided that MONUS-
CO, the new version of MONUC’s mandate, would be deployed further, 
authorizing to concentrate its military forces in eastern DRC while keeping a 
reserve force capable of redeploying rapidly elsewhere. The Security Coun-
cil decided that MONUSCO would comprise, in addition to the appropriate 
civilian, judiciary and correction components, a maximum of 19,815 military 
personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 members of 
formed police units. Future reconfigurations of MONUSCO would be deter-
mined as the situation evolved on the ground, including: the completion of 
ongoing military operations in North and South Kivu as well as Orientale 
provinces; improved government capacity to protect the population effec-
tively; and the consolidation of State authority throughout the territory.49 
Emphasizing that the protection of civilians must be given priority, the Secu-
rity Council authorized MONUSCO to use all necessary means to carry out its 
protection mandate, including the effective protection of civilians, humani-
tarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of phys-
47 The African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur, referred to by its acronym UNA-
MID, was established on 31 July 2007 with the adoption of Security Council resolution 
1769 (S/RES/1769, adopted by the Security Council at its 5727th meeting, on 31 July 
2007) . On 31 July 2008, the Security Council extended UNAMID’s mandate for a further 
12 months to 31 July 2009 and then again on 6 August 2009, for a further 12 months to 
31 July 2010. UNAMID has the protection of civilians as its core mandate, but is also 
tasked with contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verify-
ing implementation of agreements, assisting an inclusive political process, contributing 
to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and monitoring and reporting on 
the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). For 
an overview of the mandate, see Protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian aid and 
helping political process in Darfur by UNAMID, accessible at: http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/missions/unamid/
48 T. G. Weiss, “The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in 
a Unipolar Era”, 2 Security Dialogue 2004, at 135.
49 For an overview of the nature of such comprehensive peacekeeping mandate see http://
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/mandate.shtml
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ical violence, as well as the protection of UN personnel, facilities, installations 
and equipment. The UN mission would also support government efforts to 
fight impunity and ensure the protection of civilians from violations of inter-
national human rights and humanitarian law, including all forms of sexual 
and gender-based violence. The support to the investigations and prosecu-
tions of the ICC is not detectable by the configuration of the peacekeeping 
mandate in the country, while the agreements and arrangements between 
peace operations and the Court are not maximizing the results on the ground.
5.3.2 Peacekeeping reforms and the accountability on the ground
On the top of the lack of credibility of humanitarian interventions and the 
issues of coordination, the reform of the UN peacekeeping with the pur-
pose of improving transparency, accountability and integrity is an on-going 
issue. As pointed out by Schwartz during his testimony before the US House 
International Relations Subcommittee on Africa (Global Human Rights, 
and International Organizations), “the United States and other members of 
the UN Security Council now regularly ask peacekeepers and their civilian 
counterparts to remake societies coming out of internal conflict: negotiat-
ing peace agreements; reforming security sectors and operations; promoting 
political reconciliation and effective and democratic governance; rebuild-
ing domestic systems of justice. The activity by the DPKO started a process 
of recent reconstruction with the aim of developing an “exit strategy” for 
peacekeeping, working closely with partners to ensure a bridge from imme-
diate post-conflict situations towards long-term development. In the years to 
come the DPKO will need to focus on delivering efficient and effective peace 
operations by enhancing the partnerships it has established within and out-
side the UN system. This phase of reconstruction should focus on support-
ing the Court’s field offices.50 Moreover, in the absence of local capacity, UN 
troops and international civilian police have been asked to ensure public 
security in post-conflict environments, responding to threats while mentor-
ing and training local security forces”. Schwartz in his capacity of consultant 
in the US Council on Foreign Relations during his testimony at the Congress 
in 2005 underlined that the US administration must ensure effective peace-
keeping reforms, while sustaining support for UN activities that are critical 
not only to international peace and security, but also to US national integrity. 
According to Schwartz it is not possible to discuss seriously peacekeeping 
reform without addressing the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN 
peacekeepers in the DRC and in other UN operations. The attention on this 
issue by the Members of Congress and others is highly appropriate and criti-
cally important both because ending victimization is a humanitarian imper-
ative, and because an effective policy of ‘zero tolerance’ is essential to ensur-
50 For an overview see the portal of the Offi ce of Rule of Law and Security Institutions 
(OROLSI) accessible at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/orolsi.shtml
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ing the future credibility of the UN peace operations.51 The ideal should be 
to consider such forces on the ground as also at the disposition of the Court 
enforcing its judicial warrants, while being accountable of international 
crimes falling under the Rome Statute. For an overview of the debate on the 
mechanisms that need to be established in order to enable peace enforcers 
to arrest war criminals and of what lessons future peace enforcement mis-
sions can learn from the experience of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR, the views 
expressed by experts in peace, security and justice studies are extremely for-
mative for decision makers.52
During his testimony Schwartz recalls the issue of sexual exploitation and 
abuse by peacekeepers in some field operations in Africa, referring to the 
report of Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein to the Secretary-General, to 
advise him on this issue and prepare a public report with urgent recommen-
dations. Prince Zeid’s report described a range of shortcomings, including 
a mosaic of rules and regulations that create a lack of clarity such as: a) the 
absence of a system-wide commitment to investigation and, as appropri-
ate, punishment of members of military contingents; b) the absence of local 
enforcement capability for investigation and prosecution of civilian members 
of the UN missions; c) lack of resources, personnel and procedures for effec-
tive investigations, training, and interaction with local populations; and d) the 
absence of redress or compensation for victims. Finally, without seeking to 
excuse sexual exploitation and abuse, the report notes that “absence of orga-
nized recreational activities for troops can contribute to aberrant and unaccept-
able behavior”.53 From the recommendations settled in this report, account-
ability and integrity must be the two important elements for an appropriate 
reform of the UN peace operations. The Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) 
was formally established in the Department of Field Support in 2007 follow-
ing the initial formation of a Conduct and Discipline Team in the Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations which started its activity only a few years ago. It 
was launched as part of a package of reforms in UN peacekeeping designed 
to strengthen accountability and uphold the highest standards of conduct. The 
new content complies with a General Assembly resolution requesting “the 
51 See E. P. Schwartz, ‘UN Peacekeeping Reform: Seeking Greater Accountability and 
Integrity’, 2005, US Senate, Council on Foreign Relations, accessible at: http://www.cfr.
org/publication.html?id=8113 See UN Doc ST/SGB/2003/13, UN Secretary General’s 
Zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, in SGB, Secretary Generals 
Bulletin, Special measures on protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, 
2003. For an overview of the debate, see O. Simic, ‘Rethinking Sexual Exploitation in 
UN peacekeeping operations’, July-August 2009, Women’s Studies International Forum, 
Volume 32, Issue 4, pp. 288-295. See also UN News, UN team looking into alleged sexual 
misconduct by blue helmets in DRC, 2009, accessible at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsID=32857
52 See M. Lyck, ‘UN Peace Missions’ Involvement in Securing Justice and Transitional Jus-
tice’, Peace Operations and International Criminal Justice: Building Peace After Mass Atroci-
ties, 2009, 35 at 70.
53 See UN doc. A/59/710 (2005).
Chapter 5  The Governance Structure of Complementary Global Regimes and their Competence 205
implementation of an effective outreach programme to explain the policy of 
the UN against sexual exploitation and abuse, and to inform the public on 
the outcome of all such cases involving peacekeeping personnel, includ-
ing cases where allegations are ultimately found to be legally unproven.”54
5.3.3 Peacekeepers and the Court
The issue of peacekeepers and the role of the Court have been controversial 
since the first treaty negotiations. It can be said that this was an explicit rea-
son of the Court’s rejection by the US albeit that its resistance related par-
ticularly to the American peace soldiers. The Rome Statute contains many 
safeguards that would prevent the Court from pursuing politically motivated 
prosecutions against peacekeepers. The Court can only investigate the des-
ignated types of very serious crimes that fall within the Court’s jurisdiction, 
including crimes that are unlikely to be authorized or engaged in as part of 
any peacekeeping mission. The judicial decision by the Court to summon 
a rebel leader allegedly responsible for the killing of members of the Afri-
can Union peacekeeping forces in Darfur underscores the gravity of attacks 
against those deployed to protect civilians. The rebel commander Bahar 
Idriss Abu Garda appeared voluntarily before the ICC judges to respond 
to the summons related to such attacks on peacekeeping forces. The US is 
able to impede the ICC action by investigating any charges against American 
peacekeepers, even if it does not lead to prosecution. The American Service-
Members’ Protection Act (ASPA) was a federal law introduced by US Senator 
Jesse Helms as an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act and 
passed in August 2002 by Congress. The stated purpose of the amendment 
was “to protect the US military personnel and other elected and appointed 
officials of the US government against criminal prosecution by an Interna-
tional Criminal Court to which the US is not party”. Moreover, the UN status 
of forces agreements including troop contribution agreements applicable to 
peacekeeping missions, already provide for the US jurisdiction over many 
criminal offences committed by the US military and civilian members in host 
countries.55 This section is not intended to discuss the American national 
security policy and the reasons of its attacks to the Court, which are well 
known. However, it should be time to define the US role as non-State Party 
to the Rome Statute, hopefully characterized by the transition from “reject-
ing to supporting” the Court with concrete, visible and transparent actions.
54 See CDU portal accessible at: http://cdu.unlb.org/
55 For an overview of the practice of UN peacekeeping, in four detailed case studies on 
El Salvador, Cambodia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, see also, M. Katayanagi, 
Human Rights Functions of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, (2002). For an chron-
ological overview see, J. Washburn, Background on Peacekeeping and the ICC, AMICC, 
accessible at: http://www.iccnow.org/documents/FS-AMICC-Peacekeeping.pdf For 
an overview of the practice of UN peacekeeping, in four detailed case studies on El Sal-
vador, Cambodia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, see also, M. Katayanagi, Human 
Rights Functions of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, (2002).
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5.3.4 The challenges and opportunities
The reporting activity of the Secretary-General to the UN institutions, specif-
ically addressed to the Security Council, has been characterized by the neces-
sity of supporting the role of the Court since its establishment. In the report 
delivered to the Security Council “The rule of law and transitional justice in 
conflict and post-conflict societies” the Secretary-General noted that the Court 
offers new hope for a permanent reduction in the phenomenon of impunity 
and the further ratification of its Statute is thus to be encouraged. He stated: 
“…undoubtedly, the most significant recent development in the internation-
al community’s long struggle to advance the cause of justice and rule of law 
was the establishment of the International Criminal Court. The Rome Statute 
entered into force only on 1 July 2002, yet the Court is already having an 
important impact by putting would-be violators on notice that impunity is 
not assured and serving as a catalyst for enacting national laws against the 
gravest international crimes. It is now crucial that the international commu-
nity ensures that this nascent institution has the resources, capacities, infor-
mation and support it needs to investigate, prosecute and bring to trial those 
who bear the greatest responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and genocide, in situations where national authorities are unable or unwill-
ing to do so”.56
The Secretary-General continued: “The Security Council has a particular role 
to play in this regard, empowered as it is to refer situations to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, even in cases where the countries concerned are not 
States parties to the Statute of the Court. At the same time, all States Mem-
bers of the United Nations should move towards the ratification of the Rome 
Statute at the earliest possible opportunity”. Upon receipt of this report from 
the Secretary-General, the Security Council discussed the matters during 
the ministerial meeting “Justice and the rule of law: the United Nations role”.57 
Pleuger (the German representative during the UNSC meeting 5052) pointed 
out that the Secretary-General’s report, as thorough and thoughtful as it may 
be, is only the beginning of a long-term global agenda. Pleuger stated: “…
important and often difficult questions remain unresolved. Here, I am refer-
ring to policy questions such as the proper sequencing and timing of mea-
sures to promote peace, justice and reconciliation; to institutional questions 
such as the cooperation between the UN, notably the Security Council and 
the ICC; and to resource questions. With regard to the latter, action by the 
UN must be complemented by assistance that States make available to each 
other if a State is in need of certain capacities, materials or expertise. The 
Security Council will urge Member States that are able to do so to contribute 
national expertise and materials”. In his statement Pleuger makes clear that 
56 See UN doc. S/2004/616, para. 49, at 16.
57 See UN doc. S/PV.5052 accessible at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/
cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/IJ%20SPV5052.pdf
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“the Secretary-General’s report on the rule of law and transitional justice in 
conflict and post-conflict societies (S/2004/616) is a ‘landmark document’. It 
represents a significant step forward in conceptualizing the rule of law and 
transitional justice and in explaining their relevance to the work of the UN”. 
Such statement was in line with the position expressed by the representative 
of the Netherlands on behalf of the EU.
Danforth, the former US representative responded as follows: “…as this 
Council and the wider membership of the UN know full well, the US has 
fundamental objections to the ICC created by the Rome Statute. Our prob-
lems with the ICC concern the rule of law. We believe the Court should not 
have jurisdiction over citizens of States that are not parties to the Rome Stat-
ute. We believe that the Rome Statute does not reflect due process of law as 
we understand it, because, among other things, it allows multiple jeopardy 
and does not provide for jury trials, as our Constitution requires. We believe 
the ICC runs a high risk of politicization and is not accountable. And we 
believe the ICC clashes with the international system of the United Nations 
Charter. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that we do not endorse 
the report’s embrace of the ICC. We can accept the draft presidential state-
ment today because it respects our inability to support the ICC and does not 
explicitly or implicitly endorse the ICC”.
The conclusion would be that the political priority, resource allocations and 
the determination of the Security Council only focused on the peace opera-
tions and security reform for the operational improvements in the African 
deployments, practically ignoring the Court’s presence in the field such as 
MONUC, UNMIS, UNAMID and MINURCAT.58 One year later in 2005 the 
ICC received the first Security Council’s referral (Sudan, Darfur). However, 
the paragraph 7 of the Resolution 1593 (2005) stated that the Security Council 
“Recognizes that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the refer-
ral including expenses related to investigations or prosecutions in connection 
with that referral, shall be borne by the United Nations and that such costs 
shall be borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those States that wish 
to contribute voluntarily; The paragraph 8 “Invites the Prosecutor to address 
the Council within three months of the date of adoption of this resolution and 
every six months thereafter on actions taken pursuant to this resolution”.
5.3.5 Relationship and partnership implementation
Further consensus will be necessary to provide political support for the 
Court’s work towards concrete actions implementing the relations between 
the Court and the UN, including the ways the international community 
58 For an overview of the last developments in the fi eld missions of the United Nations and 
the peace operations in Africa see http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/currentops.
shtml#africa
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would work with the Court. Some fundamental issues on the importance to 
have a permanent Court operating in the field have been underestimated by 
some governments, preferring to argue on triggering mechanisms instead 
of recognizing the public authority of the Rome Statute institutions. The UN 
General Assembly resolutions supporting the work of the ICC served three 
main objectives: to provide political support for the Court’s work, to under-
line the importance of the relations between the Court and the UN, and to 
show the need for the international community to work with the Court.59 
The General Assembly:
“ […] Welcomes the cooperation and assistance provided thus far to the International Crim-
inal Court by States parties as well as States not parties, the United Nations and other 
international and regional organizations, and calls upon those States that are under an 
obligation to cooperate to provide such cooperation and assistance in the future, in par-
ticular with regard to arrest and surrender, the provision of evidence, the protection and 
relocation of victims and witnesses and the enforcement of sentences; 6. Emphasizes the 
importance of cooperation with States that are not parties to the Rome Statute […].
Despite such resolutions the support to the Court is still weak.
5.3.6 Peace building and post-conflict justice
From the notion of restorative justice the literature reveals that it is possible 
to generate processes and institutions that can serve the needs of justice dur-
ing the transition from civil war to the rule of law in domestic realities. These 
structural and normative international efforts can establish a strong founda-
tion for peace, justice and reconciliation of domestic realities on their own in 
post-conflict situations. Some scholars emphasize the decentralized policies 
for the regime formation of restorative justice and the lack of resources on 
one side, but also the progress through the classic features of international 
criminal law, for instance in the freezing of assets of criminal perpetrators. 
Such features represent the income for the reparation of victims but much 
more will need to be accomplished in the context of sustainable peace and 
capacity-building. At institutional level, this has been proposed by the UN 
Secretary General at several stages, bringing as positive outcome the estab-
lishment of the UN Peace-building Commission.
“By establishing the Peacebuilding Commission, Member States of the United Nations 
have created an important new structure to support fragile societies recovering from the 
devastation of war” as stated by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (SG/SM/11063, 27 June 
2007).
59 See UN doc. A/64/356, 17 September 2009, Fifth Report of the International Criminal 
Court to the United Nations for 2008/2009, accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/1BC01710-9C42-44AC-8B18-85EE2A8876EB/281210/A_64_356_ENG2.pdf
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The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is a new intergovernmental UN advi-
sory body that supports peace efforts in countries emerging from conflict, 
and is a key addition to the capacity of the international community in the 
broad peace agenda. The Peacebuilding Commission plays a unique role in 
a) bringing together all of the relevant actors, including international donors, 
the international financial institutions, national governments, troop contrib-
uting countries; b) marshalling resources and to c) advising on and propos-
ing integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery and 
where appropriate, highlighting any gaps that threaten to undermine peace. 
The concurrent General Assembly and Security Council resolutions estab-
lishing the Peacebuilding Commission also provided for the establishment 
of a Peacebuilding Fund and Peacebuilding Support Office, which together 
form the UN peacebuilding architecture.60 The forward-looking orientation 
of restorative justice is one of the features that render it most attractive to 
the work of peace building in the post-conflict phase. Therefore while such 
peacebuilding architecture consolidates itself it is required that it would 
become an important actor in the field of justice and accountability. The 
States parties to the Rome Statute should develop a strong relationship with-
in such architecture in order to promote the Court towards such important 
partnerships.
5.3.7 The concept of restorative justice
In conclusion, the restorative justice refers to societies seeking to establish, or 
re-establish, solid institutions and just practices that will sustain and sup-
port a peaceful future. It requires capacity-building. Lambourne defines 
peace-building activities as “strategies designed to promote a secure and sta-
ble lasting peace in which the basic human needs of the population are met, 
and violent conflicts do not recur. Justice and order are important aspects of 
peace-building in a post-conflict situation where there is a need to end vio-
lence, disarm combatants, restore the rule of law, and deal with the perpetra-
tors of war crimes and other human rights abuses”.61 Cornwell appraises the 
potential of restorative justice to make “corrections” more effective, civilised, 
60 UN doc. A/64/341-S/2009/444, Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its third 
session, 8 September 2009, accessible at: http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/doc-
sandres.shtml
61 See W. Lambourne, ‘Post-Confl ict Peacebuilding: Meeting Human Needs for Justice and 
Reconciliation’, April 2004, Peace, Confl ict and Development Journal 4, accessible at: http://
www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/docs/PostConfl ictPeacebuilding.PDF See also W. Lam-
bourne ‘Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding After Mass Violence’, 2010 International 
Journal of Transitional Justice (forthcoming). W. Lambourne ‘Justice After Genocide: The 
Rwandan Experiment with Gacaca Community Justice’, 2010 (forthcoming), in proceed-
ings from the conference “Social Justice and Human Rights in the Era of Globalisation: 
Between Rhetoric and Reality”, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium, 21-23 August 
2006. W. Lambourne (2007), “Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding” in United Nations Asso-
ciation of Australia, Australia and the United Nations, UNAA, pp. 27-32.
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humanitarian, pragmatic and non-fanciful, by looking at “bedrock issues” 
in contemporary criminology and penology and demonstrates that restor-
ative justice offers no “soft options”, rather the demands of remorse, accep-
tance of responsibility, and the repairing of harm done. Cornwell points out 
that “restorative justice makes the case for the radical overhaul of existing 
approaches on the basis of principle rather than political expediency”.62 
Bassiouni clarifies that “a number of different concepts are used to refer to 
what is sometimes called post-conflict justice, including transitional justice, 
strategies for combating the impunity, peace-building, and post-conflict 
reconstruction. These terms have evolved over the past two-a-half decades 
and, while their definitions and values often overlap, they are rarely used 
in a consistent manner. Some concepts emphasize the demands of nation-
building and democratic governance, while others focus more on institu-
tional development, rule of law, and security”. The text of the Chicago Prin-
ciples on Post Conflict Justice, a document that links a theoretical consideration 
of post-conflict justice with a practical consideration of policy development, 
was prepared by Bassiouni and Rothenberg. The final draft was presented in 
the hope that the principles would be integrated into a wider international 
approach of post-conflict justice.63 These valid contributions deserve to be 
mentioned as they represent one of the appropriate voices for a change in 
policy and law, offering clarity about the implementation of complementar-
ity, linking domestic, regional and international responsibilities in transition 
societies from conflict, violence and crime, to stability and reconstruction.
5.4 Preserving the Rule of Law towards pluralistic jurisdictions
Section Outline
The requirements in the policy formulation to extend complementarity 
between the UN system and the Rome Statute institutions have been debat-
ed in the previous sections. The view argued in this section is that the pro-
motion of the rule of law towards complementary global regimes refers to 
62 Restorative justice is a paradigm that was developed over the last twenty years by prac-
titioners working in the fi eld of criminal justice. Because of these modern roots, the 
concept has been almost exclusively identifi ed with criminal justice. See D. J. Cornwell, 
‘New Horizons: International Perspectives on Restorative Justice’, in Criminal Punish-
ment and Restorative Justice. Past, Present and Future Perspectives, (2006), at 108. For an 
important overview of the debate on restorative justice placing victims of crime at the 
centre of the criminal justice process see also D. J. Cornwell, Doing Justice Better. The Poli-
tics of Restorative Justice, (2007).
63 See the Excerpt from IHRLI’s Chicago Principles on Post Confl ict Justice: Combating 
impunity through Prosecution; Truth-Telling and Investigations of Past Violations; 
Acknowledging Victims’ Rights and Providing Remedies of Reparations; Ensuring 
Accountability through Vetting Sanctions and Administrative Measures; Supporting 
Memorialization, Education, and the Preservation of Historical Memory; Respecting 
Traditional, Indigenous, and Religious Approaches to Justice and Healing; Enabling 
Institutional Reform and Effective Governance.
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the implementation of a legal framework of interactions advocated in this 
study, including the constant effort to enhance visibility and accountabil-
ity of their actions. Such interaction framework, which has still to be found, 
would enhance both efficiency and credibility of global mandates in the 
fight against the impunity of international crimes and the quest of sustain-
able peace. In order to provide a comprehensive assessment on these issues, 
this section contains an extensive analysis of the UN position concerning the 
rule of law at international level and the efforts for the creation of an inter-
national justice system in conflict and post-conflict societies, including the 
criminal accountability and the internal justice cluster for the UN officials 
and experts on mission. The positions of the UN bodies and institutions will 
be discussed taking into account the reporting activity of the Secretary-Gen-
eral to the Security Council and the resolutions of the General Assembly on 
these matters. In 2012 the UN members in the General Assembly Rule of 
Law Declaration explicitly stated “we recognize that the rule of law applies 
to all States equally, and to international organizations, including the United 
Nations and its principal organs, and that respect for and promotion of the 
rule of law and justice should guide all of their activities and accord predict-
ability and legitimacy to their actions”.64
The involvement of the UN in the promotion and preservation of the rule of 
law activities at international level is determined by the actors responsible of 
the overall coordination of the UN efforts in this sensitive area of governance, 
mainly the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department of Peace-
keeping Operations (DPKO), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR), the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The rule of law is at the very 
heart of the UN mission and structure. In the World Summit Outcome Docu-
ment (2005) the UN members stressed the need for universal adherence to, 
and implementation of, the rule of law at both the national and international 
levels. The UN is engaged in an on-going process to strengthen its attention to 
the rule of law. Principal landmarks in this process have included in chrono-
logical order: the Millennium Declaration (2000); the Report of the Panel on 
the UN Peace Operations (“the Brahimi report”, 2000); the Report of the Secre-
tary-General: The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-con-
flict societies” (2004)65 including the other Reports of the Secretary-General: 
Uniting our strengths: Enhancing the UN support for the rule of law (2006); 
64 See UN doc. A/RES/67/1, 30 November 2012, accessible at: http://www.unrol.org/
fi les/A-RES-67-1.pdf
65 See the Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General: The Rule of Law and Transi-
tional Justice in Confl ict and Post-Confl ict Societies, 5, UN Doc. S/2004/616, August 23, 
2004.
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Strengthening and coordinating the UN rule of law activities (2008); Annual 
reports on strengthening and coordinating the UN rule of law activities (2009), 
Delivering justice: programme of action to strengthen the rule of law at the 
national and international levels.66
At the opening of the general debate of the General Assembly in 2004, fol-
lowing the serious violations of international law and the war in Iraq, the 
Secretary-General made the following remarks, “we must start from the 
principle that no one is above the law and no one should be denied its pro-
tection. Every nation that proclaims the rule of law at home must respect it 
abroad, and every nation that insists on it abroad, must enforce it at home. 
The rule of law starts at home but in too many places it remains elusive. 
Hatred, corruption, violence and exclusion go without redress. The vulner-
able lack effective recourse, while the powerful manipulate laws to retain 
power and accumulate wealth. At times, even the necessary fight against 
terrorism is allowed to encroach unnecessarily on civil liberties. It is the law, 
including the Security Council resolutions, which offers the best foundation 
for resolving prolonged conflicts, in the Middle East, in Iraq, and around the 
world. And it is by rigorously upholding international law that we can, and 
must, fulfill our responsibility to protect innocent civilians from genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes…”.67
There are a number of approaches defining the rule of law, or at least identi-
fying the principal elements that constitute such concept. For example, the 
Secretary-General has defined it in these terms: “the rule of law is a concept 
at the very heart of the UN mission. It refers to a principle of governance 
in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, includ-
ing the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, 
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent 
with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, 
measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equal-
ity before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the 
law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, 
avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency”. As Tolbert 
asserts, this is a good black letter definition of the rule of law because “it cov-
ers the principal elements that lawyers expect in terms of how the law is cre-
ated and applied. An important element is missing from such definition”. 68
66 See UN doc. A/66/749 (2012).
67 See K. Annan The Rule of Law Remains Elusive, addressed at the opening of the general 
debate of the fi fty-ninth session of the General Assembly New York, 21 September 2004, 
accessible at: http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2004/issue3/0304p4.asp
68 See D. Tolbert, A. Solomon, “What is the Rule of Law, Which Rule of Law?”, in United 
Nations Reform and Supporting the Rule of Law in Post-Confl ict Societies, 2006 Harward 
Human Rights Journal 19, p. 29, accessible at: http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/
orgs/hrj/iss19/tolbert.shtml#fn10 See also T. Carothers, ‘The Rule of Law Revival’, 1998 
Foreign Affairs 77, at 95.
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One area that is repeatedly mentioned both in terms of UN reform and the 
future role of the organization is in building the rule of law in developing 
countries, in general, and post-conflict societies, in particular. Both Tolbert 
and Casper put this in the same way asserting however, that the rule of law 
is not a recipe for detailed institutional design. The concept of the rule of 
law does not contain such a prerogative. It is an interconnected cluster of 
values”.69 In Casper’s view “the concept of the rule of law is a fairly empty 
vessel whose content, depending on legal cultures and historical conditions 
can differ considerably and, therefore, can give rise to vast disagreements 
and, indeed, conflicts. One can easily see how differences in the various 
approaches might lead to conflict. For example, in Iraq there has been con-
siderable debate regarding the extent to which Shari’a law, as opposed to sec-
ular approaches, should be incorporated into the Iraqi constitution and its 
legal system”. On the other hand, the rule of law at national and internation-
al levels as a principle of governance finds deep and solid roots in the UN 
Charter and in the major declarations adopted by the General Assembly. The 
rule of law appears as a powerful notion that embraces the most classical 
and fundamental principles of the international legal order, allowing to face 
the most urgent and contemporary concerns of the international community, 
such as the maintenance of peace and security, the respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, the fight against impunity and universal justice. 
According to the Charter, the United Nations will need to place “conditions 
under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and 
other sources of international law can be maintained”. The intent of this sec-
tion is to provide an assessment of the last developments in the preservation 
of the rule of law and justice in the UN.
5.4.1 The Rule of Law and Justice
In the last period of his mandate Secretary-General Kofi Annan pleaded and 
insisted with the General Assembly that the rule of law is at risk around the 
world. He pointed out that there is a framework of fair rules and institu-
tions but “the gaps in applying the rules fairly and impartially is huge”.70 
The analysis of the United Nations documents since 2004 contains a com-
mon language of justice, incorporating concepts of “justice”, “rule of law” 
and “transitional justice”.71 On 6 October 2004, at the initiative of the Unit-
69 See G. Casper, Rule of Law? Whose Law? note Address, 2003 CEELI Award Ceremony 
and Luncheon, San Francisco, Cal. (Aug. 9, 2003) quoting Martin Krygier, International 
Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences 13404 (Smelser & Baltes eds., 2001), 
accessible at: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20677/Rule_of_Law.pdf
70 See UN Press Release SG/SM/9491 GA/10258, Kofi  Annan’s ground-breaking address 
at the opening of the 59th session of the UN General Assembly on 21 September 2004. 
See also Secretary-General’s remarks on ringing the Peace Bell, New York, 21 September 
2004, accessible at: http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=1088
71 UN doc. S/PV.5052 accessible at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/
cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/IJ%20SPV5052.pdf
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ed Kingdom, the Security Council held a meeting to discuss “Justice and the 
rule of law: the United Nations role” after the Secretary-General’s report of 23 
August 2004, entitled “The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and 
post-conflict societies”.72 In a statement made on behalf of the Security Coun-
cil at the conclusion of the meeting, the President of the UNSC stressed the 
importance and urgency to restore justice and the rule of law in post-conflict 
societies, not only to come to terms with past abuses, but also to promote 
national reconciliation and to help prevent a return to conflict.73 The Secu-
rity Council later requested the Secretariat to make proposals for implement-
ing the recommendations, set out in paragraph 65 of the Secretary-General’s 
report, aimed at strengthening the efforts of the United Nations system to 
address the rule of law and transitional justice issues in conflict and post-
conflict situations. In the conclusions and recommendations of this docu-
ment in the Part XIX, Moving Forward, the Secretary-General addressed: a) 
the considerations for negotiations, peace agreements and Security Council 
mandates and b) the considerations for the United Nations system.
Paragraph 65 of the report contains the determination of the Secretary-Gen-
eral within his own institutional powers, explicitly addressed to the Security 
Council and General Assembly. He expressly stated: “I intend to instruct the 
Executive Committee on Peace and Security, building on the earlier work 
of its task forces, to propose concrete action on the matters discussed in the 
present report, for the purpose of strengthening the UN support for transi-
tional justice and the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict countries and to 
give consideration, inter alia, to: a) making proposals for enhancing United 
Nations-system arrangements for supporting the rule of law and transi-
tional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies; b) ensuring that rule of 
law and transitional justice considerations are integrated into our strategic 
and operational planning of peace operations; c) updating the current list 
of United Nations guidelines, manuals and tools on rule of law topics and 
supplementing those materials as needed; d) proposing new or enhanced 
United Nations system mechanisms, including common databases and 
common web-based resources, for the collection and development of best 
practices, documentation, manuals, handbooks, guidelines and other tools 
for transitional justice and for justice sector development; e) reviewing best 
practices and developing proposals for workable national-level rule of law 
coordination mechanisms involving justice sector institutions, civil society, 
donors and the United Nations system; f) developing approaches for ensur-
ing that all programmes and policies supporting constitutional, judicial and 
legislative reform promote gender equality; g) Convening technical-level 
workshops on the rule of law and on transitional justice experiences from 
72 UN doc. S/2004/616 accessible at: http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/reports.htm
73 UN doc. S/PRST/2004/34 accessible at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_pres_
statements04.html http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/539/38/PDF/
N0453938.pdf?OpenElement
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around the world; h) establishing arrangements for creating and maintain-
ing an up-to-date roster/database of justice and transitional justice experts, 
based upon explicit criteria, reflecting geographic, linguistic, gender and 
technical diversity, and organized according to particular areas of expertise; 
i) organizing interdepartmental staff-training programmes on the rule of law 
and on transitional justice; j) ensuring systematic debriefing of personnel 
involved in rule of law and transitional justice operations.
While such institutional policy would take shape with the purpose of 
strengthening the UN support to justice and the rule of law sectors, the UN 
political body also deliberated on the situation in Sudan. In 2005 with Resolu-
tion 1593 the Security Council refers the situation in Darfur to the Court.74 On 
22 June 2006, the Security Council met to discuss the item entitled “Strength-
ening international law: rule of law and maintenance of international peace and 
security”.75 In its preparation for the debate Denmark circulated an informal 
discussion paper setting out various suggested themes and questions for dis-
cussion. Under the broad title proposed for the debate, it was suggested to 
address three related distinct themes, each critically important for the promo-
tion of the rule of law and human rights: a) the promotion of rule of law in con-
flict and post-conflict situations; b) ending impunity for international crimes; 
and c) enhancing efficiency and credibility of UN sanctions regimes. In a pres-
idential statement the Security Council reiterated the need for the Secretariat 
to provide proposals reported above in paragraph 65 of the Secretary Gener-
al’s report on the rule of law and justice in conflict and post-conflict societies.
In the presidential statement (S/PRST/2006/28), “The Security Council 
emphasizes the responsibility of States to comply with their obligations 
to end impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes 
against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law. 
The Security Council reaffirms that ending impunity is essential if a society 
in conflict or recovering from conflict is to come to terms with past abus-
es committed against civilians and to prevent such abuses in the future. 
The Security Council intends to continue forcefully to fight impunity with 
appropriate means and draws attention to the full range of justice and recon-
ciliation mechanisms to be considered, including national, international and 
‘mixed’ criminal courts and tribunals and truth and reconciliation commis-
sions”. The document does not refer explicitly to the ICC but it only recalls 
the main responsibility of the UN Member States in a general sense.76
74 UN doc. S/RES/1593 (2005). Adopted by Vote of 11 in favour to none against, with 4 
abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China, United States). Other UNSC resolutions are acces-
sible at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions05.htm
75 See UN doc. S/PRST/2006/28.
76 For an overview see UNSC Presidential statement “Strengthening international law: rule 
of law and maintenance of international peace and security” accessible at: http://daccess-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/401/59/PDF/N0640159.pdf?OpenElement
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5.4.2 The sectors of the rule of law
In his report to the General Assembly and Security Council, “Uniting our 
strengths: Enhancing United Nations support for the rule of law” (2006),77 the 
Secretary-General points out the normative foundation for legal assistance, 
namely: the Charter of the United Nations, together with the four pillars of 
the modern international legal system international human rights law, inter-
national humanitarian law, international criminal law and international ref-
ugee law; the wealth of United Nations human rights and crime prevention; 
and criminal justice standards. The rule of law and transitional justice issues 
must be consistently integrated into the strategic and operational planning 
of new peace operations and Member States almost universally must rec-
ognize the establishment of the rule of law as an important aspect of peace-
keeping. As a result, the Security Council should be engaged in including 
human rights and the reform of policing, judicial, penal and legal systems 
in peacekeeping mandates. According to the legislative history of the UN on 
these issues, a stronger political will is necessary in respect to the presence 
of the ICC in the post-building phase developing specific strategies in coun-
tries under investigation. Moreover, the rules of law activities are just about 
to start in the UN. For purposes of coherence and coordination such rule of 
law activities of the UN can be grouped into three main sectors. The first one, 
the Rule of law at the international level, includes issues related to the Charter 
of the United Nations, multilateral treaties, international dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms, the International Criminal Court and advocacy, training 
and education regarding international law. The second, the Rule of law in the 
context of conflict and post-conflict situations, includes two components: transi-
tional justice and strengthening of national justice systems and institutions. 
The activities under transitional justice will include the following: national 
transitional justice consultation processes, truth and reconciliation processes, 
reparations, international and hybrid tribunals, national human rights insti-
tutions, vetting processes and ad hoc investigations, fact-finding and com-
missions of inquiry. The second component of the rule of law in the context 
of conflict and post-conflict situations is also the core component of the third 
sector, on the Rule of law in the context of long-term development, and comprises 
activities in the area of strengthening of national justice systems and institu-
tions (domestic institution building). These include work to strengthen legal 
and judicial institutions (e.g. prosecution, ministries of justice, criminal law, 
legal assistance, court administration and civil law), policing, penal reform, 
the administration of trust funds and monitoring. In addition, the follow-
ing additional priority areas have been identified: customary, traditional and 
community-based justice and dispute resolution mechanisms; victim and 
77 UN doc. A/61/636, UN doc. S/2006/980, 14 December 2006, Uniting our strengths: 
Enhancing United Nations support for the rule of law, addressed by the Secretary-Gen-
eral to the Security Council and the General Assembly, the report is accessible at: http://
www.un.org/docs/sc/sgrep06.htm
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witness protection and assistance; combating corruption, organized crime, 
transnational crime and trafficking, and drug control; legal education; pub-
lic law issues (e.g. land and property, registration, national identification, 
citizenship and statelessness); interim law enforcement and executive judi-
cial functions performed by the UN; and security support to national police 
agencies. So as to ensure coherence, the activities in the final sector, the Rule 
of law in the context of long-term development, will closely mirror those activi-
ties being undertaken in the context of conflict and post-conflict societies. 
As the conclusive part of the Secretary-General report points out, the UN 
human rights standards and norms will be integrated throughout these sec-
tors of the rule of law in all peace operations.
5.4.3 The Coordination of the Rule of Law Activities in the UN System
At the national level, the rule of law activities involve among other aspects, 
strengthening the constitution, internal laws, institutions of justice, and 
domestic governance of security sectors (such as army, police and judiciary). 
Since the rule of law is today at the centre of the UN concerns, the organi-
zation needs to deepen and rationalize its rule of law activity, strengthen 
its capacities, enhance its institutional memory and coordinate more effec-
tively within the UN and with outside actors. To achieve these objectives, 
a division of labour is being established among the key UN actors. The UN 
work on rule of law covers a wide area involving a range of themes and sub-
topics. Some themes can be described as “cross-cutting” as they are com-
mon to the work of most, if not all the UN actors conducting rule of law 
activities. The organization also supports judicial mechanisms, such as the 
ad hoc criminal tribunals and hybrid tribunals, established mainly to address 
past international crimes in war-torn societies, and fact-finding-investigato-
ry bodies. Many of these mechanisms are hybrid tribunals or commissions, 
involving often mixed national and international composition and jurisdic-
tion. They are set up in cooperation with national authorities under the UN 
auspices and with mandates tailored to the specifics of each situation.78 To 
ensure better coordination and adequate capacities across the system, lead 
entities, designated in accordance with their mandates, will assume clearly 
defined responsibilities for specific areas of the rule of law activities. Lead 
entities will be obligated to take action to ensure that required capacities 
exist upon which the whole system can draw. The designation of lead enti-
ties is intended to ensure a much higher degree of coherence, predictabil-
ity and accountability in the delivery of rule of law assistance to Member 
States. Many offices within the system are involved in the promotion of the 
rule of law: an inventory issued by the Secretary-General in 2008 (A/63/64) 
identified as many as 40 entities active in this field and listed 520 differ-
ent categories of activities performed for the promotion of the rule of law. 
78 For an overview of the activities of the UN Rule of Law see the portal accessible at: 
http://www.unrol.org/
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In view of the tremendous magnitude and diversity of the UN involvement 
in this area, the Secretary-General proposed in 2006 to establish a Rule of 
Law Coordination and Resource Group, chaired by the Deputy Secretary-
General and consisting of the main rule of law actors in the system, to ensure 
the overall coordination of the UN efforts. As already listed in the section 
outline the membership of the Group consists of the Department of Political 
Affairs (DPA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Office of Legal 
Affairs (OLA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), The Unit-
ed Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), The Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Develop-
ment Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC).
The Group has prioritized partners to engage in the development and imple-
mentation of the Joint Strategic Plan. In developing the Plan, members of 
the Group and the Rule of Law Unit consulted with the UN system (head-
quarters and field offices) and external partners. For implementation of the 
Plan, the Group will draw upon the expertise and cooperation of a wide 
range of partners depending on the purpose of the partnerships (financial, 
political, and programmatic) and corresponding to the Plan outcomes. Part-
ners include the wider UN system, Member States, civil society groups, aca-
demics and training institutes in donor and recipient countries and inter-
national and regional assistance providers. Existing partnerships should be 
drawn upon to the extent possible. This Group has taken a new strategic and 
results-based approach to the UN rule of law work, agreeing on a Joint Stra-
tegic Plan for 2009-2011 and for the years to come (see Results Framework)79 
developing Guidance Notes of the Secretary General on the UN Approach 
to Rule of Law Assistance, Justice for Children and Constitution-making. 
The Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group is responsible, under the 
leadership of the Office of Legal Affairs, for further guidance on the rule of 
law at the international level. Such activities support the development, pro-
motion and implementation of international norms and standards in most 
fields of international law. Furthermore, the issues relating to the rule of law 
at international level are being discussed in different political fora within 
the UN. The Security Council, for example, has held between 2003 and 2006 
several thematic debates on matters relating to the rule of law. Since 2006, 
on a joint proposal by Liechtenstein and Mexico, the General Assembly has 
included the item “The rule of law at the national and international levels” 
on its agenda, entrusting it to the Sixth Committee.80 In the resolution 62/70 
79 See Joint Strategic Plan for 2009-2011, Implementation and Partnerships, 2009, pp. 3-4, 
accessible at: http://www.unrol.org/doc.aspx?doc_id=2140
80 The Sixth Committee is the primary forum for the consideration of legal questions in 
the General Assembly. All of the UN Member States are entitled to representation on the 
Sixth Committee as one of the main committees of the General Assembly.
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of 8 January 2008 the General Assembly reaffirmed further the need for uni-
versal adherence to and implementation of the rule of law at both the nation-
al and international levels and its solemn commitment to an international 
order based on the rule of law and international law, which, together with 
the principles of justice, is essential for peaceful coexistence and cooperation 
among States.81 In the resolution 63/128 of 11 December 2008, the General 
Assembly has invited Member States to focus their comments at the sixty-
fourth session, in October 2009, on the sub-topic of “Promoting the rule of 
law at the international level”. The rule of law is a core principle of gover-
nance that ensures justice and fairness, values that are essential to human-
ity. The rule of law is central to the vision of the Secretary-General for the 
coming five years, and must guide the collective response to a fast-changing 
world.82 The High-level Meeting of the 67th Session of the General Assem-
bly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels took place at 
the UN Headquarters in New York on 24 September 2012. This was a unique 
occasion for all Member States, non-governmental organisations and civil 
society represented at the highest level, to discuss and agree a forward look-
ing agenda on strengthening the rule of law.83
5.4.4 Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission
From the extensive analysis of the UN documents related to the rule of law at 
national and international level a couple of points need to be clarified. First 
of all, that the maintenance of peace, justice and security needs to be based 
on the principle of accountability of all actors involved in mission operations 
in the field, and second that a consistent strategy of cooperation between 
the UN and the Court will need to be implemented in addition to the bilat-
eral agreements with peacekeeping forces. At its sixty-first session, in 2006, 
the General Assembly decided that the agenda item entitled Comprehensive 
review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, 
which had been allocated to the Special Political and Decolonization Com-
mittee (Fourth Committee), should also be referred to the Sixth Committee 
for discussion of the report of the Group of Legal Experts on ensuring the 
81 The General Assembly has considered the rule of law as an agenda item since 1992, with 
renewed interest since 2006 and has adopted resolutions at its last three sessions. See A/
RES/61/39, A/RES/62/70, A/RES/63/128. The Security Council has held a number of 
thematic debates on the rule of law (UN docs: S/PRST/2003/15, S/PRST/2004/2, S/
PRST/2004/32, S/PRST/2005/30, S/PRST/2006/28) and adopted resolutions emphasiz-
ing the importance of these issues in the context of women, peace and security (SC res 
1325, SC res. 1820), children in armed confl ict (e.g., SC res 1612), the protection of civil-
ians in armed confl ict (e.g., SC res 1674). The Peacebuilding Commission has also regu-
larly addressed rule of law issues with respect to countries on its agenda.
82 UN doc. A/66/749, 16 March 2012, Report of the Secretary-General, Delivering justice: 
programme of action to strengthen the rule of law at the national and international levels, acces-
sible at: http://www.unrol.org/fi les/SGreport%20eng%20A_66_749.pdf
83 See UN doc. A/RES/67/1 (2012), Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General 
Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels.
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accountability of the UN staff and experts on mission with respect to crimi-
nal acts committed in peacekeeping operations (see A/60/980), submitted 
pursuant to Assembly resolutions 59/300 and 60/263 and decision 60/563 
(decision 61/503 A). At the same session, the General Assembly decided 
to establish an Ad Hoc Committee, open to all States Members of the UN 
or members of specialized agencies or of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, for the purpose of considering the report of the Group of Legal 
Experts, in particular its legal aspects (resolution 61/29). At its sixty-second 
session, the General Assembly strongly urged States to consider establish-
ing to the extent that they had not yet done so jurisdiction, particularly over 
crimes of a serious nature, as known in their existing domestic criminal laws, 
committed by their nationals while serving as United Nations officials or 
experts on mission, at least where the conduct as defined in the law of the 
State establishing jurisdiction also constituted a crime under the laws of 
the host State; requested the Secretary-General to bring credible allegations 
that revealed that a crime might have been committed by United Nations 
officials and experts on mission to the attention of the States against whose 
nationals such allegations were made, and to request from those States 
an indication of the status of their efforts to investigate and, as appropri-
ate, prosecute crimes of a serious nature, as well as the types of appropriate 
assistance States might wish to receive from the Secretariat for the purposes 
of such investigations and prosecutions (resolution 62/63).
At its sixty-third session (2008), the General Assembly encouraged States, 
in accordance with their domestic law or any applicable treaties or arrange-
ments on extradition and mutual legal assistance, to afford each other assis-
tance in criminal investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings, 
including with regard to evidence; encouraged all States, in accordance with 
their domestic law, to explore ways and means of facilitating the possible 
use, in criminal proceedings regarding crimes of a serious nature allegedly 
committed by UN officials and experts on mission, of information and mate-
rial obtained from the UN, bearing in mind due process considerations; to 
provide effective protection to witnesses and others who provide informa-
tion in respect of such crimes; and to explore ways and means of responding 
adequately to requests by host States in order to enhance their investigative 
capacity; decided that the consideration of the report of the Group of Legal 
Experts on the topic (see A/60/980) should be continued during the sixty-
fourth session in the framework of a working group of the Sixth Commit-
tee; requested the United Nations to consider any appropriate measures that 
might facilitate the possible use of information and material for purposes 
of criminal proceedings initiated by States in respect of such crimes, bear-
ing in mind due process considerations; encouraged the United Nations to 
take appropriate measures, in the interests of the Organization, to restore the 
credibility and reputation of officials and experts on mission, in the case of 
unfounded allegations; urged the UN to continue cooperating with States 
exercising jurisdiction in order to provide them, within the framework of 
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the relevant rules of international law and agreements governing activities 
of the UN, with information and material for purposes of criminal proceed-
ings initiated by States; emphasized the importance that no action be taken 
by the UN that would retaliate against or intimidate UN officials and experts 
on mission who reported allegations concerning such crimes; and requested 
the Secretary-General to report to the Assembly at its sixty-fourth session on 
the implementation of the resolution, as well as with respect to any practical 
problems in its implementation, on the basis of information received from 
Governments and the Secretariat, and to include in the report information 
on the number and types of credible allegations and any actions taken by the 
UN and its Member States regarding crimes of a serious nature committed 
by the UN officials and experts on mission (resolution 63/119).84
5.4.5 Conclusions
In general, the practice of governing conflict and post-conflict situations 
shows that the rule of law has been ignored in many cases as a consequence 
of the accountability gaps and capacity of institutions. The rule of law has 
been defined as elusive according to UN official reports and by the ana-
lytical approaches of many scholars. Acceptable standards of compliance at 
international level have been weak in the last decades. Under the rule of law 
national leaders are accountable when committing international crimes. This 
basic principle, ignored in international affairs for decennia, received legal 
provisions since the establishment of a permanent International Criminal 
Court. As discussed above, there is less andless space left for the concept 
of immunities and for norms that belong to an era where the sovereignty of 
the nation-state was perceived as absolute.85 The concept of the rule of law 
expressed by Tomuschat contains a constitutional framework of the interna-
84 The item entitled “Criminal accountability of United Nations offi cials and experts on 
mission” was included in the provisional agenda of the sixty-fourth session of the Gen-
eral Assembly pursuant to Assembly resolution 63/119 of 11 December 2008. UN doc. 
A/64/446, 12 November 2009. For an overview of the activity of the Ad Hoc Committee 
on the Criminal accountability of United Nations offi cials and experts on mission see 
information accessible at: http://www.un.org/law/criminalaccountability/index.html
85 In March 2009, the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
authorized the issue of an arrest warrant in respect of President al-Bashir of Sudan in 
relation to the alleged atrocities committed in Darfur. The request for the arrest war-
rant raised the issue of whether a serving head of State may rely upon immunity under 
international law to shield themselves from proceedings before international criminal 
tribunals. The decision was the fi rst occasion on which the question of State immunity 
has been raised before the ICC and the fi rst time an international criminal tribunal has 
considered the issue in respect of an incumbent head of State. For a legal commentary 
of head of State immunities in international law and the obligation of States, includ-
ing Sudan, to comply with the Court’s request for cooperation in the execution of the 
arrest warrant, see S. Williams and L. Sherif, ‘The Arrest Warrant for President al-Bashir: 
Immunities of Incumbent Heads of State and the International Criminal Court’, 2009 
Journal of Confl ict and Security Law 14 (1), 71 at 92.
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tional community which includes the basic rules and norms of jus cogens and 
obligation erga omnes, but which also permit sovereign action.86 The individ-
ual criminal responsibility, as distinct from the State responsibility, of those 
who act on behalf of sovereign entities, or on behalf of intergovernmental 
organizations, must not be left out of the system of international norms and 
regulations for the protection of human rights. This is the most important 
prerequisite to preserve the rule of law towards democratic international 
governance institutions.
The question under what conditions member States of an international orga-
nization may be responsible for international wrongful acts committed by 
international organization has become a question of fundamental impor-
tance in modern international law. There has been a continuing transfer of 
powers to international organizations. At the same time, for injured parties 
(whether States or private persons) it remains virtually impossible to find a 
proper remedy against wrongful acts committed by international organiza-
tions, inter alia due to lack of jurisdiction of international courts, immunity in 
domestic courts.87 As a result of these and related factors, in several instanc-
es injured parties have tried to pierce the veil of organizations and have 
attempted to invoke responsibility of Member States in relation to wrong-
ful the acts of international organizations. In 1999 the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia brought claims against member States of NATO in regard to the 
bombardments carried out by NATO in response to the crimes committed 
in Kosovo.88 In 2007, the European Court of Human Rights had to deter-
mine whether certain member States of the UN could be held responsible in 
regard to a failure of the UN to protect civilians from a mined area in Bos-
nia Herzegovina. The considerable growth of UN activities, as well as the 
increasing quality demands emanating from the “global rule of law”, require 
a more adequate legal framework for assessing the conduct of the UN.89
86 See, C. Tomuschat and J. M. Thouvenin, The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal 
Order: Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes, (2006), 376 at 400.
87 See N. Blokker, “International Organisations: The Untouchables?” in 10 International 
Organizations Law Review 2, 2014/2013, at 259. See also N. Schrijver, “Beyond Srebrenica 
and Haiti”, in 10 International Organizations Law Review 2, 2014/2013, at 588.
88 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that Serbia and Montenegro’s claims 
against NATO members Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Por-
tugal and Britain should be rejected because the Balkan country was not a member of 
the United Nations at the time the complaint was fi led in April1999. The ICJ can only 
rule on disputes between UN Member States, unless they have signed conventions giv-
ing the court jurisdiction or two States agree to let the ICJ consider its dispute or if the 
UN Security Council refers a case for an advisory opinion. See Legality of the Use of 
Force Application of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia v. Belgium) 1999 I.C.J. 
105 (Apr. 29).
89 See UN Secretary-General, Delivering Justice: programme of action to strengthen the rule of 
law at the national and international levels, 16 March 2012, UN doc. A/66/749. See also N. 
Schrijver, “Beyond Srebrenica and Haiti”, in 10 International Organizations Law Review 2, 
2014/2013, at 592.
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The rule of international law dealing with the accountabilities of States and 
individuals waits for further progress in the political convergence of expec-
tations by complementary regimes dealing with war and crime which have 
to be accountable of their actions. As discussed above, for the implemen-
tation of the emerging regime of international justice, which is still under 
construction, the first step should be to reinforce the accountability mecha-
nisms between States, international and regional organizations, and all par-
ties involved in situations at serious risk during humanitarian interventions. 
In the long period the practice of accountability would empower the judicial 
power of the Court in the international legal and political relations. In reality 
we are still very far from such realization. The problem is that the emerging 
regime of international criminal justice did not receive any role in the moni-
toring activity of international humanitarian interventions under the flag of 
the responsibility to protect. Moreover, as we have seen from the previous 
assessments, several gaps characterize the governance of civilian protection 




In order to provide a definition of complementary global regimes, it is required 
to look at the construction of law enforcement intended by established 
international regimes and emerging sub-regimes, dealing with the criminal 
accountability of individuals. Those need the determination of the Security 
Council of unlawful acts committed by the States not parties to the Rome 
Statute, before the Court, in accordance with the principle of territoriality, 
would determine the criminal behaviour of individual perpetrators during 
intra- and eventually inter-state armed conflicts. The Security Council autho-
rized an increasing number of diverse international peace operations, rang-
ing from standard peacekeeping deployments to multifaceted peace-making 
and peace-enforcement operations. Despite rising political support for the 
strategic use of military presence and force to strengthen the protection of 
civilians, important aspects of the legal frameworks regulating peace opera-
tions remain unclear in support of justice and accountability. This lack of clar-
ity has also raised significant concerns about the impunity for abuses com-
mitted in the course of peace operations, especially those established under 
US Status of Forces Agreements conferring immunity on foreign military 
personnel (SOFAs).90 Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Char-
ter, the Security Council requested that the ICC, for a twelve-month period 
90 See E. Rosenfeld, “Application of US Status of Forces Agreements to Article 98 of the 
Rome Statute”, 2 Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 2003 at 273, accessible 
at: http://law.wustl.edu/wugslr/issues/Volume2_1/p273Rosenfeld.pdf
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beginning on 1 July 2002, refrain from commencing or continuing investiga-
tions into personnel or officials from States not a party to the ICC Statute. The 
Security Council expressed its intention to renew the measure within twelve 
months for as long as necessary. Obviously, such position of the Security 
Council was incompatible with the Rome Statute, demonstrated the improp-
er lawmaking use of the Security Council, and contradicted the UN Charter 
and other international law. In 2004 the Security Council refused to renew the 
exemption again after pictures emerged of US troops abusing Iraqi prison-
ers in Abu Ghraib, and the US withdrew its demand.91 Against the backdrop 
of recent disagreement about the applicability of international humanitarian 
law and international human rights law to members of peace operations, the 
political convergence on such matters is still absolutely required.
This part argued about the shortcomings fostering peace and justice in the 
field operations, including the lacuna of human security measures and the 
capacity-building at national, regional and international levels. The topics 
approached in this part want to emphasize that the deterrent effect of the 
emerging regime of international criminal justice is identical either in the 
North or in the South of the world. The culture of accountability is the only 
catalyst for the legitimacy and compliance in every legal system or consti-
tution. This study addresses recommendations to the leaderships of any 
government. Such leaders have to be visible, responsible and accountable 
of their choices having negative consequences on individuals. What we cur-
rently see in western societies is that some leaders have been accused, by 
knowledgeable groups and individuals throughout the world, of complicity 
in war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other gross human rights abus-
es. The systemic collapse of legality including the shortcomings of domes-
tic jurisdictions on criminal and corrupted behaviours, require higher stan-
dards of accountability. The States Parties to the Rome Statute have accepted 
obligations going beyond customary law in relation to the immunities of 
their own officials. In Western society, the return of great recessions is a vis-
ible sign that governance systems may even be designed to control over the 
life of individuals.92 Rich get richer, and ordinary people are left in a deeper 
condition of poverty and pressure to perform against corrupted domestic 
governance systems. For many, the capitalistic system causes a widening 
gap between the rich and everyone else; constant warfare is justified as nec-
essary to fight ‘terrorism’; erosion of personal freedoms; expanding power 
allocated to the military and police; pervasive control and inequalities; com-
plete lack of accountability by politicians for their fraudulence and crimes; a 
91 See UN doc. S/RES/1422 (2002) and UN doc. S/RES/1487 (2003).
92 M. Chossudovsky, A.G. Marshall, The Global Economic Crisis: The Great Depression of 
the XXI Century, Centre for Research on Globalization, 2010. See also R.C. Cook, ‘The 
Nature of the current Financial Crisis: The System is designed to exert Total Control over 
the Lives of Individuals’, 2009 Global Research, accessible at: http://www.globalresearch.
ca/index.php?context=va&aid=13551
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mass media devoted solely to the establishment of propaganda, and a clash 
of ethic, social, political and religious values sustaining multicultural differ-
ences, are only some of the effects of the systemic crisis of governance. These 
are some of the reasons why it is important to rely on international gover-
nance institutions for the preservation of accountability and compliance of 
universal values. The political forces empowering them have a specific call 
to be fulfilled.
5.5.1 The challenges and opportunities of governance systems
In this realistic scenario the rule of law, as setting values and as principle 
of governance, is extremely important as well as multilateralism. The 
accountability of national leaders combined with compliance mechanisms 
of the States is the only valid catalyst in this state of affairs, either at domes-
tic, regional, or at international levels. Multilateral and intergovernmental 
settings have to take concrete measures in order to rebuild weak States in 
such systemic break downs and transitions, while safeguarding individual 
rights. In conflict and post-conflict societies of underdeveloped countries the 
situation is indeed worse. The list of so-defined ‘failed’ States is growing 
extensively. The quest for development, cooperation and sustainability in 
devastated societies is shaped by military enforcement during micro-con-
flicts, combined with humanitarian interventions involved in the destabili-
zation of criminal and corrupted regimes wasting individual lives. Despite 
these important reasons for the existence of complementary regimes, there 
is a lacuna in the accountability and compliance of international entities and 
mandates involved in the so-called international humanitarian escalations of 
last resort addressed to multilevel jurisdictions and which are established by 
political organs. The discourse on the responsibility to protect, for instance, 
is analogous to the doctrinal and normative frameworks of human rights 
and democratic governance, but still argued in delimiting multilateral inter-
ventions and State sovereignty. It is also argued that powerful nation-states 
are still a central actor of international governance in peace and in conflict. 
These are some of the reasons why it is important to asses the extent of which 
individual rights are kept central in conflict and post-conflict multilateral 
interventions, according to international criminal justice and human rights 
standards, including victim rights advocates. The supranational character of 
a governance system is still absolutely required.
5.5.2 The global effort of interactions
The complex interaction between international governance institutions fos-
tering peace, justice and security deserves a detailed analysis at structural, 
normative and functional levels. The past failures or delays by the inter-
national society to respond to mass atrocities discharge important lessons. 
Protecting civilians in violent conflicts involves understanding the links 
that the military, political, humanitarian and development aspects entail, as 
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well as recognizing the failure in upholding respect for justice and human 
rights. The consequences of serious breakdowns in conflict and post-conflict 
situations determine global responsibilities for complementary governance 
institutions. There are still gaps when it comes to achieving a wide-ranging 
protection instrument of individuals in conflict and post-conflict situations, 
including mechanisms promoting victim rights in domestic judicial systems. 
These are only some of the reasons why the interaction between complemen-
tary international mandates deserves attention from both legal and political 
perspectives in order to verify feasible ways and further progress centraliz-
ing individuals in global matters. Moreover, as we have seen the interaction 
between the UN bodies and the Rome Statute institutions raises important 
questions about the project of universal jurisdiction, the enforcement of law 
and civilian protection duties.
Political consensus will be necessary to determine provisions regulating the 
relationships, partnerships and operational interactions between comple-
mentary global mandates which deal with the reconstruction of societies 
affected by armed conflicts, towards universal values, such as the rule of law 
and justice, human rights and democracy, according thus, to the principles 
of democratic governance. This is the only chance to fulfil the absence of tri-
as politica or separation of powers in international relations. This is also the 
only option for a democratization process which should at least characterize 
a road map for a regime of checks and balances of international humanitarian 
interventions in sovereign States, where the accountability concerns all actors 
involved, including individuals or States responsible of misconduct. One pre-
rogative of democratic governance is that global governance institutions (UN 
and Rome Statute institutions) would interact appropriately between them 
in order to deal with the escalations of humanitarian atrocities, influencing in 
the short, middle and long terms domestic realities with law and order. The 
democratisation of such complementary governance institutions through 
widespread participation is of course a 21st century imperative. Therefore, 
the quest for democratisation should be pragmatic rather than idealistic and 
find its place in specific actions and accomplishments.
To that end, and before reporting on the current position of the African 
Union and other regional organizations, according to the deliberations of 
the last decade of the EU institutions, it was suggested that the EU should 
support the expansion of the UN Security Council through the promotion 
of India, Japan, South Africa and Brazil as permanent members, but that 
new ways of decision-making should also be explored in parallel in order 
to avoid the paralysis of the Security Council. Moreover, there should be a 
greater reliance on those organs and institutions which already reflect a fair 
measure of democratisation, such as the General Assembly, the Economic 
and Social Council, the Human Rights Council, the Peace-building Com-
mission, including the Rome Statute institutions which represent funda-
mental actors for the quest of human rights and for a rule-based interna-
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tional order. The EU systematically pursues the inclusion of an ICC clause 
in negotiating mandates with third countries. On the initiative of the Euro-
pean Commission, as anticipated earlier, the Cotonou Partnership revised 
Agreement with ACP countries, in 2005, includes an ICC clause.93 This is the 
reason why the Sudan refused to ratify the revised Cotonou Agreement.94 
Under the European Neighbourhood Policy, the European Commission has 
also negotiated the insertion of ICC clauses into many related Action Plans 
as well as in association agreements with countries in Latin America. The 
EU engaged its support to the Rome Statute institutions with the Common 
Position in 2003 and an Action Plan immediately after in 2004. The EU can 
do more in such a process of democratization of governance institutions, 
promoting the widespread ratification of the Rome Statute towards: a) a 
coordination of EU activities in each of its institutions; b) promoting the uni-
versality and integrity of the Rome Statute in peace building mandates; and 
c) campaigning for the independence and effective functioning of the ICC 
supporting the participation of civil society.95 It is important to analyse the 
developments in another important regional reality, especially in the Afri-
can Union but also in the League of Arab States, ASEAN and other political 
regional realties.
93 Cotonou Agreement (ICC clause), from the Preamble: considering that the establishment 
and effective functioning of the International Criminal Court constitute an important 
development for peace and international justice (...) and Article 11 reads, “in promoting 
the strengthening of peace and international justice, the Parties reaffi rm their determina-
tion to: share experience in the adoption of legal adjustments required to allow for the 
ratifi cation and implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; 
and fi ght against international crime in accordance with international law, giving due 
regard to the Rome Statute. The Parties shall seek to take steps towards ratifying and 
implementing the Rome Statute and related instruments.” Furthermore, 16 negotiating 
directives for agreements under negotiation or to be negotiated include the ICC clause. 
See European Council, The EU and the ICC, May 2010, at 13, accessible at: http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ICC_may%2010_internet.pdf
94 See EC, Non-ratifi cation of the revised Cotonou Agreement by Sudan FAQ (August 
2009), accessible at: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/sudan_fi nal_
non-ratifi cation_faq_200908.pdf
95 For an overview of the EU support to the ICC fostering the creation of a global criminal 
justice system see J. Wouters, S. Basu, ‘A Global Criminal Justice System based on Inter-
national Cooperation’ in The Effectiveness of International Criminal Justice, Introduction, 
(2009), 128 at 140. For an overview of the ICC sub-area of the public international law 
working party (COJUR ICC) and the implementation of support by the EU in the UN, 
see Council of the EU (Consilium), “Support to the ICC in UN fora”, in The European 
Union and the International Criminal Court, European Communities, 2008, DGF, EU doc. 
RS/07/2008, p. 15, accessible at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUp-
load/ICC_internet08.pdf
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5.5.3 The advocacy of systemic change
The approach in this part of this study is that with the Rome Statute it can be 
contested whether any recognition exist of the links between an established 
system based on individual criminal accountability and the maintenance of 
international peace and security. The question is whether such links are put 
in practice during intra and inter-state conflicts, and whether they influence 
further jurisdictional progress for the emerging regime of international crim-
inal justice and its public authority. This study points out that the interaction 
between the Rome Statute institutions and the UN takes place at several lev-
els, but most importantly represents the nexus between global politics and 
the rule of law, interacting with several branches of international law, respec-
tively humanitarian, criminal and the emerging law of human rights. There 
are no doubts that a result-oriented approach empowering the partnerships 
of universal organizations would replace the unilateral political or legal 
rhetoric of States for the preservation of individual rights in conflict and 
post-conflict societies. A strong political consensus or political convergence 
is necessary to strengthen the relationships and partnerships of complemen-
tary global mandates, initiating a democratization process of the internation-
al governance of justice, which at the moment excludes law enforcement of 
binding character of multinational forces, and is not in charge of humanitari-
an interventions, humanitarian police, and non-state actors. Considering the 
great expectations of international responses in mass atrocity crimes, while 
contributing to the formation of a global state-building apparatus dealing 
with ‘failed’ States, important solutions have to be found in the short, mid-
dle and long terms, on collective responsibilities, human security measures, 
domestic capacity-building and mutual accountability of interventions in 
conflict and post-conflict situations.
With the Rome Statute, the universal principle of individual criminal account-
ability of international crimes in domestic jurisdictions has been translated in 
legal humanitarian frameworks by complementary features and institutions. 
The purpose of such global architecture is to oppose the culture of impunity 
of mass atrocity crimes. The intent is to centralize victim rights during fair 
trials of the most responsible criminal perpetrators. The failure of the nation-
state on such responsibilities generates other responsibilities. The concept of 
complementary regimes is also applicable at international level, considering 
the humanitarian escalations of violations between the UN and the Rome 
Statute institutions. Such complementary regimes, and their international 
governance institutions, deal respectively with the nation-state responsibility 
and the accountability of individuals. As an outsider from the UN institu-
tional premises the emerging regime of international criminal justice is also 
being tested in the quest of peace and security for the first time in the Sudan 
and Libya, receiving jurisdiction under the authority of the Security Council. 
In accordance with the legal provisions of the Rome Statute, the governments 
of the Sudan and the Libyan authorities have an obligation to cooperate with 
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the Court even if they have not ratified its founding treaty. The jurisdiction of 
the Court resulted from the resolutions of the Security Council, and therefore 
applies to all member States of the UN.96
5.5.4 International criminal justice: shifting or balancing power?
The Security Council is a political body while the International Criminal 
Court is a judicial body. They deal respectively with the accountabilities of 
States and individuals. From a legal perspective and with regard to interna-
tional conflicts (inter-state, or conflicts between States), the authority given 
to the Security Council under the UN Charter was not intended for a judicial 
determination of the question of aggression for purposes of individual crim-
inal accountability. It was intended to enable the Security Council to take 
measures to maintain or restore international peace and security. With the 
Rome Statute, if further agreed, the Court would also receive jurisdiction in 
the context of peace and security maintenance investigating and prosecuting 
individuals responsible of aggression. The problem in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is characterized by the political impasse of 
the reform of the Security Council, and as counterpart by the presence of the 
International Criminal Court as a permanent judicial institution function-
ing through a cooperation pillar between sovereign States and international 
organizations such as the United Nations. In the words of Cassese, “the UN 
Security Council has been unable to keep up with increase of violence. No 
one can contest its inability to react promptly and effectively and to put a 
stop to massacres amounting to serious threats to the peace or breaches of 
the peace in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia including Kosovo, Sierra Leone, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, Indonesia, the Middle East, and so on”.97 The reform of 
the Security Council encompasses sensitive democratization issues such as 
the categories of membership, the question of the veto held by the five per-
manent members, the regional representation, the size of an enlarged Secu-
rity Council and its working methods. Currently, no African country has a 
permanent seat in the Security Council. This is seen as a major political issue 
negatively influencing the support expected by the African States accord-
ing to their membership to the Rome Statute and by the African Union in 
96 See UN doc. S/RES/1593 (2005) which refers to the Report to the Secretary-General of 
the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur accessible at: http://www.un.org/
news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf For an Afrocentric outlook of such historic refer-
ral by the Security Council see N. J. Udombana, “Pay Back in Sudan? Darfur in the Inter-
national Criminal Court”, Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law, Vol. 13, 2005-
2006. See also Touko Piiparinen, ‘The Lessons of Darfur for the Future of Humanitarian 
Intervention’, 13 Global Governance 3, 2007, at 365. For an analysis of the confl ict in Dar-
fur discussing what the situation reveals about the response of international actors to 
mass atrocities, see D. R. Black, P. D. Williams, Security and Governance. The International 
Politics of Mass Atrocities: The Case of Darfur, 2010.
97 See A. Cassese, ‘et al’ “Failure of International Sanctions against Serious State Delin-
quencies” in State, Sovereignty and International Governance, (2004), at 240.
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the maintenance of peace and security, including fighting against the impu-
nity of international crimes, enforcing appropriately the emerging regime of 
international criminal justice. Moreover, considering the past, present and 
future achievements of international criminal justice both States and non-
state actors are responsible of their responsiveness serving the “interests of 
justice” or so-called community obligations.98 The simple question is what 
kind of authority characterizes the emerging regime of international crimi-
nal justice in the arrays of peace and security? How such authority would 
evolve in the future, considering its complementary role with the UN sys-
tem? In order to provide a complete picture the political standpoints of 
regional organizations also deserve discussions. After all, they have to be 
completely involved in finding solutions on peace, justice and security in 
their own regional realities, upholding the expectations of the human secu-
rity doctrine and the rule of law. The UN system and the Rome Statute insti-
tutions have a specific role on such sensitive issues which deserve further 
debate. The last paragraph of this section, which ends my conclusive obser-
vations, deals with the normative gaps of the Rome Statute, in particular, its 
nature as a governance system based on international cooperation of non-
compulsory character.
5.5.5 The features of justice governance: the cooperation pillar of the 
Rome Statute
In conclusion, it needs to be noted that in addition to the relationship 
between international organizations and their member States, the law of 
international organizations also covers the interaction between themselves, 
where the literature is relatively scarce and some is pertinent to the case law. 
The Darfur case, as first referral to the Court by the UN Security Council, is 
the case study of such imperfect interaction.99 According to the provisions of 
the Rome Statute, the Security Council is not obliged to enforce judicial deci-
98 On the way the institutional design of the ICC regulates the opportunities of States to 
shape and strengthen international criminal justice, see S. C. Roach, “Global Governance 
in Context”, Governance, Order, and the International Criminal Court. Between Realpolitik and 
a Cosmopolitan Court, (2009), at 1.
99 In the situation in Darfur, Sudan, three cases are being heard before Pre-Trial Chamber 
I: The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad 
Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”); The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir and 
and The Prosecutor v. Bahr Idriss Abu Garda. On 31 March 2005, The Security Council deter-
mined that “the situation in the Sudan continued to constitute a threat to international 
peace and security”, and “decided to refer the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court”, UNSCR 1593 (2005). See, Sixth Report of the Prosecutor of 
the ICC to the UN Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005) accessible at: http://
www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP-RP-20071205-UNSC-ENG.pdf See statement 
of H. Köchler, President of the International Progress Organization after the Darfur refer-
ral. H. Köchler, Double Standards in International Criminal Justice: The Case of Sudan, (2005), 
accessible at: http://i-p-o.org/Koechler-Sudan-ICC.pdf See also H. Köchler, Global Justice 
or Global Revenge? International Criminal Justice at the Crossroads, (2003).
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sions. The Court simply operates through a judicial pillar, represented by the 
Court itself, and a cooperation pillar which belongs to the States Parties and 
through other cooperation agreements with international organizations such 
as the UN missions in the field.100 In order to offer an overview of the coop-
eration regime established by the Rome Statute, Rastan points out that under 
Article 54 of the Statute the Court may seek the cooperation of any intergov-
ernmental organization or so-called ‘arrangements’, which refer implicitly 
to the UN peacekeeping operations, and may enter into specific agreements 
with the UN, while Article 87 (6) enables the Court to ask any intergovern-
mental organization to provide information or documents, or other forms of 
cooperation that are consistent with its judicial mandate. Where the Security 
Council did not refer a situation, there is nothing preventing the Court from 
asking the cooperation and assistance of the Security Council pursuant to 
Article 87 (6) of the Rome Statute and Article 15 of the UN-ICC Relationship 
Agreement. Obviously, the legal modalities of such forms of cooperation fall 
outside the regime established by Part IX of the Rome Statute (International 
Cooperation and Judicial Assistance) which only deals with the State Party 
obligations. With regard to the cooperation with other international organi-
zations, including the UN Security Council, the legal obligation to cooperate 
with the Court falls under separate arrangements and agreements. In fact, 
outside the forms of cooperation voluntarily agreed upon these specific legal 
arrangements, international organizations, namely the UN, are under no 
legal obligation to cooperate with the Court. Rastan further clarifies that “an 
international organization cannot be compelled to cooperate in the absence 
of such consent even when the ICC is acting pursuant to a Security Council 
referral”.101 In addition to this fragmentation of legal modalities of coopera-
tion, a law enforcement pillar of the governance of justice is inexistent.
In substance, challenging old models of conflict management, intervention 
in humanitarian crises and ending the impunity of international crimes, 
requires a defined law enforcement strategy. Sovereign States still have to 
find the middle ground for an effective governance of justice in conflict and 
post-conflict situations. The argument in this study refers to the indispens-
able analysis of emerging complementary regimes working on humanitarian 
issues and international justice, securing the universality of the rule of law in 
the international legal order. The findings of this research propose a model 
of governance (institutional, normative and functional) of multilateral tools 
100 For an overview of the legal practice of cooperation and judicial assistance between the 
ICC and the States, see R. Rastan, “Testing Co-operation: The ICC and National Authori-
ties”, (2008) 21 LJIL 431, at 456.
101 See R. Rastan, supra.
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based on universal principles;102 on global values for the protection of fun-
damental rights; and on the interdependence of international threats and 
crimes. Only through such considerations of international governance solv-
ing the vacuum of law enforcement effectively managed by the sovereign 
States, by the UN and the ICC, it is possible to challenge the causes of large-
scale violations of human rights (due to ethnic conflicts, bad governance and 
resource exploitation), occurring during internal civil wars (intra-state con-
flicts), and State aggression (inter-state conflicts). According to the treaty law 
the States have the responsibility of solving the delay in the harmonization 
of their domestic legislations. The domestic jurisdiction of the States needs to 
be monitored according to the principles of universality and accountability. 
Another problem constantly debated is the deficiency of checks and balances 
regulating the relations between international public mandates and their 
complementary interaction. In the law of international organizations, vis-à-
vis the theory of checks and balances, their fragmentation and decentralization 
is constantly a matter of concern in the scholarly or academic literature.
Summarizing the main issues, the emergent features of the governance of 
justice will need: a) to preserve the independence of the judicial pillar of 
the ICC and the implementation of its jurisdiction; b) to extend the further 
definition of international crimes; c) the individual and corporate criminal 
responsibility; d) the criminal responsibility of a State; and e) the enforce-
ment of law with States that are not parties to the Statute of the Court. For 
an evaluation of the possible evolution of the features of justice governance, 
it will also be important to observe the institutional relations between the 
General Assembly of the UN, the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome 
Statute, the Security Council, the Human Rights Council, the Trust Fund 
for Victims, the International Court of Justice and the evolution in their 
relations. A systemic approach, institutional and normative, illustrate this 
research, which supports the determination of the States expressed in the 
Rome Statute, establishing a permanent criminal Court in relationship with 
the UN system with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern 
to the international community as a whole.103 In any case, the rule of law 
should be applied domestically and the main responsibility for it rests with 
the States themselves.
102 See C. Bassiouni and D. Rothenberg , “Facing Atrocity: The Importance of Guiding Prin-
ciples on Post-Confl ict Justice”, The Chicago Principles on Post-Confl ict Justice, (2007) Inter-
national Human Rights Law Institute, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Istituto Supe-
riore Internazionale di Scienze Criminali, Association Internationale de Droit Pénal,, at 
6, accessible at: http://www.isisc.org/public/chicago%20principles%20-%20fi nal%20
-%20may%209%202007.pdf
103 See the Rome Statute provisions in Part II, Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable law, 
Article 5 (Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court) until Article 21 (Applicable law), 
at 3, 16, accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/
Chapter 5  The Governance Structure of Complementary Global Regimes and their Competence 233
The next part of this study argues that pressuring the sovereign responsi-
bility of any State on sustainable peace, impunity, meaningful justice to the 
victims and accountability of criminal perpetrators should be dealt with an 
integrated approach of governance. It selects two case studies and debates 
the findings deriving from them. In particular, it provides assessments of the 
country-specific situation in the Sudan (Darfur).104 It debates the humani-
tarian escalations of last resort and their governance in the field operations. 
It argues about the issue of cooperation dealing with serious international 
crimes and with the fight against impunity while protecting civilian lives. 
Obviously, this case study cannot be considered as exhaustive. The next and 
last part of this study advocates for the political will to implement the duty 
to maintain and restore peace, justice and security according to the human 
security doctrine. The main requirement would be to develop interaction 
strategies between legal and political frameworks oriented on the suprana-
tional perspective of the international legal order and in accordance with 
the constitution of the world community. Such constitutional drift seems to 
become more distant in view of the pluralistic approaches taken at nation-
al, regional and international levels. This is particularly true if we look at 
the developments in the position of the African Union and the relationship 
with the Security Council and the International Criminal Court, either in the 
context of peace enforcement operations, or looking at the implications in 
the context of international criminal justice and human rights obligations 
of the African States. Moreover, only a minority of States Parties adjusted 
their internal legislation and constitutional parameters in accordance with 
the emerging regime falling under the Rome Statute. The lacuna of interac-
tion strategies is also applicable in the bilateral approach of States and global 
actors implicated in mass atrocity crimes, including the important role of 
civil society organizations in their collection of fact-findings and reporting 
activities.
104 In December 2012 the new Prosecutor of the Court informed the Security Council that 
her offi ce might pursue further investigations of individuals who may be responsible 
for attacks on civilians, attacks on the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID), and the disruption of the delivery of humanitarian relief. See F. Bensouda, 
Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the situation in Darfur, the Sudan, pursu-




 The Humanitarian 
Escalations of Last Resort 
and their Governance 
in the Field Operations
“Since wars begin in the minds of men it is in the minds 
of men that the defences of peace must be constructed”. 
From the Preamble of the UNESCO Constitution

Preliminary remarks
The main argument expressed in this part of this study is that without 
appropriate interaction strategies between complementary global regimes 
(based on balancing public powers through visible reforms, policy formula-
tion and law-making processes) there would be limits in the creation of a 
global architecture dealing effectively with the escalations of war and crime. 
Such interaction strategies are required for democratic governance and for 
the preservation of the rule of law. The good governance of peace and justice 
not only depends from the implementation of mutual interests and mutual 
support applied on the ground between complementary mandates, but also 
from the developments of governance frameworks and their complemen-
tary character at structural, functional and normative levels. The role of the 
emerging regime of international criminal justice in the arrays of peace and 
security in Africa is still very weak for several reasons. The formulation of 
governance frameworks dealing with humanitarian escalations of war and 
crime is only at its initial stage of realization. The actors involved have to 
take ownership of their mutual responsibilities of cooperation, law enforce-
ment and civilian protection in situations of mass atrocities. The purpose of 
this Part III is to introduce the case studies dealing with the humanitarian 
escalation of last resort and their governance in the field operations in the 
Sudan and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It debates respectively: a) 
the current place of justice in the arrays of peace and security maintenance, 
b) the political issues around the first generation of international humanitar-
ian escalations of mass atrocity crimes and the governance frameworks deal-
ing with them, c) the role of international, regional and bilateral actors in the 
Sudan and in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and d) the management of 
the intra-state conflict in the Sudan and the lessons learned.
The last years of the century proved to be a period of dramatic transition 
for the sake of statehood and democratic governance in African States.1 The 
inter-state ethnic conflicts had terrible consequences visible in the execution 
1 See R. H. Jackson, C. G. Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and 
the Juridical in Statehood”, World Politics, Volume 35, Issue 1 (Oct. 1982), at 1-24. See also 
S. Levitsky, L. A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War, 2010.
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of mass atrocities.2 In 1989 it seemed that the end of the Cold War heralded 
far brighter prospects for the African future but good hopes were soon seri-
ously troubled.3 The continent was devastated by internal conflicts and large 
scale humanitarian atrocities spreading in multiple countries. It was as if 
the Iron Curtain had been left open releasing the demonic forces of war and 
crime. Since then, an increasing number of emerging nations have under-
gone the turning drama of violent conflicts, mass atrocity crimes and the 
determination of warlords to retain political power at the expenses of civil-
ians. These civil wars have claimed millions of lives, and still do. The list of 
the so-called failed States doubled consistently. In several situations of war 
and crime the domestic governance systems and institutions are not self-
reliant during difficult political transitions, and are exposed to constant fail-
ure upholding human security measures. In the majority of such situations 
the State is replaced by criminal regimes violating fundamental individual 
rights. Empirical data of mass atrocities demonstrate serious impunity gaps 
and the powerless or unwillingness of domestic security systems to preserve 
law and order. The domestic, regional and international responsibilities 
upholding minimal standards of governance of war and crime are undoubt-
edly in transition. Although the paradigms of the responsibility to protect 
civilians in conflict zones and the use of international justice and account-
ability should be complementary in their governance, this is not the case in 
the humanitarian escalations of last resort. The delimitation between state-
hood, State sovereignty and the frameworks of international governance 
requires new policy formulations upholding human security measures. An 
international architecture of governance fostering human security is abso-
lutely required. There is, however, a long way to go.
The dilemma of human security in the governance of complementary global 
regimes is still unresolved and waits for visible solutions from the political 
forces involved in such policy formulations. Besides, the conceptualization 
of human security upraised already an extensive debate in academic and 
policy circles. This study, however, does not attempt to solve it.4 If on one 
side the reality of armed conflicts rendered international protection duties 
of civilians more complex, on the other there are institutionalized defenders 
of truth protecting individual rights. This is the vision offered by comple-
2 For an overview of African confl icts and serious humanitarian breaches currently occur-
ring in several countries, see Human Rights Watch, CAR/DRC: LRA Conducts Massive 
Adduction Campaign, August 11, 2010, accessible at: http://www.hrw.org/en/news/
2010/08/11/cardr-congo-lra-conducts-massive-abduction-campaign For the debate about 
international interventions and democracies see, W. M. Reisman, ‘Humanitarian Interven-
tion and Fledging Democracies’, 18 Fordham International Law Journal, 1994-1995, at 794.
3 R. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War, 2000.
4 See R. Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?”, International Security, Fall 
2001, Vol. 26, No. 2, 87-102. See A. Pop, Article Review: Human Security: Paradigm Shift 
or Hot Air? 2006, accessible at: http://www.academia.edu/1098843/Article_Review_-_
Human_Security_Paradigm_Shift_or_Hot_Air
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mentary global regimes such as the UN and the Rome Statute institutions. 
In the context of the governance of international threats and crimes these 
regimes represent an opportunity to centralize individuals rather than exclu-
sively prioritizing the interests of nation-states. Obviously, only a suprana-
tional capacity upholding universal norms would be the satisfactory way 
dealing with mass atrocity crimes and also fighting against other interna-
tional threats and crimes. This is of course left to the outcome of political 
convergence of expectations in global politics, which still depend on the 
volatile dynamics and fluctuations characterizing international relations 
and the politics of mass atrocities. The governance debates regarding the 
breakdowns of domestic jurisdictions, or even worse, about the situations 
characterized by the complete absence and collapse of nations-states in con-
flict and post-conflict situations share the same common concerns. Namely, 
that the international responses in mass atrocities simply depend from frag-
mented legal and political frameworks based on cooperation requiring fur-
ther implementation. This is either true in the context of the maintenance, 
management and restoration of international peace and security, or in the 
fight against the impunity of serious international crimes. Nevertheless, it is 
required to assess where feasible opportunities can be found in the humani-
tarian escalations of last resort with an integrated model of cooperation, law 
enforcement and civilian protection duties in conflict and post-conflict situa-
tions. The first section below introduces a) the place of justice in the arrays of 
peace and security as a tool of last resort, b) the assessment provided by way 
of case studies and c) the outline of the chapters pointing out the practice 
applied in situations of war and crime before the formulation of the recom-
mendations would take place.
6.1 The place of Justice in the arrays of Peace and Security
Section outline
The analysis of multilateral perspectives indicates that since the creation of 
the United Nations system seventy years ago, much of the international law 
and diplomacy has been developed, shaped, implemented and enforced 
through the UN bodies and related international organizations dealing with 
peace and justice. Later, with the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc in the 
early 1990s it emerged a considerably revitalized political determination of 
the UN to promote a new era of global cooperation. However, the political 
trend to respond to the challenges of the increasingly interdependent global 
economy delayed the attention required in the extreme violence occurring in 
conflict zones and the mass atrocity crimes deriving from them. The interna-
tional interventions in Africa, particularly in Rwanda and Sierra Leone, did 
not reduce the misery of civilians.5 In order to give an idea of the place of 
5 See R. Kaplan, supra. See also F. Grünfeld, A. Huijboom, The Failure to Prevent Genocide in 
Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders, 2007.
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justice in the arrays of peace and security this part offers an overview of the 
conflict management and peace enforcement in the Sudan and the humani-
tarian escalation of the Security Council to the Court (Darfur). The regime 
of justice falling under the Rome Statute was generated in the first instance 
by the determination of civil society organizations advocating for interna-
tional engagements in mass atrocities preserving fundamental individual 
rights. Such regime is still far from realizing the expectation of international 
humanitarian escalations based on the complementary character of global 
regimes working for sustainable peace. Therefore, the case studies advo-
cate for systemic changes of governance frameworks in order for them to 
be complementary and maximize the results in conflict and post-conflicts 
situations.
The Rome Statute system has a limited jurisdiction and does not have police 
force. The referral of the situation in the Sudan from the Security Council 
confirms the limitations of its working methods with the Court. In theory, 
the judicial proceedings against criminal perpetrators not only represent 
a deterrent tool of international crimes, but most importantly provide the 
truth in regard to a specific situation requiring political engagement for 
humanitarian intervention enforcing the law. In the past, such important 
factor proved not to be reliable in the selection of situations compromising 
international peace and security. Now, at least, there is a specific tool which 
still requires a place in the arrays of peace and security for its maintenance 
and restoration, and also for a well-defined, well-supported and well-visi-
ble complementary and comprehensive role in the international operations 
deployed on the ground. As the case studies will demonstrate, this is not yet 
the case. The international capacities of law enforcement and the strategies 
of civilian protection in situations of war and crime require systemic changes 
at structural, normative and functional levels and an integrated approach of 
governance fostering human security. In this way the retributive, protective 
and restitutive aspects of justice and the fight against impunity will serve the 
quest of sustainable peace in communities affected by war and crime. The 
attempt of this part is to shed some light on the complementary responsibili-
ties in the humanitarian escalations of mass atrocities, particularly about the 
so often referred ‘African test’ of humanitarian interventions under the flag 
of the responsibility to protect and the referrals of last resort addressed to the 
emerging regime of international criminal justice.6
6 See H. Breakey, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Confl icts: Review and Analysis”, Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law, Griffi th Univer-
sity, May, 2011, accessible at: http://www.griffi th.edu.au
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6.1.1 The risk analysis of international responses
In general this part examines the governance of international responses in 
fragile States where ‘arrangements and agreements’ of cooperation between 
relevant stakeholders are weak and need implementation. In particular, it 
emphasizes the necessity to establish ‘narrowly focused’ mandates and high 
standards of cooperation based on mutual interests between peace and jus-
tice. This trend of governance should be visible in both referral and non-
referral activities of the Security Council to the Court. This part examines 
the dynamics in the case studies dealing with the peace enforcement opera-
tions of the Security Council and the judicial activity of the Court provid-
ing some recommendations for decision-makers. The first case study gives 
attention to the first generation of referrals coming from the Security Coun-
cil to the Court exploring the operationalization of the R2P in the Sudan. 
The most obvious case for the first application of the new set of mechanisms 
and guidelines within the duty to protect civilians was Darfur, but we will 
see that both the Sudanese government and the international community 
have failed to take the necessary steps to protect civilians in the country. 
Instead, while the Security Council remained silent to the judicial outcomes 
addressed by the Court to the Sudanese warlords, the regime of the govern-
ment in Khartoum and its janjaweed militias have conducted a systematic 
campaign of atrocities in Darfur. The most responsible perpetrators are still 
at large and there is a political impasse between global and regional actors, 
namely the UN, the ICC and the AU considering the political unrest and the 
violence spreading also in South Sudan. Obviously, such an impasse slows 
down the political road map required for an ‘architecture’ fostering peace, 
justice and security and the best ways humanitarian escalations should be 
governed in intra-state, and eventually in inter-state conflicts, upholding the 
responsibilities to protect civilians.
The Court’s jurisdiction is complementary to that of the States that have rati-
fied its Statute while its global mandate is complementary to the UN regime. 
The Court has no police force and no prisons. Thus, implementing and mak-
ing effective the obligation of States and other international actors cooperat-
ing with the Court’s activities has been the most important challenge in the 
initial period of its existence. Moreover, we have seen that the interaction 
with the Security Council is not characterized by any compulsory coopera-
tion. Paragraph 7 of the Darfur referral by the Security Council to the Court, 
“recognizes that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the refer-
ral, including expenses related to investigations or prosecutions in connec-
tion with that referral, shall be borne by the United Nations, and that such 
costs shall be borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those States that 
wish to contribute voluntarily”.7 The same trend is confirmed with the refer-
7 See UN doc. S/RES/1593 (2005).
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ral of the situation in Libya to the Court. An appropriate involvement of the 
Security Council with resources and law enforcement support does not seem 
to be the priority. Consensus on such support is expected in the UN General 
Assembly at least with regard to the referrals addressed to the Court by the 
Security Council. The last resort option of international criminal justice waits 
for political convergence and for a legal framework based on compulsory 
cooperation with or without the referrals coming from the Security Council.
6.1.2 The case studies assessment
In primis the case studies reveal several gaps in the international humanitar-
ian escalations and their governance in the field operations. There are no 
doubts that the conventional (military) methods of conflict management are 
no longer effective, therefore the configurations of international mandates 
deployed on the ground require a new approach of governance. The place 
of justice in the arrays of international peace and security is compromised 
for several reasons. The governance of the emerging regime of international 
criminal justice in the context of sustainable peace in intra- and possibly inter-
state civil wars requires further decision-making on the ways humanitarian 
escalations would be performed between complementary global actors. The 
case studies focus on the operations deployed on the ground and the current 
restrictions of complementarity, which in some ways reduces the impact of 
justice and its deterrent effect. In the DRC, for instance, the United Nations 
invested in multidimensional operations on the ground mandated by the 
Security Council to assist the country on the road to stability (MONUSCO). 
The Congolese government referred to the International Criminal Court the 
investigation and prosecution of serious breaches of international humani-
tarian law. In the Sudan, the Security Council referred the situation of Darfur 
to the Court after the shortcomings in peace agreements and peace enforce-
ment.8 It is clear that peace operations should support the Court a) since the 
referral, b) during its investigative activity, and c) after its judicial outcomes. 
In practice, this has not been the case. In the Sudan the law enforcement 
failed, including the expectations of civilian protection duties and humani-
tarian assistance. The criminal regime still in power in the country waits to 
be isolated with concrete international efforts. In the DRC the configurations 
of peace-keeping and peace-building mandates do not fulfill the require-
ments of the judicial activities of the Court, including the civilian protec-
tion duties of civilians. Hopefully, judicial proceedings will be performed 
8 See P. Takirambudde, “UN: Darfur Resolution a Historic Failure”, Human Rights Watch, 
September 18, 2004, accessible at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2004/09/17/un-darfur-
resolution-historic-failure See also “Security Council must urgently take action to end 
impunity in Darfur – ICC Prosecutor”, UN News Centre, 5 June 2013. See Statement of the 
Prosecutor of the ICC to the UNSC pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 05/06/2013, acces-
sible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/ICC-OTP-UNSC-Dafur-05June2013-ENG.
pdf
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in situ, but such trend is not sufficiently detectable in the domestic judicial 
activity and victims and witnesses still cry for justice. In Mali the configura-
tion of robust peacekeeping operations does not refer to any support to the 
quest of justice on the ground.9 In Kenya there is confusion about legal obli-
gations and political positions at domestic and regional levels. The political 
trend of the AU against the Rome Statute system is absolutely regrettable. In 
any case, the judicial activities of the Court cannot be compromised by any 
of its political standpoints.10 The lack of cooperation with the Office of the 
Prosecutor by the government of Kenya and the withdraw of the charges of 
crimes against Kenyatta is deplorable. Justice for victims of the 2007-2008 
post-election violence is still an urgent priority.11
The case studies indicate that peace and justice mandates are disconnected 
between them in both categories of referrals to the Court. In regard to Lib-
ya, the use of the language in the resolution of the Security Council referred 
to the responsibility to protect authorizing the military intervention, while 
extending further the mandate of international criminal justice falling under 
the Rome Statute. In Libya the national transitional council (NTC) will need 
to perform reliable domestic governance of both security and rule of law 
sectors taking care of civilian protection measures, while investigating and 
prosecuting serious breaches of international humanitarian law.12 The con-
sensus building in the Security Council to intervene in Syria totally failed. 
The dangerous domino effect of the Arab Spring characterizing the violence 
spreading in the entire region of the Middle East still raises serious security 
concerns. In Syria the international community remains silent and inactive 
to the commission of serious crimes of common concern. The Court is not 
able to get involved in Syria. It simply did not receive jurisdiction from the 
Security Council. In Syria no political convergence has been met in regard 
to the maintenance of peace, justice and security. The same political iner-
9 See UN doc. S/RES/2085 (2012). See M. Lankhorst, “Peacebuilding in Mali: Linking Jus-
tice, Security, and Reconciliation”, The Hague Institute for Global Justice, Policy Brief 6, 
November 2013, accessible at: http://thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org
10 During the yearly speech at the UN General Assembly (31 October 2013) the ICC Presi-
dent Song emphasised that “the Court has the duty to observe the legal framework set 
by States” and asked the other stakeholders of the system to uphold the integrity of the 
Rome Statute, respecting the roles assigned to each entity under the Statute. He also 
stressed that “whereas the Assembly of States Parties can consider legislative issues and 
discuss political questions, the ICC must remain an independent, judicial institution”. 
See ICC Annual Report to the United Nations General Assembly, 31 October 2013, accessible 
at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/presidency/Pres-statement-31-10-2013-Eng.pdf
11 See Amnesty International, “Kenya: Justice for victims of post-election violence still an 
urgent priority”, 5 December 2014, accessible at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/arti-
cles/news/2014/12/icc-drops-charges-against-kenyan-president/
12 See Sixth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Coun-
cil pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), New York, 14 November 2013, accessible at: http://
www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/
ProsecutorUNSCNov2013.aspx
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tia characterizes the humanitarian crisis exploded in North Korea and the 
authoritarian nature of its regime, including the gravity, the scale and the 
nature of the violations committed in this country.13 The unacceptable nature 
and magnitude of these crises demand a common position and joint interna-
tional actions.14
If in theory the tools governing multiple situations of war and crime have 
the role to improve human security expectations centralizing individuals in 
international affairs, the practice shows serious concerns. There is a long way 
ahead for further accomplishments of international governance institutions 
of complementary character. Some of the obstacles, challenges and concerns, 
including the opportunities upholding multilateral solutions have already 
been discussed in the previous parts of this study. The case studies conclude 
this analytical journey which surely requires further research providing 
solutions to the enforcement of law, civilian protection duties and the mod-
els of capacity building in conflict and post-conflict situations characterized 
by serious violations of international law. The purpose of the case studies 
is to evaluate the multidimensional capacity of international responses and 
the efforts maximizing the results on the ground integrating peace, justice 
and security mandates. Their complementary character requires stronger 
political determinations strengthening partnerships globally, regionally and 
on the ground. In order to influence the domestic governance institutions 
and the accountability system against criminal perpetrators as an important 
aspect of civilian protection duties, flexible configurations between com-
plementary mandates are strongly recommended in the short and middle 
terms. In the long term, political convergence should be found by the politi-
cal forces empowering complementary global regimes on the ways their 
institutions, and the political processes deriving from them, could work 
together more effectively.
Justice and accountability are fundamental for lasting peace and security in 
conflict and post-conflict situations. The UN family of institutions, bodies, 
specialized agencies and donors should support the Court’s mandate pri-
oritizing: the retributive aspect of justice (investigations, prosecutions, arrest 
warrants and law enforcement); the protective aspect of justice, (relocation, 
demobilization of ex-soldiers, protection of witnesses of crimes and other 
civilian protection duties); and the reparative aspect of justice (participation of 
civilians in judicial proceedings, facilitating the reparative measures for the 
13 See UN doc. A/HRC/25/63 (2014), Report of the commission of inquiry on human 
rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
14 The Geneva II Conference on Syria (January 2014) is pursued by UN peace envoy to 
Syria Lakhdar Brahimi in cooperation with the United States and Russia. The aim of the 
conference is ending the civil war in the country. See UN Action Group for Syria, Final 
Communiqué, 30.06.2012, accessible at: http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/
FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf
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victims of serious international crimes). Besides, the findings of justice should 
not be left half way deprived of law enforcement capacity, in particular after 
the failure of preventive diplomacy, peace negotiations and the commis-
sion of criminal acts. Once again, justice should receive support with every 
means in both referrals and non-referrals coming from the Security Council.
6.1.3 The outline of the chapters
In this part the first chapter points out the humanitarian escalations in mass 
atrocity and their governance in the field operations exploring the politi-
cal dynamics of the first referral of the Security Council to the Court in the 
Sudan, and the political impact at regional level and also for the range of 
other actors involved. The second chapter deals with the multidimensional 
operations and the issue of cooperation including the gaps in the coordina-
tion, coherence and law enforcement in the DRC as the main obstacles to 
reach sustainable peace in the country. The third and last chapter provides 
the concluding assessment about the place the emerging regime of inter-
national criminal justice should receive in the arrays of peace and security 
mandates on the ground. The findings in the case studies underscore the 
necessity of a political road map fostering peace, justice and security with an 
integrated, democratic and comprehensive approach of governance. The 
main recommendation addressed to decision-makers on such issues is to re-
determine the democratization process of global regimes of complementary 
character preserving further international law and order. This is considered 
the fundamental requirement to achieve results in the global fight against 
international threats, and be prepared to respond, react and rebuild in situ-
ations of war and crime in accordance with the challenges of the time and 
the features of our global society. The progress of democratic governance, 
or better say, the search of an international architecture fostering peace, jus-
tice and security obviously depends on a) the evolution of the international 
politics of mass atrocities, b) the cooperation between the actors dealing with 
humanitarian escalations in extreme situations of war and crime, and c) the 
institutional reforms and reviews of the working methods between them. 
The definition of complementary global regimes requires a political road map 
at domestic, regional and international levels by the stakeholders investing 
in them. Despite the critics from a relevant number of observers there seem 
to be new opportunities fostering peace, justice and security. These opportu-
nities have to rely on the human security doctrine. The complementary char-
acter of global regimes deserves the attention from decision-makers in the 
short, middle and long terms in accordance with the human security doc-
trine. After all, the approach in accordance with the expectations of human 
security has the potential “to bring international law better into line with the 
requirements of today’s world”.15
15 G. Oberleitner, “Human Security: A Challenge to International Law?” in Global Gover-
nance 11 (2005), at 185–203.
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This part underscores the importance of an interaction strategy between 
global regimes of complementary character against criminal regimes that 
destabilize peace and security and violate fundamental individual rights. It 
offers some observations regarding the international interventions in mass 
atrocities in Africa. In particular, it explores the challenges of such respons-
es in the African continent and the emerging role of complementary global 
regimes. It considers the implementation and harmonization as fundamen-
tal prerequisites for the definition of the complementary character of such 
regimes, including the assessments of their legal frameworks based on: 
complementarity (with a particular focus on ‘positive complementarity’ and 
the referrals by States to the Court, including the steps that may be taken to 
encourage and facilitate genuine national judicial proceedings in situ); coop-
eration (including implementing legislation, judicial assistance, international 
actors and regional organizations); peace and justice (e.g. the role of the UN, 
particularly focusing on the law enforcement of the arrest warrants of the 
Court and the working methods with the Security Council); and the impact 
on victims and affected communities (including outreach, victim participation, 
reparations and the trust fund for victims).16 In order to shed some light on 
the shortcomings of sustainable peace in several situations the next section 
points out a) the dynamics of the international engagements in mass atroci-
ties, b) the formulation of humanitarian escalations and the governance 
frameworks dealing with them, and c) the prerequisites for their implemen-
tation and harmonization.
6.2 The International Humanitarian Escalations of Mass 
Atrocities
Section Outline
The idealistic approach in the debate of humanitarian escalations in mass 
atrocities emphasizes the fact that complementary global regimes should 
be able to retain either the challenges occurring in international politics, 
or the global policy formulation of humanitarian interventions and mutu-
al accountability, using the rule of law as the most important principle of 
governance in humanitarian affairs. However, as we have previously dis-
cussed, the process of the internationalization of law focusing on the inter-
play between national, regional and international norms and based on the 
universalism principle of human rights is a ‘work in progress’ issue which 
requires political determination, persistence and time. The intervention 
in humanitarian matters in sovereign States needs further efforts in accor-
dance with universal values and human rights preservation standards, as 
16 See ICC-ASP docs., Stocktaking of International Criminal Justice, 2010, accessible at: http://
www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/reviewconference/stocktaking/Pages/stocktaking.
aspx
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well as international governance institutions dealing with civilian protec-
tion measures. This is particularly true in this delicate phase of the exist-
ing global institutional frameworks which risk not to be further extended 
by know-how and resources due to the financial constraints and economic 
breakdowns of many States. The best option should be to benefit from the 
increased competence and responsibility of the tools already at disposition: 
the United Nations and the Rome Statute systems. The search of the basic 
requirements for a global architecture fostering peace, justice and security is 
fundamental. Such architecture has to be designed in a comprehensive and 
democratic way and based on the constitution of the world community. Fur-
ther progress is to be seen in the institutional reforms, in the advancement of 
global democratization processes, and in the concrete efforts balancing pow-
ers between international governance institutions of complementary char-
acter. In other words, the applicable ways international global actors would 
best understand the complex needs of affected populations by war, violence 
and crime centralizing the rights of civilians. Such an approach, of course, 
requires political convergence of expectations. Some of the reasons why this 
is so difficult to realize are examined in this section.
This section examines the emerging regime of international justice as a tool 
to achieve sustainable peace in intra- and eventually inter-states civil wars. 
It attempts to define the new concept of humanitarian escalations between 
complementary global regimes involved in conflict and post-conflict situa-
tions and their governance. Such escalations are characterized by the autho-
rizations of the Security Council to intervene in conflict zones with every 
means in order to maintain and restore peace and security and also to protect 
civilians. In the African continent and in particular in sub-Saharan Africa in 
the Great Lakes African region, including Sudan and Chad,17 the Security 
Council attempted to leave and authorize the regional involvement in the 
humanitarian escalations of mass atrocities. This was the case in the Sudan, 
in the DRC and other situations left to the African Union to intervene with 
the option of hybrid solutions. In both cases the working methods in regard 
to the responsibility to protect civilians in conflict zones displayed several 
gaps of governance. In regard to justice the political consensus to extend the 
Court’s jurisdiction has not been reached in several situations of war and 
crime, with the last one being Syria. The new element about the use of justice 
as deterrent tool of war and crime and towards the referrals activities of the 
Security Council to the Court would require, first of all, a place in the arrays 
of peace and security for law enforcement measures supporting the judicial 
institution with every means. Instead, the Court is left completely discon-
nected from the working methods of the Security Council and its involve-
17 See J. Giroux, D. Lanz, D. Sguaitamatti, “The Tormented Triangle: The Regionalization of 
Confl ict in Sudan, Chad and Central African Republic”, Crisis States Working Papers No. 
2, 2009, at 17.
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ment falling under the flag of humanitarian interventions. Furthermore, the 
Court is left quite isolated in regard to the protection, relocation and safety 
of civilians affected by war and crime. The results of the Court depend on 
such narrow international cooperation regime and on the legal obligations 
of its States Parties. The Security Council and the UN members should be 
supportive before, during, and after the humanitarian escalations so-called 
of last resort would occur. Besides, through the UN political institutions even 
non-States Parties to the Court should be pressured to cooperate.
6.2.1 The international engagements in mass atrocities
From a broad perspective the international engagements in mass atroci-
ties implicated matters of conscience, sense of guilt and helplessness, com-
bined with valuable ethical and universal aspirations to intervene in case of 
severe violations of international humanitarian law.18 Despite the psycho-
logical, ethical and philosophical aspects, including the political reasons for 
the creation of the UN ad hoc tribunals in the past, a reliable motivation to 
create a governance system based on individual accountabilities was never 
part of the political determinations expressed by the permanent members 
of the Security Council, including many States governed by different legal 
traditions, and which took political distance from the emerging regime of 
international criminal justice falling under the Rome Statute. It is clear that 
the system of accountability proposed by the emerging regime of the Rome 
Statute needs further political campaign and advocacy from global actors 
and civil society. Such regime represents the opportunity to centralize the 
role of the victims of serious international crimes challenging the mental-
ity of impunity of crimes recognised under customary international law. 
Obviously, the global political engagement of States Parties and non-Parties, 
international and regional organizations and civil society are absolutely nec-
essary. The risks of political impasse, however, currently persist if we look at 
the distant political position taken from the African Union against the Rome 
Statute regime.19
The promise made by the international community of ‘never again’ in regard 
to genocide has not been fully maintained. In the early 1990s the UN and 
the US intervention in Somalia for example, was supposed to be driven by 
humanitarian concerns, but the subsequent humiliation and improper with-
18 See L. E. Fletcher, “From Indifference to Engagement: Bystanders and International 
Criminal Justice”, 26 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1013 (2004), accessible at: http://scholarship.law.
berkeley.edu/facpubs/598
19 T. Murithi, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court: An Embattled Rela-
tionship?”, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), 2013, accessible at: http://www.
africaportal.org/dspace/articles/african-union-and-international-criminal-court-embat-
tled-relationship K. Kindiki, “The Normative and Institutional Framework of the African 
Union Relating to the Protection of Human Rights and the Maintenance of International 
Peace and Security: A Critical Appraisal”, 3 Afr. Hum. Rts. L.J. 97 (2003).
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drawal of those forces in 1994 quickly undercut what international engage-
ment there was for intervention on humanitarian grounds. The demands of 
international humanitarian interventions were enormous and the resources 
inadequate.20 Today, from the lessons learned in the situations in Libya, Syr-
ia and in the Sudan many have troubles to believe that there is something we 
can do in the face of the collapse of nation-states and the devastating conse-
quences on civilians. The international responses to the genocide in Rwanda 
and the Balkans, most notably in Srebrenica, were characterized by weak 
political engagements. When such interventions did occur, as in Kosovo for 
instance, the international legal basis for it was even unclear.21 The selectiv-
ity of such situations has been based on political interests. The risk was that 
such selectivity would become the practice of international responses any-
where else. As extensively discussed in the previous chapters, the support 
to address gross human rights violations emerged with the reinvigoration 
of multilateralism following the end of the Cold War. When a State would 
fail in its primary responsibilities towards its citizens the international com-
munity would also be responsible to intervene in extreme conflict situations. 
Since 2005, the norm of ‘the responsibility to protect’ civilians presented 
operational shortcomings on the ground, including unclear strategies of 
mandates’ configuration of the Security Council supporting complementary 
actors fostering peace, justice and security, such as the Court. The test of the 
‘responsibility to protect’ civilians by the international community, interven-
ing in violent conflicts in Africa and the Middle East, has been partially left 
in the hands of the volatile character of global politics. Such responsibility 
is not legally defined and in the stage of policy formulation and still requir-
ing implementation and harmonization. Therefore, it is required to spend 
a couple of words a) on the formulation of governance frameworks deal-
ing with humanitarian escalations; b) on the role of complementary global 
regimes and the responsibilities of the States in such formulations; and c) on 
the prerequisites of their harmonization to optimize the results at domestic, 
regional and international levels. The international politics of mass atrocities 
and the governance frameworks at their disposition require with any doubt 
systemic changes.
6.2.2 The formulation of governance frameworks
At present the formulation of governance frameworks dealing with law 
enforcement and civilian protection duties in situations of mass atrocities 
is an idea not yet realized. It is clear that the current impasse in regard to 
the enforcement of law is troubled by the politics of double standards of 
20 See J. Mayall, The New Interventionism: 1991-1994. The UN experience in Cambodia, former 
Yugoslavia and Somalia, at 94, transferred to digital printing in 2001.
21 See D. H. Joyner, “The Kosovo Intervention: Legal Analysis and a More Persuasive Para-
digm” EJIL (2002), Vol. 13 No. 3, at 597, accessible at: http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/con-
tent/13/3/597.full.pdf
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the Security Council and by the shortcomings of States and regional orga-
nizations to fully cooperate with the Court. Despite the fact that two arrest 
warrants are outstanding against the President of the Sudan, Omar-Al 
Bashir, and despite the Court’s orders and widespread calls of the interna-
tional community to respect its obligations of cooperation with the Court, 
the visit of Omar-Al Bashir to many African States had taken place anyway 
since the Court’s judicial orders. Furthermore, the Sudan, as a member of 
the UN, did not comply with the UN Resolution 1593 (2005) to arrest the 
perpetrators of serious violations of international humanitarian law. Obvi-
ously, the fact that the highest authorities in the country are responsible of 
the crimes requires an optimized use of the international tools currently at 
disposition. Such good use depends on the drift in global politics and on 
the willingness to preserve internationally law and order. The legal dichot-
omy between pluralism and constitutionalism, and the global regimes and 
institutional frameworks deriving from them, have to rely on their comple-
mentary role for their effectiveness. There is no other way to improve their 
good governance. This requires further efforts in regard to law enforcement, 
civilian protection duties and capacity-building models to be applied in con-
flict and post-conflict situations. It needs to be noted that in the Sudan the 
Security Council did not take the previous law enforcement position as in 
the situation in Sierra Leone. In the Charles Taylor’s case before the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, unanimously passed the Resolution 1638 (2005) which empow-
ered the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to arrest, detain, and 
transfer Taylor to the UN court in Sierra Leone in the event that he appeared 
in Liberia or in another African country. In the case of the Sudan the inter-
national politics of mass atrocities manifested the risk to undermine the 
credibility of a fair, impartial and independent international judiciary.22 The 
problem is that both support and cooperation were not provided on very 
sensitive issues falling under the Rome Statute regime and the critics pro-
liferate. Such trend confirms the complications characterizing the legal and 
political debates in regard to the emerging regime of international criminal 
justice, including the political convergence required for its place in the arrays 
of peace and security.23
The policy formulations of humanitarian interventions deserve some obser-
vations. After the Cold War the challenges of human security in Africa pres-
sured the leadership for a political agenda sustained by the international 
22 See W. A. Schabas, “The International Criminal Court and the Security Council Referral 
of the Darfur Situation”, D. R. Black, P. D. Williams (eds.), The International Politics of 
Mass Atrocities, 2010, at 149.
23 M. G. Ituma, “The Crossroads of Politics and Law: The Unfi nished Debate between the 
United States and the International Criminal Court”, in Africa Peace and Confl ict Journal, 
5:2 (2012), at 79–82, accessible at: http://www.apcj.upeace.org/issues/APCJ_Vol_5_2_
Final_Web.pdf
Chapter 6  The International Responses to Mass Atrocities in Africa and the Criminal Regime in the Sudan  251
actors involved in the continent. The domestic criminal regimes and the 
dictatorships would come across legal frameworks and renewed political 
approaches by African leaders themselves, western governments, interna-
tional organizations and civil society. Sovereignty would finally be seen as 
a defined responsibility of domestic governance institutions of the nation-
states towards their citizens. If it is true that the ‘non-intervention’ policy 
of African States applied in mass atrocities situations during the Cold War 
turned out to be only on paper on civilian protection duties and victim 
rights in the post-cold war phase, such policy still requires an appropriate 
implementation visible in the practice of civilian protection applied on the 
ground.24 Moreover, after an extensive analysis of the serious shortcomings 
in the field operations in the last couple of decades, eminent observers dem-
onstrated to policy-makers the necessity to review old models of conflict 
management performed by the UN involved in security matters and sustain-
able peace in African countries.25 Finally, with the Rome Statute the majority 
of the African States committed themselves to put an end to the mentality of 
impunity of serious crimes perpetrated before, during, and after the explo-
sion of armed conflicts. However, immediately after its establishment the 
Court’s involvement in large scale humanitarian atrocities with investiga-
tion and prosecution in African countries, resumed in political pressure over 
its presence, its priorities, and the controversial relation between peace, jus-
tice and security.
Since the start of the first generation of referrals received from the States and 
the Security Council in the Sudan and Libya, the Court made immediately 
clear its prosecutorial strategy, based on judicial and not political decisions, 
its policy over admissibility, interest of justice and gravity, according to its 
treaty, the Rome Statute, which is complementary to the UN Charter.26 The 
confirmation of its complementary role to the United Nations derived from 
the fact that the Court did not hesitate to take over the situation in Dar-
fur referred by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
extending the Court’s jurisdiction to a non-State party such as the Sudan.27 
But before assessing further the ways such complementary roles have been 
24 On the failure of the responsibility to protect in Darfur, see N. Grono, “The International 
Community’s Failure To Protect”, 105 African Affairs 421, 2006, at 622.
25 See T. Piiparinen, The Transformation of UN Confl ict Management. Producing Images of Geno-
cide from Rwanda to Darfur and Beyond, (2010).
26 For an overview of the Policies and Strategies see the Policy Papers and Prosecutorial 
Strategy accessible on the web portal of the International Criminal Court (OTP): http://
www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Offi ce+of+the+Prosecutor/
Policies+and+Strategies/
27 UN doc. S/RES/1593 (2005) Referring the Situation in Darfur, Sudan to the Prosecutor 
of the International Criminal Court, Adopted by Vote of 11 in Favour, To None Against, 
with 4 Abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China, United States). See also UN doc. S/RES/1970 
(2011) on Libya. This resolution represents the fi rst time the Security Council has voted 
unanimously for an ICC referral.
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applied in the practice, it is required to recall some background governance 
issues, including the methods evolving around the international responses 
in mass atrocity crimes. The joint task force on peace and security between 
the African Union and the United Nations for instance, requires further 
efforts facilitating cooperation on humanitarian concerns and human securi-
ty on the ground, including the opportunity to enforce the arrest warrants of 
the Court while isolating the criminal perpetrators from the top diplomacy 
circles.28 A joint task force is also required and recommended between the 
AU and possibly with the involvement of the Assembly of the States Parties 
of the ICC (ASP) interacting with the UN political institutions. Such joint 
task force should have a specific role in regard to the AU decision-making, 
possibly merging international crimes in the jurisdiction of an African Court 
complementing the work of the ICC. The idea is that the ICC would repre-
sent a model of international criminal justice to be followed by any court or 
tribunal at domestic, regional and international levels. Moreover, the estab-
lishment of the African Court by the AU should demonstrate its feasibility 
complementing the ICC, and this, of course, remains to be seen.29
6.2.3 The role of complementary global regimes
In theory the role of complementary global regimes is to consolidate effec-
tive protection mechanisms of individuals in situations of war (protective 
justice), including a reliable sequence between peace negotiations and the 
judicial proceedings, or else, individual criminal accountability (retributive 
justice), and through reparation to the victims (restitutive justice). It is too 
soon to conclude if the mechanisms currently applied fostering peace, jus-
tice and security are capable to challenge domestic jurisdictions dealing with 
28 The African Union (AU), United Nations (UN) Joint Task Force (JTF) on Peace and Secu-
rity held its sixth consultative meeting at the AU Headquarters, in Addis Ababa, on the 
margins of the 20th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Govern-
ment on 26 January 2013, the AU-UN-JTF Joint Communiqué is accessible at: http://
www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-un-6th-jtf-meeting-26-01-2013.pdf
29 See M. du Plessis, “Implications of the AU decision to give the African Court jurisdiction 
over international crimes”, in Institute for Security Studies, Paper No. 235, June 2012. It 
needs to be noted that the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights had merged the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights and the 
Court of Justice of the African Union into a single Court, The African Court, see the Draft 
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights 15 May 2012, accessible at: http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ex-
cl-731-xxi-e.pdf
  See C. Jalloh, The African Union and Its Discontents with the International Criminal Court, 
Jurist, Forum, August 6, 2010, accessible at: http://jurist.org/forum/2010/08/the-african-
union-and-the-icc-growing discontent.php See also AU doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.296(XV), 
Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of Decision Assembly/
AU/DEC.270(XIV) on the Second Ministerial Meeting on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Doc. Assembly/AU/10(XV). Adopted by the Fifteenth Ordinary Session of 
the Assembly of the Union on 27 July 2010 in Kampala, Uganda.
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the devastating actions of criminal regimes on individuals and entire com-
munities. Nevertheless, a defined common strategy and institutional archi-
tecture optimizing the end results of democratic transformation, national 
reconstruction and good governance at domestic levels is required. These 
mechanisms largely include: constitutional reforms, investigations and pros-
ecutions, reparations, reconciliation and peace building measures, memori-
alization and truth commissions. The approach is intended to be case-by-
case and oriented to each particular conflict scenario. As several observers 
point out, if the emerging regime of international criminal justice delivers 
results not simply in terms of effective prosecution of a few leaders who 
could easily be replaced, but instead, “by promoting peace in a region where 
little else has succeeded over the last decades, the African enthusiasm that 
led to the establishment of the world’s first permanent international criminal 
tribunal will probably revive, returning even more strongly than before”.30 
This is of course true, but then again, it is not only a common responsibility 
of complementary global regimes and their political institutions, but primar-
ily a responsibility of the nation-states themselves, including regional orga-
nizations. After all, the African States expressed their strong political will 
to be part of the Rome Statute, and some of them voluntarily referred their 
inability to investigate and prosecute international humanitarian crimes to 
the Court. There are no doubts about the gaps characterizing the emerging 
international architecture fostering peace, justice and security. These gaps 
derive from the absence of a political road map and the determination of 
States to govern war and crime with multilateral and universal tools. The 
primary responsibility to adjust constitutional parameters in accordance 
with universal norms erga omnes lies in the hands of the States, while the 
role of complementary global regimes is to provide capacity-building in 
domestic jurisdictions. As stated by Delmas-Marty the emerging regime of 
international criminal justice and the rule of criminal law in general, “might 
found an ethic of globalization and show how to organize interactions at 
different levels to achieve pluralist stabilisation”.31 In order to achieve this 
important objective the political convergence of expectations at global level 
is absolutely required.
It needs to be noted that during the Review Conference of the Rome Statute 
in Kampala the limited presence of States Parties and observer delegations 
in the assessment panels for the implementation of the treaty, was remark-
able. There is no doubt that such educational segment of the Review Confer-
ence requires further work of researchers and practitioners. However, the 
attention was not prioritized on the side of the main representatives of the 
States Parties to probe and question the positive and negative aspects in the 
30 See W. A. Schabas, supra.
31 See M. Delmas-Marty, ‘Le droit pénal comme étique de la mondialisation’, Revue de sci-
ence criminelle 1, 2004. See also M. Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism. A Conceptual Frame-
work for Understanding the Transnational Legal World, 2009, at 109.
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implementation of the Rome Statute. Accurate recommendations about the 
reform of the working relationship between the Security Council and the 
Court will need to be further addressed by relevant findings of academia 
and civil society organizations. The Review Conference only initiated the 
discussions between governmental delegations on implementation and 
harmonization. Hopefully, this debate will continue soon on several crucial 
issues such as complementing the role of peace and justice and the reform 
of the working methods between the Security Council and the Court. The 
political dialogue on these matters, between the decision-making of States 
either parties to the Rome Statute or only members of the UN, is fundamen-
tal. Such dialogue requires to be shaped at multilateral level neutralizing the 
unilateral interests of some powerful observers trying to shape the Court at 
their own benefit. In my view such trend needs to be completely neutral-
ized opting for democratic reforms at national, regional and international 
levels in regard to the intervention in mass atrocities, individual criminal 
accountability of such serious crimes and the formulation of humanitarian 
escalations. The problem is the slow motion in realizing such reforms in the 
short term, while the political determinations and the actions taken in the 
middle and long terms have to be more concrete. Many issues have to find 
consensus in the UN General Assembly and in the Assembly of States Par-
ties to the Rome Statute, however, it remains to be seen the outcome of it. 
Considering the challenges in the international politics of mass atrocities 
and the emerging architecture dealing with it, both of them deserve further 
discussion. These challenges represent the key issues in order to optimize 
the results of complementary global regimes and their interactions in con-
flict and post-conflict societies. Organizational improvements for a better 
interaction between the UN system and the Rome Statute institutions would 
bring more results of early warning and deterrence, while intervening for 
stability, reconstruction and good governance. The implementation of an 
interaction strategy in respect of the separation of powers would benefit 
the fight against the culture of impunity establishing the rule of law, while 
renewing the trust of citizens in governance institutions and public service. 
In any case, implementation and harmonization are both required and the 
next paragraph elucidates some of the reasons.
6.2.4 The prerequisites of implementation and harmonization
In order to maximize the results on the ground, compulsory cooperation is 
absolutely required between relevant stakeholders. This is clear in the situ-
ations in the Sudan and with the first referral to the Court from the Security 
Council in regard to Darfur. Such cooperation should be based on the prin-
ciple of universality. The UN members should have mandatory obligations 
in case of Court’s referrals especially after the refusal of the Sudan to coop-
erate. Besides, their cooperation should undermine the fragmentation and 
decentralization of international law and its institutions, and prepare the 
grounds for a global structure of governance. The new system falling under 
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the Rome Statute should be integrated with the old system of the United 
Nations in respect of its judicial independence. If we consider the gaps of 
support in the referral activity coming from the Security Council and also in 
the situations where the Court and the Security Council are both involved, 
such an integrated model of governance is not yet realized. It is clear that 
the relationship agreement between the United Nations and the Court, the 
Rome Statute provisions and other agreements and arrangements are not 
sufficient for the governance of war and crime in authoritarian regimes. An 
appropriate implementation is required in the immediate, middle and long 
terms to enhance the relationship and partnership between complementary 
global regimes maximizing the results in the field operations. The last resort 
option to fight against the impunity of serious crimes cannot be left discon-
nected by parallel working relationships and distant political engagements 
of civilian protection mechanisms at international, regional and domestic 
levels. Besides, the States and regional organizations should address politi-
cal issues about peace and justice exclusively to the ASP, leaving the judicial 
proceedings entirely to the Court in accordance with the provisions of the 
Rome Statute and the principle of complementarity.
The priority is to solve the complexity of an impasse undermining the evolu-
tion to centralize individual rights in times of war, including the credibility 
of emerging regimes preserving universal purposes towards multilateral 
solutions. Until such issues are not resolved by the political organs enforcing 
complementary global regimes, it will be unrealistic, speculative and partial 
to refer to a global architecture fostering peace, justice and security. Another 
aspect of the international responses to the humanitarian escalations of last 
resort between political and judicial institutions is that they would not offer 
any preventive action of mass atrocities and this on the top of law enforce-
ment and civilian protection gaps. The risk is that neither the cause nor the 
effect of war and crime in conflict and post-conflict situations would receive 
a reliable architecture to be dealt with. In order to give orientation with spe-
cific guidelines to regional and bilateral solutions the multilateral approach-
es in humanitarian escalations deserve further attention. Such escalations 
are characterized by the violence and severe violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law and destabilize international peace and 
security. The next section looks at the global, regional and bilateral actors 
involved in mass atrocities in Africa and in the Sudan, including the impact 
of their policy formulations in regard to humanitarian interventions and 
civilian protection duties in the Sudan. Particularly, it underscores the dis-
crepancies between the findings of international commission of inquiries, 
the failure of law enforcement and civilian protection duties, including the 
accountability mechanisms against the criminal leadership in the Sudan, 
which regrettably is still in power.
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6.3 The International, Regional and Bilateral Actors in the 
Sudan
Section Outline
This section explores the role of the relevant actors involved in the Sudan. 
It points out the unresolved issue of the working methods between peace 
negotiations, peace enforcement and the accountability system of mass 
atrocities committed in the Sudan, despite the notorious status of the crimi-
nal regime in the country. The problems incurred in monitoring the elections 
in South Sudan and the clashes in Abyei prior the referendum, did not neu-
tralize the controversial governance in the mediation efforts falling under 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the UN and the Sudanese 
government. This represented a sensitive issue on top of the serious diver-
gences between the configuration of the UN mandate and the credibility of 
the judicial decisions released by the Court, including the current political 
unrest and the violence spreading in South Sudan. South Sudan is a young 
and independent State which has to hold accountable the perpetrators of 
serious crimes committed against civilians. In regard to the working meth-
ods between peace and justice, the reports of the UN activities in the North 
Sudanese region confirm that UNMIS provided transportation to the Court’s 
accused Ahmed Haroun who has been considered by the UN the ‘key 
player’ to provide good offices for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.32 
Wasn’t the accused supposed to be brought to justice instead?33 When ques-
tioned about this controversial issue, for the UN, the “Governor Haroun was 
critical in its role to bring the Misseriya leaders in southern Kordofan to a 
peace meeting in Abyei to stop further clashes and killings. In accordance 
with the UNMIS mandate the UN will continue to provide the necessary 
support to those key players in their pursuits to find a peaceful solution”.34 
This matter deserves a couple of words. First of all, the UN position here 
creates confusion as the legalistic approach in accordance with Article 16 of 
the Rome Statute about the deferral of investigation and prosecution is only 
applicable with a resolution adopted by the Security Council under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter and prior investigations and prosecutions would be 
performed by the judicial institution.35 Such provision is not applicable in 
32 See M. R. Lee, ‘UN in Sudan Didn’t Ask Security Council As Flew War Criminal Haroun 
to Abyei’, Inner City Press, 12 January 2011, accessible at: http://www.innercitypress.
com/un2harun011211.html
33 See ICC-02/05-01/07 Pre-Trial Chamber I, Warrant of Arrest of Ahmad Harun, acces-
sible at:: http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279813.PDF
34 See Questions and Answer during the UN Secretary-General Spokesperson’s Daily Brief-
ing, 12 January 2011, accessible at: http://www.un.org/News/briefi ngs/docs/2011/
db110112.doc.htm
35 Article 16 of the Rome Statute about the deferral of investigation or prosecution reads: 
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Stat-
ute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; 
that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.
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case of warlords expected to be brought to justice and without a lawful reso-
lution of the Security Council. The following questions arise: are the Chapter 
VI of the UN Charter and the soft measures of mediation in peace processes 
applicable in such case? Obviously, human rights groups are critical about 
such controversial approach taken in the peace process. It compromises 
the possible accomplishments of justice. They argue that such an approach 
would only neutralize the truth established by the Court’s judicial delibera-
tions and they are absolutely right.36
The question is whether the global tools fostering peace and justice will actu-
ally work together to undermine the devastating consequences of interna-
tional threats and crimes, including the credibility of their governance. The 
configuration of political mandates should take in consideration judicial 
decisions and support them. This is the only way the complementary char-
acter of international regimes could work. The option of law enforcement 
for the commission of mass atrocity crimes after the judicial outcomes of the 
Court is not settled by a reliable model of legal and political engagements. 
On the one hand, the law enforcement that should characterize the com-
pliance and accountability of universal laws does not follow the last resort 
option of justice pointing out the most responsible perpetrators of serious 
crimes. On the other hand, when executive and judicial authorities inter-
vene in intra-state conflicts the civilian protection duties are characterized by 
multidimensional operations on the ground not coordinated between each 
other. The problem of coordination would also aggravate the lack of pre-
paredness, early warnings and preventive measures of mass atrocities on the 
ground. In any case, the inconsistency dealing with warlords and criminals 
in peace processes and further negotiations with them needs to be absolute-
ly resolved. An efficient exchange of information and intelligence between 
peace and justice mandates is absolutely required. Before approaching the 
dynamics that characterized the conflict management in the Sudan, it is nec-
essary to spend a couple of words about the political support required in 
mass atrocities, considering the failure of the promise of never again in regard 
to the genocide in Darfur and the international, regional and bilateral actors 
involved in the Sudan. The attention goes to the interventions under the 
flag of humanitarianism in Africa and the political support required in mass 
atrocities. The next paragraphs examine how global solidarity worked in 
36 Ahmad Muhammad Harun is allegedly criminally responsible for 42 counts on the basis 
of his individual criminal responsibility under articles 25(3)(b) and 25(3)(d) of the Rome 
Statute, including: Twenty counts of crimes against humanity: murder (article7(1)(a)); 
persecution (article 7(1)(h)); forcible transfer of population(article 7(1)(d)); rape (article 
7(1)(g)); inhumane acts (article 7(1)(k)); imprisonment or severe deprivation of liberty 
(article 7(1)(e)); and torture (article 7(1)(f)); and Twenty-two counts of war crimes: mur-
der (article 8(2)(c)(i)); attacks against the civilian population (article 8(2)(e)(i)); destruc-
tion of property (article 8(2)(e)(xii)); rape (article 8(2)(e)(vi)); pillaging (article 8(2)(e)(v)); 
and outrage upon personal dignity (article 8(2)(c)(ii)).
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Darfur, considering the inconsistencies of legal and political engangements 
in mass atrocities.
6.3.1 The Failure of the Promise of ‘Never Again’ in Darfur
With regard to the situation in Darfur although there was a consensus that 
ethnic groups had been targeted and that crimes against humanity had 
therefore occurred, there have been discussions about whether genocide 
took really place. In May 2006, the International Commission of Inquiry 
on Darfur organized by the United Nations (UNCOI) “concluded that the 
government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide”.37 According to 
its conclusions “international offences such as the crimes against humanity 
and war crimes that have been committed in Darfur may be more serious 
and heinous than genocide”.38 Scholars and practitioners have questioned 
the methodology of the commission neglecting the genocide in Darfur. The 
report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur concluded before the 
referral to the ICC that there was “insufficient evidence of genocidal intent”. 
The serious critics referred to the reasoning of the commissioners and the 
failure to conduct forensic investigations at all sites of reported mass eth-
nic murders. In addition, “the UNCOI badly confused the issues of motive 
and intent, deployed evidence in a conspicuously contradictory fashion, and 
misrepresented the consequences of genocidal violence and displacement of 
civilians in Darfur”.39
The US government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and indi-
vidual world leaders have chosen to use the word ‘genocide’ for what was 
taking place in Darfur and according to the definition of genocide. The inter-
national legal definition of the crime of genocide is found in Articles II and 
III of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. 
37 The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur was established pursuant to United 
Nations Security Council resolution 1564 (2004), adopted on 18 September 2004. The 
resolution, passed under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, requested the Sec-
retary-General rapidly to set up the Commission. In October 2004 the Secretary-General 
appointed a fi ve member body (Mr. Antonio Cassese, from Italy; Mr. Mohammed Fayek, 
from Egypt; Ms Hina Jilani, from Pakistan; Mr. Dumisa Ntsebeza, from South Africa, 
and Ms Theresa Striggner-Scott, from Ghana), and designated Mr. Cassese as its Chair-
man. The Secretary-General decided that the Commission’s staff should be provided 
by the Offi ce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Ms Mona Rishmawi was 
appointed Executive Director of the Commission and head of its staff. The Commission 
assembled in Geneva and began its work on 25 October 2004. The Secretary-General 
requested the Commission to report to him within three months, i.e. by 25 January 2005.
38 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
Secretary-General, United Nations International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 18 
September 2004, accessible at: http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.
pdf
39 For a critical overview see E. Reeves, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur: A critical analysis (Part I an II), 2006, accessible at: www.sudanreeves.org
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Article II describes two elements of the crime of genocide: 1) the mental ele-
ment, meaning the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethni-
cal, racial or religious group, as such”, and 2) the physical element which 
includes five acts described in sections a, b, c, d and e. A crime must include 
both elements to be called “genocide”. Article III described five punishable 
forms of the crime of genocide: genocide, conspiracy, incitement, attempt and 
complicity.40 In any case, despite the critics to the UNCOI, the right channels 
to investigate and prosecute such crimes, working on the findings to estab-
lish genocide among other crimes, which it did, was the International Crimi-
nal Court.41 The independent judicial outcomes performed by the Court, 
however, extensively delayed. Following the referral from the UN Security 
Council in 2005, the Prosecutor received the information previously archived 
by the UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (UNCOI). In addi-
tion, the Office of the Prosecutor requested information from a variety of 
sources, leading to the collection of thousands of documents. The Office also 
interviewed over 50 independent experts. After extensive preliminary analy-
sis the Prosecutor concluded that the statutory requirements for initiating an 
investigation were satisfied. In 2010 the Appeals Chamber rendered its judg-
ment on the Prosecutor’s appeal, reversing, by unanimous decision, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I’s decision of 4 March, 2009, to the extent that Pre-Trial Chamber I 
decided not to issue a warrant of arrest in respect to the charge of genocide. 
The Appeals Chamber directed the Pre-Trial Chamber to decide whether or 
not the arrest warrant should be extended to cover the charge of genocide.
The arrest warrant of Al Bashir lists seven counts on the basis of his indi-
vidual criminal responsibility under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute as 
an indirect (co)perpetrator including: five counts of crimes against human-
ity: murder, Article 7(1)(a); extermination, Article 7(1)(b); forcible transfer, 
Article 7(1)(d); torture, Article 7(1)(f); and rape, Article 7(1)(g); two counts 
of war crimes: intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population as 
such or against individual civilians not taking part in hostilities, Article 8(2)
(e)(i); and pillaging, Article 8(2)(e)(v). Three counts of genocide: genocide 
by killing (article 6-a), genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm 
(article 6-b) and genocide by deliberately inflicting on each target group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction 
(article 6-c). There are four cases of the Court in Darfur. The judges have 
issued arrest warrants a) against Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb, for crimes 
against humanity and war crimes; b) against Omar Al-Bashir for genocide, 
40 See W. A. Schabas, “Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno -
cide”, 2008, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, the electronic version is 
accessible at: http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/cppcg/cppcg.html
41 The UNCOI recommended the Security Council to refer the crimes to the ICC in applica-
tion of Chapter VII of the UN Charter to re-establish peace. See P. Alston, ‘The Darfur 
Commission as a Model for Future Responses to Crisis Situations’, Vol. 3 Journal of Inter-
national Criminal Justice, Issue 3 July 2005, at 539.
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crimes against humanity and war crimes; and c) summonses to appear for 
rebel leaders Abdallah Banda, Saleh Jerbo and Abu Garda for war crimes. 
On the 2nd of December 2011, the Prosecutor requested the Pre-Trial Cham-
ber I to issue an arrest warrant against the current Sudanese Defense Min-
ister Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein for crimes against humanity and war 
crimes committed in Darfur from August 2003 to March 2004.42
6.3.2 What kind of law enforcement strategy?
The critics about the Court’s investigation and prosecution in the Darfur 
case did not take long. As far as the critics are constructive they deserve to be 
mentioned and digested. In fact, eminent scholars and practitioners argued 
that “if the Court’s investigations were serious about prosecuting Al Bashir, 
the office of the Prosecutor should have issued a sealed request and asked 
the judges to issue a sealed arrest warrant to be made public only once Al 
Bashir traveled abroad, instead of publicly requesting the warrant, allowing 
him to avoid his arrest simply by remaining in the Sudan, or allowing him 
to prepare his political campaign with African States Parties to the Rome 
Statute against the Court” and based on the assumptions of new colonial-
ism in the continent.43 Furthermore, for some observers, the indictment only 
to Sudan’s president excluding the other members of the political and mili-
tary leadership that together with him planned, ordered, and organized the 
massive crimes in Darfur, was considered partial and still controversial for 
several reasons. In any case any mistake in such prosecutorial strategy “may 
harden the Sudanese government’s position, endanger the survival of the 
peacekeeping forces in Darfur, and even induce Al Bashir to take revenge 
by stopping or making even more difficult the flow of international humani-
tarian assistance for the two million displaced persons in Darfur”.44 On the 
top of that, as further emphasized by Cassese, such prosecutorial strategies 
“might further alienate the Great Powers (China, Russia, and the United 
States) and the African Union which are hostile to the ICC”.45
42 See ICC-02/05-01/09, Case The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, accessible at:
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0205/
 See ICC-OTP-20111202-PR750, ICC Prosecutor Presents New Case in Darfur, accessible at: 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/D6519D05-76EC-4EFC-AE37-E02FBD346D7A.htm
43 See A. Cassese, Flawed International Justice for Sudan, 2008, accessible at: www.project-syn-
dicate.org See also A. Abdelrahman, “Bashir’s Last Part of Genocide Plan”, Sudan Tribune, 
August 8, 2010, accessible at: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article35892 
 See also K. H. Mohmmad, “Sudan, Chad Offered the ICC as a Precious Advance of Good-
will Between Them”, Sudan Vision, August 8, 2010, accessible at: http://www.sudanvi-
siondaily.com
44 See A. Cassese, supra.
45 See A. Cassese, supra.
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The compulsive behavior by the alleged criminal perpetrators after the 
Court’s indictments became soon evident. The President of Sudan Al Bashir 
warned again aid agencies in South Darfur that the camps were under the 
full authority of his government and that any of the parties involved on 
the ground, whether from UNAMID, the AU or NGOs, would be expelled 
if they disrespected the government authority. The Sudanese government 
announced the expulsions of the humanitarian agencies shortly after the 
Court issued an arrest warrant for President Al Bashir for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, and only later genocide in Darfur. Civil society orga-
nizations called on the government to reinstate immediately the license to 
operate and to facilitate all humanitarian agencies providing assistance in the 
Sudan but without success.46 Such scenario took shape under the eyes of the 
US and other superpowers of the Security Council, which were not engaged 
to take any action fulfilling the hope of police and law enforcement after the 
arrest warrants issued by the international judicial authority.47 This, of course, 
confirmed that the emerging regime of international criminal justice falling 
under the Rome Statute would function without any police enforcement.
6.3.3 The international, regional and bilateral actors
The practice examined in the Sudan demonstrates that the maintenance 
and restoration of peace, justice and security come along closer in the pol-
icy debates by means of controversial issues.48 At multilateral level, inter-
national organizations both make international law and are governed by it, 
but a consistent legal framework of interactions between complementary 
governance institutions is scarce.49 At bilateral level, the policy of govern-
ments on retributions and sanctions has been extremely important in regard 
to genocide and mass atrocities committed in the Sudan. Most notably in 
passing the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, the US government 
codified specific economic and legal sanctions on the Sudanese government 
as a result of its findings of genocide.50 The sanctions continue to underscore 
the US efforts to end the suffering of the millions of Sudanese affected by 
the crisis in Darfur. The US also organized a multinational team of inves-
46 See Human Rights Watch, Sudan: Expelling Aid Agencies Harms Victims, March 5, 2009, 
accessible at: http://www.hrw.org/node/81326
47 See XI Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the Security Coun-
cil Pursuant to UNSC 1593 (2005), 17 June 2010, accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/
NR/rdonlyres/A250ECCD-D9E5-433B-90BB-76C068ED58A3/282160/11thUNSCRepor
tENG1.pdf
48 See the reference of the debate over the ‘Rule of Law and the International Criminal 
Court’ in the statements released by Member States of the Security Council (29 June 
2010). UN doc. S/PRST/2010/11.
49 For an extensive overview of international organizations see M. P. Scharf, The Law of Inter-
national Organizations, 2007, accessible at: http://www.cap-press.com/pdf/1608.pdf
50 For an overview of the sanctions see ‘The United States-Sudan Relations’, Embassy of the 
US Karthoum-Sudan, accessible at: http://sudan.usembassy.gov/ussudan_relations.html
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tigators, the so called ‘Darfur Atrocities Documentation Team’ (ADT). The 
task received by this team of experts was to collect data from the refugees in 
Chad coming from the Darfur region of Sudan in order to enable the US to 
determine whether the mass violence being directed against African tribes 
(Fur, Massaleit, and Zaghawa) constituted undeniably genocide.51
Moreover, looking back also at the policy formulation of some other rele-
vant States and international actors a Commission for Africa also known as 
the ‘Blair Commission for Africa’ was established by the UK government 
to examine and provide impetus for stability and development in Africa. 
The Commission’s report acknowledged that “much more must be done to 
prevent conflict in Africa if development in the continent is to be provided 
and accelerate”. The report called for practical means to implement ‘agreed 
criteria for humanitarian intervention and the use of force drawing on the 
principles of the ‘responsibility to protect’ human life which some years later 
was simply discharged to the African Union (AU) in the Sudan.52 The same 
policy trend of the US, the UK and France and further political distance tak-
en by Russia and China characterized, of course, the actions taken by the 
Security Council in the Sudan and the reduction of level of diplomatic repre-
sentations advocating for a unified action. The Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005) was established to oversee 
the relevant sanctions measures and to undertake the tasks set out by the 
Security Council in sub-paragraph 3 (a) of the same resolution. The Secu-
rity Council first imposed an arms embargo on all non-governmental enti-
ties and individuals, including the Janjaweed, operating the States of North 
Darfur, South Darfur, and West Darfur with the adoption of Resolution 1556 
(2004). The regime of sanctions was modified and strengthened with the 
Resolution 1591 (2005), which expanded the scope of the arms embargo and 
imposed additional measures including a travel ban and freeze of assets of 
individuals designated by the Committee.53
51 For an overview of the ADT project see S. Totten, E. Markusen, Genocide in Darfur: Inves-
tigating the Atrocities in the Sudan, 2006.
52 The Commission for Africa, Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa, 2006 
accessible at: http://allafrica.com/sustainable/resources/view/00010595.pdf
53 The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concern-
ing the Sudan which sanctions measures currently in effect are summarized in the table 
accessible at: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1591/ For an overview of the peace-
keeping deployments in Darfur see UN doc. S/RES/1672 (2006); UN doc. S/RES/1706 
(2006).
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Since 2006 the reports of the Court addressed to both the UN Gen-
eral Assembly and Security Council contained detailed information on the 
criminal findings in Darfur.54 Furthermore, the lack of cooperation by Khar-
toum and by the international community was constantly emphasized by 
the Court’s officials when addressing the UN political institutions. The EU, 
NATO, and the US as important key international players also remained 
silent after such reports on specific criminal findings. As indicated by Grono 
of the International Crisis Group “the EU approach has been largely to stand 
behind the African Union (AU). The EU has made it clear that it considers 
the AU as the lead international player in Darfur and that the EU’s role is 
primarily to support “an African solution to an African problem” by partly 
funding the AU mission in the Sudan. Shortly after such political engage-
ment coming from the EU, its support consistently decreased as the EU also 
pressured for a UN transfer to the AU mission. With regard to the NATO, it 
was initially a strategic competitor of the EU in Darfur. However, NATO has 
only been providing expertise and logistics without putting troops on the 
ground in any significant numbers. Between 2005 and 2007 NATO helped 
the AU expanding its peacekeeping mission in Darfur by providing airlift 
for the transport of additional peacekeepers into the region and by train-
ing AU personnel. The support provided by NATO however, did not imply 
the provision of military troops but only logistics. The NATO support end-
ed when AMIS was transferred to the United Nations/African Union Mis-
sion in Darfur (UNAMID). One year later NATO has expressed its readiness 
to consider any requests for support to the new UN-AU hybrid peacekeep-
ing force, made up of peacekeepers and civilian police officers, but without 
showing a consistent engagement on the ground.55 We all know how differ-
ent the approach of such global actors was in the situation in Libya consider-
ing the military operations deployed against the regime.56
In regard to the situation in Darfur it needs to be noted that the US 
abstained and did not use its veto power in the Security Council on the refer-
ral to the Court. For some observers this could be seen as a new direction 
of the US policy regarding the emerging regime of international criminal 
justice established by the Rome Statute and its previous distant political 
54 See XI Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Coun-
cil Pursuant to UNSC 1593 (2005) accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
A250ECCD-D9E5-433B-90BB-76C068ED58A3/282160/11thUNSCReportENG1.pdf 
For the chronology of the Court Reports and Statements see the electronic version of the 
documents accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Reports+on+activities/
Court+Reports+and+Statements/
55 See Press Release, NATO Supporting AU’s Mission, 1 February 2008, accessible at: http://
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_8306.htm?selectedLocale=en
56 See UN doc. S/RES/1973 (2011).
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position.57 Despite different policy interpretations a concrete engagement 
by the Obama administration is still to be politically and legally verified. 
An important aspect from the analysis of its policy is that the US was not 
prepared to commit its troops on the ground in the Sudan but only pres-
suring for an African solution through the African Union (AU). China is the 
largest importer of oil from the Sudan and was ready to block any deploy-
ment of troops in Darfur. In general terms, China and Russia are quite dis-
tant from the UN engagement in civil wars for humanitarian reasons. Both 
governments may well fear possible international judicial interventions on 
their own territories deriving from serious human rights breaches. Besides, 
in 2008 the UN Security Council statement calling for the Sudanese govern-
ment to comply with the Court by handing over two men suspected of war 
crimes in Darfur, has been scrapped due to the opposition from China and 
Russia.58 The Arab League, and most of its member States, was opposed to 
a Western-led intervention in Africa, and strongly protective of one military 
intervention of its own. The last and most important actor remains the Afri-
can Union (AU) which in a way undermined the outcomes of the emerging 
regime of international criminal justice neglecting a permanent institutional 
liaison with the Court on African grounds.59
The AU was operating in Darfur with the consent of the government of 
Sudan and was reluctant to push too hard. The AU feared of being further 
marginalized by the Sudanese authorities in its economic relations. The AU 
had also been desperately trying to prove that it could resolve one of Africa’s 
most destructive conflicts even when all the evidence demonstrated that it 
57 In November 2009, the US participated as an observer to the eighth session of the Assem-
bly of States Parties (ASP) in The Hague with a delegation comprised by State and 
Defense Department offi cials and headed by the Ambassador at large for War Crimes, 
Steven Rapp. One year later the US has been an observer at the Review Conference of 
the Rome Statute in Kampala. According to the statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal 
Advisor of the US Department of State “the outcome in Kampala demonstrates again 
principled engagement that can protect and advance our interests, it can help the States 
Parties to fi nd better solutions, and make for a better Court, better protection of our inter-
ests, and a better relationship going forward between the US and the ICC”. For a policy 
overview of the US ‘engagement strategy’ with the Court see the speeches of Harold 
Hongju Koh Legal Advisor U.S. Department of State and Stephen J. Rapp Ambassador-
at-Large for War Crimes Issues, “US Engagement With The International Criminal Court 
and The Outcome Of The Recently Concluded Review Conference”, June 15 2010, acces-
sible at: http://www.state.gov/s/wci/us_releases/remarks/143178.htm
58 UN doc. S/PV.5905 (2008), the electronic version of the document is accessible at: 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N08/367/43/PDF/N0836743.
pdf?OpenElement See K. Glassborow, ‘China, Russa quash ICC efforts to press Sudan 
over Darfur crimes’, Sudan Tribune, 12 January 2008, accessible at: http://www.sudantri-
bune.com/spip.php?article25544
59 See T. Murithi, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court: An Embat-
tled Relationship?” Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) Policy Brief, Number 8, 
March 2013, accessible at: http://www.ijr.org.za/publications/pdfs/IJR%20Policy%20
Brief%20No%208%20Tim%20Miruthi.pdf
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could not do it”. These motivations, as further emphasized by Grono, con-
firm that “the international community shies away from effective interven-
tion” in Darfur. Instead, the international community should have focused 
its efforts to solve at least the priority of humanitarian aid “thereby address-
ing the effects but not the causes of mass atrocities in Darfur”.60 From the 
documents of recorded interviews performed by International Crisis Group 
is remarkable to emphasize what a senior UN official noted about the UN 
humanitarian intervention under the flag of the responsibility to protect: 
“we are only keeping people alive with our humanitarian assistance until 
they are massacred”.61 This was indeed the reality for the refugees in Dar-
fur. The obvious conclusion is that despite the humanitarian interventions in 
mass atrocities by international, regional and bilateral actors an architecture 
dealing with the causes of war and crime is still under construction.
6.3.4 Conclusions
The governance institutions of complementary character should initiate 
effective strategies of interactions particularly around country-specific situ-
ations where the States are not fulfilling their treaty obligations on coopera-
tion, as in the case of the Sudan. The accountability of criminal perpetrators 
should be the priority in peace processes. After all, an effective architecture 
fostering peace, justice and security requires to keep alive the political dia-
logue between regional and international realities, while marginalizing 
criminal domestic regimes. The international community did not respond 
properly to early warnings of threats and crimes in Darfur. In such situations 
the establishment of mechanisms of early warnings should have been the 
priority. There are no doubts that these are required steps in the configura-
tion of the mandates of the Security Council. As pointed out in the next sec-
tion the hybrid solutions of peace enforcement and the last resort options of 
justice in Darfur did not work. The struggle is to find mechanisms to prevent 
war and crime and maximize the results on the ground. This struggle how-
ever, still focuses on the effect more than having a real impact on the causes 
of such conflicts. Besides, the democratization process between political, 
executive and judicial global mandates are still waiting to be digested. The 
AU reaction is a clear reflection of such divergence. The lead international 
actors and the leadership at regional level addressed serious issues. Darfur 
has been a test case for the AU and for the international community as a 
whole, and their shortcomings have being cruelly exposed. The situation in 
Darfur represented the failure to speak and act with one voice and one arm 
on peace, justice and security.
60 See N. Grono, “Briefi ng Darfur: The International Community Failure To Protect”, 
105/421 African Affairs, 2006, at 628.
61 See N. Grono, supra.
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The lesson learned is that the international norm or the ‘right’ to intervene 
under the flag of the responsibility to protect civilians should be explicitly 
based on law enforcement and civilian protection duties under the paradigm 
of international criminal justice and accountability. In less than a decade the 
responsibility to protect civilians in situations of war and crime became the 
centrepiece of the efforts to reform the UN. Since 2005 the doctrine of the 
responsibility to protect was embraced by the key quarters of the interna-
tional community, notably the UN Secretariat, the EU and the AU. It culmi-
nated with the endorsement of the UN General Assembly at the World Sum-
mit stating that: “each individual State has the responsibility to protect its 
population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, includ-
ing their incitement through appropriate and necessary means. The interna-
tional community through the United Nations has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accor-
dance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter to help protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against human-
ity”. This is now widely accepted as providing the criteria for international 
responses to armed conflict and large scale atrocities.62 It remains to be seen 
which are the main requirements applied in the mandate configurations on 
the ground and the support provided to international criminal justice in the 
context of the responsibility to protect civilians. The current struggle is to 
find possible ways civilian protection duties would be implemented and 
harmonized through the configuration of complementary mandates on the 
ground enabling peace and justice to complement with each other.
The fight against the impunity of serious crimes is undermined not only by 
political standpoints but also by legal issues such as the implications of the 
AU decision to give the African Court jurisdiction of international crimes. We 
have seen how the ratio of Article 16 of the Rome Statute results to be prob-
lematic on peace and justice priorities causing the political impasse in the 
AU. Article 16 demonstrates the gaps in the governance of peace and justice. 
The Court does not obtain any cooperation but only a deep-rooted political 
deadlock coming from the African States as parties to the treaty. The Assem-
bly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute has an important role in such 
context. Such sensitive issues deserve a strong involvement by the political 
body and not by the judicial organ of the Rome Statute, such as the Court. 
In order to solve urgent issues in the quest for peace, justice and security 
in Africa, the UN and the Rome Statute regimes need the implementation 
of agreements and arrangements between peace enforcement and retribu-
tive justice, including civilian protection measures, and thus, implementing 
measures of protective and restitutive justice in a comprehensive manner. The 
preventive diplomacy and the competence of complementary governance 
62 UN doc. A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, articles 138 and 139, accessible at: http://unpan1.
un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan021752.pdf
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institutions of early warnings is an important requirement. In order to offer 
a comprehensive overview of the unresolved issues, the next section debates 
both the conflict management and the civilian protection duties in the Sudan 
claimed by civil society organizations. It further underscores the need of a 
political road map defining the complementary character of global regimes 
fostering peace, justice and security with an integrated model of governance. 
The international community should either prevent or respond immediately 
to the commission of mass atrocity crimes. The good timing of humanitarian 
interventions would safe many more human lives. In other words, locating 
possibilities to transform bureaucratic constraints is the direct responsibility 
of international governance institutions of complementary character.63
6.4 The Management of the intra-State Conflict in the Sudan
Section Outline
The intent of this section is to offer some comprehensive views of the con-
flict management in the Sudan using the UN political mediation, peace 
agreements, negotiations and peace operations. It debates about the con-
figurations of both peacekeeping operations and civilian protection duties 
of the United Nations and the African Union (AU). Despite the last resort 
involvement of the Court in the severe violations committed against civil-
ians in Darfur and referred from the Security Council, the situation did not 
reach any stage of peace building and sustainable solutions for civilians. As 
anticipated in the previous section, with the UNAMID mandate deployed 
on the ground there should have been a clear duty of peacekeeping troops to 
enforce the Court’s arrest warrants irrespective of the consent of the Suda-
nese government. This was absolutely not the case. On top of that, with the 
Resolution 1996 (2011), the Security Council determined that the situation in 
South Sudan also constitutes a threat to international peace and security in 
the region.64 The Security Council established the mission in South Sudan 
(UNMISS) to consolidate peace and security.65 Unfortunately, the manage-
ment of the conflict did not provide sustainable solutions for peace and civil-
ian protection in North and South Sudan. There is currently further esca-
lation of violence against civilians. This section emphasizes the evolution 
of the UN peacekeeping mandate and the UN-AU hybrid solutions which 
63 See T. Piiparinen, “Bureaucratic Mechanisms”, The Transformation of UN Confl ict Manage-
ment, 2010, at 118. See also H. Wiseman, “The UN and International Peacekeeping: A 
Comparative Analysis”, in UNITAR (eds.), The UN and the Maintenance of International 
Peace and Security, 1987 at 263.
64 UN doc. S/RES/1996 (2011).
65 On 9 July 2011 South Sudan became the newest country in the world. The birth of the 
Republic of South Sudan is the culmination of a six-year peace process. The mandate of 
UNMIS ended following the completion of the interim period set up by the Government 
of Sudan and SPLM during the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
in 2005.
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did not undermine the urgent and undoubtedly legitimate concerns of civil 
society organizations about civilians. This section provides some guidelines 
for the relevant actors involved in multiple situations to reach sustainable 
peace. The arrays of peace and security should hold accountable the most 
responsible of the crimes. The emerging regime of international criminal jus-
tice as an important tool to protect civilians in situations of war and crime 
should have received support with every means after the referral of jurisdic-
tion in the situation in Darfur. Regrettably, this was not the case.
6.4.1 The background of the UN-AU conflict management
As previously anticipated, the conflict management and the peace enforce-
ment by the UN have been fragmented in the Sudan prior the last resort 
option to refer to justice in Darfur. This is only one aspect characterizing the 
international humanitarian intervention performed on the ground. Imme-
diately after the failure of the peace negotiations with the Sudanese authori-
ties, the configuration of the UN mandate on the ground was characterized 
by the political intent to handover the violence in Darfur to the African 
Union. A brief background of the conflicts in the Sudan is necessary in order 
to have an understanding of the African Union mission (AMIS), including 
a) the evident intolerance of the Sudanese government allowing the initial 
deployment of the AU mission in Darfur, b) the shortcomings of the UN-AU 
hybrid mission (UNAMID), and later the unacceptable government’s clo-
sure of corridors for humanitarian assistance and c) its continuous attacks on 
peacekeepers.66
The political background in the country demonstrates that for decades, 
from 1983 to 2005 and since its independence, the government of the Sudan, 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice 
and Equality Movement (JEM), as the main rebel movements in the South 
of Sudan, fought in a civil war over resources, power, religion, including 
self-determination.67 The country has been divided along the lines of Arab-
Muslims in the North, and Africans in the South. Even though the North has 
enjoyed relative economic, social and political development, the South of the 
country has been constantly marginalized. Southern rebellion began in the 
50s. Before the independence in 1956, the conflict erupted as a result of fears 
that independence would not only result in northern domination but could 
also mark the return to the Arab enslavement of the Africans in the south.68 
66 See J. Flint, A. de Waal, Darfur: A short history of a long war, (2005). See also, A. de Waal, ed., 
War in Darfur and the Search for Peace (2007).
67 For more on the history of the confl ict in Darfur, see A. de Waal, ‘Who are the Darfuri-
ans? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External Engagement’, African Affairs, 
104/415, 2005, at 181.
68 See F. Deng, ‘Sudan at the Crossroads’, MIT Centre for International Studies, Audit of the 
Conventional Wisdom Series, 07-05, March 2007, accessible at: http://web.mit.edu/CIS/
pdf/Audit_03_07_Deng.pdf
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The war ended in 1972 with the signing of the Addis Ababa peace agreement 
and resumed again in 1983 when the agreement was broken by the central 
government. In the course of that period until now, more than two million 
people have died, four million displaced internally, and thousands of civilians 
have fled the country as refugees in Chad, and in the Kalma camp for inter-
nally displaced persons, or so called IDPs in Nyala, in the south of Darfur.69
The attempts for stability in the country by major regional and international 
actors such as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at the time, and shortly later, the 
hybrid solution offered by the AU and the United Nations (UNAMID), 
achieved little success. In regard to the peace process several agreements 
were signed between the government and the various factions. These agree-
ments centred on the principles of governance, the transitional process and 
the structures of government, as well as on the right of self-determination 
for the people of South Sudan, currently a new State. Other agreements were 
taking place on security arrangements including wealth- and power-shar-
ing. Finally, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which is a blend 
of six agreements, was signed in January 2005 which paved the way for the 
establishment of the UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) to oversee 
the implementation of the peace agreement in its entirety in accordance 
with the Resolution 1547 (2004). UNAMIS was mandated to facilitate con-
tacts with the parties concerned and to prepare for the introduction of an 
envisaged UN peace support operation. The Secretary-General appointed 
Jan Pronk as his Special Representative for the Sudan and head of UNAMIS, 
who led the UN peacemaking support to the IGAD-mediated talks on the 
North-South conflict, as well as to the African Union-mediated talks on the 
conflict in Darfur.70
6.4.2 Failed UN handover of peacekeeping operations
Several shortcomings characterized the UN mission in Darfur. The interest 
of international engagement became visibly weak if we look at the deploy-
ments of multinational forces by the UNMIS. The configuration strategy of 
the Security Council of its peace enforcement mandate was to handover the 
situation in Darfur even prematurely, to the African Union (AMIS). Soon it 
became clear that the lack of international engagement in Darfur displayed 
the configuration of the UN-AU hybrid option (UNAMID) combined with 
the failure of the peace agreements of the Sudanese authorities. On the top 
of that, the sequence of the Security Council’s mandates in the Sudan has 
been characterized by the following negative elements: a) the political and 
diplomatic failure pressuring the Sudanese authorities to stop the violence; 
69 A. M.S. Bah, I. Johnstone, ‘Peacekeeping in Sudan: The Dynamics of Protection, Partner-
ships and Inclusive Politics’, Centre on International Cooperation, Occasional Paper, 2007.
70 See UN. Doc. S/RES/1547 (2004).
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b) the weak multilateral engagement followed by hybrid solutions between 
the African Union and the United Nations, while the Security Council would 
pressure the AU for the feasibility to take over the main peacekeeping opera-
tions in Darfur; and c) the serious shortcomings of civilian protection duties 
in such multidimensional operations.
In order to emphasize the failure of protecting civilians during peace 
enforcement operations the analysis of the mandates’ configuration of the 
UN Security Council is required. UNAMIS or so defined ‘advance mission’ 
had a political and diplomatic purpose monitoring the peace agreements, 
while UNMIS was expected to be operational on the ground in Darfur with 
scarce deployments of peacekeepers. As a response to the escalating crisis in 
Darfur, the Security Council, with its Resolution 1556 (2004) assigned some 
additional tasks to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) relating to 
Darfur.71 At the same time, the United Nations and a group of non-govern-
mental organizations advocating in the region launched a massive humani-
tarian operation in Darfur, constantly expanding activities to respond to 
the needs of an increasing number of people displaced by the violence. As 
a result of these developments the UN Special Representative and UNA-
MIS were deeply engaged in Darfur, particularly in supporting the African 
Union and its mission in the Sudan by, among other things, participating in 
the Abuja peace talks and establishing a United Nations assistance cell in 
Addis Ababa which supported deployment and management of the African 
Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS).
Having determined that the situation in Sudan continued to constitute a 
threat to international peace and security, the Security Council decided to 
establish the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS).72 The Security 
Council with its Resolution 1706 (2006) decided to expand the UNMIS man-
date to include its deployment to Darfur without prejudice of the existing 
mandate and operations. The Security Council invited the consent of the 
Sudanese Government of National Unity, called on Member States to ensure 
expeditious deployment and requested the Secretary-General to ensure 
additional capabilities to enable UNMIS to deploy in Darfur. The Security 
Council decided that the mandate of UNMIS would be to support imple-
mentation of the peace deployments and the N’djamena Agreement on 
Humanitarian Ceasefire of the conflict in Darfur by performing a number of 
specific tasks. The Security Council decided that UNMIS would be strength-
ened by up to 17,300 military personnel and by an appropriate civilian com-
ponent including up to 3,300 civilian police personnel and up to 16 Formed 
Police Units.
71 For an overview see the UNMIS mandate and its challenges, accessible on the UN portal 
of Peacekeeping operations at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/
mandate.shtml
72 UN doc. S/RES/1590 (2005).
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By further terms of the text of its resolutions the Security Council request-
ed the Secretary-General to consult jointly with the African Union on a plan 
and timetable for a transition from AMIS, visibly failing and not equipped 
to contrast the widespread violence in Darfur, to a United Nations operation 
in Darfur (UNMIS). In the following steps, however, UNMIS was not able 
to deploy to Darfur due to the government of the Sudan’s steadfast opposi-
tion to a peacekeeping operation undertaken solely by the United Nations as 
envisaged in Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006). The UN then embarked 
on an alternative approach to try to stabilize the region through the phased 
strengthening of AMIS, before transfer of authority to a joint AU/UN peace-
keeping operation. Following prolonged and intensive negotiations with the 
government of the Sudan and significant international pressure, the govern-
ment accepted the peacekeeping operation in Darfur. As soon as such opera-
tions were guaranteed from the Sudanese government, the Security Council 
with its Resolution 1769 (2006) authorized the establishment of the United 
Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). On its part, 
UNMIS continued to support the implementation of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) providing good offices and political support to the 
parties, monitoring and verifying their security arrangements and offering 
assistance in a number of areas, including governance, recovery and devel-
opment. The mission had focused on the commitments between the parties, 
including a) the redeployment of forces, b) the resolution of the dispute over 
the oil-rich Abyei region, and c) the preparations for national elections in 2010 
and the referenda in 2011, which decided the political stand of self-determi-
nation of South Sudan.
The analysis of the mandate’s configuration of UNAMID and UNMIS indi-
cates, however, that no electoral assistance had been planned with serious 
consequences on the result of the presidential elections. The Sudan presiden-
tial and parliamentary elections were held in the Sudan from 11 April to 15 
April 2010 (extended from the original end date of 13 April 2010) to elect the 
President and the National Assembly of the Sudan. The election brought to 
the end the transitional period which began when the decades-long second 
Sudanese civil war ended in 2005. Early results on 20 April 2010 showed 
that President Omar Al Bashir’s party National Congress was well ahead 
the opposition. On 26 April 2010, full results were announced and Al Bashir 
was confirmed as the winner by having received 68.24% of the votes.73 Such 
result in the political transition of the country was characterized by the non-
cooperation of the international community to follow up on the judicial 
indictments of the Court against President Al Bashir and few other Sudanese 
top leaders responsible of genocide, crimes against humanity and crimes of 
war. 
73 See IRIN, Sudan: Elections in a volatile climate, humanitarian news and analysis, 19 Febru-
ary 2010, accessible at: http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=88167
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Despite the international presence into the country the criminal regime 
was re-established and would not cooperate with any of the international 
governance institutions, including civil society organizations. The humani-
tarian crisis would take larger proportions.
6.4.3 Darfur and the failure of the responsibility to protect
On paper, the civil war in the South Sudan concluded with the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. Despite such an agreement, 
which was pressured by the international community and led by the US, the 
conflict continued in the Darfur region. According to the Secretary-General, 
“a stable Sudan requires a peaceful Darfur”.74 In this regard, it was essential 
that the work of the United Nations and the African Union in the Sudan had 
to be complementary. The simple question was: how? In the meantime, the 
AU was pressuring the Security Council to defer the situation in the Sudan 
and was consistently against the Court’s decisions about President Al Bashir. 
Moreover, the practice of the conflict management applied on the ground 
in Darfur undermined the effectiveness of the AU hybrid mission and the 
UN operational peacekeeping role with the mandate to protect civilians for 
several reasons.75
As previously anticipated, in addition to the African Union Mission in the 
Sudan (AMIS) there was an African Union (AU) peacekeeping force oper-
ating primarily in the country’s western region of Darfur with the aim of 
performing peacekeeping operations related to the Darfur conflict. Origi-
nally founded in 2004, with a force of 150 troops, by mid-2005 its numbers 
were increased to about 7,000.76 Under the United Nations Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1564/2004, AMIS was to “closely and continuously liaise 
and coordinate at all levels” its work with the United Nations Mission in 
Sudan (UNMIS).77 AMIS was the only external military force in Darfur until 
UNAMID was established. As previously said, it was not able to effectively 
contain the violence in Darfur. A more sizable, better equipped UN peace-
keeping force was originally proposed in 2006, but due to Sudanese govern-
ment opposition, it was not implemented at that time. AMIS’ mandate was 
extended repeatedly throughout 2006, while the situation in Darfur contin-
74 See UN doc. S/2006/591, 28 July 2006, Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur.
75 See A. de Waal, “Darfur and the failure of the responsibility to protect”, 83 International 
Affairs 6 (2007), at 1039–1054. See Human Rights Watch, They Shot at Us as We Fled: Gov-
ernment Attacks on Civilians in West Darfur, 2008, accessible at: http://www.hrw.org See 
also, Human Rights Watch, No One To Intervene: Gaps in Civilian Protection in Southern 
Sudan, 2009, accessible at: http://www.hrw.org
76 See AU doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.68 (2005), Decision on the Situation in the Darfur Region of 
Sudan, (2005), accessible at: http://www.africa-union.org/DARFUR/homedar.htm
77 UN doc. SC/RES/1590 (2005). UN doc. SC/9649 Security Council Extends UNMIS man-
date until 30 April 2010. See also UN doc. SC/RES/1870 (2009).
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ued to escalate. After terrible shortcomings to stop the violence in Darfur, 
AMIS was finally replaced by UNAMID in 2007.78
In May 2007, the African Union officially declared that AMIS was on the 
point to collapse. In previous months seven Nigerian peacekeepers had 
been killed, while lack of funding had caused soldiers’ salaries to go unpaid 
for several months. The internal chaos in the country and its serious conse-
quences would be externally visible to the still inactive international actors. 
Both Rwanda and Senegal warned that they would withdraw their forces 
if the UN members did not live up to their commitments of funding and 
supplies. On the top of that, the financial assistance promised over the last 
decade by the Americans and the Europeans to AMIS was not provided. In 
2007, the United Nations Security Council finally approved the mandate of 
UNAMID with Resolution 1769 (2007) which was to take over operations 
from AMIS.79 AMIS was finally merged into UNAMID but civilian protec-
tion did not characterize the configuration of peace enforcement operations 
on the ground. As emphasized by de Waal, “the pursuit of the responsibil-
ity to protect in Darfur has not achieved its goal”. Contrary to the position 
taken by the most ardent advocates of the responsibility to protect, de Waal 
argues that “this failure owes much to the inadequate conceptualization of 
protection duties of civilians. The inflated expectation that physical pro-
tection by international troops is indeed possible, within the limits of the 
military strength envisaged, including the confused advocacy around the 
issue, has created the premises for its failure in Darfur. It is possible that 
more concerted international pressure could have brought a bigger and 
better-equipped international force to Darfur much earlier. That would, in 
itself, have been a positive development. But the expectation that such a 
force could have ‘saved’ Darfur is erroneous”.80 According to the chronol-
ogy and evidence of all steps in such tentative handover from the UN to the 
AU, and back to the UN mission in Darfur (UNAMID) the shortcomings 
on the ground are clearly visible. Once again early warnings were not fol-
lowed and applied in such mandate’s configurations. The lessons learnt by 
the global actors of complementary character should be clear. Hopefully, 
there would be a gradual expansion in the interpretation of the Security 
Council of what constitutes a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression and the commission of mass atrocity crimes. In Darfur the 
promise of ‘never again’ in regard to genocide has not been maintained.
78 On 31 March 2006 the mandate of AMIS would have run out, with the African Union 
force already on the ground to be incorporated into a UN peacekeeping mission. Nev-
ertheless, during a March 10, 2006 meeting of the African Union’s Peace and Security 
Council, the Council decided to expand the mission for six months until 30 September 
2006. On August 31, after United Nations Security Council Resolution 1706 failed to see 
the implementation of its proposed UN peacekeeping force of 20,000 due to opposition 
from the government of Sudan, on October 2 the AU extended AMIS’ mandate further, 
until December 31, 2006, and then again until June 30, 2007.
79 UN doc. SC/9089 (2007).
80 See A. de Waal, supra.
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6.5 The Lessons learned
This case study arguing about peace, justice and security in the Sudan dem-
onstrates that the recognition of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect 
civilians in situations of war and crime requires further multilateral efforts. 
The implementation of such doctrine is proving to be a real test for the inter-
national politics of interventions in mass atrocities. Such politics are strictly 
related to the old promise of designing a democratic reform of the gover-
nance system of peace and security and their maintenance, management 
and restoration.81 The same considerations are valid for the complementa-
ry regime of the Rome Statute preserving the interests of justice. Besides, 
complementary global regimes must guard their mission “to ensure that 
they are not subverted, or perceived to have been subverted, as a pawn for 
great power use, to merely target weak and or defeated adversaries in less 
influential regions of the world”.82 This is not the case considering the find-
ings in the case study which underscore: a) the failure of the peace processes 
between the Sudanese government and the UN; b) the lack of cooperation by 
the Sudanese government with the international efforts; and c) the extreme 
violence perpetrated against civilians in the country, despite the judicial 
outcomes of the Court. The global political engegements to protect civilians 
failed in North Sudan including the criminal accountability of its leadership.
6.5.1 Solving the gaps in the working methods
In this chapter dealing with the criminal regime in North Sudan several 
issues arise between the ‘interests of peace’ having exclusively a politi-
cal nature and the ‘interests of justice’ characterized by a legal and juris-
dictional character. In the triggering mechanisms falling under Article 16 
for instance, the Rome Statute does not exclude the constant deception of 
political processes undermining the judicial and neutral role of the Court. 
Moreover, the last resort option of international criminal justice does not 
receive any kind of mandatory engagements by the UN political and execu-
tive premises and its members. This became clear with the referral of the 
situation in Darfur from the Security Council to the Court, right after the 
failure of hybrid operations of peacekeeping forces provided by the United 
Nations and the African Union which were supposed to protect civilians, 
while working with all possible means on sustainable peace. Many African 
States, as relevant parties to the Rome Statute, reveal serious inconsistency 
of compliance in their legal obligations deriving from the treaty. At regional 
level the AU recalls political standpoints waiting to be resolved in the UN 
81 See P. Hilpold, ‘The Duty To Protect and the Reform of the United Nations. A New Step 
in the Development of International Law?’, 10 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 
2006, at 35.
82 See C. C. Jalloh, Regionalizing International Criminal Law?, 2009, Working Paper 2009-20, 
accessible at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431130
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premises and related to the membership and permanent representation of 
African States in the Security Council. Their pressure to obtain clarifica-
tion on the deferral activity from the Security Council does not receive any 
political follow up at the expenses of the Court as a judicial and not political 
institution. It is clear that the compromised regime of the permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council resumed in Article 16 of the Rome Statute is 
not working and creates controversial politicization. The ASP needs to keep 
abreast on such sensitive political issues. If at provisional level Article 16 of 
the Rome Statute has not been used by the Security Council it still creates 
political shortcomings in the AU undermining the important meaning of 
justice and accountability.
Besides, it would also be appropriate to develop a set of criteria for the meth-
ods applied by the Security Council to make a referral to the Court: a) using 
the reports of human rights violations in a particular situations monitored by 
the UNHRC, b) understanding the relation between the commission of core 
crimes under international law and the existence of threats to international 
peace and security, and c) using preliminary information about the commis-
sion of core crimes susch as the outcomes of the preliminary situation analy-
sis of the Prosecutor. The development of such set of criteria would help the 
decision-making of the Security Council to offer law enforcement capacities, 
and would also provide civil society and other stakeholders with a set of 
principles that they could also apply in order to put pressure on the Security 
Council to make referrals to the Court.83 The referral of the situation in the 
Sudan should have been characterized by law enforcement capacity consid-
ering the criminal regime in the country. In that way, the deterrent effect of 
peace and justice would have increased sustainable solutions. Unfortunate-
ly, with the Rome Statute and the establishment of the Court there is no fur-
ther progress of law enforcement measures. The Court still functions with-
out police. The practice indicates several shortcomings in the fight against 
the impunity of domestic criminal regimes violating fundamental individual 
rights. This is the case in the Sudan and the criminal leadership still in power 
in the country, which is politically advocating with all its partners against 
the Rome Statute system.84
83 See H. Mistry, “Developing consistency”, in The UN Security Council and the International 
Criminal Court, International Law Meeting Summary with Parliamentarians for Global 
Action, Chatham House, 16 March 2012, at 4, accessible at: http://www.pgaction.org/
pdf/activity/Chatham-ICC-SC.pdf
84 A group led by the AU chair with representatives from Africa’s fi ve regions pressures 
the Security Council to defer proceedings against Kenya’s leadership and the Sudanese 
president, Omar Hassan al Bashir, who faces charges of genocide. See African Union 
(AU) Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the ICC, African Union Ext/Assembly/
AU/Dec.1 (Oct.2013). The AU decision is accessible at: http://summits.au.int/en/sites/
default/fi les/Ext%20Assembly%20AU%20Dec%20&%20Decl%20_E_0.pdf
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The situation in Darfur indicates primarily the failure of early warnings. 
On top of that, the international intervention required law enforcement and 
civilian protection mandates deployed on the ground immediately after the 
failure of the peace process initiated by the UN, avoiding any manipulation 
from the domestic criminal regime in power in the country. The problem is 
still the weak political determination to fight against the impunity regime in 
North Sudan. For the States partners of such criminal regime the priority has 
been given to their own economic interests characterizing their relationship 
with the Sudanese leadership and its resources at the expenses of civilians. 
In conclusion, it is clear that for a reliable architecture fostering peace, justice 
and security the enforcement of public international authorities and the defi-
nition of their complementary character should be appropriately reviewed 
in both documents: the UN Charter and the Rome Statute. Such an effort 
in combination with a political road map based on an integrated approach 
of governance would influence further the design of reliable architecture 
dealing with conflict and post-conflict situations, and with the fight against 
international threats and crimes destabilizing peace and security.
The solutions in the short and middle terms have to be found in an inte-
grated approach of governance of peace, justice and security operations 
on the ground. In the long term a political road map is necessary in order to 
deal with situations where criminal leaders are still in power and civilians 
are victimized. Such political road map would strengthen the credibility of 
global regimes fostering peace, justice and security and their complemen-
tary character. In conclusion of this case study it is clear that the consensus 
of systemic reforms, if reached, would preserve further the international 
legal order strengthening its legal and political institutions. Such process 
of building political consensus on substantive reforms represents the main 
challenge for complementary global regimes. We have clearly seen that the 
practical dilemma on the ground indicates an insufficient implementation 
and harmonization of the interactions between such complementary man-
dates involved in the same field operations, such as in the Sudan. These gaps 
reflect the standards of cooperation applied on the ground which are incon-
sistent and not sufficient to maximize the results to prevent, react and rebuild 
in situations of war and crime. Substantive reforms are required between 
governance frameworks particularly in the working relationship between 
the Security Council and the International Criminal Court.
Preliminary remarks
The DRC has the size of Western Europe and gained formal autonomy from 
Belgium in 1960. Since the country’s decolonization the current updated 
empirical data on governance show that the human development index is 
lower now than in 1975 and the GDP pro capita roughly one-third of what 
it was back in 1960. The World Bank has currently put the DRC as fourth 
worst-administrated State after Somalia, Iraq and Myanmar.1 The DRC has 
been classified as the second most unstable country after the Sudan, and the 
fifth most corrupted African State. An estimated 5.4 million people have died 
because the war and its after-effects since 1998. In spite of the end of the civil 
war since 2002, millions of Congolese continue to die each year. Arguably 
considered as the world’s most deadly crisis after WWII, its intra-state insta-
bility receives more attention than many of the past and recent crises such 
as Bosnia, Iraq and Ukraine.2 Since its independence the DRC has been the 
subject of cross-border incursions, including the interference of neighbour-
ing States in its domestic affairs. The illegal exploitation of natural resources 
has emerged as the primary means of financing the civil war including the 
illicit trade of corporations. Such intrusions demolished any institutional 
heritage in the fragile domestic apparatus of the country. The internal politi-
cal transition in the DRC is characterized by extreme violence and crime to 
retain power on civilians, territories and resources. The last elections in 2011 
marked the second vote held since the Kivu Conflict that killed more than 
five million people. The electoral process was characterized by voting dif-
ficulties as some voting materials arrived late, or did not arrive at all. The 
presidential election involved 11 candidates, although the victory of Presi-
dent Joseph Kabila received claims of intimidation and vote-rigging. With 
regard to the delicate situation affecting the civilian population including 
the concerns related to democratic transitions in the country, this case study 
puts forward important elements to be taken in consideration by the deci-
sion makers on reconfigurations, cooperation standards and interactions, 
1 See The World Bank World Development Indicators respectively in 2012, 2013, 2014, 
accessible at: http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/fi les/wdi-2014-book.pdf
2 For an overview of the causes and the effects of the confl ict in the DRC see I. Samset, 
‘Confl ict of Interests or Interests in Confl ict? Diamonds and War in the DRC’, 2002 
Review of African Political Economy 29, at 463.
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including the alternative between ‘comprehensive’ and ‘narrowly focused’ 
international mandates able to complement with each other on the ground.
This case study advocates for more significant political engagement coming 
from the African Union, the European Union, the United Nations and the 
peacekeeping missions in the LRA-affected region where the International 
Criminal Court is still involved. This chapter highlights the need for more 
financial and technical support of early warning networks, sensitization and 
demobilization efforts, including long-term rehabilitation for returnees and 
ex-combatants. These activities, of course, also require a well-functioning 
domestic accountability system. In fact, the statements released by the Con-
golese government that the LRA threat no longer exists in the DRC is a claim 
strongly disputed and requires international attention. After all, the instabil-
ity in the DRC is directly linked to the causes of mass atrocity crimes com-
mitted in the region, especially by the genocide in Rwanda and the criminal 
activity of the LRA in the South of Sudan and Central African Republic. This 
case study explores the evolution of multidimensional responses in an envi-
ronment of violent conflicts, volatile sites, mass atrocities, poverty and the 
complete absence of the State able to safeguard civilian lives.
This chapter examines the challenges of international responses foster-
ing peace, justice and security and the opportunities, to prevent, or reduce, 
deadly conflicts, while protecting civilian lives.3 It offers recommendations 
to implement the relationship between the global regime preserving human 
rights and sustainable peace, through the UN presence in the country, and 
the criminal accountability emerging regime of the Rome Statute, including 
the enforcement of arrest warrants, judicial decisions, operational assistance 
and protection of civilians in situ. It reports about sensitive fact-findings 
by non-governmental human rights organizations on the issue of civilian 
protection and massive humanitarian violations, which are offering infor-
mation, guidelines and recommendations for the international governance 
institutions of complementary character involved in the DRC. The intersec-
tion between peace enforcement, international justice and human security 
requires a model of governance falling under the paradigm of accountability. 
The DRC case confirms such necessity. This chapter demonstates that the 
fight against the impunity of international crimes at domestic and interna-
tional levels in the DRC is characterized by the gaps in the configurations 
of international mandates of complementary character requiring partner-
ships on the ground in order to maximize the results in accordance with the 
human security doctrine. The section below clarifies the case study objec-
tives. It offers an overview of the background, analysis, issues and purpose 
of the case study in the DRC.
3 See H. F. Weiss, ‘The DRC: A Story of Lost Opportunities to Prevent or Reduce Deadly 
Confl icts’, in R. H. Cooper, J. Kohler (eds.), Responsibility To Protect. The Global Moral 
Compact for the 21st Century, 2009, at 115.
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7.1 The Case Study Objective: what kind of configurations in the 
field operations?
Section Outline
This case study demonstrates that the harmonization of complementary 
efforts deployed in the field operations is an idea not yet realized. The Rome 
Statute, as a multilateral treaty, requires a balance between the retributive, 
restitutive and protective aspects of international criminal justice, while the 
United Nations struggles with its credibility of civilian protection duties in 
conflict and post-conflict situations. In devastated societies characterized by 
conflicts, crimes, corruption and instability the interaction between comple-
mentary global regimes represents an opportunity to maximize the results 
on the ground. Ending the impunity of serious crimes is an urgent prior-
ity in the DRC. Confronting the judiciary lacuna where judicial corruption 
is pervasive is essential in this country. Violence against civilians is largely 
motivated by the exploitation of resources, while gender crimes are used 
as a weapon of war. The current disarmament, demobilization and reinte-
gration efforts in the DRC do not produce sufficient results. Militia groups 
are opposing such process of stabilization in the country. The Congolese 
civilians face extreme violence and insecurity caused by the presence of 
armed groups characterizing the current political transition. The MONUC/
MONUSCO4 mandate to protect civilians has a negligible impact for several 
reasons.5 Furthermore, the impunity regime normalized “predation as the 
principal modus operandi by the Congolese military, by various militia groups 
and by self-defense forces across the east of the country. The UN peacekeep-
ers have done little to halt this practice”.6 Moreover, some of the warlords 
targeted by the ICC were extremely dangerous for the local populations and 
could be even a risk for the victims and witnesses screened by the judicial 
institution.7
With regard to security the international responses should as much as pos-
sible intervene when the crisis has dramatic consequences on acceptable 
standards of human security. The international responses, rather than being 
4 See UN docs. S/RES/1925 (2010), S/RES/2053 (2012).
5 See H. Edstrom, D. Gyllensporre (eds.), “Mission in Central Africa: MONUC/MONUS-
CO”, in Political Aspirations and Perils of Security. Unpacking the Military Strategy of 
the United Nations, 2013.
6 E. B. Rackley, ‘Predatory Governance in the DRC: Civilian Impact and Humanitarian 
Response’, March 2005 Humanitarian Exchange Magazine 29, at 3, accessible at: www.odi-
hpn.org
7 On 22 March 2013, Bosco Ntaganda surrendered himself voluntarily and is now in the 
ICC’s custody. Two warrants of arrest have been issued by the ICC for Bosco Ntaganda 
for seven counts of war crimes and three counts of crimes against humanity allegedly 
committed in Ituri in the DRC between 1 September 2002 and the end of September 2003. 
See for a general overview M. Eriksson Baaz, M. Stern, ‘Making Sense of Violence: Voices 
of Soldiers in the Congo (DRC)’, 2008, Journal of Modern African Studies, 46, 1, at 57.
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exclusively militarily, should be ‘narrowly focused’ and serve the right 
actors on the ground. There is consensus that the concept of security only 
approached by military means may work as combustible on the flame of 
such violent conflicts in the DRC. The military operations by the AU autho-
rized by the UN failed to raise acceptable standards of human security. 
Therefore, the efforts focusing on the preservation of lives and their protec-
tion are the priority of planning whatever security mandate. The struggle 
of the UN on institution-building supporting the reform of the army, police 
and justice systems in the corrupted domestic reality of the DRC should 
complement and prioritize the activity of the ICC. Police and law enforce-
ment following supranational criminal decisions are both necessary. The pri-
ority is also to safeguard the safety of victims and witnesses. The warlords 
still active in the army have to be immediately targeted by the domestic judi-
cial system with judicial proceedings in situ. After all, the DRC has a legal 
obligation to cooperate in accordance with the Rome Statute. The political 
organs of both the UN and the Rome Statute regime should pressure the 
local authorities while also working on the configuration of their comple-
mentary mandates on the ground. The exchange of information and intel-
ligence operations are still absolutely required, including investigations and 
the extension of prosecutions until the domestic ability to take over would 
be unquestionably proven by the local authorities.
This section offers an overview of the background, the issues and the pur-
pose of international mandates in the DRC supposed to receive complemen-
tary configurations and cooperation raising the standards of human security. 
It emphasizes the importance of justice in securing peace and the role that 
international criminal justice could play in facilitating the peace process and 
democratic transitions with support, assistance and cooperation. The recom-
mendations on cooperation are addressed to the high representatives and 
policy makers which have considered the issue of cooperation in a number 
of occasions. This assessment complements the recommendations set out 
by the report of the Bureau on Cooperation (ASP) and by the Court in the 
ICC-ASP8/44 and annex 1. These relate respectively, with the cooperation 
with the United Nations and on the consideration of the present situation, 
including the ways in which such cooperation can be developed in the DRC. 
The report of the Court on international cooperation and assistance notes, in 
paragraphs 6 and 7, that although cooperation with the Court has generally 
been forthcoming, “public and diplomatic support remains a priority in the 
galvanization of arrest efforts, as does the conclusion of more agreements for 
the enforcement of sentences, the relocation of witnesses and interim release. 
Attention might be drawn to the fact as well that such agreements would 
cover any situation of a release from custody”.8
8 ICC-ASP/8/44, Annex I.
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7.1.1 The Background
With regard to the international responses in the aftermath of the presiden-
tial elections in 2006 and the DRC constitution several concerns and critics 
followed respectively, on the political transition in the country, on the wide-
spread humanitarian violations, and on the corruption in the domestic insti-
tutions. Scholars, human rights activists and practitioners claim that interna-
tional actors have given little attention to the grave human rights breaches of 
the first two years of the Kabila government. This brought as a result the fail-
ure to hold accountable the perpetrators of these abuses. Although the UN 
presence took some steps to ensure political space for the opposition during 
the electoral transition, the institution-building assistance provided by the 
UN failed to check on the executive power, even though some Congolese 
analysts were voicing concerns about the authoritarian shift well in advance. 
In 2007, some Congolese media ran an opinion about the brutal behavior 
of the government. Questioning the electoral process and its bloody after-
math in Kinshasa and Bas Congo, the author lamented without releasing 
his identity “we were ardently searching to become a democracy, but we 
are on our way to becomin g an absurd dictatorship”.9 According to human 
rights activists, the elections themselves cannot bring democracy. Both the 
“Congolese and international actors must work to establish an independent 
judiciary and a vibrant parliament with an effective opposition to improve 
human rights, hold the executive to account for its actions, and counterbal-
ance the restriction of political convergence. The failure to establish such 
counterweights will endanger the slight chance of Congo’s young democra-
cy. The same kind of focus and international cooperation that brought about 
the elections must be replicated in the cause of improving human rights and 
opening up democratic space, if the hopes for stability and improved gover-
nance for this war-torn nation are to be fulfilled”.10
One of the biggest negative aspects of reliance on the ICC in the DRC is that 
the Court’s temporal jurisdiction means that it cannot address all of the 
crimes committed during the civil wars in the DRC. This has been heavi-
ly criticized. The obvious expectation is that the domestic judicial capacity 
would arrange proceedings in situ undermining the regime of impunity in 
9 An amnesty law was signed by President Kabila on 7 May 2009. For the debate and 
lack of trust to Kabila after the elections and the instable political situation for the next 
electoral round in 2011 see, ‘Sortir de la politique du pire: Une exigence pour le chef de 
l’Etat’, May 18, 2007, Kinshasa, Le Potentiel Congolese Newspaper. For an overview of 
the political transition in the country and the peace and justice constraints see, T. Caray-
annis, ‘The peace and justice dilemma in the DRC’, The Challenge of Building Sustain-
able Peace in the DRC, (July 2009), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Background Paper, 
accessible at: http://www.hdcentre.org/fi les/DRC%20paper.pdf
10 See Human Rights Watch, We Will Crush You. The Restriction of Political Space in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, November 2008, accessible at: http://www.hrw.org/en/
node/76188/section/9#_ftn314
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the country. The wars began in 1996 and the ICC’s jurisdiction extends back 
only to 2002. Whatever the ICC mandate brings in the DRC, its jurisdictional 
and resource constraints limits a ‘full service’ justice solution. Another critic 
is that focusing primarily on Ituri, the ICC takes in hand only one part of the 
history of the Congo wars. This, and the combination with the case against 
Thomas Lubanga and the arrest of popular opposition leader, Jean-Pierre 
Bemba in 2008, for crimes allegedly committed in the Central African Repub-
lic, has eroded much of the goodwill enjoyed by the ICC initially in the DRC. 
Bemba’s arrest prompted outrage in the DRC with accusations that the ICC 
is a political instrument of Kabila, or Western powers, or both. Increasingly, 
Congolese human rights lawyers favour a special chamber inside the Con-
golese judicial system supported by external donors, aware of the limita-
tions of the ICC and the very expensive option of ad hoc tribunals. While this 
would help rebuild the DRC’s justice system and allow for local ownership 
of justice, both elements being critical in building a durable peace, the ICC 
has neither the mandate nor the resources to accomplish such goals. In con-
clusion these are the enduring issues which current and future mediation 
efforts will have to contend.11 The reality is that Kabila has the power in this 
country. The DRC is rich of mineral resources and this appeals different par-
ties with negative consequences on democratic governance.
In accordance with its constitution the DRC held presidential elections in 
2011 which were followed by local elections in 2012-2013. In 2010, the Con-
golese government, through a letter to the UN Secretary-General, requested 
international assistance for the organization of the entire electoral process. 
Earlier than that and to respond to the conflicts in the country, MONUC 
(Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo) was established by the 
United Nations Security Council in Resolutions 1279 (1999) and 1291 (2000) 
to monitor the peace process of the Second Congo War, though much of its 
focus subsequently turned to the Ituri conflict, the Kivu conflict and the 
Dongo conflict. In 2010 MONUC was renamed the United Nations Organiza-
tion Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) 
to reflect the new phase reached in the DRC and the inability of peace keep-
ing to address the human security dilemma. In August 2010, the Mai Mai 
rebels ambushed a base of the 19th Kumaon Regiment of the Indian Army, 
killing three Indian peace-keepers. The attack renewed the Indian govern-
ment decision to decrease the military presence in the DRC due to grow-
ing conflict in the region. It should be noted that the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1925 (2010) provides that MONUSCO has the mandate, inter alia, 
“to provide technical and logistical support for the organization of national 
and local elections, upon explicit request from the Congolese authorities and 
within the limits of its capabilities and resources”. In 2010, a timetable of the 
UN missions was prepared covering until June 2012 and still subject to the 
11 See for the devate P. Clark and N. Waddell, ‘Courting Confl ict? Justice, Peace and the 
ICC in Africa’, in The International Journal of Transitional Justice, March 2008, at 40.
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decision of the Security Council regarding the extention of the missions in 
2013-2014 giving absolute priority to the protection of civilians.12
With regard to justice, since the entry to force of the Rome Statute, the DRC 
authorities referred to the International Criminal Court to investigate and 
prosecute international crimes of common concern allegedly committed 
anywhere in the country. On 26 January 2009, the ICC opened its first trial 
in the case against Congolese warlord Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. Lubanga 
was the first person charged in the DRC situation as well as the Court’s first 
detainee. The trial marks a turning point for the Rome Statute. The Lubanga 
proceedings represent the first test of formal victim participation in an inter-
national criminal trial. The case highlights the gravity of recruitment, enlist-
ment and conscription of child soldiers.13 The trial in the case of The Prosecu-
tor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui started on 24 November 
2009. Trial Chamber II found German Katanga guilty, as an accessory, within 
the meaning of article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute, of one count of crime 
against humanity (murder) and four counts of war crimes (murder, attack-
ing a civilian population, destruction of property and pillaging) committed 
on 24 February 2003 during the attack on the village of Bogoro, in the Ituri 
district of the DRC. On 23 May 2014, Trial Chamber II sentenced Germain 
Katanga to a total of 12 years’ imprisonment. The time spent in detention 
at the ICC, between 18 September 2007 and 23 May 2014, will be deducted 
from the sentence.14
Considering the international political engagements and the governance 
background in the DRC, the United Nations electoral assistance was provid-
ed through an integrated team that includes the MONUSCO Electoral Divi-
sion and the UNDP’s Project in Support of the Electoral Cycle (PACE). The 
electoral assistance was provided throughout the creation of an Independent 
National Electoral Commission (CENI). The organization, functioning and 
promulgation of laws of the Independent National Electoral Commission 
(CENI) by Congolese President Joseph Kabila certainly marked a significant 
step in the electoral process and deserved international attention. It needs to 
be noted that millions of Congolese went to the polls in November 2011 to 
12 The authorization and further extention of the UN mission in the DRC is to be found in 
the Security Council Resolution 1991 of 28 June 2011 and so forth, accessible at: http://
www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1991(2011)
13 ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, Case The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence 
pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc1438370.pdf
14 In the situation in the DRC, fi ve cases have been brought before the relevant Chambers: 
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo; The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda; The Prosecutor 
v. Germain Katanga; The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui; The Prosecutor v. Callixte 
Mbarushimana; and The Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Mudacumura. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Ger-
main Katanga and Bosco Ntaganda are currently in the custody of the ICC. Sylvestre 
Mudacumura remains at large. See ICC » Situations and Cases » Situations » ICC-01/04.
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cast their votes in presidential and parliamentary elections. Since its inde-
pendence in 1960 this is only the second time that the country held demo-
cratic elections. Earlier in 2011, the UN issued a report that detailed numer-
ous human rights violations during the pre-electoral period in the DRC, 
and warned that such incidents could threaten the democratic process and 
could escalate in further post-electoral violence. The report documented 188 
violations apparently linked to the electoral process that occurred between 
1 November 2010 and 30 September 2011, including acts of intimidation, 
threats, incitement, arbitrary arrests and violence. The violations most fre-
quently infringed individuals’ freedom of expression, the right to physical 
integrity and the right to liberty and security of the person, as well as the 
right to freedom of peaceful assembly.15
7.1.2 The Analysis
This case study deals with the multidimensional operations fostering peace, 
justice and security and the issue of cooperation in the DRC. It discusses 
the links between comprehensive and narrowly focused mandates encom-
passing a range of civilian protection tasks. In particular, it argues about the 
implementation of peace agreements and the actions undertaken to consoli-
date peace, including the reforms strengthening the institutions of the State 
and the rule of law, while fighting against the impunity of serious crimes. 
In other words, the multidimensional peace-keeping and peace-building 
operations supposed to contribute to the formation, recovery and democ-
ratization of the domestic jurisdiction in the DRC.16 In this situation the 
intents have fallen on the political transitions following the authorization 
of the Congolese authorities involving international governance institu-
tions, such as the UN missions and the Rome Statute institutions. In accor-
dance with the three essential tasks set out in the Security Council Resolution 
1279 (1999) and Resolution 1906 (2009), the activities of MONUC (Mission de 
l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo) and later re-named MONUSCO 
(Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilization en République 
Démocratique du Congo)17 should centralize a) the post-election peacekeeping 
15 See the report of the Joint Human Rights Offi ce in the DRC accessible at: http://www.ohchr.
org/Documents/Countries/ZR/ReportDRC_26Nov_25Dec2011_en.pdf For an overview
of the situation during the national elections, see the UN News Centre, Deploring election-
related violence in the DRC, top UN offi cial appeal for calm, 1 December 2011, accessible at: 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40580&Cr=democratic&Cr1=congo
16 See C. T. Call, E. M. Cousens, “Ending Wars and Building Peace”, in Coping with Crisis 
Working Paper Series, International Peace Academy, March 2007, at 4. For some views of 
experts in African politics and the politics of ‘collapsing State’ such as DRC see, W. Reno, 
‘Sovereignty and the Fragmentation of the DRC’, Warlord Politics and African States, (1998), 
at 147.
17 See UN doc. S/RES/1925 (2010) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6324th meeting, 
on 28 May 2010, accessible at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/
RES/1925(2010)
Chapter 7  Multidimensional Operations and the Issue of Cooperation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 285
and peacebuilding in the protection of civilian populations; b) the disarma-
ment, demobilization and repatriation and reintegration of armed Congo-
lese and foreign armed groups; c) the support provided to the government in 
security sector reform (SSR), respectively the reform of the army, police and 
judiciary. As part of its mandate and compared with the new peace-keeping 
and peace-building operations, MONUC had the following tasks: a) estab-
lish contact with the signatories to the Ceasefire Agreement; b) liaise with 
the Joint Military Commission, provide technical assistance and investigate 
ceasefire violations; c) provide information on security conditions; d) prepare 
for the observation of the ceasefire and disengagement of military forces; e) 
maintain contacts with signatories of the Ceasefire Agreement, facilitate the 
delivery of humanitarian aid and protect human rights.
While other approaches are conceivable, considering that the European 
Union might be operationally involved again on the ground, the UN pri-
macy among external actors in the DRC especially in the (human) security 
arena, including its long-lasting presence on the ground, makes MONUC/
MONUSCO the principal point of analysis. MONUSCO expresses deep 
concern about the renewed fighting between rival groups in Rutshuru and 
Masisi territories, in North Kivu, and the subsequent consequences on the 
civilian population.18 Moreover, the impact of the Rome Statute in the jus-
tice system of the DRC as the complementary capacity on the ground is also 
debated. This case study offers an overview of the actors involved in the 
DRC where the public authority of state-building are partly in the hands of 
the subsidiary body of the UN Security Council. In this case study the fol-
lowing relationships are argued, namely the issues of evolution, coordina-
tion and coherence within the MONUC’s mandate; MONUC’s cooperation 
with the Congolese authorities; MONUC’s coordination with the UN agen-
cies and humanitarian NGOs; including the implementation, harmoniza-
tion and coordination between MONUC and the ICC. The arrest warrants 
against warlords should be enforced by MONUSCO due to the State not 
cooperating with the Court. This case study argues that the reconfiguration 
of the security forces should provide support to the ICC. In order to deliver 
18 “The situation on the ground is extremely precarious and civilians are being exposed 
to an unacceptable threat,” said Moustapha Soumare, Deputy Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General, Humanitarian Coordinator and acting Head of MONUSCO. 
“MONUSCO troops are risking their own lives to fulfi ll their mandate. See latest press 
release, 2 March 2013, MONUSCO expresses deep concern about the escalation of violence in 
North Kivu. The UN documents on MONUSCO are accessible at: http://www.un.org/
en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/documents.shtml For an overview of the crisis 
in North Kivu, the Human Rights Watch 86-page report details crimes against civilians 
by Congolese army soldiers, troops of renegade general Laurent Nkunda, and com-
batants of a Rwandan opposition force called the Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda 
(FDLR). The report documents an 18-month pattern of confl ict where civilians bear the 
brunt of the abuses. See HRW, ‘The Role of the International Community’, Renewed Cri-
sis in North Kivu, October 2007, the report is accessible at: http://www.hrw.org/en/
reports/2007/10/22/renewed-crisis-north-kivu
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results in the context of sustainable peace-building, global mandates have to 
find clear interaction strategies of law enforcement and humanitarian pro-
tection in the fight against the impunity of serious breaches of human rights. 
The multidimensional presence of international actors in the DRC and the 
necessity of implementing their interactions is the purpose of this case study. 
The concerns arise about the lack of preparedness and accountability in the 
reconfiguration of the civilian protection and peace building mandate of 
MONUSCO. Serious concerns are particularly raised about a) the victims 
and witnesses protection and relocation programs; b) about the delimita-
tion of competences between such mandates; c) including the option of law 
enforcement at disposition of the judicial outcomes of the Court, which are 
still in motion. In other words, both options fighting the impunity at interna-
tional and domestic levels in the DRC are analysed.
7.1.3 The Issues
With regard to the international mandates active on the ground and the 
enduring struggle of sustainable peace and stability several issues arise 
due to the lack of coherence and coordination. Mainly on the nature of the 
‘comprehensive’ mandate of peacekeeping characterized by the militarized 
approach, while dealing with the responsibility to protect civilians, human-
itarian assistance and preservation of human rights. The Security Council 
members should have a better understanding of the mission’s status in the 
DRC and not rely exclusively on the unilateral position of the DRC govern-
ment. First, considering the range of actors involved in the country, sec-
ond, assessing the progress made by the military operations against armed 
groups, and third, deploying security forces to assume UN’s protection 
tasks, including the establishment of State authority in the areas freed by the 
armed groups. These issues should have received an appropriate assessment 
before extending or revising the MONUC’s mandate, initiating a substan-
tive model of reconfiguration and preparedness to support complementary 
actors on the ground with MONUSCO serving to such purpose. The support 
of the electoral activities in the country should have been combined with 
investigations and prosecutions and with law enforcement against the most 
dangerous criminal perpetrators. The State apparatus in the DRC is still not 
able to safeguard its citizens by war and crimes, while international respons-
es lack of interaction strategies to maximize the results in such devastated 
society.
The idea behind this work is to stimulate the debate on governance strategies 
and unresolved gaps, recommending an appropriate interrelation between 
civilian protection, peace and security enforcement, crime prevention and 
international criminal justice mandates on the ground. Such mandates need 
to be planned jointly and in full compliance with human rights, interna-
tional humanitarian law and refugee law. This case study debates on the 
overall impact of such mandates in the domestic institutional reality of the 
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DRC, enabling its governance institutions to safeguard human security. This 
obviously depends on the sovereign responsibilities of the DRC authorities, 
but not exclusively, since the international community has specific respon-
sibilities as well. The implementation, harmonization and coordination of 
complementary mandates are indispensable. These aspects require urgent 
consensus including the know-how of global organizations operating on 
the ground and supporting with each other. The results about peace, justice 
and security in the country depend on the way the States Parties, including 
the non-States Parties to the Rome Statute and formal UN members would 
take delivery of precise guidelines of cooperation with regard to the DRC, 
extending the challenge of cooperation in the whole African region. In other 
words, what kind of practical measures would finally be applied pressuring 
the DRC authorities to take care about civilians?
The challenges incurred by the multidimensional operations on the ground 
in the DRC are extensively debated. The first option refers to the implemen-
tation of cooperation agreements, memoranda, and other legal tools either at 
bilateral (e.g. ICC-State) or at multilateral levels (e.g. MONUSCO-ICC). The 
extreme situation in the country, characterized by serious threats and crimes, 
shows the inevitability to implement, harmonize and coordinate the inter-
national responses. According to the rule of law as one of the most impor-
tant requirements of governance, all feasible ways deserve to be analysed. 
The harmonization of governance of resources and competences of global 
mandates ‘narrowly focused’ means to influence the State formation and 
self-sufficiency of the institutional apparatus in such complex situation. The 
challenges incurred by multidimensional operations need to dwell on the 
fragility of the State, keeping away from the risk of political manipulation by 
the DRC government from such international presence in the country. Global 
actors need to harmonize their work on the ground to maximize the results. 
The ideal would be a deep determination to act on the causes such as cor-
ruption, militarization, resource exploitation and criminal behaviour reduc-
ing the devastating effects on the civilian population. In the quest of the 
State fulfilling its own responsibilities, the change of regime undermining 
human security in the country is the only way for this community to profit 
from development programs. Challenging such aggressive regime requires 
the harmonization of international mandates with law enforcement actions, 
enhancing the role that international criminal justice can play in facilitating 
peace processes, domestic institution reforms and democratic transitions in 
the country. Despite the several approaches in such debate there seems to be 
only one way out from war and crime in the DRC. This can obey result from 
a stronger unity of intents between the relevant stakeholders to make sure 
that the domestic institutions start working in favor of civilians affected by 
war and crime.
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7.1.4 The Purpose
The modest purpose of this case study is to examine the challenges of the 
interaction between complementary mandates on the cluster of cooperation 
between peace and justice in a ‘failed’ State, with appropriate implementa-
tion of ‘arrangements and agreements’ between complementary global tools. 
It addresses the enduring challenge for the Court made only more difficult 
in the absence of adequate diplomatic and political support such as the need 
for increased international cooperation towards arrests, including the pro-
tection of affected communities and individuals during violent hostilities. 
The need of political support for international criminal justice risks constant 
tension with other important diplomatic objectives, including peacekeeping 
and peace negotiations which may undermine the credibility of the inter-
national judiciary. The UN ‘comprehensive’ mandate active on the ground 
fostering peace, justice and security and the pressure for democratic political 
transitions in the country, requires specific arrangements between all actors 
involved in the field, including the Court. There is an opportunity on the 
ground to establish ‘narrowly focused’ mandates based on the rule of law. 
Such mandates need high cooperation standards undermining the risks for 
the country to fall back in the regime of war and mass atrocities.
The concern addressed in this case study questions the extent in which the 
governance of ‘comprehensive’ international responses may challenge the 
complex reality in a ‘failed’ State such as in the DRC, without raising appro-
priately the international standards of cooperation between complementary 
mandates and the Congolese authorities. This study also measures the level 
of cooperation provided by the DRC to the Court where the most danger-
ous criminal perpetrators are still at large and around. The problem in the 
DRC is a lack of responsibility by the government to design acceptable secu-
rity sector reforms protecting the affected communities and civilians by war 
and crime. The justice system, including army and police are still unable to 
function in acceptable ways. The membership of the DRC of the Rome Stat-
ute system does not show any consistent check against the impunity, with 
genuine investigations by the State itself, including the delivery of mean-
ingful justice to the victims. Furthermore, being a party to the Rome Statute 
is not serving as a deterrent of serious crimes.19 Another problem derives 
19 Lately, 50 Congolese NGOs and Human Rights Watch lodge a formal complaint against 
Colonel Innocent Zimurinda. The complaint was addressed to General Amuli Bahigwa, 
the offi cer in command of Congolese army operations in eastern Congo. The Congolese 
groups said that abuses were continuing under Zimurinda’s command, including with 
his direct involvement: “We have taken this unusual step of jointly lodging a formal 
complaint against Colonel Zimurinda because we can no longer tolerate the abuses he 
continues to commit against civilians”, said Joseph Dunia of Promotion de la Démocratie 
et Protection des Droits Humains (PDH). “We fear these attacks on civilians will continue 
unless there is urgent action by the authorities to suspend and investigate him”. See 
HRW, ‘Complaint Against Colonel Innocent Zimurinda’ 1 March 2010, accessible at: http://
www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/03/01/complaint-against-lt-col-innocent-zimurinda
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from the temporal jurisdiction of the Court which leaves uncovered serious 
crimes committed in the country. The DRC leadership launched amnesties 
for crimes previously committed not applicable to serious human rights 
breaches and humanitarian violations falling under the Rome Statute. There 
seems to be a hole to be covered in the country for sustainable order and 
stability. In any case the violence can be put to an end only finding an appro-
priate balance between the ‘interests of peace’ and the ‘interests of justice’ 
and only by vigorous interactions improving responsibility and cooperation 
while providing such balance. The practice applied shows several problems 
of legal and political nature. The DRC situation has been characterized by 
the failure of democratic elections, retention of internal power by the politi-
cal élite, and the limited impact of international responses. 20
7.2 The Problem of Operational Coherence and Cooperation
Section Outline
In the DRC the Court delivered arrest warrants against warlords which the 
State is not entirely enforcing. The humanitarian violations continue and the 
law enforcement of judicial decisions does not receive appropriate follow 
up. This section argues about the absence of coherence in the context of gov-
erning peace, justice and security operations in the DRC. It debates about 
the possible evolution of international operations performed by executive 
and judicial mandates, providing security and law enforcement assistance, 
including planning and support between interdependent operations in the 
field. The common goal should be the preservation of law and order includ-
ing a democratic transition in the country through a coherent strategy of 
interactions between domestic and global actors. A clear interaction strategy 
would have a positive impact on the rule of law, institutional building and 
justice in the DRC for the following main reasons. First of all, far from politi-
cized actions and in respect of the judicial independence of the Court, such 
coherent efforts of governance would persuade global consent to the Court 
as equal, independent and enforced international judicial tool, dissolving 
the friction with the political and executive authority of the Security Council. 
Second, a coherent support to the Court would develop the ability of peace 
enforcement serving judicial mandates on the ground, offering more cred-
ibility to the peace operations on humanitarian protection and human rights 
defence in the country. Third, it would expedite the cooperation of the State 
20 For an overview of the causes and the effects of the confl ict in the DRC see I. Samset, 
‘Confl ict of Interests or Interests in Confl ict? Diamonds and War in the DRC’, 2002 
Review of African Political Economy 29, at 463. For an extensive overview of the local gov-
ernance in Eastern DRC see also the contributions by way of working papers of K. Vlas-
senroot, H. Romkema, ‘War and Governance in the DRC’, in Local Governance and Lead-
ership in the DRC, (2007) Oxfam-Novib, accessible at: http://www.psw.ugent.be/crg/
publications/working%20paper/localgov_rapport_eng_def.pdf
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to take over its own responsibilities against the impunity of serious crimes, 
while offering higher degree of deterrence, stability and democratic transi-
tion at both national and regional levels. Fourth, it would offer directions 
and guidelines of cooperation also for non-States Parties to the Rome Stat-
ute furthering positive engagement from them, including legal and politi-
cal legitimation of multilateral involvement by regional organizations. The 
judicial outcomes of the Court would also serve as a signal of action required 
by the non members of the treaty and their future ratification of the Rome 
Statute.
The UN is a key actor in the DRC but not the only one engaged in the post-
conflict peace-building. In general terms, the UN has the political legitimacy 
and the capacity to convene parties and should strengthen cooperation and 
cohesion with the multiple regional and international actors involved on 
the ground. This section recognizes that cooperation is first and foremost a 
responsibility of the government in the DRC but also requires the support 
from regional and international actors. Such actors can optimize the results 
on the ground through appropriate interactions and complementing with 
each other. With regard to the Court, the current phase of investigative and 
prosecutorial activities in the DRC requires cooperation with the UN mis-
sion on the ground. Such multilateral cooperation should become the prior-
ity. Only relying on the bilateral cooperation with the State and its domestic 
authorities is not sufficient for the Court and neither for the UN. The DRC 
authorities should be pressured in accordance with the respective peace and 
justice mandates. They should start their own judicial proceedings in situ 
challenging visibly the impunity regime of international crimes. The analy-
sis of the UN legislative history in the DRC shows that the governance of 
peace operations focusing on the responsibility to protect does not take in 
consideration as much as necessary the presence of the ICC, neither provid-
ing support with law enforcement assistance, victims’ protection and relo-
cation, or securing assets, infrastructures and facilities. Moreover, the mod-
ernization of the operations on the ground by the Security Council require 
awareness about the responsibilities of the military hierarchy and criminal 
accountability of all parts involved in the civilian protection duties. In order 
to have a spectrum of governance of such operations on the ground which 
are characterized by the lack of coherence and coordination, and by the lim-
ited support provided to the Court, this section offers an overview of the 
Security Council activity in the DRC and the cooperation standards prac-
ticed with the ICC in the field operations.
7.2.1 The prospect of coherence
In 2004 the UN Security Council provided “inter alia that MONUC will have 
the mandate, in support of the government of national unity and transition 
of the DRC, to investigate human rights violations to put an end to impunity, 
and to continue to cooperate with efforts to ensure that those responsible 
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for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law 
are brought to justice, while working closely with relevant agencies of the 
UN”.21 Apparently, it was early to consider the ICC presence in the plan-
ning of the UN mission in 2004. In 2005 the memorandum of understanding 
between MONUC and the ICC regulating such interaction finally entered 
into force but waits for further implementation (MoU).22 The ideal would 
be to reach consensus in the Security Council on the reconfiguration of its 
mandate. The security of the operations regarding victims’ relocation and 
protection may also fall in the civilian protection already foreseen in such 
comprehensive mandate of the UN.
The investigation of the Court in the DRC situation involves allegations of 
thousands of deaths by mass murder and summary execution occurred since 
2002, as well as large-scale patterns of rape, torture and the use of child sol-
diers.23 Numerous armed groups active in the DRC were allegedly involved 
in these crimes. Given the scale of the situation, the investigation of the cases 
would proceed in sequence. Some cases selected on the basis of gravity were 
prioritized in 2005, while others would be developed subsequently. The 
first investigations and the collection of evidence brought the prosecutorial 
activity in The Hague with judicial proceedings. The Office of the Prosecutor 
and the Registry established a field office in Kinshasa and a field presence 
in Bunia and concluded a cooperation agreement with the government of 
the DRC. However, because of logistical challenges and the lack of effective 
control of many areas the government’s ability to cooperate with the Office 
of the Prosecutor remains a great challenge for the current investigative and 
prosecutorial activity. The State indeed did not show any willingness and 
ability to take over the criminal proceedings in situ. With regard to the prose-
cutions and the indictments to warlords by the Court, the State failure about 
acceptable standards of cooperation should attract further the attention of 
the international community. The Security Council including non-States Par-
ties like the US should offer political and diplomatic assistance, pressuring 
the DRC government to follow up on the ICC judicial decisions. In this way 
21  UN doc. S/RES/1565 (2004).
22 UN Treaties Vol. 2221, I-39500 No. 1292, 8 November 2005, MoU between the UN and
the ICC concerning cooperation between the MONUC and the ICC (with annexes
and exchange of letters), accessible at: http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/
5/3/12842.pdf
23 The Offi ce of the Prosecutor has been closely analyzing the situation in the DRC since 
July 2003, initially with a focus on crimes committed in the Ituri region. In September 
2003 the Prosecutor informed the Assembly of the States Parties that he was ready to 
request authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber to use his own powers to start an 
investigation, but that a referral and active support from the DRC would assist his work. 
In a letter in November 2003 the government of the DRC welcomed the involvement 
of the ICC and in March 2004 the DRC referred the situation in the country to the Court. 
See ICC doc. ICC-01/04 Situation and Cases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, acces-
sible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/
situation%20icc%200104/
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the critics about double standards and about the controversial US position 
towards the Court would be neutralized by legitimized cooperation efforts.
Despite the lessons learned after the genocide in Rwanda the DRC is still one 
of those that missed early intervention. Many projects have been devoted to 
the development of early-warning indicators about State failure, and many 
books and policy papers have been written about how to create the political 
wills for early conflict prevention, but success has been limited. In the DRC 
situation, early intervention has not been performed and the UN mandate 
in the country showed a lack of preparedness for several reasons.24 As far 
as the situation escalated at such violent extent in the country, and no early-
warning had good effect, consensus is now necessary on narrowly focused 
operations between complementary mandates fostering peace, justice and 
security. The law enforcement on the ground of some of the Court’s arrest 
warrants against Congolese warlords requires immediate action. When 
the State cooperation fails, the Security Council should be engaged in law 
enforcement operations. The question is whether in the practice there would 
be at least the determination to act with human security parameters in such 
violent situations, or the search of measures to prevent, react and rebuild 
would only remain theoretical assumptions.
7.2.2 The standards of cooperation
In the previous chapters the structural and normative challenges embodying 
the emerging regime of international criminal justice based on international 
cooperation upraised several concerns. In accordance with the treaty provi-
sions, Article 87(6) of the Rome Statute addresses the relationship between 
the Court and intergovernmental organizations in providing that: “…the 
Court may also ask for other forms of cooperation and assistance which may 
be agreed upon with such an organization, and which are in accordance with 
its competence and mandate”. Article 54(3)(d) leaves space to ‘arrangements 
or agreements’ to facilitate such cooperation. While at provisional level the 
Rome Statute clarifies in detail the obligation of the States Parties to coop-
erate with the Court, including the cooperation with non-parties under ad 
hoc agreements, international organizations such as the UN are not bound 
by such obligations. There is no provision in the Rome Statute defining the 
24 For an overview of the challenges incurred by MONUC supporting multidimensional 
operations in the country such as humanitarian protection, confl ict management and 
peace enforcement see, V. K. Holt, T. C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Pre-
paredness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations, (2006), at 155. For the 
broad range of issues arising from the fact that the UN mission in the DRC, MONUC, is 
an integrated mission mandated, among other things, to protect civilians and humani-
tarian aid workers and to improve the security conditions under which humanitarian 
assistance is provided and the failure to reach coherent standards of assistance on the 
ground see T. Mowjee, ‘Coherence: Integration Missions in Theory and in the DRC’, 
Humanitarian Agenda 2015 DRC Case Study, (2007), at 15.
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level of involvement of multinational forces in the arrest of individuals 
indicted by the Court in case the State does not take its own responsibilities. 
Further action is left to the political interest of the international community 
and to the international cooperation capacity-building of the Court towards 
‘arrangements or agreements’ with other international organizations.
As explained above, the ‘multidimensional’ operations in a ‘failed’ State, such 
as in the DRC, typically require the participation of several organizational 
entities engaged in state-building operations. In order to ensure the coherence 
as a whole of such complementary activities it is necessary to harmonize, inte-
grate and coordinate their respective mandates and operations. Article 18 of 
the relationship agreement between the UN and the ICC clarifies that the UN 
“undertakes with due regard to its responsibilities and competence under the 
Charter of the United Nations and subject to its rules, to cooperate with the 
Prosecutor of the Court and to enter with the Prosecutor into such arrange-
ment or agreements as may be necessary to facilitate such cooperation, in 
particular when the Prosecutor exercises his duties and powers with respect 
to investigation and seeks the cooperation of the UN under Article 54 of the 
Statute”.25 In 2005 an important memorandum of understanding has been 
established between the UN and the ICC concerning cooperation between 
the MONUC and the ICC (MoU). Chapter III and particularly Article 10 on 
cooperation and legal assistance has been used for such governance, and 
will need further attention on facilitating exchange of information between 
the organizations including substantive and operational assistance (MoU).
When the Security Council decided to extend its mission in the DRC the rea-
son was to respond to continued attacks against civilians, respectively, the 
widespread sexual violence, the recruitment of child soldiers and the extra-
judicial executions. The Security Council emphasized that the protection of 
civilians must be given first priority in the allocation of available capacity 
and resources of any other tasks. In the context of civilian protection, the 
Security Council urged the Congolese government to establish sustainable 
peace in the eastern part of the country, to ensure respect for human rights 
and put an end to impunity, reforming the justice system and the security 
sectors as fundamental requirements to restore the rule of law. Furthermore, 
the ongoing debate in the Security Council on a strategic review of the situ-
ation in the DRC, including the reconfiguration of its mandate, was based 
first “to determine, in close cooperation with the Congolese government and 
troop- and police-contributing countries, the modalities of a reconfiguration 
of the UN mandate, in particular the critical tasks that must be accomplished 
before the mission could envisage”.26 In such debate the Security Council 
25 For the provisions on cooperation between the organizations see respectively Article 18 
of the Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the International Crimi-
nal Court and Article 54 of the Rome Statute.
26 UN doc. S/RES/1906 (2009).
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does not mention the role of the Court and the support expected by its peace 
operations thereof. It will be up to the Secretary-General to emphasize again 
the standards of cooperation to be provided in the UN mandate configura-
tion to complementary partners involved on the ground such as the ICC. The 
next paragraph examines the evolution of the comprehensive mandate of the 
Security Council on the ground, its reconfiguration and the necessity of ‘nar-
rowly focused’ operations fostering peace, justice and security in the DRC.
7.2.3 The UN Mission in the DRC
The necessity of a coherent model of interaction and support of the Security 
Council to the ICC is obvious. Some adjustments should have been consid-
ered in the reconfiguration of the new deployment of the UN mandate in the 
country (MONUSCO). In the first place the Security Council decided that 
MONUC will have the mandate, in close cooperation with the Congolese 
authorities and the United Nations country team and donors, to support the 
strengthening of democratic institutions and the rule of law and, to that end, 
to: a) provide advice to strengthen democratic institutions and processes at 
the national, provincial, regional and local levels; b) promote national recon-
ciliation and internal political dialogue, including through the provision of 
good offices, and support the strengthening of civil society and multi-party 
democracy, and give the necessary support to the Goma and Nairobi peace 
processes; c) assist in the promotion and protection of human rights, with 
particular attention to women, children and vulnerable persons, investigate 
human rights violations and publish its findings, as appropriate, with a view 
to putting an end to impunity, assist in the development and implementa-
tion of a transitional justice strategy, and cooperate in national and interna-
tional efforts to bring to justice perpetrators of grave violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law; d) in close coordination with 
international partners and the United Nations country team, provide assis-
tance to the Congolese authorities, including the national independent elec-
toral commission, in the organization, preparation and conduct of local elec-
tions; e) assist in the establishment of a secure and peaceful environment for 
the holding of free and transparent local elections; f) contribute to the pro-
motion of good governance and respect for the principle of accountability; 
g) in coordination with international partners, advise the government of the 
DRC in strengthening the capacity of the judicial and correctional systems, 
including the military justice system. The further evolution of the UN mis-
sion in the field and its impact on humanitarian protection, security issues 
and accountability in the DRC in the post-election phase will be discussed in 
the next session. The next session concludes with some remarks on the pres-
ence of the Court in the DRC which confirms the need of cooperation to be 
settled in the configuration on the ground by a narrowly focused mandate of 
the Security Council.
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7.2.4 The ICC presence in the DRC
The DRC is one of the situations that the ICC is currently investigating and 
prosecuting falling under the ‘self-referral’ category of the States Parties to 
the Rome Statute. The government of the DRC referred the situation to the 
Court which focused its attention on atrocities committed in the Ituri prov-
ince. The Ituri militia leaders have been charged with crimes against the 
humanity and war crimes, including the involvement in the murder in Feb-
ruary 2005 of nine Bangladeshi peacekeepers, ambushed during a MONUC 
patrol near Lake Albert.27 As previously anticipated, between 2006-2008 
the ICC secured the arrest of Thomas Lubanga, the political and military 
leader of the rebel Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC), Germain Katanga, 
commander of the Force de Résistance Patriotique en Ituri (FRPI) and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo, former leader of the Front des Nationalistes et des Intégrationnistes 
(FNI). They were arrested by Congolese authorities during military training 
in Kinshasa and transported to The Hague. In total four arrest warrants have 
been issued for the DRC situation. The accused Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Ger-
main Katanga, Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui are currently in the custody of the 
ICC. The suspect Bosco Ntaganda is now also in custody. The situation of the 
DRC has been assigned to Pre-Trial Chamber I, which is composed by three 
judges. The Court has charged Lubanga with three counts of war crimes: 
enlisting children under the age of fifteen years, conscripting them to the 
armed forces of the UPC and using them to participate actively in the hostili-
ties. Katanga and Ngudjolo have both been charged with six counts of war 
crimes and three of crimes against humanity, including murder, sexual slav-
ery and conscription of children, all stemming from an alleged joint FRPI-
FNI attack on the village of Bogoro in Ituri in 2003.
7.2.5 Conclusions
For many human rights experts involved in the DRC the recommendations 
to the Security Council regarding its mandate refer to the lack of clarity of its 
comprehensive strategy in the country. According to the UN Special Advi-
sor on Sexual Violence in the DRC,  Dahrendorf, “the mandate to protect 
civilians, to monitor human rights abuses and to enforce the arms embargo 
has been renewed. However, since then, it is not clear how far the UN mis-
sion in the DRC will remain involved in promoting and safeguarding the 
remaining agendas of the peace process, such as judicial reform, devolution 
of central government powers to provincial assemblies and anti-corruption 
27 Thomas Lubanga was arrested and imprisoned in the DRC, following the killing of nine 
Bangladeshi peacekeepers in the gold-rich Ituri region. The military arm of Lubanga’s 
Union of Congolese Patriots, UPC, was implicated in the killings of the Bangladeshi 
peacekeepers. See Ayesha Kajee, ‘Lubanga Case Signals Hope for Child Soldiers’, 29 
March 06 Institute for War and Peace Reporting, No.58, accessible at: http://www.iwpr.
net/?p=%3Cp%3ENo%20item%20found.%3C/p%3E&s=f&o=260591&apc_state=henh
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legislation. The UN political role will have to be re-defined by the Security 
Council in line with the recommendation made by the Secretary-General and 
with regard to the Congolese institutions. The security sector reform (SSR) in 
the DRC is not an isolated process, but it has to take place at different levels 
simultaneously and in combination with other reform processes. The SSR has 
to be incorporated into ongoing efforts aimed at strengthening governance, 
such as an effective legislature and other oversight bodies, financial manage-
ment, human rights and civilian protection. There is a lack of conceptual clar-
ity amongst all actors involved on the way the SSR is coupled with a lack of 
expertise and appropriate human and financial resources dedicated to these 
efforts. The UN’s approach to SSR in the DRC has been marred at structural, 
conceptual and management level, and a lack of dedicated strategic capac-
ity at the level of the UN mission to assist in the coordination of SSR”.28 The 
security sector reform in the DRC must be viewed in the broader spectrum of 
the development of domestic institutions and capacity-building. The Security 
Council needs to take such recommendation in consideration while adjusting 
appropriately its mandate.29
This section argued on the challenges in the governance of international 
responses in a failed State characterized by constant instability between 
the conflict and post-conflict phases. The conflict in eastern DRC is in part 
incited by the overflow of the genocide ideology from Rwanda, and it has 
involved up to seven African nations in the Great Lakes region, including 
Uganda. The conflict is characterized by the deliberate targeting of the civil-
ian population which has suffered mass murder, rape, torture and mutila-
tion. The situation continues to cause a threat to international peace and 
security in the whole region and it still requires appropriate consideration 
of peace enforcement and international criminal justice. The international 
community did not have the resources, the political will, or the know-how 
to take early action in the region. The genocide in Rwanda confirmed such 
trend. The international failure to take seriously the initial massacres of 1994 
in Rwanda, which ultimately led to genocide became four years later a major 
cause of war in the DRC. The empirical data of peace enforcement at dispo-
sition in the country, since its colonial independence struggling with social, 
economic, and political State formation, confirm the failure of governing 
early signs of State failure through comprehensive international responses. 
However, the current struggle of the international governance institutions is 
not only worth it for the DRC, but for the whole region, where the needs of 
28 The focus of the UN integrated mission in Security Sector Reform (SSR) is an examina-
tion of the army, police and judicial institutions in the DRC. For an analysis of the key 
elements and obstacles of the SSR, a brief overview of MONUC involvement in SSR 
activities, and fi nal recommendations see, N. Dahrendorf, ‘MONUC and the Relevance 
of Coherent Mandates: The Case of the DRC’, in  H. Hänggi, V. Scherrer (eds.), Security 
Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions, (2008), at 98.
29 See N. Dahrendorf supra.
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sustainable peace, justice and security are interrelated and their operations 
should be more coherent and complement with each other.
Questions and concerns arise on the governance of international responses, 
cooperation standards and their interaction thereof. There are urgent adjust-
ments to be made considering the evolution of executive mandates on the 
protection of civilians with militarized operations, combined with the lacuna 
of supporting judicial decisions with law enforcement, police operations and 
protection of victims and witnesses. It is premature to establish if the mem-
bership of the DRC to the Rome Statute system and the support provided by 
the UN on democratic transition in the country would influence further the 
developments in the domestic governance institutions. The priorities remain 
the fight against the regime of impunity of massive crimes in the country, 
where the process of demilitarization, civilian protection, law enforcement 
and police, good governance of courts and tribunals, including the welfare 
of individuals and victimised communities, can be optimized by an interac-
tion strategy of global governance institutions. These global efforts would 
surely reflect on the State at micro level offering at least a model of gover-
nance to be followed by the domestic institutions in the country. There is the 
need to avoid the militarized approach which instead should turn their sup-
port to law enforcement and police operations to an international judiciary, 
including civilian protection duties extended to the victims of international 
humanitarian crimes. Moreover, the main important element is to hold all 
actors involved accountable for their actions without any exclusion.
7.3 Fighting the Impunity at International and Domestic levels
Section Outline
This section explores the problems of ‘inability’ and ‘unwillingness’ of the 
DRC government investigating and prosecuting the perpetrators of serious 
international crimes; its domestic justice system; the impact of the Rome 
Statute in the judicial apparatus of the country, including other alternatives 
dealing with the regime of impunity falling outside the temporary jurisdic-
tion of the ICC. In the DRC the justice system is completely unable to pre-
serve the rule of law. Its domestic governance institutions, courts and tribu-
nals do not have any meaning for the populations in the chaotic scenario of 
impunity and commission of serious crimes. The ability of domestic courts 
to deliver justice for victims of rape and sexual violence is almost inexistent. 
The prisons do not retain such violators. The majority of the criminals easily 
escapes and commits the same crimes over and over again. Entire commu-
nities have been victimized in the DRC and victim rights are not recognized.
Thomas Lubanga was the first to be arrested by the ICC on charges for the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers. This indictment drew considerable 
attention about the issue of child soldiers and hopefully also from other rebel
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leaders in the country, the majority of which had children among their 
forces. On the positive side, Lubanga’s arrest had an enormous educational 
impact, making clear what was not previously understood that “recruiting, 
enlisting, and using children to fight, is a war crime”.30 It may seem surpris-
ing that the use of child soldiers was not considered to be a crime. Instead 
child soldiers had been part of the entourage of every senior armed leader 
in the DRC, and this indeed for years. Laurent Kabila’s Kadogo troops were 
probably the best known example. In some places in the East, parents have 
even ‘donated’ their children to an armed group to help protect the commu-
nity.31 More commonly the conscription of children in the army was forced 
by kidnapping them from their villages. In those cases militia, warlords and 
army commanders were so familiar with such practice that they considered 
this being normal in time of conflict.
The views of Hayner and Davis on the demobilization of children, their 
rehabilitation and care after conflict are completely shared. In principle, 
there is no apparent procedural way to release the child soldiers into a 
formal system of demobilization. Children’s rights advocates began to 
see a new pattern emerge. After Lubanga’s arrest, armed groups entering 
demobilization programs and sites no longer brought children with them. 
Instead, according to NGOs involved in child demobilization, the children 
were abandoned, left behind in the forest or perhaps in a village. In a few 
cases the armed group would return the children to their families. Only a 
small proportion of the abandoned children would find their way to the UN 
or other children’s service agencies, whose programs are designed on the 
assumption that child soldiers would be released through the official demo-
bilization process. In addition, demobilization benefits are generally avail-
able only to those demobilized through formal entry points.32 For this reason 
international rehabilitation programs have been very weak either for girls 
as victims of sexual crimes or for child soldiers, or for both. This is another 
reason why the coordination between complementary actors on the ground 
is extremely important. This section reflects on the impact of complemen-
tary global regimes fighting against the impunity in domestic governance 
30 Such unawareness of crimes in time of confl icts is empirically confi rmed, according to 
the fi nding of a survey which respondents were interviewed and assessed in Ituri, North 
Kivu, and South Kivu. See P. Vinck, P. Pham, S. Baldo, R. Shigekane, Living with Fear: A 
Population-based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice, and Social Reconstruction in Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Human Rights Center of the University of California Berke-
ley, Payson Center for International Development, and ICTJ, August 2008.
31 Practice not acceptable under international standards. The donation of children was more 
common among local Mayi Mayi groups, which were initially conceived as community-
based protection forces. This practice is also not acceptable under international standards.
32 See L. Davis, P. Hayner, ‘The ICC’s Impact on Children’,  Diffi cult Peace, Limited Justice: 
Ten Years of Peacemaking in the DRC, March 2009, International Center for Transitional 
Justice, at 30, accessible at: http://www.ictj.org/static/Africa/DRC/ICTJDavisHayner_
DRC_Diffi cultPeace_pa2009.pdf
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systems with the scope to maintain, preserve and restore the rule of law. The 
new inspiration comes from the principles to be applied to reparations for 
victims in the context of the case against Lubanga, who was found guilty 
by the ICC and sentenced to a total imprisonment of 14 years. Hopefully 
the DRC authorities will take over in situ very soon the judicial proceedings 
against other criminal perpetrators.
In order to offer an assessment of the justice system in the DRC, this sec-
tion contains the finding of the report entitled Rebuilding courts and trust: An 
assessment of the needs of the justice system in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) of the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAH-
RI), in conjunction with the International Legal Assistance Consortium 
(ILAC). The report includes recommendations to the government of the 
DRC at both central and regional levels; the most notable of which is for the 
government to increase funding of the judicial system and fight corruption 
within the judiciary. The report follows the IBAHRI-ILAC delegation visit 
to the DRC to undertake an examination of the current state of the country’s 
justice system. The IBAHRI and ILAC experts found ongoing conflicts, seri-
ous violations of human rights, violence against women and international 
crimes, which have added sensitive challenges of a justice system already 
struggling to meet the basic demands of the population. Further, the report 
states that the judicial system in the DRC continues to suffer from underin-
vestment, corruption, and a severe lack of resources and infrastructure. The 
frequent disregard or delay in compliance with court orders by members of 
the executive and the overall difficulty for individuals to access justice and 
have judgments enforced, is deplored by the IBAHRI and ILAC. The two 
non-governmental organisations and eminent think-tanks are concerned 
that legal aid is not easily accessible in the DRC, and that tribunals are not 
present in all regions, which contributes to the feeling of injustice for victims 
and a sentiment of impunity for perpetrators. Christian Ahlund, Executive 
Director of ILAC said, right after releasing such important findings, “we 
wish to offer our contribution to the ongoing effort to improve the justice 
system in the DRC, particularly in areas that are in great need of assistance. 
The report includes recommendations for specific projects in areas that the 
delegation has visited and that are still relatively untouched by international 
intervention”. “The current situation of the administration of justice in the 
DRC is of grave concern” said Justice Richard Goldstone, IBAHRI Co-Chair. 
“The Government must make the improvement of the justice system as a 
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priority. This is the only way to fight impunity and restore the rule of law in 
the country”.33
Extremely useful for a legal overview is also the case study and the recom-
mendations delivered by Avocats sans frontières, on the application of the 
Rome Statute by the courts in the DRC.34 Another important legal, political 
and institutional overview of the current state of justice in the DRC comes 
from an evaluation of the sensitive security system reform in the country.35 
This section contains an overview of the emerging regime of fighting the 
impunity in the DRC through the application of Rome Statute provisions 
in local courts, which are limited by the problems facing the judicial system 
(deprived judicial budget; shortage of judges and deficiencies in training; 
corruption; lack of independence; prisons conditions and infrastructure; 
poor means of communication; geographical restraints). It reports on the 
cases before the ICC, including limits and critics of its impact fighting the 
impunity in the DRC (not targeting the highest-level perpetrators; limited 
geographic reach in the country; unwillingness to prosecute crimes commit-
ted by government forces; limited charges on the crimes committed; limited 
information and outreach activity in the country). In order to complete the 
assessment this section also explores other alternatives dealing with impu-
nity. It explores the evolution of the jurisprudence of domestic courts; the 
impunity regime of sexual violence, the international assistance for institu-
tion-building currently present in the country which lacks of coherence and 
cooperation.
33 The International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI) and the Interna-
tional Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC) organised an international delegation of 
jurists to visit the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in February 2009. The IBAH-
RI and ILAC mission was aimed at conducting a needs assessment of the Congolese 
judicial system in order to assess where expertise can be most constructively applied, 
both geographically and thematically, to assist the reconstruction of the justice system. 
See International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI), the International 
Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC), Rebuilding Courts and Trust: An Assessment of the 
Needs of the Justice System in the Democratic Republic of Congo, August 2009, OSISA and 
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, accessible at: http://www.ibanet.org/Article/
Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=6c2be523-f512-48c1-b09c-fc9a8b1d0aab
34 Avocats Sans Frontières, ‘Summary of Recommendations relating to the Application of 
the Rome Statute by the Congolese Courts’, DRC Case Study, March 2009, at 125, acces-
sible at: http://www.asf.be/publications/ASF_CaseStudy_RomeStatute_Light_Page-
PerPage.pdf
35 L. Davis, ‘The Current State of the Security System in the DRC’, Justice-Sensitive Security 
System Reform in the DRC, February 2009, International Centre for Transitional Justice, 
accessible at: http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/Justice_Sensitive_Secu-
rity_System_reform_in_the_DRC.pdf C. Aptel, ‘Challenges Facing Domestic Justice in 
the DRC’, Domestic Justice Systems and the Impact of the Rome Statute, September 2009, 
International Center for Transitional Justice, at 6, accessible at: http://www.internation-
alcriminaljustice.net/experience/papers/session7.pdf
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7.3.1 The impact of the Rome Statute
As briefly clarified above, several problems characterize the governance of 
the domestic system in the DRC, respectively a) the justice system structure, 
b) the lacuna in the national legislation, and c) the application of the Rome 
Statute provisions in domestic courts.
a) Implementing legislation
The ICC has become an important factor in the DRC following the referral by 
the Congolese government of the situation on its territory on 3 March 2004. 
The DRC’s ratification of the Rome Statute instituting the ICC dates back to 
11 April 2002.36 Despite its ratification, the DRC has yet to actually adopt the 
bill formally incorporating the Rome Statute into Congolese law. The legal 
experts of IBAHRI-ILAC met in 2009 with representatives of the Permanent 
Commission of Congolese Law Reform, who explained that they had pre-
pared a draft law at the government’s request upon ratification of the Rome 
Statute. The acting President of the Commission said that the draft had been 
handed to the government two years ago. The delegation was informed 
that a draft law could be presented again before the National Assembly at 
its next session. The draft law has been a matter of debate for several years, 
and some speculate that certain government officials are resisting the legisla-
tion because of fears that they may themselves end up being prosecuted.37 
In its current format, the draft law involves changes to the Penal Code in 
order to include war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, and in 
order to replace the sentence of capital punishment with life imprisonment. 
Amendments would also be required to the Military Penal Code in order to 
move war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide under the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the civilian Courts of Appeal. The draft legislation would 
also clarify the definition of these crimes, as there are currently discrepan-
cies between the definitions found in the Military Penal Code and in the 
Rome Statute. This anticipated transfer of jurisdiction is the cause of debate 
as to the prudence of removing jurisdiction from military courts over mili-
tary personnel in cases of international crimes, in light of the present state of 
the civilian justice system. The current draft law provides for the transfer of 
jurisdiction to the Courts of Appeal, but it also introduces a military judge 
in the composition of the five judge bench which will hear these infractions.
36 Décret-loi No 13 of 13 March 2002.
37 The Permanent Commission of Congolese Law reform modifi ed the text before submit-
ting it to the then Minister of Justice. Human Rights First has issued comments, jointly 
with Human Rights Watch, on the draft, stressing remaining concerns and suggesting 
alternative language, in particular with regard to the death penalty and cooperation pro-
cedures. It is now for the Minister of Justice in the current transitional government to 
take the legislation forward. For the comments of HRF and HRW see document accessi-
ble at: http://www.humanrightsfi rst.info/cah/ij/icc/implementation/imp_dem_rep_
congo.aspx
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b) Application of the Rome Statute provisions in domestic courts
Given the monistic nature of the Congolese legal system, the Rome Statute is 
already part of domestic law even in the absence of an implementing law.38 
The Constitution provides at Article 153 that courts can apply ratified inter-
national instruments as long as these are not contrary to law and custom.39 
Local courts have started invoking the provisions of the Rome Statute in 
their judgments since 2006.40 The Tribunal militaire de garnison of Mbandaka 
was the first one to do so in the cases of Mutins de Mbandaka41 and Son-
go Mboyo.42 In these two cases, the tribunal used the definition of crimes 
against humanity found in the Rome Statute. In Songo Mboyo, the tribunal 
used the definition of rape as a crime against humanity as outlined in the 
Rome Statute, which is wider than the one found in the Military Penal Code. 
Recently, the trial of Mai Mai militia chief Gédéon Kyungu Mutanga showed 
another example of the application of the Rome Statute by domestic courts. 
In March 2009, the Tribunal militaire de garnison of Haut-Katanga found 
Gédéon guilty of crimes against humanity. The court applied the definition 
of crimes against humanity as found in the Rome Statute. The jurisprudence 
of domestic courts as regards the application of the Rome Statute provisions 
is still limited not only in the number of decisions, but also in the strength 
of the legal reasoning found in the judgments. In its study, Avocats sans fron-
tières notes the weakness of the decisions and explains that judges often omit 
to point out the constitutive elements of the crime or the evidence on which 
they are founding their decision.43 Challenges to the proper functioning of 
the judiciary also influence the application of the Rome Statute by domestic 
courts. Magistrates have rarely been adequately trained and investigative 
capacities are very limited. The lack of qualified magistrates and judicial 
personnel also poses a challenge to proper application of the Rome Statute 
domestically.44
38 In a monistic system, ratifi ed international treaties become directly applicable national 
law, while a dualistic system requires an additional act of the legislature to transform the 
ratifi ed treaty into national law.
39 While Article 156 of the 2006 Constitution of the DRC limits the jurisdiction of military 
justice to members of the armed forces and of the police.
40 A recent publication by Avocats Sans Frontières analyses the jurisprudence of Congolese 
military courts applying the Rome Statute. See ASF, Etude de jurisprudence. L’application 
du Statut de Rome de la Cour Pénale Internationale par les Jurisdictions de la RDC, March 
2009, accessible at: www.asf.be/index.php?module=publicaties&lang=fr&id=51
41 Military Court of the Garrison of Mbandaka, Affaire Mutins de Mbandaka, 12 Januery 
2006, RP 86/05.
42 Military Court of the Garrison of Mbandaka, Affaire Songo Mboyo, 12 April 2006, RP 
84/05.
43 Avocats Sans Frontières, supra note 482.
44 Avocats Sans Frontières, ‘Criminal Responsibility, Grounds for exclusion of Responsibil-
ity and Extenuating or Aggravating Circumstances’, DRC Case Study, March 2009, at 64, 
accessible at: http://www.asf.be/publications/ASF_CaseStudy_RomeStatute_Light_
PagePerPage.pdf
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c) Cases before the ICC in the DRC
Following the referral by the Congolese government, the Prosecutor opened 
an investigation in 2004 which led to warrants of arrest being issued against 
four Congolese nationals. There are currently three pending cases before the 
ICC for the crimes committed in the DRC. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, accused 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity in relation to the use of child sol-
diers, was arrested in 2006 and his trial began in January 2009.45 In the joint 
case of Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, charges were con-
firmed on 26 September 2008 and the trial started in September 2009.46 In 
addition, a warrant of arrest was issued against Bosco Ntaganda, the alleged 
Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération 
du Congo (FPLC) and alleged Chief of Staff of the Congrès National pour la 
Défense du Peuple (CNDP), an armed group active in North Kivu. In addition 
to the three above mentioned cases, the ICC has charged another Congolese 
national, former opposition leader Jean-Pierre Bemba, with crimes against 
humanity and war crimes committed in the Central African Republic.47
The strategic approach and the prosecutorial policy of the ICC in the DRC 
have been both criticized by several scholars, human rights activists and 
observers on different issues. Some of them argue that the Court is not tar-
geting the perpetrators at the highest-level. Many of the militia groups in 
eastern Congo have operated with the direct support of the political leader-
ship in neighbouring countries. Human rights organizations argue that the 
ICC prosecutor has shown no intention to investigate this higher level of 
involvement. In 2006 Human Rights Watch on this issue stressed that the: 
“Chief prosecutor should also investigate those who armed and supported 
militia groups operating in Ituri, including key players in power in Kinsha-
sa, Kampala and Kigali. The crimes committed in Ituri are part of a broader 
conflict in the Great Lakes region, and the Court should finally pierce the 
veil of impunity that stretches beyond Congo’s borders”.48
7.3.2 The limits and critics of the ICC
A variety of limits and critics have characterized the impact of the ICC in the 
DRC. First of all, the Court’s geographic reach within DRC is considered too 
limited. Some scholars and practitioners regret that the unilateral focus on 
Ituri during the Court’s first years in the country has raised questions about 
its role and impact. According to Davis and Hayner, “the fighting in Ituri is 
less connected to the ruling elite and least implicates the government, com-




48 See R. Dicker, Human Rights Watch, “D.R. Congo: ICC Arrest First Step to Justice,” press 
release, March 17, 2006; www.hrw.org
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be stronger in Ituri more than in other areas of conflict because of intensive 
international engagement. Partly because local authorities had done some 
substantive investigation of the cases that the ICC selected for prosecution, 
these are generally considered the easier cases. The density of international 
peacekeeping troops was the highest in Ituri, and so it is possible that the 
prosecutor chose the location safest for his investigating staff as well as for 
the witnesses. An obvious aspect of its intervention is that the ICC became 
active when the conflict was calming down in Ituri. The more-entrenched, 
politically more complex, and longer-term conflict was centred in North and 
South Kivu”.49 Another issue is that the Court seems unwilling to prosecute 
crimes committed by government forces. For many commentators this is 
particularly unfortunate, “since the national army has often been cited as 
the worst offender in serious rights abuses”.50 Some observers believe that 
the Court is acting in a partial manner, perhaps worried that it might put 
at risk the political support and collaboration it currently receives from the 
government.51
The ICC prosecutor’s actions in Uganda, where arrest warrants only tar-
geted the armed opposition, reinforced this impression, as did the arrest of 
Jean-Pierre Bemba, President Kabila’s main political rival, for crimes alleg-
edly committed in the Central African Republic. For these groups of observ-
ers the charges are too limited. In the Court’s very first case, the charges 
against Thomas Lubanga focused on the use of child soldiers but made 
no mention of killings, sexual crimes, and other severe atrocities of which 
Lubanga is also widely suspected. Such limited criminal charge is consid-
ered to ‘undermine the credibility of the ICC’ as well as limiting victims’ 
participation, as international human rights organizations argued in an open 
letter to the prosecutor in 2006.52 Local human rights groups and women’s 
organizations were especially critical of the failure to include sexual crimes 
in the charges against Lubanga, given the continued high occurrence of, 
and general impunity for such crimes, especially after later arrests involved 
much broader charges, including sexual crimes. Some NGOs strongly urge 
the prosecutor to broaden her investigations. Another critic is that the Court 
has done modest national outreach. The main consequence is the fact that 
the affected communities have many misconceptions about the Court’s role 
and its powers. Although this reflects a lack of resources and insufficient 
in-country staff, the prosecutor said that the limited outreach was initially 
49 See L. Davis, P. Hayner, ‘The Role and Impact of the ICC’,  Diffi cult Peace, Limited Justice: 
Ten Years of Peacemaking in the DRC, March 2009, International Center for Transitional 
Justice, at 25, accessible at: http://www.ictj.org/static/Africa/DRC/ICTJDavisHayner_
DRC_Diffi cultPeace_pa2009.pdf
50 See L. Davis, P. Hayner supra.
51 See P. Clark, N. Waddell ‘Law, Politics and Pragmatism’, Courting Confl ict? Justice, Peace 
and the ICC in Africa, March 2008, at 40.
52 See HRW joint letter to the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, July 31, 
2006, accessible at: www.hrw.org
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intentional to avoid jeopardizing the peace process and to protect the safety 
of witnesses. Local human rights advocates strongly criticized this approach 
and it appeared that the Court was planning a more proactive public educa-
tion program in the future.53 There are no doubts that these issues are all 
related to the necessity to improve the cooperation, assistance and support 
to the Court on the ground. The Court is in urgent need of securing its sites, 
the staff, the protection of witnesses, potential witnesses or victims identi-
fied or contacted in the course of the investigative activity, including their 
participation in the proceedings and relocation programs.
7.3.3 The alternatives to the ICC
The ICC’s jurisdiction is limited not only in terms of time, as it only covers 
crimes committed after the entry into force of the Rome Statute on 1 July 
2002, but also in terms of the number of individuals it may prosecute. The 
prosecution strategy of the ICC is to carry out targeted investigations and 
trials, and to prosecute those bearing the greatest responsibility. The ICC 
operates according to the principle of complementarity with the national 
justice system, taking over when the latter lacks the will or the capacity to 
judge perpetrators of the most serious crimes.54 On this basis, it remains the 
responsibility of the Congolese courts to try perpetrators of serious viola-
tions of human rights and international humanitarian law. However, the 
present weakness of the Congolese justice system makes this difficult. As 
described in the sections above, judicial institutions, civil as well as military, 
face numerous challenges in their day-to-day operations. Moreover, the 
prosecution of international crimes requires extensive investigative capaci-
ties. There is also the need to strengthen current investigation capacities of 
the judicial police. The lack of witness protection programmes in the DRC 
is another obstacle to the investigation and prosecution of international 
crimes.55
53 See F. Petit, Sensibilisation à la CPI en RDC: Sortir du Profi l Bas, ICTJ, March 2007, acces-
sible at: www.ictj.org According to the Court’s outreach report which addresses many 
of these concerns, see Public Information and Outreach Unit of the ICC, Outreach Report 
2009, accessible at: www.icc-cpi.int
54 Article 17, Rome Statute. See the OTP-ICC public policies and strategies accessible at: 
www.icc-cpi.int
55 See International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI), the International 
Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC), Rebuilding Courts and Trust: An Assessment of the 
Needs of the Justice System in the Democratic Republic of Congo, August 2009, OSISA and 
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, accessible at: http://www.ibanet.org/Article/
Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=6c2be523-f512-48c1-b09c-fc9a8b1d0aab
306 Part III  The Humanitarian Escalations of Last Resort and their Governance in the Field Operations 
a) The ‘Mapping Project’
Years of conflict, notably during the wars that took place in the country 
between 1995-1997 and 1998-2002, caused massive human rights violations 
and violations of international humanitarian law, many having been com-
mitted prior to the DRC’s ratification of the Rome Statute. Potential solu-
tions to put an end to impunity for these crimes will need to be examined. 
An important step in that process is the Justice Mapping Project. Originally 
a MONUC initiative, the project was established by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), in close collaboration with 
MONUC. The Justice Mapping Project covers the most serious violations 
of human rights and international humanitarian law committed in the DRC 
between March 1993 and June 2003 (until the implementation of the transi-
tional government). The project is divided into three steps. It aims first at 
establishing an inventory of human rights violations committed between 
1993 and 2003. This portion of the project does not involve forensics or any 
formal investigation as the project’s team members use a ‘reliable body of 
evidence’ established by cross-referencing sources, reports and witness 
statements. In this way the Congolese justice system is examined to deter-
mine its capacity to deal with the human rights violations inventoried. On 
this point, the director of the project noted the strong need to reinforce the 
country’s legal aid system. Finally, the project’s report proposes options for 
transitional justice to deal with impunity and makes suggestions to deal 
with related issues such as memorial, vetting and compensation.
b) The Truth and Reconciliation Commission
It should be recalled that the DRC made an attempt at a truth and reconcili-
ation commission. Created by the Sun City Accord of 16 December 2002, the 
commission was then established by law in 2004.56 Faced since the begin-
ning with issues related to its credibility and independence, the DRC’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission was never successful and was dissolved in 
December 2006, without having heard a single case. However, the idea is 
still alive and the former head of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
presented a proposal to the Senate in 2008 for the establishment of a new 
commission. The issue of amnesty will need to be examined by a future tran-
sitional justice mechanism in the DRC. Amnesty appears to be still used as a 
method in peace negotiations, as illustrated by the recent amnesty law cov-
ering crimes committed from June 2003 to May 2009 in the regions of North 
and South Kivu.57 This law does not apply to acts of ‘genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity’.
56 Loi No /04/018 du 30 Juillet 2004 portant sur l’organisation, attributions et fonc-
tionnement de la Commission Vérité et Réconciliation (Law on the organisation of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission).
57 Loi No 09/003 du 7 mai 2009 portant amnistie pour faits de guerre et insurrectionnels 
commis dans les provinces du Nord-Kivu et du Sud-Kivu Law on amnesty for acts of 
war and insurrection committed in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu).
Chapter 7  Multidimensional Operations and the Issue of Cooperation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 307
7.3.4 The gender crimes
Rape and sexual violence are now internationally recognised as crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and genocide. The DRC, throughout its long 
running conflict, has witnessed some of the highest levels of sexual violence 
in the world.58 Rape has been used as a weapon of war by all sides involved 
in the conflict, and an estimated 200,000 women and girls of all ages have 
been assaulted over the past 12 years.59 While sexual violence is rampant 
and prevalent throughout the DRC, the most affected areas have been in 
north-eastern provinces (for example Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu and 
Maniema).60 The victims were very young in part due to the erroneous belief 
that raping a virgin girl is a remedy against HIV and AIDS.61 Unfortunately, 
despite the adoption of laws against sexual violence in the country,62 this 
crime is perpetrated at an alarmingly high rate, with many acts committed 
by those charged with protecting the general public (the FARDC and the 
PNC). The struggle of the domestic courts to apply the law properly does 
not show sufficient results, with most of the sexual violence cases remain-
ing under investigation for years. Even if a perpetrator is tried and convict-
ed, the sentence is rarely enforced. The law on sexual violence requires the 
courts to conclude a case within three months after the case is brought to the 
justice system, but this is hardly ever possible due to the fact that the justice 
sector is severely under-resourced and under-staffed.63 The absence of an 
effective criminal justice delivery system has led to an increase in the num-
ber of out-of-court settlements based on traditional justice and often leading 
to forced marriages, to the detriment of the victim’s rights and in violation 
of the various laws on sexual violence. The problem is two-fold. On the one 
hand, the major problem encountered by the victims, often leading to the 
perpetrators’ impunity, is the difficulty to prove the crime in court, or even 
58 UN doc. S/RES/1820 (2008) on Women and Peace and Security. In the resolution, passed 
on 19 June 2008, the Security Council noted that “women and girls are particularly tar-
geted by the use of sexual violence, including as a tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, 
instill fear in, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or eth-
nic group”. The resolution demanded the “immediate and complete cessation by all par-
ties to armed confl ict of all acts of sexual violence against civilians”.
59 According to the statistics compiled by the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) 
see UN News Service, 28 February 2009, available at: www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/49aff7bc1e.html
60 For an assessment of programmatic responses see, M. Pratt, L. Werchick, ‘Sexual Terror-
ism: Rape as a Weapon of War in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. An assessment 
of programmatic responses to sexual violence in North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, 
and Orientale Provinces’, (2004), accessible at: http://www.osisa.org/resources/docs/
PDFs/Sexual_Terrorism.pdf
61 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, (2009), 14, at 16.
62 Loi No 06/018 modifi ant et complétant le Décret du 30 janvier 1940 portant Code Pénal 
Congolais (Law amending the Congolese Penal Code).
63 Loi No 06/019 de 2006 sur les violences sexuelles (Law on sexual violence), Art 1, add-
ing art 7 bis to the Code de procédure pénale (Penal Procedure Code).
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bring the matter to court. This is all the more difficult issue in addition to 
the absence of any witness protection programme. On the other hand, even 
if the victim can bring the matter to court and have the perpetrator(s) arrest-
ed and convicted, there is no certainty that reparation will be paid. This is 
because victims may not be able to afford to pay the legal fees required for 
judgment enforcement, or because the perpetrator will not have sufficient 
resources to pay. Also, due to very deficient security in most of the prisons, 
it is not uncommon that the perpetrators are able to escape and become once 
again a threat to victims and witnesses. The inability of the justice system 
to handle such crimes has had the adverse effect of creating a sentiment of 
impunity for witnesses and victims. Unfortunately, and as a direct result of 
the many crimes remaining unpunished and the general sense of impunity, 
rape and sexual violence in the DRC is increasing at an alarming rate and 
is now being committed by ordinary citizens, in addition to the armed and 
military groups. The international community has reacted to some extent on 
the brutality of sexual violence committed in DRC, particularly in the east of 
the country. However, the efforts to fight impunity need to be re-directed in 
the whole region. Next paragraph has the purpose to analyse the strategies 
of international responses on such sensitive issues.
7.3.5 The international assistance
The MONUC Rule of Law Section was first set up in 2004 as a small unit 
to advice on a range of rule of law issues and has since expanded to sup-
port wider security sector reform, including civilian and military justice and 
reform of the penitentiary system. The Rule of Law Section has adopted a 
three-tiered approach to the support of the justice system, providing, first, 
immediate assistance to enable existing DRC capacity to be fully maximised. 
Second, the section supports DRC authorities in designing mid-term coor-
dinated strategic plans to reform justice sub-sectors, such as legislation, 
military justice, prisons and courts. Third, the section supports short-term 
implementation of urgent elements of longer-term reform strategy, includ-
ing building capacity to investigate and try cases involving international 
crimes. Closely attached to MONUC is the Office of the Senior Adviser and 
Coordinator on Sexual Violence for DRC. The Office was created in March 
2008 as an answer to increasing international reaction against the extent and 
brutality of sexual violence in the DRC, particularly in the war-torn east-
ern part of the country. The Office has been set up with the support of UN 
Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict, a conglomerate of 12 UN agen-
cies and sections (including UN DPKO), and the UNDP Bureau for Crisis 
Prevention and Recovery (UNDP BCPR). On 18 March 2009, in consultation 
with UN agencies and MONUC sections, international NGOs, the Sexual 
Violence Task Force and the DRC’s ministries of justice, defence, interior and 
gender, the Office launched a ‘Comprehensive strategy on combating sex-
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ual violence in the DRC’.64 This strategy consists of four pillars: i) fighting 
impunity; ii) prevention and protection; iii) security sector reform (reform-
ing the Congolese army and police); and iv) coordinated medical, mental-
health, legal and reintegration assistance to victims. The aim of this strategy 
is, according to the office, to provide a practical framework for action.
There is a growing consensus in the UN system and beyond that the rule of 
law is a precondition for sustainable peace and development at both inter-
national and national level. It is also recognized that security and justice are 
essential stepping stones in achieving the rule of law. Neither can be left 
unattended in preventing conflict, nor in responding to or recovering from 
the same. At the international level, the achievement of peaceful relations 
will eventually be determined by the commitment to resolving conflict and 
disputes on the basis of the UN Charter. At the national level, conflict pre-
vention and recovery, democratic governance, poverty reduction, gender 
equality and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will depend on 
the capacity to prevent and manage conflict, while also advancing political, 
social and economic aspirations. According to the principles of global demo-
cratic governance the rule of law is both the vehicle and its manifestation. 
Its evolution however, depends from the political convergence on specific 
issues of capacity-building and international assistance.
As a programmatic development agency, the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) responds to requests by host-governments for capacity 
development support. Technical assistance to national efforts in the justice 
and security sector is provided by UNDP within its framework of Crisis Pre-
vention and Recovery and Democratic Governance. In doing so, UNDP rec-
ognizes the centrality of national ownership and early foundations towards 
64 UN. Doc. S/RES/1794 (2007). In response to this UNSC resolution MONUC with the 
support of the UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Confl ict Network, would imple-
ment the Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence in the DRC. The Com-
prehensive Strategy is made up of 5 components each led by a specialist UN agency. An 
Operational Plan that put the strategy into action was then developed. It highlighted the 
fi fth and fi nal pillar dedicated to the collection and analysis of data on sexual violence. 
The enormity and importance of this task will not simply improve the understanding 
of the dynamics of this violence but offer insight into the most effective responses that 
may end it. Each of the fi ve components is led by a UN agency or MONUC section: 1. 
Protection and prevention (UNHCR); 2. Ending impunity for perpetrators (Joint Human 
Rights Offi ce – MONUC/OHCHR); 3. Security sector reform (MONUC, SSR); 4. Assis-
tance for victims of sexual violence (UNICEF); 5. Data and mapping (UNFPA). The 
total appeal for the implementation of the Operational Plan in the next two years is US 
$56million. At national level, the Operational Plan and costing was endorsed by the gov-
ernment of the DRC in November 2009. The prioritization and implementation of the 
activities of the Comprehensive Strategy will be coordinated by UN agencies and their 
governmental counterparts for each of the fi ve components. For a detailed overview 
see, The Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence in DRC: Executive Summa-
ry, Final Version, 18 March 2009, accessible at: http://monuc.unmissions.org/Default.
aspx?tabid=4073
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long-term investments. The Global Programme outlines UNDP’s services to 
rule of law programming in conflict- and post-conflict situations within its 
Crisis Prevention and Recovery mandate. It is a living document and will 
continuously be reviewed and updated on the basis of best practices and 
lessons learned from the field. The following terms are usually referred to: 
‘the rule of law’, ‘access to justice’, ‘justice and security sector reform’, and 
‘security and sector reform’. The UNDP is an active member and important 
founder of the Comité Miste de Justice (CMJ) and contributor to the Action 
Plan in the DRC. In 2008, UNDP launched a US$390 million governance pro-
gramme with the DRC. The programme, which ran throughout 2012, con-
sists of five components, one of which, the legal and security governance 
component, worked towards judicial reform, capacity-building in the securi-
ty forces, efforts to combat corruption in public administration, and action to 
strengthen internal and external audit institutions. Within the framework of 
the Action Plan of the CMJ, UNDP supports the drafting of organic laws for 
the justice system, the upgrading of equipment and the training of judges. 
UNDP also supports the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature (CSM) and has 
contributed US$36,000 to its secretariat during the first three months of 2009. 
In early 2009, the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) 
decided to contribute an additional US$2 million to reform activities in the 
judicial system.65
7.3.6 Conclusions
The DRC is a country where history, geography and recent political devel-
opments present huge challenges to establish the rule of law. A number of 
countries, the UN, the ICC, other international and regional organisations, 
including NGOs, are assisting the DRC in its task to build a judicial system.66 
As clarified by Davis, “the inability of the justice and penal systems to deliv-
er justice exacerbates violations committed against the civilian population, 
worsens public security (especially of vulnerable groups) and strengthens 
65 For an detailed overview see, UNDP, ‘A Global UNDP Programme for Justice and Secu-
rity 2008-2011’, Strengthening the Rule of Law in Confl ict and Post-Confl ict Situations, (2008), 
accessible at: http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/jssr/rule_of_law_fi nal.pdf
66 The main international actors involved in providing assistance in the security sys-
tem in the DRC have been the UN (MONUC has been on the ground since 1999 and 
is now the largest peacekeeping operation in the world), World Bank, US, EU (and its 
Member States), Angola, South Africa and, increasingly, China. For an overview of the 
EU engagement in the country or test case in the fi eld of coordination and coherence 
between the EU and Member State of the Security Sector Reforms programmes (SSR) 
see, L. Davis, ‘European Engagement in Security System Reform in the DRC’, Justice-
Sensitive Security System Reform in the DRC, February 2009, International Centre for 
Transitional Justice, at 24, accessible: http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/
Justice_Sensitive_Security_System_reform_in_the_DRC.pdf For a more detailed discus-
sion, see H. Hoebeke, S. Carette and K. Vlassenroot, EU support to the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Centre d’Analyse Stratégique, (2007), accessible at: http://www.egmontinsti-
tute.be/papers/07/afr/EU_support_to_the_DRC.pdf
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impunity. To be successful, the reform of the police, judiciary and penal sys-
tems must necessarily be seen as interrelated and approached in a coordi-
nated manner”.67
It appears that most of the ongoing rule of law reforms in the country is 
either targeting the central institutions in Kinshasa, or has been developed in 
response to the atrocities and human suffering in the eastern part of the DRC. 
As a consequence, and despite the combined efforts by the DRC government 
and the international community, it seems that vast areas of the country are 
still largely untouched by any reform activities. Against this background 
the reports examined recommend projects of assistance with two different 
approaches: one which focuses on central institutions in Kinshasa, which 
may or may not yet have been targeted by the current reform activities; and 
one which targets two important regional centres, Kisangani and Lubum-
bashi. For Kisangani the reports propose a holistic approach with practical 
projects designed to support the current objectives of the Congolese Min-
istry of Justice and to fit in with the priorities identified in the Ministry of 
Justice’s Roadmap matrix. In Lubumbashi, IBAHRI’s reports propose a more 
target-driven project to support the already well established Lubumbashi 
bar association. The IBAHRI, with its particular expertise, is well positioned 
to implement activities in that regard, which could be extended to other bar 
associations. It is hoped that in the near future the benefits derived from 
these projects could provide a foundation for similar projects within other 
parts of the country. Also, and particularly because of the way violence and 
injustice are being directed towards women, a theme that infiltrates most 
of the following recommendations refers to gender issues. This includes 
the protection of women’s rights, in law and practice, and the promotion of 
women’s participation at all levels of the judiciary, bar, government and civil 
society. All training programmes should include women and all access-to-
justice programmes should target women.68
67 L. Davis, ‘Transitional Justice and Security System Reform’, Justice-Sensitive Security Sys-
tem Reform in the DRC, February 2009, International Centre for Transitional Justice, at 
24, accessible: http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/Justice_Sensitive_Secu-
rity_System_reform_in_the_DRC.pdf
68 For the research fi ndings, conclusions and legal recommendations delivered by the 
International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI), the International 
Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC), see Rebuilding Courts and Trust: An Assessment of 
the Needs of the Justice System in the Democratic Republic of Congo, August 2009, research 
supported by the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) and the Swedish 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, at 45, accessible at: http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.
aspx?ArticleUid=6c2be523-f512-48c1-b09c-fc9a8b1d0aab
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7.4 The absence of coordination, coherence and law enforcement
This chapter argued that multidimensional operations fostering peace, jus-
tice and security in the DRC lack of coherence and preparedness includ-
ing also strategies of cooperation between complementary mandates. The 
struggle of such international responses to deliver results on the ground 
between conflict and post-conflict is enormous. The problem in the DRC is 
that international mandates active on the ground are disconnected between 
them. With regard to the UN mission the political nature of the MONUC/
MONUSCO mandate including its operational purpose is broad and shows 
unfeasible expectations. The UN mandate needs a re-configuration which 
should think about the actors struggling in situ which are complementary 
mandates in purpose and nature. Moreover, the UN mission can provide a) 
appropriate diplomatic dialogue vis-à-vis the DRC government engaging 
police enforcement actions against criminals; b) assisting on the reform of 
the army, police and justice domestic systems; c) avoiding that the military 
demobilization does not preclude impunity of international crimes; and d) 
securing civilians with relocation and rehabilitation programs.
For the international responses involved in the protection of civilians, on 
the preservation of the rule of law, justice and human rights, including the 
maintenance of stability and conflict management characterized by ‘zero 
tolerance’ in peace enforcement, it is important to reach preparedness and 
flexibility of re-configurations and re-conceptualizations serving comple-
mentary mandates on the ground with appropriate arrangement and agree-
ments of cooperation. Challenges exist at different levels for the UN mis-
sion in the DRC: at conceptual and structural levels and ultimately also on 
coherence and coordination characterizing such mandates. The conceptual 
level relates to a) the nature, purpose or scope and preparedness of the man-
date’s deployments; b) the organizational structure defining the channels 
of communications, the level of responsibility, accountability and chain of 
command including the decision making on each operation; c) the coherence 
and coordination refers to the ability to assist complementary actors, show-
ing flexibility and preparedness of operational reconfigurations in order to 
deliver visible results.
The Court on its side needs to spread investigations and prosecutions, giv-
ing the priority to participation and reparation of victims including arrange-
ments and agreements on relocation of witnesses. The DRC State must take 
full responsibility of its obligations falling under the Rome Statute initiating 
genuine criminal proceedings on the ground. The main findings of this study 
demonstrate that international criminal justice is not an isolated process. It 
has to take place at different levels simultaneously and in tandem with other 
global actors, as an important part of the peace-building process. Despite the 
critics, the limits and the few resources at disposition, international crimi-
nal justice remains a priority. The cause of some sensitive problems is found 
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in the difficulties on consensus and lack of flexibility to reconfigure the UN 
mandate on the ground, preparing its mission to serve the range of actors 
involved in situ, shifting from a ‘comprehensive’ unfeasible mandate to a 
narrowly focused one, much less costly but surely more efficient.
Political and diplomatic expertise pressuring the DRC government on its 
obligations is necessary. Criminals and warlords need to be released to jus-
tice with judicial proceedings on the ground. At domestic level, the effective-
ness of security structures can be measured by three cornerstones: a) the abil-
ity to protect the national territory against aggression and internal threats, 
b) the adherence to the rule of law, and c) the ability of security services to 
protect and respect citizens’ rights (army, police and justice). The domes-
tic justice system relates to these clusters. As clarified by eminent experts 
involved in the UN engagement in the DRC, security forces and its gover-
nance institutions are seriously deficient in all these aspects in the country. 
Such malfunctioning institutions pose a security threat themselves on the 
communities due to corruption and bad governance.
This chapter argued that international responses are an essential cornerstone 
to influence the domestic governance institutions and the future stability of 
the DRC. Army, police and justice are the most vulnerable to corruption and 
graft and have been neglected aspects by the UN and by the involvement of 
donors. According to the UN experts directly involved on these issues the 
“problematique consists of the entangled history of a factionalised army, with 
major access to and control of vast natural resources, the lack of division of 
powers between police and army, and the political control exerted over the 
judiciary. Regulatory bodies such as courts, parliament, and anti-corruption 
and auditing institutions remain ineffective and are themselves prone to 
corruption”.69
Another problem is the lack of balance between the bilateral cooperation 
with the DRC government and the multilateral cooperation standards of 
global mandates involved on the ground. This chapter argued that due to 
the situation in the country the centrality of cooperation should raise the 
standards of multilateral cooperation, avoiding unilateral and opportunistic 
consensus with the leadership of the country. After all, the involvement of 
global mandates is to centralize the interests of individuals more than the 
interests of the government. These are enduring issues with which political 
mediation efforts will have to contend raising the international standards 
of cooperation between complementary mandates deployed on the ground, 
in order to challenge criminal, aggressive and violent regimes victimizing 
entire communities. After all, these communities are supposed to receive 
69 See N. Dahrendorf, ‘MONUC and the Relevance of Coherent Mandates: The Case of the 
DRC’, in H. Hänggi, V. Scherrer (eds.), Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions, 
(2008), Chapter 3, Introduction, at 67.
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development and humanitarian aid but they only experience war and death 
without a well-functioning domestic accountability system.
7.5 The necessity of strengthening partnerships on the ground
At provisional level and pursuant to Article 2 of the Rome Statute, on 4 Octo-
ber 2004 the Secretary General of the United Nations and the President of 
the International Criminal Court signed an agreement that provides for the 
structure of the relationship between these institutions. The relationship-
building between the organizations is still at its initial stage. In order to 
deliver better results on the ground in conflict and post-conflict situations 
under investigation or prosecution, high level of political and diplomatic 
engagement is required. In order to preserve the rule of law, human rights 
and justice, the implementation of partnerships between the actors engaged 
to bring stability in failed States, is an important requirement of global gov-
ernance. The Court needs to rely on the multidimensional operations of the 
UN. Such pragmatic support would translate the political determination 
expressed in the Preamble of the Rome Statute recognizing the link between 
peace and justice and that “grave crimes threaten the peace, security, and 
well-being of the world”. Cooperation is fundamental in order to contribute 
to the prevention of these crimes, and put an end to impunity for the perpe-
trators of such crimes. As stated by the UN Secretary General in his remarks 
to the Sixth Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, “there are no easy answers to this morally and legally 
charged balancing act. However, the overarching principle is clear: there can 
be no sustainable peace without justice. Peace and justice, accountability and 
reconciliation are not mutually exclusive. To the contrary, they go hand in 
hand”.
 In the absence of a self sufficient domestic system of governance in the DRC, 
‘narrowly focused’ mandates have to work together, complementing each 
other in order to challenge the criminal regime of impunity. The role of the 
Court is quite limited, and in most scenarios primary activities will remain 
with States, international organizations and civil society. The issue of coop-
eration is at the core of the Rome Statute. An important cluster of coopera-
tion as recognized by the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute is 
the one with the UN system. The UN can provide documents and informa-
tion, it can supply logistical and other technical support to Court field opera-
tions, and it can even accommodate the Court in its security arrangements. 
The implementation of such cluster of cooperation is urging if we consider 
the multidimensional operations taking place in a ‘failed’ State such as in 
the DRC. The legal obligations of the States Parties, including the important 
support from international, regional organizations, States non-Parties and 
other stakeholders, are also important clusters of cooperation interrelated 
between them, and on which the ICC needs to rely.
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The role and limitations of the UN in the DRC with regard to the securi-
ty sector reform (army, police and judiciary) have to be clearly defined as 
well as the reconfiguration of the comprehensive range of tasks received by 
MONUC/MONUSCO. In order to strengthen partnerships on the ground 
between complementary mandates: reconfiguration, cooperation standards, 
sharing knowledge, expertise and lessons learned are all areas in need of 
implementation. The general recommendations, as the explicit outcome of 
this case study, are addressed to the UN Security Council, General Assem-
bly, the Secretary General, including the Assembly of the States Parties of 
the Rome Statute. The MONUC (MONUSCO) mandate, to protect civil-
ians, monitoring human rights abuses and enforcing arms embargo, needs 
to be re-defined. Political and diplomatic pressure on the DRC government 
to fulfil its obligation is mandatory. The important feature of enforcing the 
judicial decisions of the ICC, including providing support for the protec-
tion and relocation of victims and witnesses would be a serious engagement 
strengthening partnerships on the ground.
The general provisions in the memorandum of understanding (MoU) con-
cerning cooperation between the UN mission in the field and the Court need 
to be revisited. Particularly its purpose: Article 1 (MoU) should set out modal-
ities of cooperation not only on investigations but also on prosecutions and 
enforcement of arrest warrants, due to the State not performing its duties; 
cooperation: Article 2 (MoU) should clarify in detail the modalities of coop-
eration and law enforcement. Furthermore at structural level, the UN Rule 
of Law section, which is supporting short-term implementation of urgent 
elements of longer-term strategy of reforms, including building capacity to 
investigate and try cases involving international crimes, may use the ICC 
expertise including cooperation with the Office of the Senior Adviser and 
Coordinator on Sexual Violence for the DRC.70 Such liaisons between the UN 
mission deployed on the ground and the ICC would facilitate the flow of 
information and legal assistance in order to speed up the judicial proceed-
ings challenging the criminal regime in the country. At operational level, 
specific arrangements of law enforcement cooperation after prosecutions of 
war criminals need to be put in place. Such arrangements would comple-
ment the demobilization activity of combatants in lower ranks which must 
be prosecuted by the local authorities.
70 The Offi ce was created in March 2008 as an answer to increasing international reaction 
against the extent and brutality of sexual violence in the DRC, particularly in the war-
torn eastern part of the country. On 18 March 2009, in consultation with UN agencies 
and MONUC sections, international NGOs, the Sexual Violence Task Force and the 
DRC’s ministries of justice, defence, interior and gender, the Offi ce launched a ‘Com-
prehensive strategy on combating sexual violence in the DRC’ consisting of four pillars: 
i) fi ghting impunity; ii) prevention and protection; iii) security sector reform (reform-
ing the Congolese army and police); and iv) coordinated medical, mental-health, legal 
and reintegration assistance to victims. The aim of this strategy is to provide a practical 
framework for action.
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The Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute should facilitate 
legal assistance on the implementation of legislation and criminal law in the 
DRC, in line with other UN channels and donors involved in the security 
sector reform (army, police, and justice). To make the Rome Statute system 
work effectively, the interaction with an important partner such as the UN 
is fundamental. In order to accomplish visible results, States, international 
organizations, civil society and other actors have to cooperate and interact 
with unity of intents, implementing a system of international justice based 
on democratic governance. This chapter offered an overview of the challeng-
es in the framework of cooperation in a failed State. It proposed an urgent 
implementation of the relationship of complementing mandates involved 
in peace-making, peace-keeping, peace-building, security sectors reforms, 
law enforcement, criminal and restorative justice, including the challenges 
to preserve further the rule of law and human rights as important prerequi-
sites of democratic governance.71 In other words, it offered an overview of 
the actions required by the political premises enforcing global governance 
institutions of complementary character.
The next chapter offers the concluding assessment and provides the answers 
to the research questions addressed in this work. The examination of the case 
studies selected point out many challenges which will surely need further 
investigation. The governance of complementary global regimes depends 
from both the States and the international community, including the strate-
gies of interactions between themselves. The political convergence about the 
systemic changes required is still to be found. We have seen that the gov-
ernance of justice and its impact on sustainable peace in conflict and post-
conflict situations cannot be assessed on its own. It depends from several 
factors. Besides, there are difficulties to uphold the idea of an international 
architecture of governance based on human security and fostering peace and 
justice in conflict and post-conflict situations. In principle, an understand-
ing of the past is fundamental to determine the way forward in the global 
fight against war and crime.72 The current devastating effects on civilians in 
conflict and post-conflict situations require, without any doubt, the atten-
tion of decision-makers. First of all, they have to find political convergence 
at domestic, regional and international dimensions. The actions required are 
the reforms in both systems of the United Nations and the Rome Statute in 
accordance with their complementary nature. In this way the results of their 
actions would be maximized and their role amplified.
71 For the UNDP programmatic approaches see, ‘Role of UNDP in Crisis and Post-Con-
fl ict Situations’, DP/2001/4 of 27 November 2000. UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-2011/
DP/2007/43, 16 July 2007, paragraphs 84 and 102. See also the UNDP global programme 
on ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law in Confl ict and Post-Confl ict Situations 2008-2011. A 
Global UNDP Programme for Justice and Security’, accessible at: http://www.undp.
org/cpr/documents/Rule_of_Law_Global_Programme.pdf
72 J. Muravchik, The Future of the United Nations: Understanding the Past to Chart a Way For-
ward, 2005.
“If you want to understand the causes that existed in the past, look at the results as they are 
manifested in the present and if you want to understand what results will be manifested in 
the future, look at the causes that exist in the present”. The Writings of Nichiren Daishonin, 
The Opening of the Eyes, 1272, Part I, p. 279.
Preliminary remarks
The meaning of complementary global regimes fostering peace, justice and 
security depends on the ways they are governed in accordance with human-
itarian principles. The international governance institutions deriving from 
such regimes have to meet the highest standards of accountability, effective-
ness and quality management, including cooperation and support between 
them in order to protect civilians. The presence of the International Criminal 
Court and the United Nations involved in the same situations is not charac-
terized by an integrated model of governance. The practice of saving human 
lives and alleviating the sufferings of civilians in conflict situations requires 
political convergence of expectations of decision-makers. This study debates 
the global humanitarian policy to intervene in conflict situations and the 
preparedness of international governance institutions dealing with mass 
atrocity crimes and aggression, including their public authority, delimitation 
of competence and responsibility. It contributes to the contemporary visions 
for the preservation of the international legal and political order, including 
the capacity-building of the international community governing intra- and 
inter-state conflicts on the ground, much more than as distant observers, or 
with militarized international responses deriving from the ideology of haz-
ardous solutions. The dilemma of human security requires further policy 
efforts and a political road map to promote the extention of international 
complementarity between both legal and political frameworks of gover-
nance of the international community. The policy formulation of interaction 
strategies between multilateral premises of universal character dealing with 
international threats and crimes deserves debate for several reasons. Their 
complementary character depends on the political forces involved in the 
preservation of law and order and is considered absolutely necessary.
In this study the search of a definition of complementary global regimes 
is advocated a) for further progress of a universal jurisdiction of the world 
community; b) for the evolution of international governance institutions cen-
tralizing fundamental individual rights; and c) for systemic changes in the 
8 Concluding Assessment
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prevention, response and reconstruction of situations of war and crime. The 
complementary nature of global regimes needs further political responsi-
bilities and legal accountabilities if the national, regional and international 
realities have to benefit from such models of governance, including their 
resources and expertise. After all, the fight against the impunity of interna-
tional crimes requires the ability to offer applicable models of domestic gov-
ernance for the protection of civilians in domestic legislations and nation-
al consitutions. In this study the preservation of basic individual rights 
upholds the requirement to empower the links between sustainable peace, 
justice and human security necessary to the concept of global justice and its 
debates. Such debate challenges the assumption of established legal theory 
in which the normative framework of criminal justice can be abstracted from 
actual power relations. It offers elements of a new doctrine between power 
and the rule of law.1 The open question is whether the challenges between 
statehood, sovereignty and international governance are seriously managed 
throughout complementary global regimes and by the governance struc-
tures deriving from them. The progress of a global society dealing with legal 
and political frameworks preserving human security in the current transi-
tion of the world order requires constant verification. Even with the advent 
of the Rome Statute system the dilemma of human security in conflict and 
post-conflict situations still remains. The preservation of the rule of law as a 
principle of governance in multilevel jurisdictions; the constellation of mul-
tilateral institutions of complementary character; the collective responsibil-
ity to intervene in humanitarian emergencies; the global solidarity and the 
mutual accountability indicate serious interaction gaps fostering peace, jus-
tice and security with a comprehensive model of governance. The political 
convergence and a road map solving the dilemma between capacity-building 
or only symbolic politics of law enforcement is required in the international 
responses in both intra- and inter-state civil wars. The quo vadis of civilian 
protection measures requires, without any doubt, a political road map com-
patible with the current times of violent political transitions characterized by 
criminal acts against civilians, disintegration of nation-states and destabila-
tion of international peace and security.
8.1 The long way ahead of complementary global regimes
Section Outline
In this study the emerging regime of international criminal justice is inter-
petred as complementing the role of other universal actors in the constel-
lation of treaty-based bodies and institutions fostering human security, but 
most importantly by the challenges occurred in the democratization of the 
international society, in the governance of international threats and crimes 
1 See H. Köchler, Global Justice or Global Revenge? International Criminal Justice at the Cross-
roads, 2003.
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and in the preservation of human rights standards. Its presence in the inter-
national legal order requires deeper responsibilities and systemic changes of 
international governance institutions of complementary character. Today the 
delimitation of competence between international humanitarian interven-
tions in conflict and post-conflict situations and State sovereignty indicates 
that ‘the States have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoid-
able humanitarian catastrophe, but when the States are unwilling or unable 
to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader intervention of the 
international community and its global governance institutions’.2 Following 
the ‘humanitarian’ collective intervention performed in Darfur and Libya 
and the controversial political positions about Syria, the argument is that 
the responsibility to protect civilians operates in a contested doctrinal frame-
work. Some observers would see such norm as a ‘progress’, while others as 
an ‘empty promise’ or only as a ‘license for humanitarian intervention’ or 
‘inaction’.3 Another view is that the responsibility to protect norm addresses 
the international community’s failure to prevent mass atrocity crimes. This 
responsibility can be interpreted as a new principle of international collec-
tive security not being legally defined.4 It introduces the concept of shared 
responsibility and compliance with international law which theorists need 
to address at the present and in the years to come.5
The multidisciplinary topics proposed in this study including the debates 
found in the literature require the attention of relevant decision-makers 
on important issues. The main political challenges for the Assembly of the 
States Parties to the Rome Statute and its institutions; the implementation 
of the Rome Statute and cooperation with the United Nations; the role of the 
Rome Statute institutions in international governance systems; and the pro-
motion of the universality of the Rome Statute are the main issues deserving 
further debate. The global efforts to protect human rights and to promote the 
rule of law, to maintain and restore international peace and security, as well 
as to prevent and punish serious international crimes are common objectives 
for the Rome Statute institutions and the United Nations. The recognition 
that international criminal justice is an integral element of conflict resolu-
tion would in concrete mean that it should receive support on the ground 
2 See UN doc. A/RES/60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, para. 138-139.
3 G. Evans, ‘Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect: Four Misunderstandings, Three 
Challenges and How to Overcome Them’, Address to SEF Symposium 2007, The Respon-
sibility to Protect: Progress, Empty Promise or a License for Humanitarian Intervention, acces-
sible at: http://www.crisisgroup.org
4 The responsibility to protect norm (R2P or RtoP in the UN circles) did not receive binding 
character. For an overview of the strategic and tactical choices to develop and to accept 
the R2P norm see, E. C. Luck, ‘Building a Norm: The Responsibility to Protect Experi-
ence’, in R. I. Rotberg (ed.), Mass Atrocity Crimes. Preventing Future Outrages, 2010, at 108.
5 See for an overview G. W. Downs, A. Trento, ‘The Compliance Gap: Some Conceptual 
Issues’, in E. C. Luck and M. W. Doyle (eds.), International Law and Organization: Closing 
the Compliance Gap, 2004, at 19.
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to be more effective. After all, within the cycle of maintenance and resto-
ration of peace and security, justice is an important component upholding 
the doctrine of human security, but how is such ‘cosmopolitan’ idea dealt 
with in the practice? Moreover, is there a new impulse, moral, legal, political, 
based on the human security doctrine for the progress of the constitution of 
the world community? Are multilateral treaties linked to a road map of gov-
ernance considering the controversial reality in world politics, the impasse 
in the democratization of global institutions and the collapse of governance 
systems at domestic, regional and international levels? According to the 
principles of the rule of law, multilateralism, collective responsibility, global 
solidarity and mutual accountability a systemic change in the governance of 
international humanitarian escalations in conflict and post-conflict societies 
is required. The governance of justice punishing the perpetrators of serious 
crimes is still waiting for implementation. Such governance does not include 
any law enforcement engagements and hopefully a strategy for victim rights 
will arise soon integrating the rehabilitation of communities victimized 
by war and crime to development programs, reconstruction and domestic 
capacity-building.
8.1.1 The last resort option of justice
Since the end of the cold war the threats to international peace and security 
include both inter-state and intra-state conflicts, including the commission 
of international crimes deriving from such conflicts. The legal and political 
developments to govern globally international threats and crimes resumed 
in forcible and non-forcible actions by the Security Council in several situa-
tions. Unfortunately, in the majority of the international humanitarian esca-
lations, the causes and the effects of war and crime have not been dimin-
ished in sustainable ways. The engagement of the international community 
to formulate a system of governance protecting civilians in situations of war 
and crime is an on-going process. However, the severe violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law have been treated as serious threats to international 
peace and security and would require a reliable structure of governance. The 
‘test’ of the Security Council using subsidiary tools without fully support-
ing them does not bring any result. The notion that international criminal 
justice is a tool of the Security Council and a last resort instrument in the 
policy framework of the ‘responsibility to protect’, rather than the paradigm 
of retributive and reparative justice deserve further discussions. This study 
attempted to verify what is missing in the construction of a global architec-
ture of governance fostering peace, justice and security which requires advo-
cacy and political consensus.
First of all, a couple of concluding remarks deserve to be made about the 
international dimensions of internal conflicts and the strategic trends in the 
resolutions of the Security Council applied during intra-state civil wars. In 
the last decade the challenging resoluteness of the Security Council demon-
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strated that even in purely internal armed conflicts, “the deliberate targeting 
of civilian populations or other protected persons and the committing of sys-
tematic, flagrant and widespread violations of international humanitarian 
and human rights law in situations of armed conflict may constitute a threat 
to international peace and security”.6 This trend has been controversial in 
the situation in Darfur (Sudan) referred to the Court. The rise, fall, and sta-
bilization, including the selectivity of the resolutions of the Security Council 
dealing with specific civil wars over the past twenty years, can be explained 
with the following considerations, respectively: a) the trends in conflict pat-
terns in civil wars, b) the humanitarian violations of laws internationally 
recognized and c) the considerations whether mass atroctities would spread 
at larger scale. Moreover, when addressing a larger portion of internal 
civil wars, the Security Council engaged in the civil war in Uganda under 
the agenda item entitled ‘The situation in the Great Lakes Region’ which also 
addressed the internal wars in the Sudan, Burundi, in the DRC, and Rwan-
da.7 Unfortunately, the fact that the Court was involved in the same region 
since the advent of the Rome Statute system in accordance with the posi-
tive complementarity principle did not mean any support from the Security 
Council. Furthermore its working methods with the Court are inconsistent 
since the configuration of its mandates on the same grounds.8
An accurate examination of the use of Chapter VII of the UN Charter after 
the cold war indicates an increased number of resolutions of the Security 
Council falling under its security provisions. The referral of the situation in 
Darfur (Sudan) and in Libya to the Court corresponds to such nature of the 
Security Council’s resolutions addressing internal civil wars spreading at 
local, regional and international levels. One may expect that such an activity 
would have been rapidly aligned to the quest of justice in these countries, 
but this was not the case. Besides, the political strategy of mandate’s config-
uration of the Security Council was constantly oriented to opt out for hybrid 
solutions of peace enforcement in intra-state conflicts. In the DRC and in the 
Sudan for instance, the political settlements of the Security Council would 
pressure (regional) authorities such as the AU to take over with military 
operations on the ground. Such security shifts carried out devastating conse-
quences on civilians and on the humanitarian situation as a whole due to the 
gaps of resources. On top of that, the criminal offenders would rely on the 
6 UN doc. S/RES/1296, (April 19, 2000).
7 UN doc. S/RES/1653, (January 27, 2006).
8 For an overview of the current debate on the working methods of the UNSC, on the 
cooperation and follow-up to UNSC referrals to the Court, including the search of mech-
anisms to ensure timely and coordinated support to the Court, see ICC-OTP-20141024-
PR1055, Justice plays a “crucial role” in maintaining international peace and security: ICC 
Prosecutor briefs the United Nations Security Council, 24 October 2014. The ICC Prosecutor 
Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Subject of “Working Methods 
of the Security Council”, 23 October 2014, is accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_
menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr1055.aspx
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regime of impunity in these countries despite international judicial proceed-
ings initiated by the Court. The practice applied through the Security Coun-
cil indicates that mass atrocity crimes have been left in the limbo of impu-
nity in several African situations, including the devastating consequences 
affecting civilians in such violent conflict zones. The risk is that such trend 
would persist even with the presence of the Court. The interrelation between 
the lack of support from the Security Council to the Court and its mandate 
configurations have been discussed during the case studies selected in this 
work. The conclusion is that the arrangements and agreements of last resort 
on the ground between them are not self-sufficient. They do not strength-
en the engagements on the ground for the sake of civilians. Therefore, the 
mandate configurations should promote that peace and justice would work 
in parallel for the sake of individuals, giving a stronger deterrent signal of 
criminal activities in these countries, while pressuring for security sector 
reforms and judicial proceedings in situ.
8.1.2 The configurations of international mandates
The case studies selected demonstrate the necessity of an integrated model 
of governance of peace, justice and security for the sake of civilians in times 
of war and crime. At this moment in time the Court struggles to receive a 
better place in the arrays of international peace and security maintenance. 
The global efforts to maximize the results on the ground have to be fulfilled 
applying an integrated approach of governance which is absolutely not the 
case. The case studies offered an insight of the Security Council involvement 
in internal civil wars and mass atrocities such as in the DRC with the pres-
ence of the Court in the country, including the ‘test’ of referral activity to the 
Court from the Security Council in the Sudan and Libya, and the failure of 
consensus building with regard to the dangerous situation in Syria, and the 
violence spreading at regional level in the whole Middle East. The quantita-
tive research findings of relevant analysts consulted in this study explicitly 
demonstrate that a capacity-building and a model of international assistance 
applicable into intra-state civil wars ‘did not develop evenly over time’.9 The 
same assumption is valid in the case of inter-state conflicts and the crime of 
aggression. Such accountability system is still in transition in global poli-
tics. There is not yet any agreement about its governance between the legal 
frameworks dealing with State responsibility and the individual account-
abilities.10 The involvement of international complementary tools foster-
9 For a quantitative analysis of the patterns of the Security Council engagement in civil 
wars and the understanding of compliance of its resolutions in (intra-state) armed con-
fl icts see J. Cockayne, C. Mikulaschek, C. Perry, The United Nations Security Council and 
Civil War: First Insights from a New Dataset, 2010.
10 See F. Rosenfeld, “Individual Civil Responsibility for the Crime of Aggression”, Journal 
of International Criminal Justice, Oxford Journals Law, 2012, Volume 10, Issue 1, 249-265. 
See also M. Vesterdahl, “Re-defi ning the Crime of Aggression: The Evolution of an Out-
dated Ideal to Include Non-State Actors”, 2010, available at: http://works.bepress.com/
matthew_vesterdahl/1
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ing peace and justice in inter-state conflicts will be the next ‘test’ of global 
governance. However, it remains to be seen how it will work between the 
responsibility of nation-states and the individual accountabilities of criminal 
perpetrators.
In order to complete this assessment some final observations about the 
mandate configurations of the Security Council in African civil wars are 
required. In accordance with the accurate data available on the trends in 
how the Security Council has engaged in civil wars, some conclusions are 
possible about the variations in where and when the Security Council chose 
to engage, including the gradual evolution of its response strategies in such 
conflicts. The combination of political and security settlements with the par-
ties involved in the conflicts and the peace enforcement deriving from them 
surely influenced the responses of the Security Council. These responses 
were visible in its resolutions and in the UN legislative history since the 
end of the cold war. The analysis performed of the activity of the Security 
Council indicates that its demands to civil war parties were increasingly 
adopted in the context of multidimensional peace operations (deployment 
of peacekeeping, targeted sanctions, police and military law-enforcement 
operations, while providing access to humanitarian assistance).11 These 
capacities and competences have not been put at disposition of international 
justice. It also needs to be noted that some of the factors characterizing the 
conflict management of the Security Council, such as: a) the political and 
strategic interests characterizing its engagements; b) the selectivity of its 
peace enforcement; c) the delay of sanctions about the exploitation of natu-
ral resources and embargos and d) the longstanding trend of exonerating 
criminal behaviors in the majority of the situations for the sake of managing 
conflicts and war parties.12
The configurations of its security mandates on the ground are still discon-
nected from the activities of complementary mechanisms such as interna-
tional investigations, prosecution and the management of protection duties 
of civilians. The analysis of the cases dealt with in this study (DRC, Sudan), 
were limited to the peace operations characterized by the multidimensional 
component of the Security Council operations and the lacuna thereof found 
in its mandates’ configuration in situations of genocide, crimes of war and 
crimes against humanity. The configuration of the respective mandates 
deployed in the field operations indicates that the Security Council increas-
ingly addressed the political aspects of post-conflict peace-building without 
succeeding in the majority of the situations in Africa. Another problem also 
derives from the fact that shortly after its security settlements would be in 
place, they became soon volatile in the majority of the situations, with con-
11 See M. Malitza, “The Improvement of Effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping Operations”, in 
UNITAR, The UN and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, 1987, at 246.
12 See J. Cockayne et al, supra.
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flict and violence recurring again, and requiring further engagements often 
shifted to domestic violent and criminal regimes. This is the case in the DRC, 
where the attacks of the M23 rebel group against civilians and also against 
the UN peacekeeping mission pose still serious threats. The consequences 
are also well known in the crises in Rwanda, Somalia, Angola, Sierra Leone, 
Uganda, Burundi, Mali, Kenya, Central African Republic and Sudan and at 
regional level in the main African Great Lakes Region.
In general, when the Security Council engaged in civil wars it did not mere-
ly seek to end an armed conflict, but rather it encouraged civil-war parties 
to reach and implement political and governance arrangements that could 
sustain peace and prevent conflicts deteriorate again. One of the tasks fre-
quently performed during peace operations was to monitor compliance 
between civil-war parties, which was already in place between the bellig-
erents, with security demands trying to destabilize conflict and violence.13 
The UN executive organ should absolutely be careful and avoid negotiating 
peace agreements with war criminals. The configuration of its mandates in 
the field operations should integrate justice and support the activity of the 
Court in accordance with its findings. Unfortunately, in both case studies 
selected this was not the case.
8.1.3 The Court’s support to maximize the results
The evident political compromise characterizing the Rome Statute system 
limits in some ways the use of international justice in the arrays of peace and 
security. This study offered an overview of both limits and opportunities. 
The States Parties themselves recognized the complementarity character of 
the Rome Statute system to the UN in the quest of sustainable peace in con-
flict and post-conflict situations. It is recommended that the Security Council 
would support the Court’s investigations and prosecutions, including pro-
grams of relocation of witnesses and victims combined with the mobilization 
and de-militarization of child soldiers and rehabilitation of ex-combatants. 
The configuration of the Security Council’s mandates in the field operations 
where the Court is involved need to provide support and assistance to the 
Court, especially in the Sudan, Libya, Uganda and DRC and in other current 
and future situations. The ideal would be to provide the configuration of the 
Security Council’s mandates under the flag of the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
with the demands of the Court to protect, demobilize, relocate and rehabili-
tate victims and witnesses, including law enforcement actions on the ground 
following the judicial outcomes of the Court. The ideal would be that the 
concept of ‘responsible’ sovereignty required by the nation-states protect-
ing their citizens cannot be separated by the responsibilities of international 
governance institutions implementing political configurations between their 
13 See J. Cockayne et al, supra.
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mandates when intervening in domestic criminal regimes. The Court needs 
support before, during, and after the humanitarian escalations and referral 
activity coming from the Security Council would take place. There is, how-
ever, a long way to go.
 We have seen that the ‘responsibility to protect’ (RtoP or R2P) is a norm or 
set of principles based on the idea that State sovereignty is not a privilege 
but a responsibility of the nation-states. Furthermore, in the international 
legal order the RtoP is a global policy directive, it is not a law. The RtoP pro-
vides a framework towards political engagements using tools that already 
exist to prevent mass atrocities, like mediation, early warning mechanisms, 
economic sanctioning, and Chapter VI powers. Civil society organizations, 
States, regional organizations, and international governance institutions 
have a role to play in the operationalization of the RtoP. The authority to 
employ the last resort options and intervene with military operations rests 
solely with the UN Security Council (Chapter VII) and the General Assem-
bly. Full implementation of the RtoP is hindered by the perception that it 
is being used by western countries to serve their interests when justify-
ing violations of sovereignty of other countries in developing regions. The 
same political standpoints are visible in the groundless critics addressed to 
the Court of targeting exclusively African countries. Besides, the UN easily 
underscored that the best way to discourage States or groups of States from 
misusing the responsibility to protect for inappropriate purposes would be 
to develop fully the UN strategy, standards, processes, tools and practices. 
The overview of the UN three pillar strategy implementing the RtoP, respec-
tively, Pillar I: the Protection Responsibilities of the States; Pillar II: the Inter-
national Assistance and Capacity Building; Pillar Three: Timely and Decisive 
Response, demonstrates that the Court is only seen as an effort of dissua-
sion and deterrence which role in the UN report is limited to the protection 
responsibilities of the State to become part of it, instead of emphasizing also 
global governance issues and interaction strategies in the second and third 
pillars: international assistance and capacity building, including timely and 
decisive response.14 Therefore, it will be relevant to see in this regard the 
future developments in the political positions of the African Union (AU), 
Arab League and UN political institutions about the Rome Statute system. It 
is too soon to speculate whether the idealistic vision of merging civilian pro-
tection duties between complementary global regimes would find its place 
in the policy formulation at global level, after the first rejections of such 
governance approach by the permanent members of the Security Council 
and by the AU. These issues deserve further attention. The configuration of 
mandates on the ground considering the presence and the activities of the 
Court would be the most appropriate and cannot wait any longer. Another 
14 See the Report of the UN Secretary-General, Implementing the responsibility to protect, 12 
January 2009, UN doc. A/63/677.
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problem of different nature refers to the political impasse to extend the juris-
diction of the Court with a range of other crimes.
Although the concept of sovereignty, statehood and international gover-
nance are currently in the work-in-progress, the political convergence and 
a road map dealing with the responsibilities towards civilians in extreme sit-
uations of war and crime are absolutely required. Such a road map should 
be visible a) in the interaction strategies between global regimes of comple-
mentary character and their political institutions, b) in the progress of their 
further empowerment, and c) in the decision-making enforcing them. The 
politics of international criminal justice will have to find solutions on these 
matters. Hopefully, the permanent members of the Security Council such as 
the US, Russia and China will join the Rome Statute system soon. Their role 
as distant observers undermines multilateral systems for the sake of funda-
mental individual rights. It still remains to be seen how far they will take 
over their global responsibilities towards individuals in times of war and 
crime. The place of international criminal justice and accountability in the 
arrays of peace and security maintenance raises many concerns. In order to 
offer sustainable peace in conflict and post-conflict situations, the challenges 
and opportunities require constructive debate in the Assembly of the States 
Parties of the ICC, in the UN General Assembly, in the regional political real-
ities and in national parliaments and constitutions.
8.2 An integrated approach of governance
Section Outline
It can be concluded that there is still a long way ahead for an integrated 
approach of governance applicable on case-by-case basis in situations of 
mass atrocity crimes. The role of complementary global regimes to prevent 
mass atrocity crimes through timely intervention requires implementation. 
The peace operations should support law enforcement and civilian protec-
tion which should serve the quest of justice and accountability. The capacity-
building offering reliable and sustainable models of governance in domes-
tic and regional realities affected by war and crime require further efforts. 
The determination to fight against the impunity of international crimes 
requires without any doubt systemic changes. It is suggested to establish 
a joint vision of governance with early warnings. The international gover-
nance institutions of complementary character have to optimize their rela-
tionship and partnership jointly at global level and in the field operations. 
Solutions are expected inter alia on the protection of victims and witnesses 
of serious crimes by way of: a) developing appropriate alternative protective 
measures before the Court, b) the possible establishment of a joint interna-
tional authority dealing with civilian protection activities and deployments 
of international humanitarian police, and c) the adoption of a joint approach 
to negotiate relocation agreements. In this respect, the States adapting to 
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the Rome Statute and implementing their legislation need to pay particu-
lar attention to the protection of victims and witnesses. After all, the Rome 
Statute’s provisional character and its interpretation require such an effort at 
global, regional and domestic levels upholding human security measures. 
There are no doubts that multilateral systems require further progress on 
these delicate issues affecting the lives of civilians in situations of war and 
crime. This study addresses the emergence of an international architecture 
of governance fostering peace, justice and security which requires system-
ic changes at structural, normative and functional levels and an integrated 
model of governance.
8.2.1 The intersection between policy, law and institutions
This study offers an overview of the evolution of international law and its 
institutions dealing with civilians in situations of war and crime. It high-
lights the necessity to get closer to the individuals during mass atrocities 
(with peace operations and civilian protection mechanisms, international 
criminal investigations and prosecutions, including fair trials based on the 
preservation of human rights standards). The interaction between peace 
and justice in the field operations represents an important paradigm shift 
for international governance and its institutions. It can be affirmed that such 
interaction is characterized by institutional, normative and policy decentral-
ization which are centered around the political question related to the defi-
nition of international threats and crimes, and the jurisdictional authority 
to decide when such crimes occur or the main legal question, including the 
operationalization of the international responses on the ground when massive 
crimes would occur.15 The challenges, obstacles and concerns in such legal 
and political decentralization have been analysed in details. Firstly, in order 
to verify the global trends governing peace, justice and security, this study 
looked at the current interaction between complementary global regimes 
including their meaning in international relations and international law. In 
other words, this study focused on the theoretical fundaments for the cre-
ation of an architecture fostering peace, justice and security in accordance 
with the challenges of the time.
The main conclusion is that the areas of collective security, human rights 
and the rule of law still suffer from the impasse of democratic reforms of the 
UN political institutions and bodies.16 Such an impasse has an impact on 
15 See H. Köchler, supra.
16 See UN Watch Report, Dawn of a New Era? Assessment of the United Nations Human Rights 
Council and its Year of Reform, presented at UN Headquarters, May 7, 2007, accessible at: 
http://www.unwatch.org/site/apps/nl/content2.asp?c=bdKKISNqEmG&b=1330819
&ct=3842825 See also Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, Reforming the United 
Nations for Peace and Security. Proceedings of a workshop to analyze the Report of the 
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, 2005, accessible at: http://www.
ycsg.yale.edu/core/forms/Reforming_un.pdf
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the further relationship between complementary regimes which also require 
appropriate reviews such as the Rome Statute system. Their complementary 
role ultimately results from such reforms based on an integrated approach 
of governance.17 The approach in this study contained two dimensions of 
governance: one relates to the struggle of complementary institutions of 
universal character cooperating with each other in their respective areas of 
competence, and the other, refers to the political determination to enforce 
them with appropriate institutional reforms, know-how, resources and cost-
effective capacity-building. In conclusion, the governance of complementary 
global regimes requires a road map of interactions based on reforming activ-
ity, systemic change and an extention of complementarity at international 
level between complementary international mandates. The political forces 
need to design a road map of interaction, partnerships and relationships 
between international governance institutions dealing with mass atrocity 
crimes and other international threats and crime. The responsibility ‘not to 
veto’ would require the permanent five members of the Security Council 
to urgently agree not to use their veto power to block action in response to 
genocide and mass atrocities. The Rome Statute institutions are still strug-
gling to identify themselves in the global order delivering a visible impact 
in the local realities affected by war and crime, including their relationship 
with the United Nations and regional institutions. Therefore, the domestic, 
regional and international responsibilities to protect civilians in times of war 
and crime require harmonization in universal laws in the UN Charter and in 
the Rome Statute.
The governance of the emerging regime of international criminal justice in 
the context of human security and sustainable peace in intra and inter-State 
civil wars represents a ‘paradigm in the making’ in modern international 
relations and international law. The rhetoric offered in this context is that 
in a world of global threats, security depends from an effective multilater-
al system based on well-functioning international governance institutions 
and a rule-based international order. However, there seem to be problems in 
reaching political convergence on such sensitive issues. Although extensive 
literature exists on international criminal justice, the relationship between 
threats and crimes, and the ideal direction crime control should take in 
world politics, must still be verified. Such relationship and its governance 
depends on too many factors, including the complex process of crime defini-
tion through the tools at disposition in the international legal and political 
order, characterized by the absence of a supranational organization, insti-
tutional fragmentation and a customized treaty-based jurisdiction dealing 
with individuals. Therefore, a political road map to govern global regimes of 
complementary character is absolutely required.
17 See R. Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security. From Collective Security to the Respon-
sibility to Protect, 2006. See also R. Thakur, Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of 
Governance, 2005.
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In order to accomplish a supranational order as emphasized by Delmas-
Marty, it is required to return to politics “determining wheter legal and other 
symbolic system share common values”.18 The interaction between com-
plementary global regimes represents a paradigm in the making, whether 
or not the concept of collective security and the use of peace enforcement 
would receive the exclusive purpose to protect individuals during violent 
conflicts. In any case, for human security experts international governance 
institutions have to promote an integrated approach when dealing with 
international threats and crimes affecting individual lives. International law-
yers, political analysts and criminologists will increasingly have to become 
multidisciplinary in their vision and strategic planning, flexible enough in 
their ability to form working groups, teams and alliances. They have to con-
struct methods to interact with each other and develop their own networks 
while deflating those of criminal groups.19
8.2.2 The current interaction strategies
In the preamble of the Rome Statute the States Parties established the Court 
in relationship with the United Nations system with the jurisdiction over the 
most serious crimes. Such relationship is too weak to destabilize criminal 
and violent regimes and requires additional arrangements and agreements 
in the field operations on a case-by-case basis, while it also requires the for-
mulation and the harmonization of the humanitarian policy at global level 
in order to benefit the conceptual framework of the human security doctrine. 
The ideal would be to configure multidimensional peace operations under 
the flag of the responsibility to protect which would serve to safe and relo-
cate civilians in extreme conflict environments. In this context, the Assembly 
of the States Parties to the Rome Statute not only struggles to find a defined 
political identity but also on the ways it would provide assistance to fragile 
domestic realities of its members. The struggle to strengthen national capaci-
ties on victims and witnesses protection programmes for instance, need to 
be directed through the Assembly and the multilateral partners active in the 
area such as the UN specialized agencies. These issues of capacity-building 
need solutions on the top of the civilian protections and law enforcement 
dilemma of the judicial decisions of the Court against warlords, when States 
or global actors do not cooperate, including the accountability of State and 
non-State actors in intra- and inter-state conflicts.
18 M. Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism. A conceptual Framework for Understanding the Trans-
national Legal World, 2009 at 165.
19 See W. Bruggeman, ‘The ICC as an Important Partner in Enhancing Global Justice’, Inter-
national Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, 8-11 March 2005 Madrid, the docu-
ment is accessible at: http://english.safe-democracy.org/confronting/the-icc-enhancing-
globaljustice.html
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The findings of this study clearly demonstrate that the international gov-
ernance of global regimes of complementary character can be more effi-
cient and effective if they work together. An interaction strategy upholding 
human security measures between them is required at two levels: either 
between the political forces empowering them with consensus and politi-
cal convergence of expectations, or between themselves with arrangements 
and agreements applied in the field operations in accordance with the treaty 
provisions of the Rome Statute. We have seen that mass atrocity crimes rep-
resent serious offences deteriorating human security and sustainable peace 
not only locally, but at larger scale. The case of Rwanda revealed how the 
gravity of such offences spread at regional level. It is clear that the judicial 
role of the Court is not sufficient to obtain the deterrent effect initially hoped 
in the fight against the impunity of international crimes. Many of the judi-
cial outcomes of the Court still wait to be enforced. Its operations should 
receive further support on the ground. The configuration of international 
mandates of the Security Council should support the activity of the Court 
deriving from all type of referrals. After all, the quest of justice offers valu-
able orientation and guidelines applicable in peace negotiations. Neverthe-
less, after years of divergence in the debate of peace versus justice the regime 
of international justice falling under the Rome Statute has still an ambiguous 
place in the arrays of international peace and security. This is also true in 
regard to the controversial position taken by the African Union against the 
Court, after the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed during 
violent political transitions and against criminal perpetrators still in power 
(Sudan, Kenya). With the advent of the Rome Statute, however, it should 
be clear that any political compromise with criminal domestic regimes and 
their impunity during peace processes must be absolutely avoided.
The practice applied on the ground in conflict and post-conflict situations 
gives rise to the pessimistic view that the rule of law as a principle of gov-
ernance is not self-sufficient. Multilateralism is characterized by serious 
political deadlocks and by the impasse of democratic institutional reforms of 
international governance institutions regulating their complementary roles. 
Collective and shared responsibilities to protect civilians in conflict environ-
ments and mass atrocity situations do not receive appropriate legal frame-
works and normative regulations towards compulsory cooperation. Instead, 
such responsibilities may result on volatile military engagements with neg-
ative consequences on civilian populations. Global solidarity is character-
ized by several gaps in the governance of international threats and crimes 
and contains the risks of militarization under the flag of humanitarianism. 
Mutual accountability is still at its embryonic stage considering the gaps 
of jurisdiction of last resort and the accountability system falling under the 
Rome Statute. On the top of all these serious concerns, the main phenomena 
requiring action is to provide models of governance retaining the shortcom-
ings, disintegration and systemic failure of governance in both nation-states, 
regional and international realities. Therefore, the governance of comple-
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mentary global regimes in an integrated, harmonized and consolidated 
ways is further required with an extention of complementarity between the 
tools at disposition of the international community.
8.2.3 The lessons learnt
This study is partly based on case studies of international humanitarian esca-
lations in case of failure to secure individuals during difficult political transi-
tions of nation-states and the commission of mass atrocity crimes. It focuses 
on the impact of international governance institutions for the preservation 
of law and order. It offers an analysis of the regime of international criminal 
justice which depends on international cooperation without any assurance 
of police and law enforcement. It debates the difficulties of international 
governance institutions of complementary nature in the absence of appro-
priate interactions. It emphasises the particularities of context between the 
governance of international humanitarian interventions, civilian protection 
duties and the possible definition of global justice. In order to accomplish 
results a political road map fostering peace, justice and security in collapsed 
societies is required. The case studies demonstrate that international peace, 
justice and security are absolutely interdependent and cannot work in paral-
lel with conflicting priorities. This is particularly true looking at the practice 
applied in the configuration of international mandates on the ground in the 
case studies selected. In order to implement the links between a) investigat-
ing and prosecuting serious violations of international humanitarian law, 
b) improving human security and c) offering sustainable peace in conflict 
and post-conflict situations, the relationship between the Rome Statute 
institutions and the United Nations needs implementation on the following 
clusters in the immediate, middle and long term: a) structural: interactions 
between policy decision-makers on several clusters of governance, deploy-
ments in the field of multinational police forces, inter-institutional liaisons in 
situ, political configurations and knowledge sharing on protection mecha-
nisms of victims and witnesses (relocation, reparation and rehabilitation); 
b) normative: legislative harmonization, cooperation agreements of binding 
character, common projects of legal and security assistance to domestic gov-
ernance institutions; c) functional: working methods, reporting activity and 
resource sharing of civilian protection duties.
This work concludes emphasizing the interactions required between the 
Court and its institutional partners in the UN system. In order to develop a 
global vision of humanitarian protection duties the networks with the UN 
specialized agencies are very important. The institutional partners identified 
are among others: the Children’s Rights & Emergency Relief Organization 
(UNICEF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), and the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR). Furthermore, 
important interactions are expected to improve the relationship between 
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the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, the key UN depart-
ments and specialized agencies dealing with the rule of law issues, NGOs 
providing rule of law assistance and working on ICC issues, the UN devel-
opment agencies and the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV), the United Nations 
Human Rights Council (HRC) recommending the Security Council to refer 
situations to the Court. The relationship agreement between the ICC and the 
UN, the memorandum of understanding with MONUC in the DRC falling 
under such agreement (later renamed MONUSCO); the New York liaison 
office of the Court with the UN as institutional link, the focal points and 
working groups and the reporting activity of the Court with the UN political 
institutions, represent only the initial stage of governance systems and fur-
ther definition of their complementary nature. The political organs of both 
organizations will have to meet in the middle somewhere. The Assembly of 
the States Parties needs to build up mechanisms of assistance and capacity-
building providing models of governance in domestic judicial systems. This 
is valid for the rest of the security sectors in domestic institutions sharing 
knowledge and preparing fragile States to reform police, army and judiciary 
under the UN flag, while monitoring the relevant development programs 
and donors. This approach of governance would require common projects 
of UN character including dissemination and awareness of the activities of 
the Court which are not only retributive but also protective and restitutive. In 
this way the ratification campaign of the Rome Statute would surely benefit 
from such integrated approach of governance strenghtening the relationship 
between peace, justice and security for the sake of individuals.
8.3 Conclusions
This study argues for the paradigm shift of international law and interna-
tional public institutions as the global tools for the protection of individuals 
in situations of war and crime. This concept is relatively new in both doc-
trines. International mandates have to be as close as possible to individual 
citizens.20 This is the common target expressed in both the Rome Statute and 
the UN Charter and the reason for their necessary harmonization at norma-
tive, structural and functional levels. From an institutional perspective the 
Court cooperates already with the UN in many different areas, including the 
exchange of information and logistical support. The Court reports to the UN 
each year on its activities, and some meetings of the Court’s governing body, 
20 See J. Dugard, ‘The Future of International Law: A Human Rights Perspective. With 
Some Comments on the Leiden School of International Law’, (2007) LJIL 20, 729 at 739. 
For an overview of the debate over the protection of the individual under international 
law, the 2007 special issue of the Leiden Journal of International Law is presented as a trib-
ute to John Dugard and his contribution to international law. See T. Skouteris, A. Ver-
meer-Kunzli, ‘Editor’s Introduction: John Dugard and the Protection of the Individual in 
International Law’, (2007) LJIL 20, 741 at 744.
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the Assembly of States Parties (ASP), are held in the UN facilities. The rela-
tionship between the Court and the UN is governed by a relationship agree-
ment between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations 
which will need further implementation on cooperation issues.21 Despite 
such institutional liaisons the first generation of referrals addressed to the 
Court by the Security Council (Sudan, Libya) did not receive appropriate 
support from the UN institutional apparatus, including the important role 
of the General Assembly on the issue of resource sharing. The first Review 
Conference of the Rome Statute considered some amendments to the Rome 
Statute as the treaty made specific reference to review the list of crimes 
within the Court’s jurisdiction.22 The main recommendation addressed to 
the decision-makers in this study is to find consensus on the harmonization 
of the treaty law, with provisions implementing the relationship between 
complementary mandates, respectively in the UN Charter and in the Rome 
Statute.
This is particularly true considering the increasing number of nation-states 
which leaders retain power during internal political transitions at the 
expenses of civilians. These leaders claim their positions from ‘democratic’ 
outcomes of general elections as in the situation in Kenya or Ivory Coast, 
where the unrest between political factions resumed in post-electoral vio-
lence requiring the involvement of the Court, and this on the top of ethnic, 
religious and power related conflicts. The main responsible should face 
international criminal justice. These situations are very complex as indeed 
in the Sudan. The leaders in this country retain domestic power whether the 
international community proved the commission of serious international 
crimes against their own people. In the DRC the political élite should focus 
on good governance of security sectors (army, police and judiciary) and 
perform judicial activity in situ. The criminal perpetrators abusing civilians 
should be isolated, captured and put to trial. The victims cry for justice. The 
21 See the Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court 
and the United Nations http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-3-Res1_English.
pdf For some literature on Cooperation Agreements and Enforcement see, G. A. Knoops, 
Surrendering to International Criminal Courts: Contemporary Practice and Procedures, (2002). 
V. P. Oosterveld and J. M. McManus, ‘The Cooperation of States with the International 
Criminal Court’, (March 2002) 25 Fordham International law Journal 3, at 767. Han-Ru 
Zhou, ‘The Enforcement of Arrest Warrants by International Forces: from the ICTY to 
the ICC’, 2006 Journal of International Criminal Justice 4, no. 2, 202 at 218. H. Zsolt, ‘The 
Making of the Basic Principles of the Headquarter Agreement’, (March 2002) 25 Fordham 
International Law Journal 3, 625 at 637.
22 Any amendments to the Rome Statute require the agreement of two thirds of member 
countries to be adopted and the ratifi cation of 87.5% for the amendment to come into 
force. However, amendments relating to the defi nition of crimes apply only to those 
member countries that ratify the amendment. After the adoption of the 2010 Kampala 
Amendments the crime of aggression is adopted on the basis of Article 121.5 of the Rome 
Statute. See for an overview, R. E. Fife, ‘Review Conference: scenarios and options’, 2006-
11-21, accessible at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-INF2_English.pdf
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governance of the emerging regime of international criminal justice in the 
context of peace and security during intra-state conflicts is characterized by 
several overlaps. The mandate configurations of the UN political organs and 
the multidimensional operations in the field where the Court is involved are 
not yet designed to provide authority, engagement and support to interna-
tional judicial decisions. This emerged repetitively in situ in the Sudan, in 
Uganda, in Kenya and in the DRC, just to name a few situations reported 
in this study. Unfortunately, such trend might be repeated again. The risk 
is that violence remains the norm during political transitions of domestic 
regimes characterized by massive crimes. At present, the Court’s arrests 
warrants are outstanding against eight suspects, including four alleged 
commanders of the LRA in the situation in Uganda. They are still free for 
years by now and this has devastating consequences on civilians. In regard 
to the Sudan, the Court informed several times the Security Council and the 
Assembly of States Parties about the non-cooperation in the arrest and sur-
render of Omar Al Bashir (Sudan) who is still travelling in several African 
States (DRC, Malawi, South Africa), but without success.
These are only some of the reasons why the Court’s existence cannot be con-
sidered as the panacea for the “malum mundus”. Furthermore, there are still 
no mechanisms in place for the deterrence of unilateral intervention policy 
of the nation-states in the affairs of sovereign States for humanitarian rea-
sons falling under the flag of the responsibility to protect civilians. Peace 
and justice are still characterized by tensions in the short and middle terms 
and judicial decisions of last resort are not followed. It is expected that the 
UN would support the judicial mandate of the Court with appropriate con-
figurations of its peace enforcement mandates at least in situations referred 
to the Court by the Security Council. The view expressed in this study is 
that support should be provided in all situations where peace operations 
are deployed on the ground. In Darfur the Court received jurisdiction from 
the Security Council without any guarantee of enforcement assistance and 
basic resources. On top of that the Court did not receive any operational or 
political support. Such parameters of governance deserve discussions also 
in the current practice applied in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in 
other situations where such international complementary institutions are 
both involved. This study underscores the importance of the humanitarian 
escalations of last resort between complementary international mandates and 
their governance in the field operations. It argues about the notion that the 
Court would be part of the maintenance and restoration of peace and secu-
rity as last resort option rather than being purely based on the paradigm of 
international justice and accountability. The majority of the situations where 
complementary governance institutions are involved swift from weak stabil-
ity falling back easily into the conflict. Therefore, they should be prepared to 
complement and support with each other defining their mutual interests at 
all levels (political, legal, structural and operational). This requires the politi-
cal committment from decision-makers.
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This study offers an analysis of the interactions required in accordance with 
the ideal of global justice in the international society. In other words, it exam-
ines the ways international regimes of complementary and universal nature 
may preserve the international order in accordance with the challenges of 
the post-cold war era. In order to guarantee law enforcement and individual 
protection mechanisms on the ground, the formulation of policy and law 
needs to give priority to applicable measures of human security. This study 
argues that there is a moral and legal case for intervention on humanitarian 
grounds where crimes internationally recognized have been committed, but 
that at such, military intervention and the authorization of the use of force 
under the flag of the responsibility to protect need to be shared in a con-
text of balancing powers, if not such frameworks would be constantly com-
promised in the absence of a reliable accountability system, including the 
negative consequences on civilians. It is hoped that the embryonic regime 
of international criminal justice would have a deterrent function in the com-
mission of crimes during political transitions in African countries and in 
other regions of the world.23 At this moment in time, however, its enforce-
ment is still more of a vision considering the weak interaction between the 
relevant international actors and their legal and political engagements. In 
such context there is also the necessity to develop more coherent theories of 
global governance in accordance with the current challenges of the time and 
the current intersection between politics and law on such sensitive issues.24
In summary, this study provides verification on the following global issues 
which require urgent solutions:
a) Is there any progress in the democratization of an international ‘system’?
At international level the requests of democratization are related to the 
reform of the permanent membership of the UN Security Council and its 
veto powers; on the protection of civilians and peace enforcements man-
dates; on the proposals for global peoples assemblies giving voice to civil 
society in the UN General Assembly on matters of international mutual con-
cern; and also with regard to the provisions of the Rome Statute centraliz-
ing the victims’ role in judicial proceedings with participation, protection 
and reparation, including the dialogue between such global institutions and 
regional and non-governmental organizations. Such open dialogue with 
regional inter-governmental organizations and civil society symbolizes the 
emerging regime of international criminal justice and needs to be kept alive. 
After all, it has been the strength of the advocacy of both civil society and 
regional organizations that brought the Rome Statute to become a reality.
23 See A. Cassese, “International Criminal justice: Is it Needed in the Present World Com-
munity?” in G. Kreijen et al (eds), State, Sovereignty, and International Governance, 2002, 
Part II, Practical Manifestations.
24 See K. Dingwerth, P. Pattberg, ‘Global Governance as a Perspective on World Politics’, in 
12 Global Governance, 2006, at 194.
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In general, the idea of international democracy was centred on a broader par-
ticipation in decision-making by under-represented States, regional political 
realities and civil society which is still struggling for concrete accomplish-
ments. An important aspect of such democratization efforts is to focus on the 
interaction of complementary global regimes and the ways they contribute 
to the progress of an ‘open’ global society. This interaction is important to 
build up a democratic global system of governance fostering peace, justice 
and security in accordance with the principle of their inter-dependence. The 
preservation of peace, justice and security is not worthy if it functions within 
conflicting regimes. Considering the theory and the practice of humanitarian 
escalations and serious human rights breaches, this study argues the neces-
sity of global strategies preserving law and order in conflict and post-conflict 
societies. It addresses structural, normative and functional challenges in the 
intersection between complementary international regimes. It offers an over-
view of the international legal and political order dealing with international 
threats and crimes. It explores the complementary role of international crim-
inal justice at both domestic and international levels in the quest of sustain-
able peace and human security in conflict and post-conflict societies.
In other words, the interaction of complementary global regimes is also 
important to define further constitutional measures in the new order, includ-
ing human security mechanisms applicable in conflict and post-conflict situ-
ations such as protection, relocation and rehabilitation of victims and wit-
nesses including reparation measures, which deserve to be associated to 
development programs in domestic governance systems, once judicial pro-
ceedings have been performed.
b) The promotion of global interactions and democratic governance
This study wants to shed some light on what global interactions between 
complementary regimes would entail for the maintenance of peace, justice 
and security, from legal, political and institutional perspectives. Normative, 
structural and functional analysis of the emerging regime of international 
justice reveals that an appropriate interaction between the Rome Statute 
institutions and the United Nations system is still in progress. Recommenda-
tions are necessary for policy makers on normative and institutional reforms 
for further progress of democratic global governance institutions, preserving 
peace, justice and security in conflict and post-conflict societies. The purpose 
of this study is to stimulate the debate on such interaction through an assess-
ment of international governance institutions, including recommendations 
of democratic adjustments preserving international relations, international 
law and order. There is the necessity of a global engagement in the democ-
ratization process preserving peace, justice and security in affected commu-
nities by war and crime. Only through such democratization process deci-
sion makers would enable complementary global mandates to rehabilitate 
dysfunctional domestic institutions in case of humanitarian escalations and 
serious violations of international law.
Chapter 8  Concluding Assessment 337
Following a referral by the Security Council to the Court the use of resourc-
es should be also supported by an appropriate law enforcement strategy. 
Attention is also needed on the political and legal relationship between 
the UN institutions and the ASP-ICC (Assembly of the States Parties and 
International Criminal Court), implementing further the project of univer-
sal jurisdiction. Considering the main organizational, operational and insti-
tutional issues, the attention in this study focuses on the current status of 
global governance in criminal matters in the absence of powers of enforc-
ing compliance, or supranational organization. The ‘triggering mechanisms’ 
need attention according to the promotion of ‘checks and balances’ of public 
powers in the international legal order. In the context of finding effective 
mechanisms of governance between the ICC and the UN the controversy has 
been whether the Security Council, the International Court of Justice or the 
General Assembly would declare the criminal responsibility of a State, with 
the Court determining the criminal individual responsibility of perpetra-
tors. The Security Council received a specific legal and political role within 
the regime of international criminal justice falling under the Rome Statute, 
which deserves some reflections after the first decade of its existence.
c) Are there further definitions of international crimes of common concern?
The governance model proposed in this study between the United Nations 
and the Rome Statute institutions (the Assembly of States Parties, the Inter-
national Criminal Court and the Trust Fund for Victims) supports the fight 
against international threats and crimes and the rehabilitation of affected 
communities, promoting study groups on the definition of crimes, including 
legal and institutional matters. The purpose of this research is also to stimu-
late the debate on international crime definitions (terrorism, corruption, traf-
ficking of drugs and weapons of mass destruction). The first involvement of 
the Court to end the impunity of humanitarian crimes which are harming 
civilians considers rape and other grave sexual violence against women and 
children as a war crime. The treaty law considers up to six grave violations 
against children in situations of armed conflict which are characterizing the 
Court’s charges in the DRC and Uganda (killing or maiming of children; 
recruitment or use of children as soldiers; attacks against schools or hospi-
tals; denial of humanitarian access for children; abduction of children; rape 
and other grave sexual abuse of children).25
With regard to the universality principle of the Court’s jurisdiction and war 
crimes, my view is that the Rome Statute should rectify the crime settlement 
over the use of arms of mass destruction and the use of nuclear weapons not 
sufficiently mentioned in the provisions of the Rome Statute, and which are 
also related to the extension of war crimes, and the definition of the crime 
25 See ICC-02/04-01/05, Situation in Uganda and related Cases, The Prosecutor v. Joseph 
Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen. See ICC-01/04-01/06, Situation 
in Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.
338 Part III  The Humanitarian Escalations of Last Resort and their Governance in the Field Operations 
of aggression and leadership crimes. But would this help to set the US and 
other powerful States to come on board of the Rome Statute system? This 
will depend by the trend in global politics and from the UN-ASP promotion 
of the universality of the Court’s jurisdiction. The amendment proposals of 
the Rome Statute addressed by the States Parties to the ASP and their policy 
positions expressed during the first review conference in Kampala recall the 
necessity of further debate. For some observers, the danger is that the Rome 
Statute would always encounter limits according to the political consensus 
to be reached by the States Parties, especially on issues strictly related to 
their legislation and approximation mechanisms. The ASP inputs on coop-
eration and the UN expertise with regard to the international threats are the 
keys to overcome the political obstacles of further jurisdictional improve-
ments of the Rome Statute. Another problem is to safeguard the indepen-
dent role of the Court in the contemporary international order characterized 
by the executive priorities of the Security Council. This is in fact related to 
the issue of the crime of aggression which focuses on the use of force, on the 
Security Council’s powers and the interaction with the Court. The crime of 
aggression was mentioned in the founding treaty even if political consensus 
over its definition was never reached at UN level and later in the ASP-ICC. 
The nuclear issue was left completely outside the Statute’s provisions, as 
well as terrorism and drug trafficking. The developments since the establish-
ment in Rome of the treaty and its first review conference in Kampala have 
been extensively debated and indicate the lacuna of such regime dealing 
with crimes characterizing inter-state conflicts.
d) Approach
This study explores the emerging regime of international criminal justice and 
its governance which is by definition complementary to the duty of the Unit-
ed Nations. In order to assess contemporary models of international respons-
es in conflict and post-conflict societies this study examines the broadening 
conceptions of governance in the absence of a supranational body. It considers 
the growing nexus between the studies of governance offering mechanisms 
of sustainable peace, justice and security in fragile and so-called ‘failed’ 
States. It reflects on the evolution or devolution of democratic processes of 
interactions between complementary global institutions fostering civilian 
protection duties which cannot be looked separately in situations where 
international peace and security are both at risk. It offers an assessment of 
the models proposed by international governance institutions getting closer 
to individuals during and after armed conflicts, while exploring the ability of 
the international society in the definition of threats and crimes, getting closer 
to the idealistic approach of a world government engaged in both intra-state 
and inter-state conflicts in accordance with a universal constitution.
The international legal order is based on the respect for the personality, sov-
ereignty, and independence of States, and “the faithful fulfillment of obliga-
tions derived from treaties and other sources of international law”. Human 
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rights and international humanitarian law are either the archetype of inter-
nal affairs or a matter of international concern, especially in the area where 
“the faithful fulfillment of obligations derived from treaties and other sourc-
es”, impacts daily on the relations between the State and individuals under 
its jurisdiction.26 As cited by Cassese, “human rights have by now become 
a bonum commune humanitatis, a core of values of great significance for the 
whole of humankind. It is logical and consistent to grant the courts of all 
States the power and also the duty to prosecute, to bring to trial, and to pun-
ish persons allegedly responsible for unbearable breaches of those values 
and norms. National courts would operate not on behalf of their own author-
ities but in the name and on behalf of the whole international community”.27 
An effective model of international governance of justice monitors at domes-
tic level the faithful fulfillment of obligations derived from the treaties.28 The 
majority of the situations where the Court is involved display the require-
ment of capacity-building to domestic governance systems, including the 
political support at regional level among other specific needs to protect indi-
viduals in situations of war and crime.
In the absence of supranational organization appropriate governance between 
the competent international mandates defending fundamental rights in con-
flict and post-conflict societies is indispensable in order to rehabilitate com-
munities after war and crime. An effective model of international governance 
is necessary in order to maximize results during peace-building operations and 
post-conflict justice. This model of governance of justice would destabilize 
criminal regimes that represent the main cause of intra-state civil wars, avoid-
ing the risks for these communities of going back to the regime of war, shortly 
after the UN intervention. Both mandates (ICC-UN) allow fragile States to 
26 See F. Kalshoven, “State Sovereignty versus International Concern in Some Recent Cases 
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights”, in G. Kreijen ‘et al’ (eds.), State, Sover-
eignty and International Governance, (2004), at 259.
27 See A. Cassese, The International Criminal Court: An End to Impunity? Crimes of War Proj-
ect, 2003, accessible at: http://www.didierbigo.com/students/readings/IPS2011/13/
cassese2003.pdf Considering another perspective, which complements the empirical 
approach in post-confl ict societies in order to examine the necessity of international 
investigations and prosecutions and the impact of international Courts on domes-
tic criminal proceedings, it is important to consider the current interaction between 
national and international Courts, involved in prosecuting individuals in mass atrocity 
situations, in combination with an analysis of the problems presented by the limited 
response of the international community to mass atrocity situations. This approach of 
justice governance entails original case studies, and comparisons of their interactions 
between the different legal systems, domestic, regional, and international, and makes 
recommendations for optimizing the complementary nature of international and nation-
al Courts. This is the purpose of the research project, Impact of International Courts on 
Domestic Criminal Procedures in Mass Atrocity Cases. See DOMAC (2008) research project 
funded under the Seventh Framework Programme for EU Research (FP7), accessible at: 
www.domac.is
28 For a legal analysis of the Court’s relationship with domestic jurisdiction see C. Stahn 
and G. Sluiter, The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court, (2009), at 208.
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rebuild their own executive, legislative and judicial powers. Moreover, in the 
long term this model of governance would influence the project of universal 
jurisdiction and the judicial empowerment of competence allocation vis-à-
vis the executive power of the Security Council. At strategic level, as shown 
by the legal reports of the Secretary-General, in order to maximize results in 
the peace operations: “international security, rule of law and justice must go 
hand in hand”. The problem is to solve the dilemma of judicial empower-
ment towards a well-defined enforcement strategy with the executive powers 
of the Security Council (checks and balances) supporting the ex-ante nature of 
the Court and its involvement in ongoing conflicts.
In the model of governance proposed, the escalation of human rights vio-
lations threatening international peace and security should be followed by 
a mechanism of horizontal nature: judicial referral (Security Council – Inter-
national Criminal Court) and law enforcement referral (International Criminal 
Court – Security Council), in order to maximize results in the field on a case-
by-case basis in the situations referred to the Court.29 The United Nations 
and the Rome Statute institutions have a universal mandate. In fact the 
definition of universal organizations applies for both systems. There is the 
necessity of building consensus, consolidating the responsibility to protect 
individuals with the determination of ending the impunity of international 
crimes, towards an appropriate interaction between these organizations. 
The right of intervention of the international community (in case the State is 
unwilling or unable to protect civilians – responsibility to protect) must follow 
up on the judicial decisions of the International Criminal Court (when the 
State is unwilling or unable of starting judicial proceedings – complementar-
ity). The model of governance proposed in this study refers to the enforce-
ment on a case-by-case basis: a) maximizing the results in the Security Coun-
cil operations and referral activity to the Court; and b) ending the impunity 
of serious international crimes with the Court’s presence in the conflict and 
post-conflict phase. In conclusion, the responsibility to protect deserves 
some progress in order to serve the main activities of the Court.
e) Motivation
The motivation in this study is to verify whether there is a genuine political 
determination of harmonization between the United Nations and the Inter-
national Criminal Court in solving some of the tensions between peace and 
justice, cooperation and complementarity, including the long term impact 
of their presence in the field operations on victims and affected communi-
ties. The intent of this study is to verify whether these complementary global 
entities are just left by means of parallel and distant working relationships, 
reflecting an improper hierarchy between political and judicial international 
authorities, which would only create undesired frictions and disputes, or if 
29 The vertical referrals: nation-states – International Criminal Court and proprio motu pow-
ers in accordance with Article 15 of the Rome Statute.
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they work together with unity of intents, providing assistance and coopera-
tion in the field operations of one another, improving the capacity-building 
of regional and domestic systems. Further consensus will be necessary for 
democratic reforms which would allow the implementation of interna-
tional cooperation standards, including international and shared responsi-
bilities of cooperation between complementary global regimes and regional 
and domestic systems. An overview of the shortcomings occurring during 
humanitarian escalations of last resort, from peace processes to transitional 
justice, and their impact on the ground, have been approached in the case 
studies dealing with conflict and post-conflict situations in African coun-
tries, where the United Nations and the Rome Statute institutions are both 
currently involved. The policy debates and the legislation of the UN institu-
tions, regional organizations and Rome Statute institutions have been exten-
sively examined.
The motivation for this research also refers to the new steps in the law-mak-
ing process and the treaty law to implement the defence of human rights; to 
enhance further the fight against international crimes; and to put an end to 
the impunity regime of serious human rights offences. This research offers a 
model implementing the governance of justice, at a time where the comple-
tion strategies of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the 
Former Yugoslavia are well under way, while the operation of a new mixed 
tribunal by the Security Council (Special Tribunal for Lebanon) brings new 
concerns of fragmented and multilevel jurisdictions.30 The International 
Criminal Court was created as a demonstration by the international com-
munity’s commitment to put an end to impunity of serious crimes interna-
tionally recognized establishing new policies based on justice and the rule 
of law.31 The Court’s presence provides high judicial standards for other 
30 In this context is important to consider the adoption of the Security Council Resolution 
1757 (2007) 30 May 2007 (UN doc. S/RES/1757) over the establishment of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, the so-called Hariri Tribunal. This “hybrid” international court is 
mandated to try those suspected of assassinating former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafi k 
Hariri, who was murdered in February 2005. Several human rights organizations such 
as Human Rights Watch had argued that the tribunal should have been given jurisdic-
tion over 14 other attacks perpetrated in Lebanon since October 1, 2004, that it is to be 
a “tribunal of an international character based on the highest international standards of 
criminal justice” and that several issues need to be addressed during the negotiations 
between the United Nations and the Lebanese government in order to ensure that the 
“highest international standards of criminal justice” are attained. The tribunal marks the 
fi rst time that an UN-based international criminal court will be trying a “terrorist” crime 
committed against a specifi c person. See HRW, Establishing the Hariri Tribunal, Letter to 
the Secretary-General Kofi  Annan, 2006 (April), accessible at http://hrw.org/english/
docs/2006/05/01/lebano13297.htm
31 See UN doc. A/63/323, Fourth Report of the International Criminal Court to the United 
Nations for 2007/08, Address to the United Nations General Assembly Judge Philippe 
Kirsch, President of the International Criminal Court, 30 October 2008, accessible at: http://
www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Reports+on+activities/Court+Reports+and+Statements/
Court+Reports+and+Statements.htm
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courts and tribunals, while its ex-ante role of permanent tribunal is unique 
and requires global support.
This study defends the necessity of applying the doctrine of checks and bal-
ances in the international legal order between universal organizations and 
vis-à-vis the States, consolidating complementary regimes dealing with seri-
ous human rights breaches. It debates the necessity for the judicial power to 
operate in the context of a global law enforcement strategy and a compulso-
ry cooperation regime. It offers a model of governance between the humani-
tarian intervention under the UN umbrella and the field operations to gather 
information and evidence of international crimes by the investigative chan-
nels of the Court. It considers the judicial proceedings of post-conflict jus-
tice (rehabilitation and reparation) as necessary operational steps of nation 
building and reconstruction. The existence of a permanent and indepen-
dent international organization with jurisdiction over individuals accused 
of committing serious international crimes, in particular, genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, signifies the establishment of a judicial 
power independent from power politics, from the selective justice performed 
by the Security Council and from the unilateral national security policy of its 
members. There is an important impetus to analyse the interaction of com-
plementary international mandates in the context of complementarity with the 
States. Studies and reports on these global issues are extremely important, 
considering the solutions to be found in the current transition of interna-
tional relations, characterized by the crisis in international democracy, and 
by the disintegration of the nation-state even in Western societies with a dif-
ficult momentum of political unrests, shifts of power, civil wars and serious 
violations against the dignity of individual lives. From a legal perspective 
further research will be necessary in order to define the criminal responsi-
bility of corporations and other non-state actors, giving new insight to the 
application of accountability and universal reach of crimes by a permanent 
International Criminal Court.
f) Country-specific situations
The political breakdowns and the failure of newly established nation-states 
is evident in civil wars which create situations where domestic institutions 
are deprived of their capabilities, triggering a constant crisis of basic gover-
nance parameters. In the majority of these situations, characterized by eco-
nomic decline and dependent upon natural resources, domestic authorities 
become unable to control violence on their own, or persist in the unwilling-
ness to investigate or prosecute international crimes of serious concern. Such 
breakdowns of nation-states are well recorded in Africa, where their inabil-
ity to initiate judicial proceedings after and during violent conflicts proves 
the necessity of institutional-capacity building at international level. Since 
the establishment of the Court there have been State referrals from the gov-
ernments of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Central African 
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Republic,32 Ivory Coast,33 Mali and and the Union of the Comoros, two refer-
rals from the Security Council regarding the situation in Darfur and Libya. 
In 2010 Pre-Trial Chamber II granted the Prosecutor’s request to open an 
investigation proprio motu in the situation in Kenya, which is a State Party to 
the Rome Statute since 2005.34 It needs to be noted that the Kenyan parlia-
ment did not agree on the establishment of a special criminal tribunal of their 
own to take care of the crimes committed during the political transition in 
the country. The Kenyan parliament voted twice negatively to have a special 
criminal tribunal looking into the criminal responsibility for the 2007-2008 
post-election violence. There was no other option for the ICC intervention.35 
The Office of the Prosecutor has also received thousands communications 
since July 2002 about multiple country-situations and performs daily pre-
liminary examinations.36
The obvious consequence in the majority of conflict and post-conflict soci-
eties is the presence of authoritarian criminal regimes which have serious 
repercussions on individual lives and which are left to international inter-
ventions of last resort. Considering the UN intervention in the DRC conflict, 
or so-called the ‘Kivu Conflict’ which was generated by an explosive mix of 
power-hungry militias and ethnic tensions, fuelled by a violent tug of war 
for control over mineral resources. The conflict is taking place between the 
Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and the Rwandan Hutu militia group, the 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) in the mountainous 
provinces of North and South Kivu. After a dramatic shift in political allianc-
es, in January 2009 the DRC and Rwanda launched joint military operations 
in eastern Congo against the FDLR, some of whose leaders had participated 
in the Rwandan genocide, and which had targeted Congolese civilians in 
these areas over the previous 15 years. Peace and security has been compro-
mised in the African Great Lakes region including the regime of impunity of 
mass atrocity crimes.
32 See ICC-OTP-20140924-PR1043, 24 September 2014, Statement of the Prosecutor of the Inter-
national Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on opening a second investigation in the Central Afri-
can Republic. See also Situation in the Central African Republic II, Article 53(1) Report, 24 
September 2014.
33 Ivory Coast had  accepted the jurisdiction  of the ICC on 18 April 2003. On both 14 
December 2010 and 3 May 2011, the Presidency of the country reconfi rmed the accep-
tance of the Court’s jurisdiction. On 15 February 2013 Ivory Coast deposited its instru-
ment of ratifi cation and became State Party to the Rome Statute.
34 ICC-01/09, 31 March 2010, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, accessible 
at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854287.pdf
35 See G. M. Musila, “Options for Transitional Justice in Kenya: Autonomy and the Chal-
lenge of External Prescriptions”, IJTJ (2009) 3 (3), at 445-464.
36 For an up-to-date overview see ICC portal, Communications and Preliminary Examina-
tions, accessible at: http://www.icc-cpi.int ICC » Structure of the Court » Offi ce of the 
Prosecutor » Preliminary Examinations.
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Seventy years since the end of WWII and the creation of the United Nations 
the events in the DRC remind us that the system of collective security based 
around the UN is still unable to save the lives of innocent civilians caught up 
in armed conflict. Even worse, the United Nations itself is facing accusations 
of complicity in violations of international law. MONUC was given the man-
date to support and participate in military operations with the Congolese 
armed forces against the FDLR in December 2008, as long as such operations 
were conducted in accordance with the laws of war. But according to human 
rights activists MONUC disregarded crucial elements of formal legal advice 
given by the UN Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) in 2009 and did not establish 
conditions for respecting international humanitarian law, as required by its 
mandate, even before it began to support the operations on the ground.37
Serious concerns emerge from the empirical research findings of such inter-
ventions in conflict prevention and conflict management and which do not 
seem to be prepared to act on the causes and on the effects of humanitarian 
atrocities. “There are many tasks which UN peacekeeping forces should not 
be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But when the 
UN does send its forces to uphold the peace, they should be prepared to 
confront the persistent forces of war and violence with the ability and deter-
mination to defeat them.” This important guideline was part of the com-
prehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all 
their aspects in the UN.38 The Brahimi Report offered an in-depth critique 
about the conduct of UN operations and made specific recommendations 
for a change. Only “by making such changes”, the Panel argued, “would the 
UN be able to meet the critical 21st century peacekeeping and peacebuild-
ing issues presented by its member States” The Brahimi Report was drafted 
during the May-June 2000 peacekeeper hostage crisis in Sierra Leone, with 
that crisis very much in mind. Experience in the 1990s had also amply dem-
onstrated that undersized and under-equipped forces with weak or unclear 
mandates could neither deter political factions nor contain the well-armed 
gangs that arise in the power and legitimacy vacuums following civil wars. 
Such was the case, for example, in Angola, Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda 
between 1991 and 1994.
In the comprehensive UN review of the whole question of peacekeep-
ing operations in all their aspects and inter-institutional communication 
between the president of the UN General Assembly and the president of 
37 See Human Rights Watch, “MONUC and Civilian Protection” in You Will Be Punished. 
Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo, Report of Human Rights Watch (HRW), December 
2009, pp. 134-153, accessible at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/fi les/reports/drc-
1209web_1.pdf
38 See A/55/305, S/2000/809, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, known 
as the “Brahimi Report” after the Panel chair, UN Under-Secretary-General Lakhdar Bra-
himi, August 2000.
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the Security Council, the paragraph 62 reads “Peacekeepers (military troops 
or police) who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be 
authorized to stop it, within their means, in support of basic United Nations 
principles and, as stated in the report of the Independent Inquiry on Rwan-
da, with ‘the perception and the expectation of protection created by the UN 
operational presence”.39 Military ethics experts took the Panel to task for 
the “presumed to be authorized” language, arguing that, if protecting civil-
ians is not part of an operation’s mandate, then the Panel has potentially 
invited soldiers who witness atrocities to violate lawful national orders not 
to intervene. But they also note that force majeure “in the sense of a collision 
of duties,” where “the necessity of choice is inevitable,” may offer a path by 
which peacekeepers, in specific emergency circumstances, may act outside 
their mandate, drawing on the ethical imperative to protect civilians that is 
implied or imposed by international humanitarian law.40 The International 
Criminal Court, however, is still kept out of any forces to be deployed on the 
ground.
The mission in the DRC illustrates the difficulties that characterize such an 
approach,41 and suggests that the United Nations and its member States do 
not yet have the expertise and commitment to deal effectively with com-
plex humanitarian emergencies.42 In 2004, the government of DRC referred 
the situation of crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court allegedly committed anywhere on its territory, since the entry into 
force of the Rome Statute, on 1 July 2002. The DRC government asked the 
39 ‘Brahimi report’, UN Doc. A/55/305, para. 62.
40 The distinction drawn is between an implicit, blanket authority to act and an emergency 
imperative that is justifi ed case by case. See T. Van Baarda and F. Van Iersel, ‘The Uneasy 
Relationship between Conscience and Military Law: The Brahimi Report’s Unresolved 
Dilemma’, (2002) 9 International Peacekeeping 3, 25 at 50.
41 Experts in peacekeeping and peacemaking in Africa discussing the history of UN efforts 
since post cold war era in DRC, Sierra Leone conclude that the UN is still struggling to 
fi nd a case by case approach in such humanitarian disasters. See A. Bariagader, ‘United 
Nations Peace Operations in Africa: A Cookie-Cutter Approach?’, 2006 Journal of Third 
World Studies 23, 2, 11 at 29. In DRC, the UN Security Council Resolution 1843, UN doc. 
S/Res/1843 (2008), November 20, 2008, increased the number of troops from nearly 
17,000 troops to just fewer than 20,000 though not all of the new troops have yet arrived. 
As of August 2009, 18,638 uniformed personnel were physically deployed, including 
16,844 troops, 705 military observers, and 1,089 police. The mission also includes 1006 
international civilian personnel, 2,539 local civilian staff and 615 United Nations Volun-
teers. See MONUC facts and fi gures, accessible at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
missions/monuc/facts.html
42 According to empirical case studies performed by African experts on the DRC, the mas-
sive confl ict lasting from 1996 to 2003 that drew in seven African countries and led to 
about three million deaths, the greatest number of fatalities in any war since World War 
II, started as a direct consequence of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. See G. Prunier, From 
Genocide to Continental War: The “Congolese” Confl ict and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa 
published in the US as Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of 
Continental Catastrophe, (2009).
346 Part III  The Humanitarian Escalations of Last Resort and their Governance in the Field Operations 
Prosecutor of the Court to investigate in order to determine whether one 
or more persons should be charged with such crimes, and the authorities 
committed to cooperate with the Court. In January 2009 the first trial of the 
Court started against the most accountable Congolese ‘warlords’ with some 
of them still at large (Sylvestre Mudacumura). In the Sudan it is even worse. 
The political élite responsible of mass atrocities in Darfur are still in charge 
of the leadership in the country. President Al-Bashir travels all over in Afri-
ca. Such trend has divided the international community and many African 
States are not cooperating in accordance with their legal obligations falling 
under the Rome Statute.
g) From rejection to political support
This study has also the scope to address the Court’s political rejection con-
sidering the American position and also by other permanent members of 
the Security Council, such as Russia and China. The United States signed 
under the Clinton administration and then rejected the Court under the 
Bush administration. For a while it even became its public enemy together 
with other powerful States which followed their own strategic intervention 
policy, delivering a governance model of justice sometimes even outside 
the multilateral premises of the UN. The Obama Administration has stated 
its intent to cooperate with the International Criminal Court. In response 
to a question from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former Secre-
tary of State Clinton remarked that the US will end its ‘hostility’ towards 
the Court. In addition, Susan Rice, US Ambassador to the United Nations, 
in her first address to the Security Council, expressed the US support for 
the Court’s investigation in the Sudan. These statements coupled with the 
removal of the sanctions and the realization of the negative impact of the 
Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs), represent a positive shift for those 
who believe in the US cooperation with the Court and which may lead to 
greater participation with it. The Obama Administration however, has made 
no formal policy decision yet on the ICC membership, neither on the status 
of the Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs).43
The expectations on the Court’s role seem very high notwithstanding its 
opposition if we consider the limited resources given by the Assembly of 
States Parties (ASP), the political and governing body of the ICC, and the 
lack of support by the Security Council following the Darfur referral. The 
debate ended on March 31, 2005 with the Security Council finally approv-
43 See “The United States and the International Criminal Court”, Wikipedia the free encyclo-
pedia, accessible at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_and_the_Internation-
al_Criminal_Court See also L. Di Cicco, “The Non-Renewal of the ‘Nethercutt Amend-
ment’ and its Impact on the Bilateral Immunity Agreement (BIA) Campaign”, April 30 
2009, accessible at: http://www.amicc.org/docs/Nethercutt2009.pdf For an overview 
of the hearing of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee see J. Kerry, “Toward a Com-
prehensive Strategy for Sudan” 2009, accessible at: http://kerry.senate.gov/cfm/record.
cfm?id=316485
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ing the Resolution 1593 granting the ICC jurisdiction to investigate ongoing 
atrocities in Darfur. The Resolution passed by a vote of 11-0, with four coun-
tries abstaining. This was an extraordinary result considering the complex 
politics involved. Algeria and the United States cited their preference for an 
African tribunal as the reason for their failure to support the referral. But the 
reluctance of the US was compounded by their ideological opposition to the 
ICC itself. The fact that they did not exercise the veto was due in part to the 
inclusion in the Resolution of a provision exempting nationals of States not 
Parties to the ICC Statute who are involved in peacekeeping from the juris-
diction of the Court. At the other end of the scale of views, Brazil withheld 
its vote precisely to object the compromised language introduced by the US. 
China justified its failure to support the resolution by saying that a political 
process for peace should be prioritized over the quest for justice.44 Yet it did 
not cast a veto, but abstained.
Taking in consideration the international relations issues, this study 
approaches the support received by the European Union and NGO coali-
tions as important channels to solve the controversial positions with other 
regional organizations, such as the Arab League and the African Union. 
The analysis focuses on the peace enforcement configurations of the Secu-
rity Council on the ground, where the Court is also involved with investi-
gations and prosecutions, including the escalations of last resort addressed 
to the emerging regime of international criminal justice. The argument is 
the lack of support to the Court, including a detached interaction between 
complementary global regimes, alongside the policy formulation of global 
humanitarianism and civilian protection duties in conflict and post-conflict 
situations.
44 See, UN doc. S/RES/1593 (2005).

Probleemstelling
In dit proefschrift is de werking van complementaire internationale regimes 
die als doel hebben om oorlogsmisdaden te bestrijden gebaseerd op begin-
selen zoals het primaat van de rechtsstaat, een multilaterale en collectieve 
benadering, gemeenschappelijke verantwoordelijkheid, mondiale solida-
riteit en wederzijdse toerekenbaarheid. Deze uitgangspunten bevorderen 
maatschappelijke vooruitgang, respect voor mensenrechten en het bereiken 
van duurzame vrede. In de huidige internationaalrechtelijke en politieke 
ordening zijn op korte, middel en langere termijn dringend oplossingen 
vereist die een balans aanbrengen tussen het ‘recht’ op humanitaire inter-
ventie en een transitie naar de ‘verantwoordelijkheid’ om burgers adequaat 
te beschermen. Vereist zijn juridische kaders die individuele grondrechten 
beschermen en die tevens werking hebben ten aanzien van misdaden die 
begaan worden in conflict en post-conflict situaties. De bescherming van de 
rechtsstaat kan bijdragen aan het vestigen van orde en stabiliteit in transitie-
samenlevingen en ook aan het behoud van gedeelde, universele waarden 
door de internationale gemeenschap. Niet duidelijk is echter hoe interna-
tionaal humanitair recht en mensenrechten bij kunnen dragen aan een toe-
pasbaar juridisch kader voor situaties die niet beschouwd kunnen worden 
als een gewapend conflict. Dit geldt ook voor de vraag aan wie schendin-
gen juridisch toe te rekenen, het afdwingen van rechtszekerheid en maat-
regelen die de burger beschermen in conflict en post-conflict situaties. De 
historische, politieke en juridische kenmerken van dergelijke lacunes wor-
den diepgaand bestudeerd met als doel een beeld te geven van een mondi-
ale architectuur gericht op het omgaan met oorlogsmisdaden en gebaseerd 
op menselijke veiligheid. Om de oorzaken en de effecten te meten van een 
democratisch gelegitimeerde inzet van aanvullende regimes op conflict en 
post-conflict situaties is per geval verder onderzoek vereist. Dit met inacht-
neming van het gegeven dat een standaardanalyse niet mogelijk is. Wel zijn 
er waardevolle uitgangspunten in het theoretisch kader die bij kunnen dra-
gen aan het formuleren van beleid ten bate van het voorkomen van conflic-
ten en die bijdragen aan het herstel in post-conflict situaties.
In het afgelopen decennium is de oordeelsvorming op de rechtmatigheid 
van het ‘recht’ van humanitaire interventie door de internationaalrechtelijke 
wetenschap diepgaand geanalyseerd. Het risico op eenzijdige humanitaire 
interventies wordt ontleend aan het falen van het collectieve veiligheidssys-
teem dat na de Tweede Wereldoorlog is opgericht. Dit veiligheidssysteem 
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werd gekenmerkt door het delegeren van humanitaire interventies door de 
Verenigde Naties aan ad-hoc coalities als het enige alternatief voor het werk-
loos toezien bij gruwelijkheden, mensenrechtenschendingen en systemati-
sche gewelddaden tegen burgers. In het huidige post-Koude Oorlog tijdperk 
en met de aanname van het Statuut van Rome komt het debat over taken op 
het gebied van burgerbescherming naar voren. In dit debat dienen de rech-
ten van het individu in conflict en post-conflict situaties centraal te staan. Dit 
debat strekt zich ook uit naar de verantwoordlijkheden van misdadige regi-
mes en dadergroepen waarbij ook het straffeloos optreden van plaatselijke 
autoriteiten in conflict en post-conflict situaties moet worden gemonitord. 
De paradigmaverschuiving van het concept van internationale veiligheid 
naar het concept van menselijke veiligheid verdient analyse, met inbegrip 
van de ernstige tekortkomingen in de rechtshandhaving na gerechtelijke 
uitspraken op basis van de huidige supranationale regelgeving. De praktijk 
van de verantwoordelijkheid voor burgerbescherming verdient eveneens 
analyse. Dit geldt niet alleen voor geautoriseerd militair ingrijpen en VN-
vredesmissies, maar ook voor andere complementaire instrumenten zoals 
het Internationaal Strafhof, dat ook worstelt met beschermingsmaatregelen 
voor getuigen en slachtoffers van schendingen van het internationaal huma-
nitair recht. In overeenstemming met de ex-ante positie van het Internatio-
naal Strafhof zou in de ideale situatie steun voorafgaand, gedurende, en na 
schendingen van de menselijke veiligheid in conflict en post-conflict situa-
ties wenselijk zijn. Maar dit ideaal is geen realiteit, en zal het waarschijnlijk 
ook niet worden.
We zien dat sommige belangrijke landen en regionale politieke samenwer-
kingsverbanden afstand nemen van het Statuut van Rome. Hierdoor is het 
feitelijk juist om te spreken van een impasse in het ontwerp en de inzet van 
complementaire regimes. Dit proefschrift analyseert de sterke en zwakke 
kanten van complementaire internationale regimes en stelt hervormingen 
voor om daarmee antwoorden te vinden op de uitbreiding van intrastate-
lijke conflicten die zich kenmerken door ernstige misdaden. Daarbij gaat het 
ook om interstatelijke gewapende conflicten of gewelddadigheden waarop 
de internationale rechterlijke structuur op dit moment nauwelijks een ant-
woord heeft.
Onderwerp van de studie
Dit proefschrift bevat een zoektocht naar de waarde van ‘complementari-
teit’ en het dilemma van menselijke veiligheid in de context van de plurale, 
liberale en grondwettelijke zienswijzen op juridische en politieke structuren 
gericht tegen ernstige misdaden en schendingen van mensenrechten in de 
internationale context. Het probeert uitdagingen en kansen inzichtelijk te 
maken die een rol spelen bij het functioneren van complementaire interna-
tionale regimes gericht op het bevorderen van vrede, recht en maatschap-
pelijke reconstructie.
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Het proefschrift onderzoekt de dynamiek tussen de internationale institu-
ties betrokken bij humanitaire interventies en de impact hiervan op missies:
a) vaststellen van de feiten en omstandigheden van de mensenrechtenschen-
dingen; b) het onderzoeken en het vervolgen van de daders van genoemde 
misdaden; c) het verzorgen van een andere vestigingsplaats, rehabilitatie en 
schadevergoeding voor de slachtoffers van deze internationale misdaden;
d) de spanningen tegengaan tussen vrede en verzoening ten opzichte van 
recht en verantwoordelijkheid in de veranderende post-conflict samen-
leving; en e) het onderkennen van het belang van nationaal herstel en her-
ontwikkeling met de inzet van vrede en recht als onafhankelijke en uni-
versele waarden. Om een maximaal resultaat te behalen ten bate van door 
gewapend conflict en misdaad getroffen samenlevingen beoogt deze studie 
de verdere ontwikkeling te stimuleren van een internationale architectuur 
die vrede en recht kan bevorderen. De huidige positie van het recht op het 
terrein van de handhaving van vrede en veiligheid kan prominenter gepo-
sitioneerd worden om a) de basis te leggen voor internationale humanitaire 
interventies, b) resultaten van missies te maximaliseren en c) burgerbescher-
mingstaken centraal te stellen.
Dit proefschrift benadrukt de betekenis en het in stand houden van de 
rechtszekerheid in internationale betrekkingen doordat complementaire 
internationale instituties de focus verplaatsten van collectieve veiligheid 
naar menselijke veiligheid, inclusief taken op het terrein van burgerbescher-
ming. Het toont de uitdagingen in het werkveld van het internationale recht 
die gevolgen zullen hebben voor de bestuurlijke en institutionele omgang 
met vrede en recht. De huidige praktijk geeft een indicatie van de moeilijk-
heden in zowel conflict als post-conflict situaties. Het aanvullende karakter 
van internationale instituties ten bate van de menselijke veiligheid biedt om 
deze reden belangrijke kansen. Dit proefschrift bespreekt het snijvlak tussen 
beleid en wetgeving bij het doorvoeren van complementaire internationale 
regimes. Complementaire regimes hebben de potentie om nationale rechts-
stelsels wereldwijd te beïnvloeden als het gaat om de aanpak van bedreigin-
gen van vrede en veiligheid. Zowel de Verenigde Naties als de geschiedenis 
van het Internationaal Strafhof als onafhankelijk juridische instelling wor-
den diepgaand geanalyseerd. In theorie hangen de verhoudingen af van het 
snijvlak tussen recht en politiek en in het bijzonder van de wil van nationale 
regeringen om de beginselen van het internationaal strafrecht op te nemen 
in nationale rechtssystemen. Hiermee kunnen deze bijdragen aan het bestrij-
den van misdaad op een nationaal en internationaal niveau en ook bijdragen 
aan het realiseren van een democratische machtsbalans die flexibel genoeg 
is om zich aan te passen aan de selectieve mandaten van vredesoperaties. 
De drie delen van dit proefschrift gaan specifiek in op die situaties waarbij 
zowel de Verenigde Naties als het Internationaal Strafhof betrokken zijn.
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Deze studie bespreekt tevens de tekortkomingen in de internationale reac-
ties op situaties waarin grootschalige mensenrechtenschendingen plaatsvin-
den en wijst op de vereiste structurele veranderingen die nodig zijn om de 
hiaten in het beleid te dichten als het gaat om de omgang met eerste signalen 
van conflicten, non-actie, selectiviteit en politieke betrokkenheid ten aanzien 
van door oorlog en misdaden getroffen landen. De weg naar een dergelijke 
paradigmawisseling ten bate van burgers getroffen door oorlog en misdaad 
is zowel afhankelijk van de specifieke verantwoordlijkheden van individu-
ele landen als van de internationale gemeenschap als geheel. Dit proefschrift 
onderzoekt de uitdagingen, hindernissen en zorgen in de huidige omgang 
met internationale strafrechtspleging zodat deze bij kan dragen aan het 
bereiken van duurzame vrede in situaties van oorlog en misdaad. Deze stu-
die richt zich op de lacunes in betreffende juridische structuren. Ook draagt 
het mogelijke democratische oplossingen aan die de interactie tussen com-
plementaire internationale regimes kunnen bevorderen.
Het proefschrift analyseert de verdragsrechtelijke instrumenten die de relatie 
tussen de Verenigde Naties en het Statuut van Rome reguleren en de nood-
zaak om in het verdragsrecht van beide organisaties de onderlinge verhou-
dingen te harmoniseren. Alle delen van deze studie richten zich op de struc-
turele, normatieve en functionele zaken en de noodzaak van aanpassingen 
en institutionele hervormingen die bijdragen aan de introductie van beleid 
gericht op de werking van complementaire internationale regimes die men-
selijke veiligheid bevorderen. In andere woorden de ‘link’ tussen internatio-
naal recht en menselijke veiligheid.
Onderzoeksvraag
Om in situaties waarin menselijke veiligheid en waardigheid van bur-
gers ernstig in het gedrang zijn te verbeteren, richt deze studie zich op de 
bestaande wisselwerking tussen complementaire internationale regimes. Dit 
wordt gevolgd door een aantal aanbevelingen.
De nadruk ligt daarbij op het zoeken naar maatregelen die bijdragen aan 
het handhaven van recht en internationale orde, zowel op mondiaal niveau 
maar ook tijdens interventies of missies. Deze studie onderstreept de nood-
zaak van een verantwoordingsstructuur die op hetzelfde niveau politieke 
en juridische verantwoordelijkheden handhaaft voor alle bij een conflict 
of post-conflict situatie betrokken partijen, inclusief niet-statelijke actoren. 
Hierdoor kan de internationale rechtsorde worden bevorderd.
De onderwerpen van deze studie worden aan de hand van de volgende vra-
gen uitgewerkt:
– Zijn we getuige van de opkomst van een internationale regelgeving die vrede en 
recht bevordert, inclusief maatregelen ten bate van menselijke veiligheid die toe-
passing kunnen krijgen in conflict en post-conflict situaties?
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– Wat voor uitdagingen, obstakels en zorgen zijn kenmerkend voor de beheers-
structuren van complementaire internationale regimes?
– Hoe functioneren de juridische doorverwijzingen naar het Internationaal Straf-
hof en hoe werkt dit uit in de praktijk van interventies of missies?
Deze studie onderzoekt de uitdagingen en kansen die complementaire inter-
nationale regimes kunnen bieden en gaat in op de rol van de hierbij betrok-
ken partijen.
Het proefschrift ondersteunt de zoektocht naar geschikte strategieën bij 
interventies, om zo een maximaal resultaat te behalen in het geval van oor-
log en misdaden. Ook beoogt het de beschermende, vergeldende en schade-
herstellende aspecten van rechtshandhaving in te brengen. Een eerste vereiste 
hiervoor is een road map van mogelijke interventies van complementaire 
internationale regimes. De internationale architectuur die vrede, recht en 
veiligheid moet bevorderen hangt af van een integraal bestuursmodel dat 
aansluit op internationale rechtsstructuren. Hieronder begrepen de rechtsge-
bieden van het internationaal humanitair recht, strafrecht en mensenrechten.
Doelstelling van het proefschrift
Doel van het proefschrift is het bevorderen van een effectieve strategie die 
de interactie bevordert tussen de complementaire internationale regimes. 
Dit in lijn met het beginsel van de menselijke veiligheid en de handhaving 
van het internationaal recht. In deze studie is de humanitaire benadering 
van menselijke veiligheid geïnterpreteerd als de paradigmawisseling van 
het centraal stellen van de veiligheid van de staat naar de bescherming van 
burgers indien overheden of politieke elites onwillig of onvermogend zijn 
op te komen voor de eigen burgers. Het rechtsbegrip ‘menselijke veiligheid’ 
biedt de mogelijkheid om fundamentele thema’s in het internationale recht 
zoals onafhankelijkheid, soevereiniteit en internationaal bestuur, inclusief 
de rol van niet-statelijke actoren in internationale rechtsstructuren, te laten 
kantelen. Maatregelen gericht op menselijke veiligheid zoals burgerbescher-
ming, het verzorgen van een andere vestigingsplaats, rehabilitatie en scha-
devergoeding zijn een absolute vereiste in situaties van oorlog en misdaad. 
De verschuiving naar veiligheid met een meer menselijk gezicht zou tevens 
gebruikt moeten worden om de wereldwijde strijd tegen ernstige misdaden 
en schendingen van mensenrechten te versterken en zou ook aan de basis 
moeten liggen van vredesmissies en het herstel van samenlevingen getroffen 
door oorlogsmisdaden.
Tevens geeft de studie inzicht in wat de meerwaarde is van samenwerking 
tussen complementaire internationale regimes ten bate van het bevorderen 
van vrede, recht en veiligheid. Dit beschouwd vanuit een juridisch, poli-
tiek en institutioneel perspectief. Verder beveelt het implementatie, hervor-
mingen en democratische aanpassingen aan. Door de afwezigheid van een 
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supranationale organisatie gaat het debat over de toekomst van het internati-
onaal strafrecht, tussen voorkomen en verantwoorden, richting de zorg over 
de voortschrijdende fragmentatie en de toename van regionale of decentrale 
internationale jurisdicties. Dit inclusief de lacunes in de verantwoordelijk-
heid voor humanitaire interventies die als oogmerk hebben om burgers in 
gewapende conflicten te beschermen. Deze studie beargumenteert dat voor 
de totstandkoming en het in praktijk brengen van een mondiaal systeem ten 
bate van internationaal strafrecht, welke tevens de mogelijkheid biedt om 
recht en internationale orde te beïnvloeden, inclusief ‘l’état de droit’, ofwel 
institutionele opbouw in plaatselijke rechtssystemen, het noodzakelijk is 
om de onderlinge competenties en werkverhoudingen van complementaire 
instituties af te bakenen. Dit zijn fundamentele voorwaarden in een mon-
diale democratische bestuurspraktijk en vervulling van deze voorwaarden 
kan bijdragen aan een pragmatische definiëring van internationale beheers-
instrumenten met een complementaire werking.
Het doel van deze studie is om de uitdagingen die er zijn ten aanzien van 
complementaire internationale regimes te onderzoeken, zowel de insti-
tutionele vraagstukken over de vorm en inrichting, maar ook de politieke 
overeenstemming die vereist is om resultaten ten gunste van door oorlog 
en criminaliteit getroffenen te verbeteren. Om die reden verkent deze studie 
de institutionele contouren van het opkomende stelsel van internationaal 
strafrecht als bijdrage aan het invoeren van mechanismen die op mondiaal 
niveau mensenrechten beschermen. In de behandelde twee casus ligt de 
focus op de gewenste vorm van complementaire mandaten ter plekke, de 
verantwoordelijkheid voor vroegtijdige signalering van politieke instabili-
teit, chaos, corruptie, slecht bestuur en grootschalige oorlogsmisdaden. De 
inzet van complementaire mandaten wordt gekenmerkt door problemen in 
de operationele samenhang en gehanteerde normen in de samenwerking. 
De impact van VN-missies in een conflictgebied op humanitaire bescher-
ming, veiligheidsvraagstukken en strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid wordt 
uitgebreid geanalyseerd. Dit met inbegrip van de resultaten van de strijd 
tegen straffeloosheid op alle niveaus, een element dat met de grootst moge-
lijk waakzaamheid door zowel de Verenigde Naties als het Internationaal 
Strafhof, met inbegrip van regionale intergouvernementele partijen, acade-
mici en het maatschappelijk middenveld wordt gevolgd.
Het doel van de studie is verder om duidelijkheid te scheppen op gevoelige 
thema’s zoals a) de humanitaire missies die vrede en recht beogen te bevor-
deren; b) het handhaven van de internationale rechtsorde en de harmonisa-
tie daarvan; c) de ontwikkeling van de leer van de menselijke veiligheid in 
het internationaal recht; d) de vormgeving en de balans in bevoegdheden 
tussen politieke, juridische en uitvoerende internationale publiekrechtelijke 
autoriteiten; e) de betekenis van complementaire bestuursstructuren- en 
instellingen; en f) het dilemma van de rechtshandhaving en de verhouding 
c.q. partnerschap van mandaathouders tijdens de uitvoer van operaties bin-
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nen missies. De studie benoemt de mogelijkheden die mondiale structuren 
bieden om de rechtsorde te handhaven en te herstellen, en daarbij ook bij 
te dragen aan institutionele ontwikkeling in het geval van internationale 
dreigingen en misdaden. In een dergelijk politiek- en rechtssysteem hebben 
menselijke veiligheid en de grondrechten van individuen prioriteit. Comple-
mentaire internationale regimes zouden geleid moeten worden in lijn met 
deze prioriteit. De studie biedt een bespreking van de sturing van het recht 
in de context van menselijke zekerheid en duurzame vrede in intra- en even-
tueel interstatelijke conflicten. In de selectie van de besproken landen wordt 
de huidige dynamiek besproken die er is in het optreden van complementai-
re internationale structuren betrokken bij intra- en eventueel interstatelijke 
conflicten.
Opbouw van het proefschrift
In de inleiding van het proefschrift wordt een overzicht gegeven van de 
onderzoeksvragen, de toegepaste methodologie en de structuur van de 
onderwerpen. Het onderzoek beoogt bij te dragen aan het uitdagende 
theoretische debat over onafhankelijkheid, soevereiniteit en het te voeren 
beleid tussen handhaven van vrede en veiligheid en de paradigmaverschui-
ving naar toerekenbaarheid en verantwoordelijkheid binnen het interna-
tionaal recht. Het gaat in op de ontstaansgeschiedenis van het Internatio-
naal Strafhof en zijn complementaire positie ten opzichte van de Verenigde 
Naties. Het analyseert de ontwikkeling van het internationaal strafrecht en 
het dilemma van het afdwingen van recht in een post-conflict situatie op 
basis van een dergelijk strafrecht. Ook wordt de behoefte besproken om 
zowel politieke als normatieve verschillen te overbruggen om burgers te 
beschermen in situatie van oorlog en misdaad. Verder stelt de introductie 
de problemen maar ook mogelijke oplossingen aan de orde ten aanzien van 
controversiële beheersvragen, het doel van en de redenen voor een multidis-
ciplinaire aanpak, inclusief de onderzoeksvraagstelling, methodologie en de 
analysestructuur van het voorgestelde onderzoeksveld.
Het eerste deel van het proefschrift pleit voor de verkenning van comple-
mentaire regimes in relatie tot het dilemma van menselijke veiligheid. Het 
analyseert de ontwikkeling van juridische en politieke structuren die de 
grondrechten van individuen getroffen door burgeroorlog centraal stellen 
en de rol daarin van het internationaal strafrecht. Het richt zich verder op de 
hervorming van complementaire internationale regimes die als doel hebben 
de menselijke veiligheid in conflict en post-conflict situaties te verbeteren. 
Het beveelt een geïntegreerde benadering aan waarbij inzet van vrede en 
recht als instrumenteel wordt gezien voor menselijke veiligheid.
Het tweede deel analyseert de uitdagingen, problemen en vraagstukken bin-
nen het zich ontwikkelende regime van het internationaal strafrecht en geeft 
inzicht in mogelijke kansen die gerelateerd zijn aan een integrale beheer 
strategie ten bate van vrede en recht. Het bespreekt de reacties, de juridische 
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en politieke escalaties in de internationale gemeenschap gericht op intra-
statelijke conflicten en grootschalige mensenrechtenschendingen. Verder 
wordt ingegaan op het snijvlak tussen politiek en recht gericht op een imple-
mentatie van complementaire regimes in door oorlog en misdaad getroffen 
samenlevingen. Afsluitend worden de kansen besproken die internationaal 
strafrecht kan bieden ten bate van de ontwikkeling van een universele juris-
dictie aan de hand van het rechtsbegrip van de menselijke veiligheid. Het 
benadrukt het belang van politieke consensus inzake gerelateerde deel-
thema’s en geeft een overzicht van de bevoegdheden onder bestaande com-
plementaire internationale regimes.
Het derde gedeelte introduceert twee casus waar complementaire inter-
venties momenteel plaatsvinden, te weten in Sudan (Darfur) en de Demo-
cratische Republiek Congo. Besproken worden de als ‘laatste redmiddel’ 
te beschouwen humanitaire interventies door de nieuwe instituties die 
voortkomen uit het Statuut van Rome en hoe deze ter plekke uitwerken. Dit 
gedeelte onderstreept het vereiste van een juiste synergie. Hierbij gaat het 
om een geïntegreerd besturingsmodel en een uitbreiding van het aanvullen-
de karakter van internationale regimes die vrede en recht bevorderen. Het 
zich ontwikkelende complementaire strafrechtssysteem is niet voldoende 
werkbaar in de onderlinge relaties tussen de lidstaten van het Internatio-
naal Strafhof. De conclusie is dat ‘complementariteit’ moet worden opgetild 
naar het internationale niveau. De ratificatie van het Statuut van Rome werd 
gefrustreerd omdat er geen verplichte samenwerking vereist werd met de 
Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties in zaken die voorgelegd werden 
aan het Internationaal Strafhof (zie de art. 13 en art. 16 van het Statuut van 
Rome). Een eerste vereiste is de uitbreiding van het complementaire karak-
ter van internationale regimes die humanitaire interventies bij ernstige mis-
daden als gedeelde werkingssfeer hebben. Dit is inclusief het formuleren 
van tegen internationale dreigingen en misdaden gericht beleid in combi-
natie met een verdere juridische uitbreiding van bevoegdheden. Dit hangt 
uiteraard af van de politieke wil om beheersinstrumenten te versterken in 
lijn met de huidige uitdagingen in de internationale constellatie en in combi-
natie met mogelijkheden om grootschalige mensenrechtenschendingen aan 
te pakken. De definiëring van ‘complementaire internationale regimes’ hangt af 
van politieke besluitvaardigheid en de wil om samen te werken ten bate van 
burgers in conflict en post-conflict situaties. Het valt te bezien in hoeverre de 
politieke macht deze weg zal bewandelen.
Conclusies van het proefschrift
In de huidige internationaalrechtelijke en politieke orde ligt de betekenis van 
complementaire internationale regimes in het uitwerken van verantwoorde-
lijkheden zoals onafhankelijkheid, soevereiniteit en internationaal beleid om 
daarmee de bescherming van mensenrechten en de verdere ontwikkeling 
van het principe van de menselijke veiligheid te bevorderen. De bevindin-
gen van deze studie maken duidelijk dat een eventuele verdere ontwikke-
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ling van internationale complementaire regimes invloed zullen hebben op 
de aanpak van escalaties in situaties van oorlog en vrede. Het ‘aanvullende’ 
karakter is gebaseerd op de verantwoordelijkheid van landen en de inter-
nationale gemeenschap om grondrechten van individuen te beschermen en 
centraal te stellen in oorlogs- en crisissituaties. Het debat over de afbakening 
van onafhankelijkheid, soevereiniteit en internationaal beleid staan centraal 
in de ontwikkelingen binnen het huidige internationale recht. Dit debat 
verdient open en democratisch te verlopen in parlementen en wetgevende 
vergaderingen en tussen de verschillende rechtssystemen en rechtstradities 
die de wereldgemeenschap kent. Dit debat moet bevorderd worden door de 
multilaterale instellingen die complementaire internationale regimes onder-
steunen. Er zijn serieuze tekortkomingen in zowel de identificatie van eer-
ste signalen, maar ook in de vormgeving van mandaten voordat, gedurende 
en nadat grootschalige mensenrechtenschendingen plaatsvinden. Daarbij 
schiet ook in de regio ondersteuning tekort, onder andere in het verlenen 
van politieke steun door regionale organisaties. Dit ondanks de juridische 
verplichtingen die op grond van het Statuut van Rome voortvloeien voor 
hun leden (bijvoorbeeld in het geval van de Afrikaanse Unie en de Arabische 
Liga). Verder zal het huidige uitwisselingsniveau tussen de instellingen die 
voortkomen uit het Statuut van Rome met de Verenigde Naties verbeterd 
moeten worden. Dit kan bijdragen (wanneer daartoe besloten is) aan een 
meer adequate aanpak van het herstel van door mensenrechtenschendingen 
en oorlogsmisdaden getroffen gemeenschappen. Concluderend plaatst deze 
studie rechtshandhaving in de context van constitutionele ontwikkeling en 
duurzame vrede.
De aanpak van humanitaire escalaties door complementaire internationale 
regimes bevat op dit moment nog geen duidelijke omschrijving van burger-
bescherming, politie- en rechtshandhaving gedurende onderzoek en ver-
volging, inclusief bijstand in het geval van arrestatiebevelen gericht tegen 
krijgsheren. Deze studie houdt tevens rekening met de belangrijke thema’s 
die momenteel onder het vergrootglas liggen bij de handhaving van vrede, 
recht en veiligheid. Specifiek gaat het dan om de vormgeving van vredes-
operaties in relatie tot het streven naar internationaal recht en verantwoor-
delijkheid. Deze thema’s reflecteren ook de gebrekkige implementatie van 
regelingen of verdragen in operaties en missies ter plekke. Zorgwekkend 
zijn de zwakke strategieën ten aanzien van menselijke veiligheid en de 
onvoldoende interactie tussen internationale instellingen. Deze uitdagin-
gen hebben op velerlei niveaus een impact: lokaal, regionaal en internatio-
naal, politiek, juridisch, historisch en ethisch, humanitair en economisch. 
Er is voldoende bewijs om de stelling te kunnen verdedigen dat het syste-
matisch falen van het beheer onder complementaire internationale regimes 
vraagt om politieke eendracht en een road map van mogelijke wisselwerkin-
gen. Het falen blijkt uit de ‘test’ van burgerbeschermingsmissies in de Afri-
kaanse Unie en de Arabische Liga en de politieke afstand die zij momenteel 
nemen van het Statuut van Rome. De wisselwerking en de betrokkenheid in 
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staatsopbouw op een lokaal, regionaal en internationaal niveau staan in het 
middelpunt van dergelijke uitdagingen. Hopelijk zal een dergelijke wissel-
werking sturingsmodellen opleveren die bijdragen aan de ontwikkeling in 
de internationale samenleving waarin we de verschuiving zien van moder-
niteit naar postmoderniteit en waarbij de rechten van het individu worden 
geborgd door systematische hervormingen.
In deze studie worden de mondiaal opkomende juridische en beleidsmatige 
uitdagingen besproken en de beweging naar complementaire internatio-
nale regimes ten bate van lokale, regionale en internationale stabiliteit. Het 
bespreekt humanitaire interventies vanuit de plicht dat burgers beschermd 
moeten worden in situaties van oorlog en criminaliteit aan de hand van oude 
conflictbeheersingsmodellen en het behoud van menselijke veiligheid in 
conflict en post-conflict situaties. In de internationale machtsverhoudingen 
stuit een betrouwbaar verantwoordingssysteem gebaseerd op principes als 
neutraliteit, integriteit en universele geldigheid op verzet van sommige per-
manente leden van de Veiligheidsraad zoals de Verenigde Staten, China en 
Rusland. Deze studie wijst op de redenen hiervoor door te kijken naar het 
verleden en de huidige uitdagingen in het werkveld van internationale insti-
tuties. Instituties met een aanvullend karakter zouden beter uitgerust moeten 
worden om zo antwoord te kunnen geven op de uitdagingen en de complexi-
teit van internationale bedreigingen en misdaden. Helaas staat de opkomst 
van internationale complementaire regimes nog altijd in de schaduw van 
andere instrumenten bij het streven naar vrede en veiligheid.
De huidige samenwerkingsnormen blijven een controversieel element in 
het speelveld van de internationale betrekkingen en het internationaal 
recht. De vraag die daarbij naar voren komt is of complementaire interna-
tionale regimes een impact kunnen hebben op de oorzaken van dreigingen 
die intra- en interstatelijke conflicten kenmerken en bij kunnen dragen aan 
het voor komen van grootschalige misdaden en mensenrechtenschendin-
gen. Voorkomen en reageren moeten gezien worden als de twee zijden van 
dezelfde munt, gericht op herstel en het vermogen om een samenleving 
weer op te bouwen. Zoals uitgebreid besproken zijn de belangrijkste pun-
ten de verantwoordelijkheid om normen te verdedigen, de instemming voor 
het gebruik van geweld en het politieke engagement om steun te geven aan 
‘checks and balances’ gebaseerd op de verantwoordelijkheid van zowel staten 
als individuen.
De openstaande vraag blijft of het complementaire regime dat ontstaan is 
onder het Statuut van Rome kan profiteren van de humanitaire betrokken-
heid van internationale politie en justitiecapaciteit als deel van een VN-ver-
plichting van lidstaten. Urgent is de prioriteit om burgerbescherming door 
te voeren met onder andere taken als het verzorgen van een andere vesti-
gingsplaats, rehabilitatie en schadevergoeding. Dit soort belangrijke activi-
teiten vragen om een plaats in het raamwerk van mandaten gericht op vrede 
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en recht in operaties en missies. De complementaire taken van internationale 
beheersorganisaties kunnen de internationale rechtsorde beïnvloeden wan-
neer zij juridisch vastgelegd worden. Dit kan bijdragen aan de wereldwijde 
strijd tegen de huidige straffeloosheid in situaties van oorlog en criminali-
teit alsmede aan het overtuigen van de nationale jurisdicties hieraan bij te 
dragen door adequate burgerbescherming te organiseren en de veiligheids-
sectoren goed op hun taken uitgerust te hebben.
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THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS – EXCERPTS
The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclu-
sion of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, and came into force on 24 
October 1945. The Statute of the International Court of Justice is an integral part of the Charter.
Amendments to Articles 23, 27 and 61 of the Charter were adopted by the General Assembly 
on 17 December 1963 and came into force on 31 August 1965. A further amendment to Article 
61 was adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1971, and came into force on 24 Sep-
tember 1973. An amendment to Article 109, adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 
1965, came into force on 12 June 1968.
The amendment to Article 23 enlarges the membership of the Security Council from eleven to 
fifteen. The amended Article 27 provides that decisions of the Security Council on procedural 
matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven) and on all oth-
er matters by an affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven), including the concurring 
votes of the five permanent members of the Security Council.
The amendment to Article 61, which entered into force on 31 August 1965, enlarged the mem-
bership of the Economic and Social Council from eighteen to twenty-seven. The subsequent 
amendment to that Article, which entered into force on 24 September 1973, further increased the 
membership of the Council from twenty-seven to fifty-four.
The amendment to Article 109, which relates to the first paragraph of that Article, provides that 
a General Conference of Member States for the purpose of reviewing the Charter may be held at 
a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and 
by a vote of any nine members (formerly seven) of the Security Council. Paragraph 3 of Article 
109, which deals with the consideration of a possible review conference during the tenth regular 
session of the General Assembly, has been retained in its original form in its reference to a “vote, 
of any seven members of the Security Council”, the paragraph having been acted upon in 1955 
by the General Assembly, at its tenth regular session, and by the Security Council.
CHAPTER VI: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Article 33
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance 
of international peace and security, shall, fi rst of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enqui-
ry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dis-
pute by such means.
Article 34
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to inter-
national friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the 




1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature 
referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Secu-
rity Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in 
advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacifi c settlement provided in the 
present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under 
this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.
Article 36
1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or 
of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the 
dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into 
consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the 
International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.
Article 37
1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the 
means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action 
under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.
Article 38
Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the par-
ties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific 
settlement of the dispute.
CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF 
THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall 
be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.
Article 40
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making 
the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the 
parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. 
Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the 
parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such 
provisional measures.
Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be 
employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations 
to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic rela-
tions and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the 
severance of diplomatic relations.
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Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inade-
quate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may 
be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the 
United Nations.
Article 43
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of internation-
al peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in 
accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, 
including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace 
and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of 
readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the 
Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or 
between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratifi cation by 
the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
Article 44
When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not 
represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 
43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security 
Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member’s armed forces.
Article 45
In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold 
immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement 
action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined 
action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements 
referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Com-
mittee.
Article 46
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assis-
tance of the Military Staff Committee.
Article 47
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Coun-
cil on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at 
its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members 
of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not per-
manently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated 
with it when the effi cient discharge of the Committee’s responsibilities requires the partici-
pation of that Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strate-
gic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions 
relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after con-
sultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.
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Article 48
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of 
international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or 
by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and 
through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.
Article 49
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the 
measures decided upon by the Security Council.
Article 50
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any 
other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with 
special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right 
to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.
Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures 
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to 
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Secu-
rity Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in 
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
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THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
TABLE OF CONTENTS1
Preamble:
The States Parties to this Statute,
Conscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a 
shared heritage, and concerned that this delicate mosaic may be shattered at any time,
Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of 
unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity,
Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world,
Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole 
must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking mea-
sures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation,
Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute 
to the prevention of such crimes,
Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over
those responsible for international crimes,
Reaffirming the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular 
that all States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations,
Emphasizing in this connection that nothing in this Statute shall be taken as authorizing any 
State Party to intervene in an armed conflict or in the internal affairs of any State,
Determined to these ends and for the sake of present and future generations, to establish an 
independent permanent International Criminal Court in relationship with the United Nations 
system, with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international commu-
nity as a whole,
Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be com-
plementary to national criminal jurisdictions,
Resolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice,
Have agreed as follows:
Part I Establishment of the Court
Article 1 The Court
Article 2 Relationship of the Court with the United Nations
Article 3 Seat of the Court
Article 4 Legal status and powers of the Court
Part II Jurisdiction, admissibility and applicable law
Article 5 Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
Article 6 Genocide
Article 7 Crimes against humanity
Article 8 War Crimes
Article 9 Elements of Crimes
Article 10 Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing 
or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.
Article 11 Jurisdiction ratione temporis
1 This Table of Contents is not part of the text of the Rome Statute adopted by the United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court on 12 July 1998. It has been included in this publication for ease of 
reference.
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Article 12 Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction
Article 13 Exercise of jurisdiction
Article 14 Referral of a situation by a State Party
Article 15 Prosecutor
Article 16 Deferral of investigation or prosecution
Article 17 Issues of admissibility
Article 18 Preliminary rulings regarding admissibility
Article 19 Challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of a case
Article 20 Ne bis in idem
Article 21 Applicable law
Part III General principles of criminal law
Article 22 Nullum crimen sine lege
Article 23 Nulla poena sine lege
Article 24 Non-retroactivity ratione personae
Article 25 Individual criminal responsibility
Article 26 Exclusion of jurisdiction over persons under eighteen
Article 27 Irrelevance of official capacity
Article 28 Responsibility of commanders and other superiors
Article 29 Non-applicability of statute of limitations
Article 30 Mental element
Article 31 Grounds for excluding criminal responsibility
Article 32 Mistake of fact or mistake of law
Article 33 Superior orders and prescription of law
Part IV Composition and administration of the Court
Article 34 Organs of the Court
Article 35 Service of judges
Article 36 Qualifications, nomination and election of judges
Article 37 Judicial vacancies
Article 38 The Presidency
Article 39 Chambers
Article 40 Independence of judges
Article 41 Excusing and disqualification of judges
Article 42 The Office of the Prosecutor
Article 43 The Registry
Article 44 Staff
Article 45 Solemn undertaking
Article 46 Removal from office
Article 47 Disciplinary measures
Article 48 Privileges and immunities
Article 49 Salaries, allowances and expenses
Article 50 Official and working languages
Article 51 Rules of Procedure and Evidence
Article 52 Regulations of the Court
Part V Investigation and prosecution
Article 53 Initiation of an investigation
Article 54 Duties and powers of the Prosecutor with respect to investigations
Article 55 Rights of persons during an investigation
Article 56 Role of the Pre-Trial Chamber in relation to a unique investigative opportunity
Article 57 Functions and powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber
Article 58 Issuance by the Pre-Trial Chamber of a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear
Article 59 Arrest proceedings in the custodial State
Article 60 Initial proceedings before the Court
Article 61 Confirmation of the charges before trial
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Part VI The trial
Article 62 Place of trial
Article 63 Trial in the presence of the accused
Article 64 Functions and powers of the Trial Chamber
Article 65 Proceedings on an admission of guilt
Article 66 Presumption of innocence
Article 67 Rights of the accused
Article 68 Protection of the victims and witnesses and their participation in the proceedings
Article 69 Evidence
Article 70 Offences against the administration of justice
Article 71 Sanctions for misconduct before the Court
Article 72 Protection of national security information
Article 73 Third-party information or documents
Article 74 Requirements for the decision
Article 75 Reparations to victims
Article 76 Sentencing
Part VII Penalties
Article 77 Applicable penalties
Article 78 Determination of the sentence
Article 79 Trust Fund
Article 80 Non-prejudice to national application of penalties and national laws
Part VIII Appeal and revision
Article 81 Appeal against decision of acquittal or conviction or against sentence
Article 82 Appeal against other decisions
Article 83 Proceedings on appeal
Article 84 Revision of conviction or sentence
Article 85 Compensation to an arrested or convicted person
Part IX International cooperation and judicial assistance
Article 86 General obligation to cooperate
Article 87 Requests for cooperation: general provisions
Article 88 Availability of procedures under national law
Article 89 Surrender of persons to the Court
Article 90 Competing requests
Article 91 Contents of request for arrest and surrender
Article 92 Provisional arrest
Article 93 Other forms of cooperation
Article 94 Postponement of execution of a request in respect of ongoing investigation or pros-
ecution
Article 95 Postponement of execution of a request in respect of an admissibility challenge
Article 96 Contents of request for other forms of assistance under article 93
Article 97 Consultations
Article 98 Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender
Article 99 Execution of request under articles 93 and 96
Article 100 Costs
Article 101 Rule of speciality
Article 102 Use of terms
Part X Enforcement
Article 103 Role of States in enforcement of sentences of imprisonment
Article 104 Change in designation of State of enforcement
Article 105 Enforcement of the sentence
Article 106 Supervision of enforcement of sentences and conditions of imprisonment
Article 107 Transfer of the person upon completion of sentence
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Article 108 Limitation on the prosecution or punishment of other offences
Article 109 Enforcement of fines and forfeiture measures
Article 110 Review by the Court concerning reduction of sentence
Article 111 Escape
Part XI Assembly of States Parties
Article 112 Assembly of States Parties
Part XII Financing
Article 113 Financial Regulations
Article 114 Payment of expenses
Article 115 Funds of the Court and of the Assembly of States Parties
Article 116 Voluntary contributions
Article 117 Assessment of contributions
Article 118 Annual audit
Part XIII Final clauses
Article 119 Settlement of disputes
Article 120 Reservations
Article 121 Amendments
Article 122 Amendments to provisions of an institutional nature
Article 123 Review of the Statute
Article 124 Transitional Provision
Article 125 Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
Article 126 Entry into force
Article 127 Withdrawal
Article 128 Authentic texts







Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda)
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia)
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia)
17 October 2000 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v. Belgium)
24 April 2001 Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the 
Case concerning Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 








Entry into Force: 22.07.2004
Source: ASP/UN
The International Criminal Court and the United Nations,
Bearing in mind the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
Recalling that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court reaffirms the Purposes and 
Principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
Noting the important role assigned to the International Criminal Court in dealing with the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, as referred to in the Rome 
Statute, and which threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world,
Bearing in mind that, in accordance with the Rome Statute, the International Criminal Court is 
established as an independent permanent institution in relationship with the United Nations 
system,
Recalling also that, in accordance with article 2 of the Rome Statute, the International Criminal 
Court shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations through an agreement to be 
approved by the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute and thereafter concluded by 
the President of the Court on its behalf,
Recalling further General Assembly resolution 58/79 of 9 December 2003 calling for the conclusion 
of a relationship agreement between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court,
Noting the responsibilities of the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the provisions 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Desiring to make provision for a mutu-
ally beneficial relationship whereby the discharge of respective responsibilities of the United 
Nations and the International Criminal Court may be facilitated,
Taking into account for this purpose the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
Have agreed as follows:
I. General provisions
Article 1
Purpose of the Agreement
1.  The present Agreement, which is entered into by the United Nations and the International 
Criminal Court (“the Court”), pursuant to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations 
(“the Charter”) and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“the Statute”), 
respectively, defi nes the terms on which the United Nations and the Court shall be brought into 
relationship.
2.  For the purposes of this Agreement, “the Court” shall also include the Secretariat of the 
Assembly of States Parties.
Article 2
Principles
1.  The United Nations recognizes the Court as an independent permanent judicial institution 
which, in accordance with articles 1 and 4 of the Statute, has international legal personality and 
such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfi llment of its 
purposes.
2.  The Court recognizes the responsibilities of the United Nations under the Charter.
3.  The United Nations and the Court respect each other’s status and mandate.
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Article 3
Obligation of cooperation and coordination
The United Nations and the Court agree that, with a view to facilitating the effective discharge 
of their respective responsibilities, they shall cooperate closely, whenever appropriate, with 
each other and consult each other on matters of mutual interest pursuant to the provisions of 





1.  Subject to the applicable provisions of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Court 
(“the Rules of Procedure and Evidence”), the Secretary-General of the United Nations (“the 
Secretary-General”) or his/her representative shall have a standing invitation to attend public 
hearings of the Chambers of the Court that relate to cases of interest to the United Nations and 
any public meetings of the Court.
2.  The Court may attend and participate in the work of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in the capacity of observer. The United Nations shall, subject to the rules and practice of 
the bodies concerned, invite the Court to attend meetings and conferences convened under the 
auspices of the United Nations where observers are allowed and whenever matters of interest 
to the Court are under discussion.
3.  Whenever the Security Council considers matters related to the activities of the Court, the 
President of the Court (“the President”) or the Prosecutor of the Court (“the Prosecutor”) may 
address the Council, at its invitation, in order to give assistance with regard to matters within 
the jurisdiction of the Court.
Article 5
Exchange of information
1.  Without prejudice to other provisions of the present Agreement concerning the submission 
of documents and information concerning particular cases before the Court, the United Nations 
and the Court shall, to the fullest extent possible and practicable, arrange for the exchange of 
information and documents of mutual interest. In particular:
(a)  The Secretary-General shall:
(i)  Transmit to the Court information on developments related to the Statute which are relevant 
to the work of the Court, including information on communications received by the Secretary-
General in the capacity of depositary of the Statute or depositary of any other agreements which 
relate to the exercise by the Court of its jurisdiction;
(ii) Keep the Court informed regarding the implementation of article 123, paragraphs 1 and 2, 
of the Statute relating to the convening by the Secretary-General of review conferences; (iii) In 
addition to the requirement provided in article 121, paragraph 7, of the Statute, circulate to all 
States Members of the United Nations or members of specialized agencies or of the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency which are not parties to the Statute the text of any amendment 
adopted pursuant to article 121 of the Statute;
(b) The Registrar of the Court (“the Registrar”) shall:
(i) In accordance with the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, provide informa-
tion and documentation relating to pleadings, oral proceedings, judgments and orders of the 
Court in cases which may be of interest to the United Nations generally, and particularly in 
those cases which involve crimes committed against the personnel of the United Nations or 
that involve the improper use of the fl ag, insignia or uniform of the United Nations resulting 
in death or serious personal injury as well as any cases involving the circumstances referred to 
under article 16, 17, or 18, paragraph 1 or 2, of the present Agreement;
(ii) Furnish to the United Nations, with the concurrence of the Court and subject to its Stat-
ute and rules, any information relating to the work of the Court requested by the International 
Court of Justice in accordance with its Statute;
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2.  The United Nations and the Court shall make every effort to achieve maximum coopera-
tion with a view to avoiding undesirable duplication in the collection, analysis, publication and 
dissemination of information relating to matters of mutual interest. They shall strive, where 
appropriate, to combine their efforts to secure the greatest possible usefulness and utilization of 
such information.
Article 6
Reports to the United Nations




The Court may propose items for consideration by the United Nations. In such cases, the Court 
shall notify the Secretary-General of its proposal and provide any relevant information. The 
Secretary-General shall, in accordance with his/her authority, bring such item or items to the 
attention of the General Assembly or the Security Council, and also to any other United Nations 
organ concerned, including organs of United Nations programs and funds.
Article 8
Personnel arrangements
1.  The United Nations and the Court agree to consult and cooperate as far as practicable 
regarding personnel standards, methods and arrangements.
2.  The United Nations and the Court agree to:
(a)  Periodically consult on matters of mutual interest relating to the employment of their offi -
cers and staff, including conditions of service, the duration of appointments, classifi cation, sal-
ary scale and allowances, retirement and pension rights and staff regulations and rules;
(b Cooperate in the temporary interchange of personnel, where appropriate, making due pro-
vision for the retention of seniority and pension rights;
(c) Strive for maximum cooperation in order to achieve the most effi cient use of specialized 
personnel, systems and services.
Article 9
Administrative cooperation
The United Nations and the Court shall consult, from time to time, concerning the most efficient 
use of facilities, staff and services with a view to avoiding the establishment and operation of 
overlapping facilities and services. They shall also consult to explore the possibility of establish-
ing common facilities or services in specific areas, with due regard for cost savings.
Article 10
Services and facilities
1.  The United Nations agrees that, upon the request of the Court, it shall, subject to availability, 
provide on a reimbursable basis, or as otherwise agreed, for the purposes of the Court such 
facilities and services as may be required, including for the meetings of the Assembly of States 
Parties (“the Assembly”), its Bureau or subsidiary bodies, including translation and interpreta-
tion services, documentation and conference services. When the United Nations is unable to 
meet the request of the Court, it shall notify the Court accordingly, giving reasonable notice.
2.  The terms and conditions on which any such facilities or services of the United Nations may 
be provided shall, as appropriate, be the subject of supplementary arrangements.
Article 11
Access to United Nations Headquarters
The United Nations and the Court shall endeavor, subject to their respective rules, to facilitate 
access by the representatives of all States Parties to the Statute, representatives of the Court and 
observers in the Assembly, as provided for in article 112, paragraph 1, of the Statute, to United 
Nations Headquarters when a meeting of the Assembly is to be held. This shall also apply, as 




The judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutors, the Registrar and the staff/officials of 
the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry shall be entitled, in accordance with such special 
arrangements as may be concluded between the Secretary-General and the Court, to use the 
laissez-passer of the United Nations as a valid travel document where such use is recognized by 
States in agreements defining the privileges and immunities of the Court. Staff of “the Registry” 
includes staff of the Presidency and of the Chambers, pursuant to article 44 of the Statute, and 




1.  The United Nations and the Court agree that the conditions under which any funds may be 
provided to the Court by a decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations pursuant to 
article 115 of the Statute shall be subject to separate arrangements. The Registrar shall inform 
the Assembly of the making of such arrangements.
2.  The United Nations and the Court further agree that the costs and expenses resulting from 
cooperation or the provision of services pursuant to the present Agreement shall be subject to 
separate arrangements between the United Nations and the Court. The Registrar shall inform 
the Assembly of the making of such arrangements.
3.  The United Nations may, upon request of the Court and subject to paragraph 2 of this article, 
provide advice on fi nancial and fi scal questions of interest to the Court.
Article 14
Other agreements concluded by the Court
The United Nations and the Court shall consult, when appropriate, on the registration or filing 
and recording with the United Nations of agreements concluded by the Court with States or 
international organizations.
III. Cooperation and judicial assistance
Article 15
General provisions regarding cooperation between the United Nations and the Court
1.  With due regard to its responsibilities and competence under the Charter and subject to its 
rules as defi ned under the applicable international law, the United Nations undertakes to coop-
erate with the Court and to provide to the Court such information or documents as the Court 
may request pursuant to article 87, paragraph 6, of the Statute.
2.  The United Nations or its programs, funds and offi ces concerned may agree to provide to 
the Court other forms of cooperation and assistance compatible with the provisions of the Char-
ter and the Statute.
3.  In the event that the disclosure of information or documents or the provision of other forms of 
cooperation would endanger the safety or security of current or former personnel of the United
Nations or otherwise prejudice the security or proper conduct of any operation or activity of 
the United Nations, the Court may order, particularly at the request of the United Nations, 
appropriate measures of protection. In the absence of such measures, the United Nations shall 
endeavour to disclose the information or documents or to provide the requested cooperation, 
while reserving the right to take its own measures of protection, which may include withhold-
ing of some information or documents or their submission in an appropriate form, including 
the introduction of redactions.
Article 16
Testimony of the officials of the United Nations
1.  If the Court requests the testimony of an offi cial of the United Nations or one of its programs, 
funds or offi ces, the United Nations undertakes to cooperate with the Court and, if necessary 
and with due regard to its responsibilities and competence under the Charter and the Conven-
tion on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and subject to its rules, shall waive 
that person’s obligation of confi dentiality.
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2.  The Secretary-General shall be authorized by the Court to appoint a representative of the 
United Nations to assist any offi cial of the United Nations who appears as a witness before the 
Court.
Article 17
Cooperation between the Security Council of the United Nations and the Court
1.  When the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
decides to refer to the Prosecutor pursuant to article 13, paragraph (b), of the Statute, a situa-
tion in which one or more of the crimes referred to in article 5 of the Statute appears to have 
been committed, the Secretary-General shall immediately transmit the written decision of 
the Security Council to the Prosecutor together with documents and other materials that 
may be pertinent to the decision of the Council. The Court undertakes to keep the Security 
Council informed in this regard in accordance with the Statute and the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence. Such information shall be transmitted through the Secretary-General.
2.  When the Security Council adopts under Chapter VII of the Charter a resolution request-
ing the Court, pursuant to article 16 of the Statute, not to commence or proceed with an 
investigation or prosecution, this request shall immediately be transmitted by the Secretary-
General to the President of the Court and the Prosecutor. The Court shall inform the Security 
Council through the Secretary-General of its receipt of the above request and, as appropriate, 
inform the Security Council through the Secretary-General of actions, if any, taken by the 
Court in this regard.
3.  Where a matter has been referred to the Court by the Security Council and the Court makes 
a fi nding, pursuant to article 87, paragraph 5 (b) or paragraph 7, of the Statute, of a failure 
by a State to cooperate with the Court, the Court shall inform the Security Council or refer 
the matter to it, as the case may be, and the Registrar shall convey to the Security Council 
through the Secretary-General the decision of the Court, together with relevant informa-
tion in the case. The Security Council, through the Secretary-General, shall inform the Court 
through the Registrar of action, if any, taken by it under the circumstances.
Article 18
Cooperation between the United Nations and the Prosecutor
1.  With due regard to its responsibilities and competence under the Charter of the United
Nations and subject to its rules, the United Nations undertakes to cooperate with the Prosecutor 
and to enter with the Prosecutor into such arrangements or, as appropriate, agreements as may 
be necessary to facilitate such cooperation, in particular when the Prosecutor exercises, under 
article 54 of the Statute, his or her duties and powers with respect to investigation and seeks the 
cooperation of the United Nations in accordance with that article.
2.  Subject to the rules of the organ concerned, the United Nations undertakes to cooperate in 
relation to requests from the Prosecutor in providing such additional information as he or she 
may seek, in accordance with article 15, paragraph 2, of the Statute, from organs of the United 
Nations in connection with investigations initiated proprio motu by the Prosecutor pursuant to 
that article. The Prosecutor shall address a request for such information to the Secretary-Gen-
eral, who shall convey it to the presiding offi cer or other appropriate offi cer of the organ con-
cerned.
3.  The United Nations and the Prosecutor may agree that the United Nations provide docu-
ments or information to the Prosecutor on condition of confi dentiality and solely for the pur-
pose of generating new evidence and that such documents or information shall not be disclosed 
to other organs of the Court or to third parties, at any stage of the proceedings or thereafter, 
without the consent of the United Nations.
4.  The Prosecutor and the United Nations or its programs, funds and offi ces concerned may 
enter into such arrangements as may be necessary to facilitate their cooperation for the imple-
mentation of this article, in particular in order to ensure the confi dentiality of information, the 
protection of any person, including former or current United Nations personnel, and the secu-
rity or proper conduct of any operation or activity of the United Nations.
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Article 19
Rules concerning United Nations privileges and immunities
If the Court seeks to exercise its jurisdiction over a person who is alleged to be criminally 
responsible for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court and if, in the circumstances, such 
person enjoys, according to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations and the relevant rules of international law, any privileges and immunities as are neces-
sary for the independent exercise of his or her work for the United Nations, the United Nations 
undertakes to cooperate fully with the Court and to take all necessary measures to allow the 
Court to exercise its jurisdiction, in particular by waiving any such privileges and immunities 
in accordance with the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and 
the relevant rules of international law.
Article 20
Protection of confidentiality
If the United Nations is requested by the Court to provide information or documentation in 
its custody, possession or control which was disclosed to it in confidence by a State or an inter-
governmental, international or non-governmental organization or an individual, the United 
Nations shall seek the consent of the originator to disclose that information or documentation 
or, where appropriate, will inform the Court that it may seek the consent of the originator for the 
United Nations to disclose that information or documentation. If the originator is a State Party 
to the Statute and the United Nations fails to obtain its consent to disclosure within a reasonable 
period of time, the United Nations shall inform the Court accordingly, and the issue of disclo-
sure shall be resolved between the State Party concerned and the Court in accordance with the 
Statute. If the originator is not a State Party to the Statute and refuses to consent to disclosure, 
the United Nations shall inform the Court that it is unable to provide the requested information 
or documentation because of a pre-existing obligation of confidentiality to the originator.
IV. Final provisions
Article 21
Supplementary arrangements for the implementation of the present Agreement
The Secretary-General and the Court may, for the purpose of implementing the present Agree-
ment, make such supplementary arrangements as may be found appropriate.
Article 22
Amendments
The present Agreement may be amended by agreement between the United Nations and the 
Court. Any such amendment shall be approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
and by the Assembly in accordance with article 2 of the Statute. The United Nations and the 
Court shall notify each other in writing of the date of such approval, and the Agreement shall 
enter into force on the date of the later of the said approvals.
Article 23
Entry into force
The present Agreement shall be approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations and 
by the Assembly in accordance with article 2 of the Statute. The United Nations and the Court 
shall notify each other in writing of the date of such approval. The Agreement shall thereafter 
enter into force upon signature.
In witness thereof, the undersigned have signed the present Agreement.
Signed this ___________ day of ___________ at United Nations Headquarters in New York in 
two copies in all the official languages of the United Nations and the Court, of which the Eng-
lish and French texts shall be authentic.
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Resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council referring to the International 





The Security Council threatened the imposition of 
sanctions against Sudan if it failed to comply with its 
obligations on Darfur, and an international inquiry 
was established to investigate violations of human 
rights in the region (International Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur).
The situation concerning Sudan adopted after 
receiving a report by the International Commission 
of Inquiry on Darfur, the Security Council referred 
the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and required all 
States to co-operate fully.
List of United Nations Security Council resolutions concerning Sudan (1996-2012)
• S/RES/1044 • S/RES/1665 • S/RES/1919 • S/RES/2075
• S/RES/1054 • S/RES/1672 • S/RES/1922
• S/RES/1070 • S/RES/1679 • S/RES/1923
• S/RES/112 • S/RES/1706 • S/RES/1935
• S/RES/1372 • S/RES/1709 • S/RES/1945
• S/RES/1547 • S/RES/1713 • S/RES/1978
• S/RES/1556 • S/RES/1714 • S/RES/1982
• S/RES/1564 • S/RES/1755 • S/RES/1990
• S/RES/1569 • S/RES/1769 • S/RES/1997
• S/RES/1574 • S/RES/1779 • S/RES/1999
• S/RES/1585 • S/RES/1784 • S/RES/2003
• S/RES/1588 • S/RES/1812 • S/RES/2024
• S/RES/1590 • S/RES/1828 • S/RES/2032
• S/RES/1591 • S/RES/1841 • S/RES/2035
• S/RES/1593 • S/RES/1870 • S/RES/2046
• S/RES/1627 • S/RES/1881 • S/RES/2047
• S/RES/1651 • S/RES/1891 • S/RES/2057
• S/RES/1653 • S/RES/1913 • S/RES/2063
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The Security Council condemned the use of lethal 
force by the regime of Muammar Gaddafi against 
protesters participating in the Libyan civil war, and 
imposed a series of international sanctions in response. 
The resolution marked the first time a country was 
unanimously referred to the International Criminal 
Court by the Security Council.
The resolution formed the legal basis for military 
intervention in the Libyan civil war, demanding “an 
immediate ceasefire” and authorizing the international 
community to establish a no-fly zone and to use all 
means necessary short of foreign occupation to protect 
civilians.

















Selected Security Council resolutions about the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
Resolution No. Topic
A/RES/2098 28 March 2013 – This resolution renewed MONUSCO’s mandate, 
including an intervention brigade to neutralise rebel groups in eastern 
DRC, until 31 March 2014.
A/RES/2078 28 November 2012 – This resolution renewed DRC sanctions and the 
mandate of the Group of Experts supporting the sanctions committee 
until 1 February 2014.
A/RES/2076 20 November 2012 – The Security Council condemned the M23’s actions 
and external support given to the group and expressed its intention to 
consider additional targeted sanctions against the leadership of the M23 
and those providing it with external support.
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ICC – Assembly of States Parties (ASP) – Sessions & Resolutions
ICC – ASP – 2014/2015 – 13th Session – Resolutions
Resolution No. Date Meeting Docs Subjects









Programme budget for 2015, the 
Working Capital Fund for 2015, scale 
of assessments for the apportionment 
of expenses of the International 
Criminal Court, financing 
appropriations for 2015 and the 
Contingency Fund





























Victims and affected communities, 
reparations and Trust Fund for 
Victims 









Strengthening the International 
Criminal Court and the Assembly of 
States Parties 
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ICC – ASP 2013/2014 – 12th Session – Resolutions
Resolution No. Date Meeting Docs Subjects 









Programme budget for 2014, the 
Working Capital Fund for 2014, scale 
of assessments for the apportionment 
of expenses of the International 
Criminal Court, financing 
appropriations for 2014 and the 
Contingency Fund







































Victims and affected communities, 
reparations and Trust Fund for 
Victims 



















Amendments to the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence
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ICC – ASP – 2012/2013 – 11th Session – Resolutions












Programme budget for 2013, the 
Working Capital Fund for 2013, scale 
of assessments for the apportionment 
of expenses of the International 
Criminal Court, financing 












































































ICC – ASP 2011/2012 – 10th Session – Resolutions
Resolution No. Date Meeting Docs Subjects









Amendments to the rule 4 of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence





























Programme budget for 2012, the 
Working Capital Fund for 2012, scale 
of assessments for the apportionment 
of expenses of the International 
Criminal Court, financing 
appropriations for 2012 and the 
Contingency Fund









Strengthening the International 
Criminal Court and the Assembly of 
States Parties











ICC – ASP 2010/2011 – 9th Session – Resolutions
Resolution No. Date Meeting Docs Subjects



















Establishment of a study group on 
governance









Strengthening the International 
Criminal Court and the Assembly of 
States Parties









Programme budget for 2011, the 
Working Capital Fund for 2011, scale 
of assessments for the apportionment 
of expenses of the International 
Criminal Court, financing 
appropriations for 2011 and the 
Contingency Fund











ICC – ASP – 2010 – Review Conference – Resolutions
Resolution No. Date Meeting Docs Subjects



















The impact of the Rome Statute 
system on victims and affected 
communities









Strengthening the enforcement of 
sentences









Article 124 of the Rome Statute









Amendments to article 8 of the Rome 
Statute  









The Crime of Aggression
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ICC – ASP – 2009/2010 – 8th Session – Resolutions
Resolution No. Date Meeting Docs Subjects









Establishment of an independent 
oversight mechanism



















Strengthening the International 
Criminal Court and the Assembly of 
States Parties









Family visits for indigent detainees





























Programme budget for 2010,
the Working Capital Fund for 2010,
scale of assessments for the 
apportionment of expenses of the 
International Criminal Court,
financing appropriations for the year 
2010,
the Contingency Fund,
conversion of GTA psychologist post 
to an established one,
Legal aid (defence) and
the Addis Ababa Liaison Office
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ICC – ASP – 2009/2010 – 8th Session – Resolutions
Resolution No. Date Meeting Docs Subjects









One-time payments for the 
permanent premises











ICC – ASP – 2008/2009 – 7th Session – Resolutions
Resolution No. Date Meeting Docs Topic



















Venue of the Review Conference









Strengthening the International 
Criminal Court and the Assembly of 
States Parties









Programme budget for 2009, the 
Working Capital Fund for 2009, scale 
of assessments for the apportionment 
of expenses of the International 
Criminal Court, financing 
appropriations for the year 2009 and 
the Contingency Fund









Amendment to the Financial 
Regulations and Rules









Amendment to the Rules of 
Procedure of the Assembly of States 
Parties









Amendment to the Rules of 
Procedure of the Committee on 
Budget and Finance
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ICC – 2007/2008 – 6th Session – Resolutions
Resolution No. Date Meeting Docs Topic



















Strengthening the International 
Criminal Court and the Assembly of 
States Parties









Amendment to the Regulations of the 
Trust Fund for Victims









Programme budget for 2008, the 
Working Capital Fund for 2008, scale 
of assessments for the apportionment 
of expenses of the International 
Criminal Court and financing 
appropriations for the year 2008









Amendment to the Financial 
Regulations and Rules









Amendments to the pension scheme 
regulations for judges of the 
International Criminal Court









Funding of the disability pension of a 
former judge of the International 
Criminal Court











ICC – ASP – 2006/2007 – 5th Session – Resolutions
Resolution No. Date Meeting Docs Topic



















Strategic planning process of the 
Court









Strengthening the International 
Criminal Court and the Assembly of 
States Parties









Programme budget for 2007, the 
Working Capital Fund for 2007, scale 
of assessments for the apportionment 
of expenses of the International 
Criminal Court and financing 
appropriations for the year 2007









Procedure for the nomination and 
election of judges, the Prosecutor and 
Deputy Prosecutors of the 
International Criminal Court: 
amendment to operative paragraph 
27 of resolution ICC-ASP/3/Res.6









Conditions of service and 
compensation of judges of the 
International Criminal Court: 
amendment to the pension scheme 
regulations for judges of the 
International Criminal Court
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ICC – ASP – 2005/2006 – 4th Session – Resolutions
Resolution No. Date Meeting Docs Topic









Code of Professional Conduct for 
counsel



















Regulations of the Trust Fund for 
Victims









Strengthening the International 
Criminal Court and the Assembly of 
States Parties









Procedure for filling vacancies in the 
Board of Directors of the Trust Fund 
for Victims









Procedure for filling vacancies in the 
Committee on Budget and Finance









Amendment regarding the term of 
office of members of the Board of 
Directors of the Trust Fund for 
Victims









Programme budget for 2006, the 
Working Capital Fund for 2006, scale 
of assessments for the apportionment 
of expenses of the International 
Criminal Court and financing 
appropriations for the year 2006
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ICC – ASP – 2005/2006 – 4th Session – Resolutions
Resolution No. Date Meeting Docs Topic









Pension scheme for judges









Amendments to the Financial 
Regulations and Rules









Transfer of funds from Major 
Programme III to Major Programme 
V under the 2005 programme budget











ICC – ASP – 2004/2005 – 3rd Session – Resolutions
Resolution No. Date Meeting Docs Topic









Negotiated Draft Relationship 
Agreement between the International 
Criminal Court and the United 
Nations









Amendment to rule 29 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Assembly of States 
Parties









Strengthening the International 
Criminal Court and the Assembly of 
States Parties









Programme budget for 2005, 
Contingency Fund, Working Capital 
Fund for 2005, scale of assessments 
for the apportionment of expenses of 
the International Criminal Court and 
financing of appropriations for the 
year 2005









Travel of members of the Committee 
on Budget and Finance









Procedure for the nomination and 














Procedure for the nomination and 
election of judges, the Prosecutor 
and Deputy Prosecutors of the 
International Criminal Court
(ICC-ASP/3/Res.6) – Consolidated 
version
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ICC – ASP – 2004/2005 – 3rd Session – Resolutions
Resolution No. Date Meeting Docs Topic









Establishment of the Secretariat of the 
Trust Fund for Victims









Intensifying dialogue between the 
Assembly of States Parties and the 
International Criminal Court
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ICC – ASP – 2003/2004 – 2nd Session – Resolutions
Resolution No. Date Meeting Docs Topic









Programme budget for 2004, Working 
Capital Fund for 2004, scale of 
assessments for the apportionment of 
expenses of the International 
Criminal Court and financing of 
appropriations for 2004









Staff regulations for the International 
Criminal Court









Establishment of the Permanent 
Secretariat of the Assembly of States 
Parties to the International Criminal 
Court









Travel and subsistence expenses of 
members of the Committee on Budget 
and Finance









Term of office of the members of the 
Committee on Budget and Finance









Establishment of a trust fund for the 
participation of the least developed 
countries in the activities of the 
Assembly of States Parties









Strengthening the International 
Criminal Court and the Assembly of 
States Parties









Recognition of the coordinating and 
facilitating role of the NGO Coalition 
for the International Criminal Court
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ICC – ASP – 2003/2004 – 2nd Session – Resolutions
Resolution No. Date Meeting Docs Topic









Role of the United Nations in the 
establishment of the International 
Criminal Court
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 ICC – ASP – 2002/2003 – 1st Session – Resolutions
Resolution No. Date Meeting Docs Topic









Continuity of work in respect of the 
crime of aggression









Procedure for the nomination and 
election of judges, the Prosecutor and 
Deputy Prosecutors of the 
International Criminal Court









Procedure for the election of the 
judges for the International Criminal 
Court









Establishment of the Committee on 
Budget and Finance









Procedure for the nomination and 
election of members of the Committee 
on Budget and Finance









Establishment of a fund for the 
benefit of victims of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court, and of the 
families of such victims









Procedure for the nomination and 
election of members of the Board of 
Directors of the Trust Fund for the 
benefit of victims









Provisional arrangements for the 
secretariat of the Assembly of States 
Parties
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 ICC – ASP – 2002/2003 – 1st Session – Resolutions
Resolution No. Date Meeting Docs Topic









Permanent secretariat of the 
Assembly of States Parties









Selection of the staff of the 
International Criminal Court









Relevant criteria for voluntary 
contributions to the International 
Criminal Court









Budget appropriations for the first 
financial period and financing of 
appropriations for the first financial 
period









Working Capital Fund for the first 
financial period









Scales of assessments for the 
apportionment of the expenses of the 
International Criminal Court









Crediting contributions to the United 
Nations Trust Fund to Support the 
Establishment of the International 
Criminal Court









Commencement of functions by the 
Committee on Budget and Finance; 
election of two members from the 
Eastern European States; and 
deferment of drawing of lots
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